J&A_SSG_TO_AID-OAA-TO-14-00041_approved.pdf

JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN

COMPETITION (J&A)

TO: Deborah Broderick, Agency Competition Advocate

From: Adam Bushey, Contracting Officer's Representative, DCHA/DRG/GROL

SUBJECT: JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND

OPEN COMPETITION (J&A)

1. This document sets forth the facts and rationale justifying the use of other than full and open competition, in accordance with AIDAR 706.302-70(b)(5), which authorizes other than full and open competition for "[a]n award for the continued provision of highly specialized services when award to another resource would result in substantial additional costs to the

Government or would result in unacceptable delays." This document was prepared by the United

States Agency for International Development (USAID), Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and

Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and

Governance (DRG).

2. The nature and/or description of the action being approved:

This is a request to approve a 16 month no-cost extension of the Security Sector Governance

(SSG) Task Order (TO) No. AID-OAA-TO-14-00041 issued under the International Rule of Law

Technical Assistance Services Indefinite Quantity Contract (ROL IQC) No. AID-OAA-I-13-

00032 implemented by Chemonics International, Inc. from September 30, 2019 to February 1, 2021 to maintain USAID’s ability to support the Security Governance Initiative (SGI). SGI is an interagency United States Government (USG) initiative including USAID, the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security.

The TO supports SSG activities in target countries in Africa to improve their security sector institutional capacity to protect civilians and confront challenges and threats. The current TO period of performance is five (5) years, from September 30, 2014 – September 30, 2019, with a ceiling of $2,599,702.00. This action will extend the TO period of performance beyond five years, which will exceed the limitations on TO period of performance established in the ROL

IQC. Per the terms and conditions of the ROL IQC, the entire task order period of performance may not go beyond five (5) years from the date of awarding the task order. The proposed extension, however, will not go beyond the final TO performance period end date under the ROL

IQC, which is August 7, 2023. The ROL IQC ordering period expires on August 7, 2020. The ceiling price of the task order will not increase as a result of the extension.

The TO has served as a critical mechanism for USAID missions in delivering targeted and timely technical assistance in rule of law, justice, and security sector governance since its inception in 2014. The TO was originally issued with a three (3) year performance period, and it has been extended twice with no increase to the ceiling. There were initial delays in the first three years due to the fact that the SGI required the SSG projects wait until each country’s joint common action plans (JCAPs) were signed between the U.S. and host governments. This process took longer than expected, two to three years for each country. Thereafter, implementation was slowed during a reevaluation of the SGI support strategy by new leadership at USAID and Department of State.

3. Description of the supplies or services required, including an estimated value:

The purpose of the SSG TO is to provide technical assistance and analysis on security sector governance and accountability in order to assist USAID to better assess, design, implement and evaluate security sector governance projects. The SSG TO also enables USAID and the USG to respond to requests for security sector governance assistance in key partner states, particularly in

Africa. Rule of law, justice, and security sector programming is often requested after a resolution of conflict, as part of conflict prevention measures, after political transition, when the provision of transparent justice is critical to stabilization efforts. This TO draws from highly experienced and specialized technical experts, who can be rapidly mobilized. Further, the TO provides proven project managers who can adapt to shifting on the ground realities, and draw upon a broad pool of partners, sub-contractors and short term experts.

The TO, centrally managed in Washington, ensures that USAID missions have integrated access to a suite of critical and highly specialized professional services for effective rule of law and security sector reform programming.

DCHA/DRG has developed and begun implementation for nine ongoing or planned activities to support SGI that will achieve the TO objectives and increase the usage of funds. The following activities are anticipated to be completed during the extension period, with an estimated value of just over $1 million:

1. Technical research on best practices and SGI lessons learned and best practices for supporting ROL and security sector governance work in SGI countries. A short term consultant will provide up to approximately 55 work days of effort. An additional expert will likely join as well. (Ongoing)

2. Adding two countries to the World Justice Project ROL index report, which will support

SGI by increasing the information provided through the Journey to Self-Reliance

Roadmap (J2SR). This new data will be presented to the Missions through both a written report and by presentation to help the mission as they develop their new Country

Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCS) in support of the J2SR new framework.

(Ongoing)

3. A Study of the links between the security sector and Transnational Organized Crime

(TOC) groups in participating countries and methods to reduce cooperation between the security sector and TOC groups. (Ongoing)

4. A collaboration with USAID and Duke University conducting a follow-up data call on a previously completed Randomized Control Trial (RCT) regarding police corruption and capacity to see if the results of the USAID programming of increasing police service delivery still hold true after a few years following the completion of the program.

(Ongoing)

5. Updating the Police Accountability quasi-systematic review paper on what has worked at increasing police accountability. (Ongoing)

6. Assisting the interagency Security Sector Monitoring and Evaluation Group with developing a group of interagency agreed upon indicators, (In planning stages)

7. Conducting a joint Public Expenditure Financial Accountability (PEFA) and Method for

Assessing Procurement Systems (MAPS) assessment with a Ministry of Finance for the security sector. (In planning stages)

8. Developing an institution capacity assessment framework guide to include ROL, and

SSG. (In planning stages)

9. Building awareness among civil society organizations in participating countries around issues of security sector governance, potentially through Grants Under Contract

(GUCs).

4. Statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The statutory authority permitting this extension without full and open competition is 40 U.S.C.

113, which allows that full and open competition need not be obtained when it would impair or otherwise have an adverse effect on programs conducted for the purposes of foreign aid, relief, and rehabilitation. The specific application of this authority is AIDAR 706.302-70(b)(5) which authorizes "[a]n award for the continued provision of highly specialized services when award to another resource would result in substantial additional costs to the Government or would result in unacceptable delays".

5. A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition that requires use of the authority cited:

The SSG TO ensures that Missions have rapid access to critical and highly specialized professional services for effective rule of law, justice, and security sector reform programming, which are key foreign policy priorities. The continued provision of this highly specialized expertise is imperative to the USG and USAID’s foreign assistance objectives. During the extension period, USAID will be able to complete the activities listed in the end of Section 3 directly above. These activities will help strengthen the host country capacity of the justice and security sectors to effectively investigate and prosecute crime, end impunity, and deliver accountable and responsive security services to citizens, which is critical to supporting countries on their Journey to Self Reliance.

By ensuring that countries uphold and promote the rule of law, and by facilitating security sector reform, USAID is advancing the Agency’s mandate of demonstrating democratic values abroad and U.S. national security objectives. Accordingly, the objective of this request is to:

1. Ensure that participating USAID Missions have uninterrupted access to specialized, high quality, critical services in rule of law, justice, and security sector reform;

2. Allow USAID to continue to advance rule of law and security sector governance and justice as a key U.S. Foreign Policy priority. As noted in the President’s 2017

National Security Strategy (NSS) and the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan (JSP) FY

2018-2022, stability, security, and the rule of law are critical priorities. The NSS notes that the United States will “use diplomacy and assistance to encourage states to make choices that improve governance, rule of law, and sustainable development”, and clearly identifies rule of law as a key foreign policy priority across all regions.

Likewise, Goal 1.3 of the JSP is to “[c]ounter instability, transnational crime, and violence that threaten U.S. interests by strengthening citizen-responsive governance, security, democracy, human rights, and rule of law”.

This TO provides crucial support that advances U.S. foreign assistance objectives in countries experiencing political transition that are less than stable;

3. Continue to support an interagency USG whole of government approach, to include

USAID, the U.S. Departments of State, Defense, Justice, and Homeland Security. The

TO is part of USAID’s contribution to the interagency collective effort to improve security sector governance in order to address transnational threats such as illicit trade and trafficking, violent extremism, and regional conflicts; and

4. Support USAID’s Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance strategy and the implementation of its Journey to Self-Reliance (J2SR) approach. Among other things, this TO will support the collection of J2SR Roadmap indicator data under the “Open and

Accountable Governance” data group.

In 2014, USAID provided fair opportunity to all nine (9) ROL IQC holders for a task order for

See National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, pages 38-40, 42, 47, 51-52;

available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf

See Joint Strategic Plan FY 2018 - 2022, U.S. Department of State & U.S. Agency for International Development, February 2018, pages 3, 26-28, 30, 32, available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/JSP_FY_2018_-_2022_FINAL.pdf https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/JSP_FY_2018_-_2022_FINAL.pdf the SSG requirement. Chemonics International, Inc. was selected for award. Chemonics, and their consortia of partners, represents a large proportion of U.S. expertise in Rule of Law (ROL), judicial reform, and security sector reform (SSR).

Chemonics has demonstrated its unique qualifications and ability to respond to the requirements of this task order. Past performance was considered for the proposed contract extension, and the holder has performed at an above satisfactory level. Specifically, the overall quality of work under this TO has been exceptional. The holder has delivered on time and with strong technical expertise at both the home office and through mobilization of high quality short-term technical assistance often under very short time frames. Chemonics has demonstrated exceptional ability to respond rapidly to requests from the field and to provide highly complex solutions to governance problems that USAID staff do not have the expertise to complete. Chemonics has established a critical relationship with World Justice Project (WJP) which is the organization that has developed the ROL index. WJP collects data for the J2SR Country Roadmaps. This support is critical to USAID senior leadership to ensure the maximum number of countries have JSR country roadmap data points in order to end the need for foreign assistance.

Furthermore, the ROL IQC under which this TO is issued contains a provision whereby the

Contractor may be required to execute and/or administer Grants Under Contract (GUCs) under awarded task orders. This provision does not typically exist in other federal contracting vehicles, including GSA's Federal Supply Schedules and One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services

(OASIS) contracts. Importantly, this capability, subject to approval by the Head of the

Contracting Activity (HCA), will permit this TO to build awareness and increase knowledge and interest in security sector governance and the rule of law among civil society organizations in key partner states in Africa. This awareness building among civil society would further the objective of the TO to demonstrate the importance of SSG, and will provide the open space necessary for change agents to discuss possible good governance reforms. Good governance is a critical component to supporting countries on the Journey to Self Reliance.

Making direct awards to local contractor(s) for this requirement was not considered to be the most effective approach to achieve the intended results. Having these activities managed within a larger strategic program has distinct advantages as it mitigates costs and reduces employee oversight time and the program benefits from synergies built and established between efforts and ensuring there are not duplicative activities since all efforts are better coordinated in a larger strategic program.

6. Description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was publicized as required by

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 5.2 [AIDAR 705.2].

On July 9, 2019, USAID publicized a notice of its intent to extend the task order for 16 months without full and open competition on FedBizOpps. One expression of interest was received in response to the notice. More details are provided below under Section 10. In 2014, USAID provided fair opportunity for the SSG requirement to all nine (9) holders of the ROL

IQC. Chemonics was selected for award.

7. A determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable. This extension will not increase the ceiling of the task order. The task order ceiling is $2,599,702 and the award is fully funded. There are sufficient funds remaining under the TO ceiling to implement the activities during the proposed extension period. As of July 31, 2019, the total accrued expenditures for the project is estimated at

$1,328,458, leaving $1,271,244 unexpended. The average monthly burn rate has been very low due to the implementation delays explained in Section 2 above. The activities during the extension period are estimated to cost approximately $1 million, based on the expected and current programming listed in Section 3, which will have an estimated burn rate of about

$65,000 per month. Furthermore, this extension will have no additional staff or budget implications. Current staff members assigned as the COR for the award will continue to perform this role. Using the existing TO will conserve Agency resources as it will reduce procurement time and the administrative burden on all staff involved. Further, it will allow the Agency to be responsive to immediate foreign policy and national security priorities in a timely and cost-effective manner within these five less than stable countries.

8. Description of the market research conducted, and the results or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted:

DRG's Market Research effort considered a wide range of sources of information, including but not limited to: a review of internal USAID awards, both existing and currently under procurement; non-USAID USG vehicles, including existing multiple-award contract vehicles, existing intra-/inter-agency contract vehicles, Government-Wide Acquisition Contracts, Federal Supply Schedules, and Best-in-Class contracts; the SBA Dynamic Small Business

Database; and USAID’s Small Business Market Analysis Research Tool. DRG also met with

Program Officers in DCHA, procurement personnel in USAID’s Office of Acquisition and

Assistance, and consulted with the relevant Missions about their programmatic needs.

The market research conducted in support of this request has led to the conclusion that the ROL

IQC is the best mechanism available to fulfill the SSG requirement. The ROL IQC permits issuance of GUCs, which is not a capability that typically exists in other federal contracting vehicles, including GSA's Federal Supply Schedules and One Acquisition Solution for Integrated

Services (OASIS) contracts. Extending the current task order rather than issuing a new task order under the ROL IQC would minimize disruption to existing efforts to ensure timely completion and uninterrupted mission support to critical development challenges in Ghana, Kenya, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria.

9. Other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

Not extending the TO would limit the Agency's ability to quickly complete and close out critical rule of law, justice, and security sector reform programming in these five countries, which are already suffering from extensive violent extremism and transnational organized crime. This would hinder vital programmatic work necessary to securing U.S. security as these short-term efforts are creating necessary quick wins to sustain longer term results. Due to the relatively short-term nature of the work, and since the work has already begun, no other source could practicably complete these efforts in a succinct, timely, and cost effective method. The abrupt ending of the ongoing work would cause USAID additional funding and resources to revamp the work after a hiatus and cause significant extra costs for a new team to get up to speed on what has already been done. A steep learning curve exists for many of the existing efforts ongoing under the TO and USAID has already paid these ‘up front costs.’

If the extension is granted, higher reward with less cost will yield significant results, compared to if the contract extension is not granted.

Furthermore, agreements with the host nations, which take years to sign, have already been made. This TO had initial delays in the first three years due to the fact that each country’s joint common action plans (JCAPs) signed between DOS and the host governments took years to formalize. Now that the agreements are signed, USAID’s role in supporting the

JCAP bi-lateral agreements with this TO is clear. Procuring a new TO would reduce the success of USG negotiated JCAPs within these five countries since it would cause further delays in implementing activities that support the JCAPs and erode existing good will that the USG has with these five partner nations.

This extension would also ensure that USAID has the data needed to establish J2SR country roadmaps. These metrics provide the U.S. government, the international community, and the host country with an unbiased and internationally recognized standard on how well they are performing in essential areas. This TO supports the data collection necessary to provide yearly ROL index scores to support the J2SR. Attaining these ROL metric scores are critical to the success of security governance efforts. If the extension is not approved, the ROL index data will remain outdated, which will impede the Mission’s ability to strategically plan the country’s journey to self reliance without current data. Other activities that are ongoing or pending will also end prior to their full completion, causing USAID to lose credibility with its host country partners in these five African countries.

10. Sources, if any, that expressed an interest, in writing, in the acquisition:

One firm, Valar, expressed an interest in response to the FBO notice posted on July 9, 2019.

In response to this expression of interest, the firm was encouraged to monitor USAID's

Business Forecast (https://www.usaid.gov/business-forecast/), the FedBizOpps website

(www.fbo.gov), and the Grants.gov website (www.grants.gov) for the latest information on new opportunities to do business with USAID.

11. The actions the Agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

The Agency is currently conducting a full and open competition for the Active Communities

Effective States (ACES) Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract (Solicitation No.

SOL-OAA-17-000103) which contains a rule of law and security sector reform component. The

ACES IDIQ solicitation closed on October 11, 2018.

1. Clearance

____cleared via e-mail___________________ _8/13/2019_____________

GC/A&A: Jun Jin Date