Statement of Work.pdf
PDF 275 KB Posted
- Attached to
- NNSY CASK DROP ANALYSIS TEST
- Solicitation number
- N4215826QE074
About this file
This is a Statement of Work (SOW) for a drop analysis feasibility study of the Chem Nuclear Systems (CNS) model 10-160 Type B cask without impact limiters installed.
The contractor shall perform Phase 1 of Energy Solutions quote SQ2026-0790, which includes finite element analysis (FEA) and hand calculations to analyze drop and impact conditions of the 10-160B cask and validate compliance with 49 CFR 173 regulatory requirements for shipment as a Type A container. The simulated cask contents are DOT 7A Type A, IP-2 or similar classification. The analysis must determine acceptability related to performance, design, and testing requirements for a DOT 7A Type A package. Phase 2 will be performed via separate contract if Phase 1 proves feasible. The period of performance begins on or around August 24, 2026, and ends August 23, 2027, or upon satisfactory completion of analysis. Results shall be reported via email to the NNSY Technical POC and Invoice Certifier.
The contract is subject to Federal Acquisition Regulation safety requirements and OSHA compliance. Contractor personnel accessing Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY) property must obtain a Defense Biometric Identification System (DBIDS) card and complete required vetting procedures, including SECNAV 5512 forms and U.S. citizenship verification for NAVSEA access badges. Portable electronic devices are subject to NAVSEA restrictions, with camera-enabled devices prohibited in Controlled Nuclear Information Areas, Nuclear Work Areas, and Open Storage Areas. Audio recordings are prohibited in NAVSEA spaces without Code 1120 Security Director approval.
View the file
Other files
| File | Type | Posted |
|---|---|---|
| Solicitation - N4215826QE074.pdf |
On GovTribe
Work with this file
- Download the original file
- Contacts named in this file
- Similar government files
- Ask GovTribe AI about this file
Text version
Document No. 6178V100 Attachment (A)
DROP ANALYSIS OF 10-160B CASK
STATEMENT OF WORK
1 Scope. This statement of work covers the following:
1.1 Feasibility study of transporting Chem Nuclear Systems (CNS) model 10-160 Type B cask without impact limiters installed to include:
1.1.1 Finite element analysis (FEA) and hand calculations to analyze drop and impact conditions of 10-160B cask without impact limiters installed.
1.1.2 Validation of compliance with all regulatory
requirements for shipment as a Type A container.
2 References
2.1 49 CFR 173 Shippers – General Requirements for Shipments and Packagings
2.2 EnergySolutions Dwg C-110-29003-010 Cask Assembly General Notes/Parts List 10-160B
3 General Requirements
3.1 Cask for evaluation is CNS model 10-160 Type B.
3.2 Impact limiters are not “installed” in FEA simulations and hand calculations.
3.3 Simulated contents of cask are DOT 7A Type A, IP-2 or
similar classification.
4 Vendor Action
4.1 Period of Performance: Starts on, or around, August 24, 2026, and ends
August 23, 2027 (or when the analysis is completed satisfactorily).
4.2 Perform analysis (FEA and hand calculations) of a reference 2.2 cask, with impact limiters removed, to determine acceptability related to reference 2.1 performance, design, and testing requirements for a DOT 7A Type A package.
4.3 Vendor shall perform only Phase 1 of Energy Solutions quote# SQ2026-0790.
Phase 2 will be performed via a separate contract, if Phase 1 is feasible.
4.4 Report results of analysis via email to NSFPY (listed below):
NNSY Technical POC and Invoice Certifier:
John Cordonier, C2380, (757) 396-0484, john.f.cordonier.civ@us.navy.mil
5 Additional Contractor Responsibility
Per Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 22.102-1(a) entitled “Safety”:
Contractors are hereby informed that either their employees or their representatives present on property under NNSY cognizance must follow Federal and State Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requirements in addition to NNSY Occupational Safety, Health and Environment (OSHE) Program Manual NAVSHIPYDNORINST P5090.2 requirements, or safety requirements for the site specific location of the Contract.
Defense Biometric Identification System and NAVSEA Badging
All contractors, with the exception of permanent party (or “seated” contractors with Common Access Cards (CACs), will be required to obtain a DBIDS card to gain access to NNSY.
Procedure for receiving a DBIDS card:
a. Contractor will complete the SECNAV 5512 form(s) and forward them to their NNSY Sponsor/Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR).
b. The sponsor will complete the CVS spreadsheet utilizing the information on the completed SECNAV5512 forms and forward all documents to Commander Navy region Mid-Atlantic (CNRMA) for vetting.
c. CNRMA will add the contractor to the “179-Day List” which is utilized by the Pass and ID office to create the DBIDS card.
d. Once on the 179-Day List, the contractor may go to Pass and ID to have their DBIDS card generated.
e. Green NAVSEA access badges can be generated at this point with contractors providing proof of U.S. Citizenship (Birth Certificate/ US Passport).
Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs)
A PED is defined as any non-stationary electronic apparatus with singular or multiple capabilities of, but not limited to recording, storing, and/or transmitting data, voice, video, or photo images (e.g., cell phones, laptops, tablets and wearable devices such as fitness bands and smart watches).
a. NAVSEA 04 Ser 04/281 IMPLEMENTATION PLAN FOR ALLOWING CAMERA-
PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES WITHIN THE CONTROLLED INDSUTRIAL
AREA
b. NAVSEAINST 2200.1A PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES POLICY
c. SECPROMAN Vol 1 5510.36 Rev E
In accordance with ref (a), personally owned camera enabled PEDs will be authorized inside of the Controlled Industrial Area (CIA) and all
Security Islands. Camera enabled PEDs will remain unauthorized within Controlled Nuclear Information Areas (CNIAs), Nuclear Work Areas (NWAs) and Open Storage Areas.
All PEDs, camera enabled or not, are still prohibited within NWAs and Open Storage Areas.
The allowance of camera enabled PEDs inside of the CIA and Security Islands does not negate existing photography policies. Unofficial photography, filming of video, or live streaming from the camera-enabled PED remains prohibited within the CIA or any NAVSEA controlled space outside of the CIA. Further, audio recordings (both digitally or magnetically) in NAVSEA spaces is prohibited without the approval of the Code 1120 Security Director.
Submarine SPECIFIC PEDs Instructions: In accordance with COMSUBLANT/ COMSUBPACINST 2075.1C, the use of PEDs while in or on Department of Navy Submarines are prohibited.
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .