STARR RFP 111811.pdf

RFP Date Issued: 11/18/2011

Questions Due By: 12/06/2011

RFP Closing Date: 01/09/2012

Closing Time: 12:00pm Noon, EST

Subject: Request for Proposal (RFP) #SOL-OAA-00-11-000075

Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR)

Dear Offerors:

NOTE: This solicitation incorporates both the RFP and Pre-Solicitation Notice, pursuant to FAR 5.203.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) wishes to inform you of the issuance of the

Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR) Indefinite

Quantity Contract (IQC). The Closing Date and Time for receipt of your proposal is at the top of this cover letter.

The STARR program is anticipated to be a five-year contract with an estimated shared ceiling of

$700,000,000 designed to address resource tenure issues in support of key U.S. Government (USG) strategic objectives, including but not limited to, enhanced food security as articulated in the Feed the

Future Initiative (FTF) (http://www.feedthefuture.gov/); climate change adaptation and mitigation;

conflict prevention and mitigation; economic growth; biodiversity protection and natural resource management; and reduction in the spread of infectious diseases (specifically HIV/AIDS). This program will employ a multidisciplinary approach to address complex resource tenure challenges as identified by

USAID missions, Bureaus and offices, and by other USG agencies (including but not limited to

Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation). It will provide short and long-term technical assistance that is needed to respond to the needs and opportunities available for improving security of property rights and increasing land access. STARR will advance USAID’s Way

Forward strategies (http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2010/fs101118.html) and best practices by building knowledge, testing hypotheses and implementing innovative approaches to strengthening property rights and resource tenure as a means to advance key USG strategic foreign assistance goals.

Technical management will be by USAID’s Land Tenure Unit, Land Resource Management Team, Office of Natural Resource Management (NRM), and Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and

Trade (EGAT).

The STARR IQC will have a shared ceiling of up to $700,000,000, of which up to $250,000,000 will be reserved for Critical Post Countries (CPC), and $450,000,000 for non-CPC countries. STARR may have approximately six awards of which approximately three may be awarded to qualifying small businesses

(S/B). Unrestricted offerors and S/B offerors are encouraged to partner with academic institutions and non-governmental organizations. USAID is interested in establishing and strengthening schools of learning for the exchange of ideas between policy makers, practitioners, leading scholars and students in the field of land tenure and resource governance. After award of the IQCs, STARR anticipates that all http://www.feedthefuture.gov/ http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2010/fs101118.html

Requests for Task Order Proposals (RFTOP) for $1,000,000 dollars or less will be set-aside for qualified

S/Bs.

All awardees (Unrestricted and S/B) must have the technical capacity to implement the full technical scope of work as presented under Section C (for both CPCs and Non-CPCs). A Subcontracting Plan must be submitted by all Prime offerors that are not S/B, with a 25% goal for subcontracting with small business concerns, small disadvantaged business concerns, women-owned small business concerns, veteran owned business concerns, and HUBZone small business concerns.

Questions may be submitted by email to leperry@usaid.gov, no later than the date indicated on the top of the first page of this letter. The email subject line for all questions should state ―Questions to STARR

RFP‖. Responding to questions is at the Contracting Officer’s discretion. Offerors may not receive individual replies. Instead, the questions will be summarized (without identifying the offeror), and the answers posted, on the Government-wide Point of Entry, www.fedbizopps.gov. Kindly check Federal

Business Opportunities (www.fbo.gov) on a routine basis for any Amendments to this RFP. Telephone inquiries will not be accepted.

Funds are not currently available for this Solicitation. This RFP in no way obligates USAID to award a contract, nor does it commit USAID to pay any costs incurred in the preparation and submission of comments or a proposal.

Sincerely, Joseph W. Lentini

USAID Contracting Officer

M/OAA/EGAT/EMD

http://www.fedbizopps.gov/ http://www.fbo.gov/

1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER RATING PAGE OF PAGES

UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)

2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER 4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION 5. DATE ISSUED 6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER

SEALED BID (IFB)

NEGOTIATED (RFP)

7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than Item 7)

NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".

9. Sealed offers in original and _____________________________ copies for furnishing the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in Item 8, or if hand carried, in the depository located in until local time _______________________ (Hour) (Date)

CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All Offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.

A. NAME B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)

PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

A SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM I CONTRACT CLAUSES

B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.

C DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

D PACKAGING AND MARKING PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

E INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

F DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA L INSTR., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

H SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS M EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

K

REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER

STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS

NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.

12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within 150 calendar days (150 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.

13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT 10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS (%)

(See Section I, Clause No. 52-232-8)

14. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. DATE AMENDMENT NO. DATE

(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the

SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated:

CODE FACILITY

16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER 15A. NAME AND

ADDRESS

OF OFFEROR

(Type or print)

15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER 17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE

AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.

15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS IS DIFFERENT FROM

ABOVE - ENTER SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE

19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION

22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION: 23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM

(4 copies unless otherwise specified) 10 U.S.C. 2304(a) ( ) 41 U.S.C. 253(c) ( )

24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7) 25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE CODE

26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print) 27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28. AWARD DATE

IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.

(Signature of Contracting Officer)

(REV. 9-97)

10. FOR INFORMATION CALL:

11. TABLE OF CONTENTS

STANDARD FORM 33

SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD

SOLICITATION

OFFER (Must be fully completed by offeror)

AWARD (To be completed by Government)

N/A 3 137

SOL-OAA-00-11-000075

X

REQ-EGAT-11-000075

U.S. Agency for International Development

Office of Acquisition and Assistance

M/OAA/EGAT/NRM, SA-44

1300 Pennsylvania NW

Washington DC 20523

See L.5, L.6, and L.7

See Section L.6 Noon EST 01/09/2012

Lealie M. Perry (202) 567-5331 leperry@usaid.gov

See Attached Table of Contents

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X 6

X 11

X 39

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Joseph W. Lentini

Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR)

Table of Contents

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK

SECTION D - PACKAGING AND MARKING

SECTION E - INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE

SECTION F - DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE

SECTION G - CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA

SECTION H - SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS

PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES

SECTION I - CONTRACT CLAUSES

PART III – LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACHMENTS

SECTION J – LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

PART IV – REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS

SECTION K – REPRESENTATION, CERTIFICATES AND OTHER STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS 81

SECTION L - INSTRUCTIONS, CONDITIONS, AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS

SECTION M - EVALUATION FACTORS FOR AWARD

ATTACHMENTS

PART I - THE SCHEDULE

SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS

B.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of this contract is to provide Technical services in support of Section C, the Statement of

Work for the Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR). USAID Task Order Contracting

Officers (TOCOs) will request the work through the issuance of task orders during the ordering period as specified in Section F of the contract.

B.2 CONTRACT TYPE AND CONTRACT SERVICES

This is an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) using individual Task Orders to provide technical services.

Task Orders issued under this contract will be either Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) or Firm Fixed Price

(FFP), as determined by the TOCO. STARR will require that all Request For Task Order Proposals

(RFTOPS) for $1,000,000 or less be set aside for qualified Small Business (S/B) awardees.

B.3 MINIMUM OBLIGATED AMOUNT

The basic contract includes an initial obligation of funds in the amount of $100,000 to cover the minimum order guarantee. [Note: This $100,000 is expected to be applied towards the initial STARR task order under this IQC)]. USAID is required to order and the contractor is required to furnish the minimum order amount of services. Following this initial obligation, individual task orders will obligate funds to cover the work required under that task order.

B.4 MAXIMUM CONTRACT SHARED CEILING

The overall ceiling price of this IQC contract is $700,000,000. The maximum aggregate dollar value of all task orders awarded cannot exceed the contract ceiling. This ceiling is not being subdivided among the number of awardees nor is it being multiplied by the number of awardees. $250,000,000 may be reserved for Critical Post Countries (CPC) under CLIN 0001 (currently, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, and

Sudan), and $450,000,000 may be reserved for non-CPC countries under CLIN 0002. USAID reserves the right to amend the list of CPC countries and reserved amounts over the life of the contracts.

B.5 CEILING ON FIXED FEE – CPFF TASK ORDERS

b.5 (a) For each task order issued under this IQC, the TOCO and Contractor agree to negotiate a set dollar amount for fixed fee. In negotiating the fixed dollar amount for fee, the TOCO must consider the policies and factors for establishing fee in FAR 15.404-4 as well as any applicable USAID policy on establishing a fixed fee amount. In no event, however, may the amount of fixed fee in any individual task order exceed _____ percent (offeror proposes ceiling percentage) of the task order’s estimated cost, excluding fee). The fee ceiling applies to the prime contractor and any subcontractors.

