Statement_of_Work_1.pdf

13 Apr 2020

STATEMENT OF WORK

LANTIRN

Buy PR # FD2060-21-00065

NSN Noun Part #

6625-01-480-6989 CHASSIS,PLUG-IN UNI 407374-01212

1.0 SCOPE - This Statement of Work (SOW) defines the tasks, supports, and technical requirements for the procurement of

The Plug-In Unit VXI Chassis NSN 6625-01-480-6989, P/N 407374-01212 is a 13-slot chassis that holds individual VXI modules. It provides power to operate the modules and connections for communication with the modules on the Fire Control System Test Set AN/AAM-103. This item is sole source to Astronics Test Systems, Inc., CAGE 21793.

1.1 Background/Requirements: The LANTIRN stations are designed to check/test, diagnose, and repair LANTIRN ATE LRUs and SRUs. They operate under computer control to provide power, generate stimuli, monitor/switch/process, and measure test signals. These check and test capabilities are essential for sustaining the ATE LRUs & SRUs.

2.0 REQUIREMENTS - The contractor shall build, test and qualify all one items mention in paragraph 1.0 above in according to the OEM specifications and deliver these one items to government.

3.0 Counterfeit Prevention Plan (CPP). Contractors that supply electronic parts or systems that contain electronic parts shall establish policies and procedures to avoid, detect, mitigate and disposition counterfeit electronic parts to prevent such parts from entering the USAF/DoD supply chain. These policies and procedures shall be documented in a CPP for submission and approval in accordance with Data Item Description (DID) DI-MISC-81832 and accomplished for all specified contract items.

DI-MISC-81832 is applicable to Parts, Material and Processes Selection (PMPS) associated with delivery of systems and assemblies to the USAF and DoD. The requirements established by DI-MISC-81832 also apply to electronics components procured in sustainment of such systems and assemblies. The requirements of the recently DoD-adopted SAE 5553, Aerospace Standard, Counterfeit Electronics Parts;

Avoidance, Detection, Mitigation, and Disposition shall also apply.

[Counterfeit Prevention Plan (DI-MISC-81832), CDRL A001]

3.1. At a minimum, the CPP shall address:

3.2. Applicability. The Contractor shall identify all Business locations and programs to which the CPP applies. The CPP shall address materials, hardware, electronic parts, and procured assemblies.

3.3. Definitions. The Contractor shall utilize definitions per AS 5553 to ensure consistency. Any contractor-derived definitions must be included in an appropriate CPP appendix or annex. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 3, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, appendix H)

3.4. Parts Availability and Use of Parts Brokers. The Contractor shall not procure materials, systems, assemblies, subassemblies or parts from parts Brokers when available from Original Manufacturers (OM) or their Authorized Distributors. In cases where materials, systems, assemblies, subassemblies or parts are no longer available from the OM or their Authorized Distributors, procurement from Brokers may be authorized as defined by the Contractor’s policy and their CPP. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.1, 4.1.2.e., appendix A)

3.5. Procurement Policies. The Contractor shall provide and implement policy directing development and implementation of business practices and procedures, and processes to prevent procurement of Counterfeit materials and parts. The Contractor shall identify the appropriate office(s), business units, functional organizations, and programs, who shall have responsibility for development, maintenance and implementation of the CPP. The CPP shall identify the specific roles and responsibility for each. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.2, 4.1.3, appendix B, C, D)

3.5.1. Risk Assessment. The contract shall address the risk of using unknown sources and or unauthorized suppliers in the CPP. Application or technical risk assessments shall establish the effect that counterfeit parts may have on performance. Vendor or source of supply risk assessments shall establish the potential for obtaining counterfeit parts. Using any risk analysis tool acceptable to the Government, the Contractor shall conduct a risk assessment based upon item characteristics and how likely it is that a counterfeit part will be received. The contractor shall identify and describe in the CPP how parts are selected for assessment and what risk is acceptable based upon the parts design, construction, material and functional requirements. As a minimum, analysis shall be completed for flagging high risk items, such as items that are obsolete, discontinued, rare, etc. The contractor shall require completion of a trade study, documented within the CPP, that shall facilitate determining whether 100% testing of parts procured from after-market sources is more cost effective than qualification or requalification of a manufacturer.

(Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.2, 4.1.3, appendix B, C, D)

3.6. Detection and Avoidance Responsibilities. The Contractor shall establish processes for the review and approval of contractor and applicable subcontractor systems for the detection and avoidance of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts, which processes shall be comparable to the processes established for contractor business systems under section 893 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111–383; 124 Stat. 4311; 10 U.S.C. 2302 note).

