Statement_of_Work.pdf
PDF 435 KB Posted
- Solicitation number
- SPRWA121P0017
- Issued by
-
Defense Logistics Agency Aviation
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Other files
| File | Type | Posted |
|---|---|---|
| IUID_Checklist_7207.pdf | ||
| Form_158.pdf | ||
| IUID_Checklist_6830.pdf | ||
| Form_1653.pdf | ||
| A002_IUID_Marking_Plan.pdf | ||
| Signed_SPRWA1-21-P-0017.pdf | ||
| A001_Couterfeit_Prevention_Plan.pdf | ||
| A003_IUID_Verification_Report.pdf |
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Text version
3 Sep 2020
STATEMENT OF WORK for
Joint Service Electronic Combat System Tester Multiple NSN
Buy PR # FD2060-2100106
1.0
SCOPE - This Statement of Work (SOW) defines the tasks, supports, and technical requirements for the procurement of NSN 5998-01-508-6830, Part Number
39818-47030-10, is the Circuit Card Assembly and NSN 5998-01-640-7207, Part
Number 40469-40060-10, is the Disc Bay Assembly in the Joint Service Electronic
Combat System Tester that accepts. The Circuit Card Assembly mounts in the Disk Bay
Assembly 1A1A24. Disk Bay Assembly 1A1A24 is mounted to the front panel and contains a removable SATA 1.8” hard drive. An easy access cover is provided so that the technician can gain access to the hard drive. Interface to the hard drive is via the SATA interface port on the CPU CCA. Power to Disk Bay Assembly 1A1A24 is provided from the power monitor CCA. The power monitor also monitors the temperature of the disk bay assembly via temperature sensors located in the disk bay assembly.
1.1 Background/Requirements: The AN/USM-670A Joint Service Electronic Combat
Systems Tester (JSECST) provides an end-to-end (ETE) functional testing capability to determine the status of the Electronic Combat (EC) systems installed in or on operational aircraft. It automatically determines Go/No-Go status of the EC system with minimal technician interaction. In cases where the EC system has a critical fault, the USM-670A detects the failure by identifying the ETE test that failed and providing the diagnostics to isolate the failed aircraft transmission line path/component or Line Replaceable Unit
(LRU). AAI Corporation is the OEM and has proprietary rights to the data. The government does not own any data, drawings, or equipment relating to the JSECST.
2.0 REQUIREMENTS - The contractor shall build, test and qualify all items mention in paragraph 1.0 above in according to the OEM specifications and deliver these three items to government.
3.0 Counterfeit Prevention Plan (CPP). Contractors that supply electronic parts or systems that contain electronic parts shall establish policies and procedures to avoid, detect, mitigate and disposition counterfeit electronic parts to prevent such parts from entering the USAF/DoD supply chain. These policies and procedures shall be documented in a CPP for submission and approval in accordance with Data Item
Description (DID) DI-MISC-81832 and accomplished for all specified contract items.
DI-MISC-81832 is applicable to Parts, Material and Processes Selection (PMPS) associated with delivery of systems and assemblies to the USAF and DoD. The
NSN Part # Noun
5998-01-640-7207 40469-40060-10 Disc Bay Assy
5998-01-508-6830 39818-47030-10 Power Montior CCA requirements established by DI-MISC-81832 also apply to electronics components procured in sustainment of such systems and assemblies. The requirements of the recently DoD-adopted SAE 5553, Aerospace Standard, Counterfeit Electronics Parts;
Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition shall also apply.
[Counterfeit Prevention Plan (DI-MISC-81832), CDRL A001]
3.1. At a minimum, the CPP shall address:
3.2. Applicability. The Contractor shall identify all Business locations and programs to which the CPP applies. The CPP shall address materials, hardware, electronic parts, and procured assemblies.
3.3. Definitions. The Contractor shall utilize definitions per AS 5553 to ensure consistency. Any contractor-derived definitions must be included in an appropriate CPP appendix or annex. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, appendix H)
3.4. Parts Availability and Use of Parts Brokers. The Contractor shall not procure materials, systems, assemblies, subassemblies or parts from parts Brokers when available from Original Manufacturers (OM) or their Authorized Distributors. In cases where materials, systems, assemblies, subassemblies or parts are no longer available from the
OM or their Authorized Distributors, procurement from Brokers may be authorized as defined by the Contractor’s policy and their CPP. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.1, 4.1.2.e., appendix A)
3.5. Procurement Policies. The Contractor shall provide and implement policy directing development and implementation of business practices and procedures, and processes to prevent procurement of Counterfeit materials and parts. The Contractor shall identify the appropriate office(s), business units, functional organizations, and programs, who shall have responsibility for development, maintenance and implementation of the CPP. The
CPP shall identify the specific roles and responsibility for each. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph
4.1.2, 4.1.3, appendix B, C, D)
3.5.1. Risk Assessment. The contract shall address the risk of using unknown sources and or unauthorized suppliers in the CPP. Application or technical risk assessments shall establish the effect that counterfeit parts may have on performance. Vendor or source of supply risk assessments shall establish the potential for obtaining counterfeit parts. Using any risk analysis tool acceptable to the Government, the Contractor shall conduct a risk assessment based upon item characteristics and how likely it is that a counterfeit part will be received. The contractor shall identify and describe in the CPP how parts are selected for assessment and what risk is acceptable based upon the parts design, construction, material and functional requirements. As a minimum, analysis shall be completed for flagging high risk items, such as items that are obsolete, discontinued, rare, etc. The contractor shall require completion of a trade study, documented within the CPP, that shall facilitate determining whether 100% testing of parts procured from after-market sources is more cost effective than qualification or requalification of a manufacturer.
(Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.2, 4.1.3, appendix B, C, D)
3.6. Detection and Avoidance Responsibilities. The Contractor shall establish processes for the review and approval of contractor and applicable subcontractor systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts, which processes shall be comparable to the processes established for contractor business systems under section 893 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4311; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note).
The Contractor shall flow down such requirements and processes to their subcontractors per ODASD Memo titled “Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance”, dated 16
March 2012. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.4, 4.1.5, appendix E)
3.7. Testing and Verification. The Contractor shall establish and accomplish testing and verification processes for items not received from an original equipment manufacturer, original component manufacturer, or authorized distributor that are identified as having high risk for counterfeit potential. These processes apply to prime contracts, and to subcontracts or suppliers below the prime contracts. The Contractor shall provide a list of acceptable test facilities if the subcontractor or supplier does not have the capability to perform required testing. Submittal of Certificates of Compliance indicating the parts are not counterfeit shall be acceptable for verification of testing. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph
4.1.4, appendix E)
3.8. Configuration Identification and Traceability. The Contractor shall identify and control the configurations of all systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts, and enable mechanisms to provide traceability of parts. The Contractor shall report to the
Government when control of the configurations of all systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts, and mechanisms to provide traceability of parts are not possible. The
Contractor shall identify the specific systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts beyond the Contractors’ control. The Contractor shall be responsible for detecting and avoiding the use or inclusion of counterfeit materials and parts, to include procured assemblies and subassemblies, in such products and shall be responsible for the rework or corrective action that may be required to resolve the use or inclusion of counterfeit materials and parts. The cost of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts are not allowable costs under Department contracts , unless: a) the contractor has established a counterfeit avoidance/detection system approved by the DoD, b) the counterfeit parts were procured from a DoD-accredited trusted supplier or provided as government property, and c) the contractor has provide timely notification to the government. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.6, appendix
F)
3.9. Counterfeit Notification and Reporting. The Contractor shall report in writing to the Procuring Activity within 30 days of determining any end item, component, part, or material contained in supplies purchased by the Department of Defense, or purchased by a contractor or subcontractor for delivery to, or on behalf of, the Department, contains counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts for the purpose of investigation and notification of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).
The Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) shall coordinate reporting to the appropriate
Program Management/Item Management, System Engineering Management, the AFMC
Discrepant Materiel Reporting Program (DMRP) Office in 406 SCMS/GULAB, and the
AFOSI. Additionally, the Contractor shall within the same 30 day period ensure all suspected or confirmed counterfeit items are entered into the Government-Industry Data
Exchange Program (GIDEP) system, which will serve as the DoD central reporting repository. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.7, appendix G)
3.10. Counterfeit Prevention Training. The Contractor shall provide appropriate training and shall require all personnel working procurement within their company, to include at a minimum their supply chain management specialists, receiving inspectors, and engineers, to complete said training. The Contractor shall determine the appropriate training required. Training may be developed in-house or may be other Industry accepted training. The CPP shall describe and list the training provided by the contractor to their personnel.
4.0 ITEM UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION (IUID) - Item Identification and Valuation, unique item identification is a method of marking items with unique item identifiers which have machine-readable data elements. Unique item identification is required for all items to be delivered to the DoD that meet the criteria established in accordance with the FAR and applicable supplements and shall be in compliance with all applicable guidance and clauses listed in the contract.
4.1 IUID Marking Plan: The Contractor shall mark items in accordance with contract clauses, and Military Standard (MIL-STD)-130N, Department of Defense Standard
Practice/Identification Marking of U.S. Military Property. [IUID Marking Plan (DI-
MGMT-81803), CDRL A002]
4.2 IUID Marking Activity Validation and Verification Report:
In accordance with the Department of Defense Guide to Uniquely Identifying Items
Assuring Valuation, Accountability and Control of Government Property, the
Government agent or Contractor representative responsible for causing “life cycle events” (i.e., abandoned, consumed, destroyed by accident, destroyed by combat, donated, exchanged - repair, exchanged - sold, exchanged - warranty, expended -experimental/target, expended - normal use, leased, loaned, lost, reintroduced, retired, scrapped, sold - foreign government, sold - historic, sold - nongovernment, sold - other federal, sold - state/local, and stolen) will update applicable item record(s) in the IUID
Registry. [IUID Marking Activity Validation and Verification Report (DI-MGMT-
81804A), CDRL A003]
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