(b) The Total Estimated Cost Plus Fixed Fee for each Task Order must be negotiated in accordance with the terms of the IQC Contract.

(c) Fixed Fee Payment. For any Task Order issued under this Contract, at the time of each payment of allowable costs to the contractor, the USAID paying office ordinarily pays the contractor a percentage of fixed fee that directly corresponds to the percentage of allowable costs being paid. Two exceptions to paying fixed fee in this manner apply:

(i) If the TOCO determines that this method results in paying a disproportionately higher ratio of fixed fee than the percentage of work that the Contractor has completed, then the TOCO may suspend further payment of any fixed fee until the Contractor has made sufficient progress to justify further payment, up to the agreed percentage.

(ii) Reference the clauses entitled ―Allowable Cost and Payment‖ (FAR 52.216-7) and ―Fixed Fee‖ (FAR

52.216-8) incorporated into this contract. Note how the terms and conditions of these clauses clarify when total payments of fixed fee reach eighty-five percent (85%) of the total fixed fee.

The offeror shall not propose, and the contractor will not receive, a fee/profit for Grants under

Contract(s).

Note: The ceiling on fixed fee shall apply to the prime contractor and all subcontractors under task orders.

B.6 INDIRECT COSTS

The contract clause entitled ―Allowable Cost and Payment (DEC 2002)‖, FAR 52.216-7, specifies that the indirect cost rates shall be established for each of the Contractor’s accounting periods that apply to this contract. Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect cost rates, allowable indirect costs shall be reimbursed on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases:

Description Rate Base Type Period

1/ 1/ 1/

2/ 2/ 2/

3/ 3/ 3/

4/ 4/ 4/

1/Base of Application:

Type of Rate:

Period:

2/Base of Application:

3/Base of Application:

4/Base of Application:

B.7 CEILING ON INDIRECT COST RATES

B.7 (a) Reimbursement for indirect costs shall be at the lower of the negotiated final or predetermined rates, or the following ceiling rates:

Description Rate Base Type Period

1/ 1/ 1/

2/ 2/ 2/

3/ 3/ 3/

4/ 4/ 4/

1/Base of Application:

2/Base of Application:

3/Base of Application:

4/Base of Application:

B.7(b) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.

B.7(c) This understanding shall not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.

B.8 LABOR

B.8(a) Compensation of personnel under this contract or any resulting subcontract must be in accordance with AIDAR 752.7007 Personnel Compensation (August 2004).

B.8(b) Specified management costs will be handled through the following method:

IQC management costs under this IQC shall not be reimbursed by direct charge allocations. Contractors should propose a centralized management structure that allows for recovery of IQC management costs through indirect cost rates.

B.8(c) All locally hired Host Country National (HCNs) personnel and Third Country Nationals (TCNs) other non-U.S. expatriates shall be paid in accordance with rates negotiated between the contractor and the cognizant USAID TOCO. The negotiated rates for individual locally-hired personnel and other non-

U.S. expatriates shall be based upon a combination of factors including, but not limited to, the Local

Compensation Plan (LCP) established by the various USAID Missions, and in the absence of an approved

LCP, the prevailing in-country salaries for the professional category being negotiated and consideration of the individual's education and salary and/or consultant rate history over the most recent 3-year period.

Annual salaries may be converted to daily salaries by dividing the annual figure by 260 workdays per year; daily salaries may be converted to hourly salaries, by dividing the daily amount by 8 hours.

B.9 OTHER DIRECT COSTS

B.9(a) Other direct costs necessary for the performance of the work under task orders, such as DBA and

Medevac insurance, travel and transportation, lodging and subsistence expenses may be authorized in the task order. Lodging and subsistence costs may be authorized for locally-hired national personnel, if the terms of the task order require travel, in accordance with the clause of this contract entitled "Travel and

Transportation (JAN 1990)", AIDAR 752.7002. Costs for U.S. expatriate travel/transportation to perform services overseas may be authorized by the TOCO or designee in accordance with the same "Travel and

Transportation" clause.

B.9(b) The TOCO determines which other direct costs are allowable, allocable, and fair and reasonable in accordance with the applicable federal cost principles (i.e., FAR 31.2 and AIDAR 731.2 for commercial

(for profit) organizations or FAR 31.3 and AIDAR 731.3 for educational institutions, or FAR 31.7 and

AIDAR 731.7 for other not-for-profit organizations). For those other direct costs the TOCO authorizes, contractors are allowed to recover applicable indirect costs on these costs, if doing so is part of the contractor's usual accounting procedures, consistent with the applicable cost principles, and are included in the contractor's Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement.

B.10 TASK ORDER LIMITATIONS

Note: Task orders issued under this IQC contract may be either Firm Fixed-Price or Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee awards. Firm Fixed-Price task orders are preferred.

B.10(a) Firm Fixed Price (FFP) Task Orders. When issuing FFP Task Orders, TOCOs shall state in the

Task Order the firm-fixed-price, which represents the total amount of the Task Order and the maximum price the contractor may be paid to perform the services, reports, or other deliverables in the Task Order.

B.10(b) Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Task Orders. When issuing CPFF task orders, the TOCO shall state in the Task Order the total estimated cost plus fixed fee, which is the total amount of the Task Order and the maximum amount the contractor may be paid without the advance written approval of the Contracting

Officer. This maximum amount represents the negotiated mix of the prime Contractors and subcontractors' professional labor categories and salaries, an estimated number of workdays, other direct costs, indirect costs, and fixed fee.

B.10(c) Minimum Order. When USAID requires services or reports and other deliverables covered by this

Contract in a Task Order in the amount of less than $25,000, the contractor is not obligated to accept an order to furnish those services or reports and other deliverables under this Contract. However, if the contractor agrees to furnish services or reports and other deliverables required by USAID in an amount of less than $25,000 and is awarded a Task Order to do so, the contractor is required to provide said services and reports/deliverables in accordance with the Contract's terms and conditions.

B.10(d) Maximum Order. When USAID requires services or reports and other deliverables covered by this Contract in a Task Order amount of more than $20,000,000, the contractor is not obligated to bid on an order to furnish those services or reports and other deliverables under this Contract. However, if the contractor agrees to furnish services or reports and other deliverables required by USAID in excess of

$20,000,000 and awarded a Task Order to do so, the contractor is required to provide said services and reports/deliverables in accordance with the Contracts terms and conditions.

B.10(e) Notwithstanding the above, if issuance of a Task Order to, and acceptance of a Task Order by, the contractor would: (1) result in the contractor (or its personnel or its subcontractors or their personnel) having an organizational conflict of interest for which restrictions would be placed on the contractor's (or its personnel’s or its subcontractors’ or their personnel’s) future activities; or (2) violate the provisions of the Procurement Integrity legislation, i.e., Section 27 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41

U.S.C. 423), as amended by Section 814 of Pub. L. 101-189 the contractor, after written notification to the cognizant Contracting Officer, is not obligated to furnish those services or reports and other deliverables under this Contract, and USAID may acquire the supplies or services from another source.

- END OF SECTION B -

SECTION C – STATEMENT OF WORK

Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights Indefinite Quantity Contract

I. Summary

The Strengthening Tenure and Resource Rights (STARR) program is a multiple-award, five- year

Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) designed to address resource tenure issues in support of key U.S.

Government (USG) strategic objectives, including but not limited to, enhanced food security as articulated in the Feed the Future Initiative; climate change adaptation and mitigation; conflict prevention and mitigation; economic growth; biodiversity protection and natural resource management; and reduction in the spread of infectious diseases (specifically HIV/AIDS). This program will employ a multidisciplinary approach to address complex resource tenure challenges as identified by USAID missions, Bureaus and offices, and by other USG agencies (including but not limited to Department of

State, Department of Defense and the Millennium Challenge Corporation). It will provide short and long-term technical assistance that is needed to respond to the needs and opportunities available for improving security of property rights and increasing land access. STARR will advance USAID Forward’s Reform

Agenda (http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2010/fs101118.html) and best practice by building knowledge, testing hypotheses and implementing innovative approaches to strengthening property rights and resource tenure as a means to advance key USG strategic foreign assistance goals. This contract will be managed by USAID’s Land Tenure Unit, Land Resource Management Team, Office of Natural

Resource Management, and Bureau for Economic Growth, Agriculture and Trade (EGAT).

II. Background

A. Problem Statement

Resource tenure and property rights challenges are present in almost every country where USAID works.

In many countries, tenure and property rights problems are so grave that they create political instability, violence, population displacement, famine and environmental destruction, which significantly undermine or prevent successful implementation of many USAID programs. The Agency requires technical assistance to meet this ever increasing demand and the STARR IQC will help meet this objective.

Secure access to and control of land and land-based resources for all private and corporate citizens is critical to supporting many of USAID’s strategic objectives including economic growth, gender equality, women’s economic empowerment, food and energy security, nutrition, democracy and governance, conflict mitigation, adaptation and mitigation of climate change, global health and natural resource management. The lack of secure and negotiable property rights is one of the most limiting factors in achieving economic growth and democratic governance throughout the developing world. Insecure or weak property rights, limited or inequitable access to resources, and weak institutional structures regulating property rights (including laws and legislation, courts and other dispute resolution mechanisms, and land administration) are debilitating factors which require sustained attention and improvement if USAID is to achieve its strategic objectives.

Despite the importance of land and resource governance, many countries continue to be constrained by the lack of a transparent and effective land tenure and property rights (LTPR) system. In these countries, statutory systems of law and governance often do not protect the property rights of large segments of the population. Their land governance institutions tend to be weak, under resourced and ineffective in serving the needs of the public. At the same time, customary and religious land tenure systems frequently provide the primary means for securing access and rights to natural resources for large segments of rural and urban peoples who live in the developing world. Although customary systems have adapted and persevered through generations of social, political and environmental upheaval, and tend to be more efficient for managing land and other natural assets, they are often ignored or are not recognized by state authorities and current legislation. Customary institutions, despite all their strengths, also have inherent weaknesses that need to be considered, including biases against women’s rights to land and resources and lack of capacity to engage with large-scale private and public investment.

Statutory land tenure and property rights laws often fail to protect people who claim assets under customary rules and norms even though these systems are the most commonly practiced in countries where USAID works. In many countries, customary rights and rules of access are often not recognized by the state or by formal legal systems. That disconnect between customary and statutory systems can allow for social and political manipulation, and rent-seeking, undermining development and generating conflict. For example, when the land rights of customary landholders and users are not formally documented or recognized by the state, more powerful individuals and interest groups can intervene to acquire land at the expense of customary landholders. When resource rights are obtained in this way, the issue often becomes the foundation for long-standing grievances and fuel for conflict.

Frequently, resource tenure challenges result from competition over scarce or valuable natural resources where the property rights are unclear or contested; when policies and institutions are unable to cope with swiftly moving economic and political transformations, or are skewed to favor one identity group; and when donors and host- governments make incorrect assumptions about how people gain access to and control land and productive assets and then make investments that solidify these assumptions even though they may not reflect reality or the true needs of the target populations. Often, the relationships between men and women, and their roles and responsibilities with respect to household security, agricultural production and economic growth, affect access to resources and rights to land. Gender analysis provides the opportunity to identify gender issues impacted by these relationships, and helps donors and host governments make more informed decisions. When wealth is created—or opportunities for wealth or better living conditions are created—without first clarifying and securing resource rights competition often occurs and violence can result. For example, when donors or governments have invested in housing, roads, hospitals, wells, schools, markets and other community improvements without first clarifying who claims which rights to affected land and resources, then the more powerful groups can usurp the rights of others for their own benefit, thus undermining the development objectives of the initial investment, or worse, creating conditions that will lead to violence (e.g. Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Kyrgyzstan, Mozambique).

Compounding these domestic societal and institutional challenges are exterior forces from the international public and private community. Over the past decade there have been increasing demands for land and natural resources to feed and fuel the growing economies of the world including China, India, and the Middle East; or to meet resource needs for agricultural-based enterprises (e.g. Madagascar). Since the 2008 global food price shocks, the world has witnessed a new trend in land acquisition in third-party countries by private companies and governments wishing to ensure access to productive agricultural land, forests and other natural assets, and by private equity firms looking for opportunities to invest. Some of these acquisitions have worrying implications for smallholder producers, and for USG objectives in promoting food security, while other acquisitions may create opportunities for broad-based economic growth, and improved food security and food nutrition. The success, or failure, lies in the property rights people hold in the target countries, and their ability to make informed decisions regarding transactions and investments for the property they own.