The Contractor shall flow down such requirements and processes to their subcontractors per ODASD Memo titled “Overarching DoD Counterfeit Prevention Guidance”, dated 16 March 2012. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.4, 4.1.5, appendix E)

3.7. Testing and Verification. The Contractor shall establish and accomplish testing and verification processes for items not received from an original equipment manufacturer, original component manufacturer, or authorized distributor that are identified as having high risk for counterfeit potential. These processes apply to prime contracts, and to subcontracts or suppliers below the prime contracts. The Contractor shall provide a list of acceptable test facilities if the subcontractor or supplier does not have the capability to perform required testing. Submittal of Certificates of Compliance indicating the parts are not counterfeit shall be acceptable for verification of testing. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.4, appendix E)

3.8. Configuration Identification and Traceability. The Contractor shall identify and control the configurations of all systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts, and enable mechanisms to provide traceability of parts. The Contractor shall report to the Government when control of the configurations of all systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts, and mechanisms to provide traceability of parts are not possible. The Contractor shall identify the specific systems, assemblies, subassemblies and parts beyond the Contractors’ control. The Contractor shall be responsible for detecting and avoiding the use or inclusion of counterfeit materials and parts, to include procured assemblies and subassemblies, in such products and shall be responsible for the rework or corrective action that may be required to resolve the use or inclusion of counterfeit materials and parts. The cost of counterfeit electronic parts and suspect counterfeit electronic parts and the cost of rework or corrective action that may be required to remedy the use or inclusion of such parts are not allowable costs under Department contracts , unless: a) the contractor has established a counterfeit avoidance/detection system approved by the DoD, b) the counterfeit parts were procured from a DoD-accredited trusted supplier or provided as government property, and c) the contractor has provide timely notification to the government. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.6, appendix F)

3.9. Counterfeit Notification and Reporting. The Contractor shall report in writing to the Procuring Activity within 30 days of determining any end item, component, part, or material contained in supplies purchased by the Department of Defense, or purchased by a contractor or subcontractor for delivery to, or on behalf of, the Department, contains counterfeit electronic parts or suspect counterfeit electronic parts for the purpose of investigation and notification of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI).

The Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) shall coordinate reporting to the appropriate Program Management/Item Management, System Engineering Management, the AFMC Discrepant Materiel Reporting Program (DMRP) Office in 406 SCMS/GULAB, and the AFOSI. Additionally, the Contractor shall within the same 30 day period ensure all suspected or confirmed counterfeit items are entered into the Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) system, which will serve as the DoD central reporting repository. (Ref. AS5553, paragraph 4.1.7, appendix G)

3.10. Counterfeit Prevention Training. The Contractor shall provide appropriate training and shall require all personnel working procurement within their company, to include at a minimum their supply chain management specialists, receiving inspectors, and engineers, to complete said training. The Contractor shall determine the appropriate training required. Training may be developed in-house or may be other Industry accepted training. The CPP shall describe and list the training provided by the contractor to their personnel.

4.0 ITEM UNIQUE IDENTIFICATION (IUID) - Item Identification and Valuation, unique item identification is a method of marking items with unique item identifiers which have machine-readable data elements. Unique item identification is required for all items to be delivered to the DoD that meet the criteria established in accordance with the FAR and applicable supplements and shall be in compliance with all applicable guidance and clauses listed in the contract.

4.1 IUID Marking Plan: The Contractor shall mark items in accordance with contract clauses, and Military Standard (MIL-STD)-130N, Department of Defense Standard Practice/Identification Marking of U.S. Military Property. [IUID Marking Plan (DI-

MGMT-81803), CDRL A002]

4.2 IUID Marking Activity Validation and Verification Report:

In accordance with the Department of Defense Guide to Uniquely Identifying Items Assuring Valuation, Accountability and Control of Government Property, the Government agent or Contractor representative responsible for causing “life cycle events” (i.e., abandoned, consumed, destroyed by accident, destroyed by combat, donated, exchanged -repair, exchanged - sold, exchanged - warranty, expended - experimental/target, expended

- normal use, leased, loaned, lost, reintroduced, retired, scrapped, sold - foreign government, sold - historic, sold - nongovernment, sold - other federal, sold - state/local, and stolen) will update applicable item record(s) in the IUID Registry. [IUID Marking Activity Validation and Verification Report (DI-MGMT-81804A), CDRL A003]