Furthermore, climate change is accelerating the pace at which land is either abandoned or acquired due to rapid and extreme changes in weather patterns, rising sea levels, and the demand for land to satisfy climate mitigation initiatives including reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD). This rapid and sizeable race for the developing world’s land and land-based resources will place great strain on already weak and non-transparent land tenure systems. If left unaddressed, this scenario will result in the property rights of large segments of vulnerable developing world populations being disenfranchised economically and politically and in people being pushed onto more marginal lands. Consequentially, peace and security will be destabilized and human vulnerability increased, which ultimately undermines the strategic objectives of USAID.

B. USAID Resource Tenure Conceptual Framework

The term ―property rights‖ is used to refer to the bundle of rights for use, control and transfer of assets

(including natural assets such as land, water, forests, minerals, and fisheries) that are held by individuals, communities, families, firms and other corporate or community institutions. Under this contract, ―property‖ may include buildings and structures (but not intellectual property). Property rights may range from private or semi-private to leasehold, community, group, shareholder, corporate and state-held (such as for parks, reserves and other purposes). Property rights may have both spatial and temporal dimensions, and may be differentially affected by sex, gender, race, ethnicity, class, and political and religious affiliation. ―Resource governance,‖ ―land tenure,‖ and ―resource access‖ are seen as subsets of

―property rights.‖

While there is a need in every country for government to hold and manage some land (reserves, parks, public space, defense), private rights, whether individual, corporate, community or family, have been shown to be the most robust. Private rights facilitate investment, economic growth, and more sustainable use of natural resources. Private rights can be collective in nature and do not necessarily have to be individual or corporatized. They can be administered and secured through formal systems, including land titling and registration, or through less formal systems, such as customary or ―traditional‖ or other non-statutory systems as seen in many parts of Africa, Latin America and Asia. The degree of formalization needed will depend on markets and the most appropriate sequencing for individual countries depending on cultural, political, economic and other sensitivities.

―Formalization‖ can mean individualization, and land titling and registration, or it might apply to a more nuanced approach where custom or customary systems are legally recognized by statutory authority and administered by more formal registration systems. Legally recognizing customary rights and institutions, and creating opportunities for individuals to transform these rights into statutory ones, is increasingly seen as a more effective, democratic, and efficient approach to secure property rights than a system that forces people to adopt statutory. USAID refers to this process as the ―democratization of property rights,‖ and will strive to remain a global thought-leader in best-practice in this area. For example, USAID’s work in

Kenya has yielded options focused upon a graduated process of regularizing informal land rights, while recognizing and honoring the customary realities that have shaped those rights.

Importantly, USAID does not consider the existence of dual tenure systems (statutory, customary or religious) operating in one country as problematic, and where appropriate, encourages continued operation of more than one system if it creates opportunities for more individuals, communities and firms to benefit from economic opportunities and mitigates negative consequences of potential challenges brought about by social, economic, political and environmental transformation. This IQC will foster the concept and implementation of ―secure enough‖ tenure rights for as many people as possible in order to support broad participation in economic development and improved livelihood options, and to mitigate against the loss of access and rights to land and resources in an increasingly dynamic global economy and under changing environmental conditions. The idea of ―secure enough‖ tenure rights will depend on both the situation and stakeholder; however, the benchmark of tenure security will be when rights to land and natural resources are not contested without reason and that people can invest efforts and reap the benefits of these efforts (Lavigne Delville, 2004).

Where dual systems exist, the challenge is not to eradicate one in favor of the other—the informal in favor of the formal—but to create effective linkages between these two systems that will provide security of property rights and allow individuals, communities and firms to make efficient transactions and optimize economic opportunities. Additionally, creating opportunities that allow men and women, communities and firms to increase security of rights by moving from informal to formal rights status (or to shift back to informality if needed) is also seen as a viable approach.

In countries where USAID has focused on strengthening property rights, there have been measurable successes in improved economic growth and livelihood opportunities, conflict mitigation, natural resource management and protection of biodiversity. Experiences in some countries are demonstrating that improved property rights for women are also improving household nutrition, and reducing the spread of

HIV/AIDS and reducing the negative impacts of the disease once people are infected.

USAID views resource tenure and property rights as a fundamental structural requirement in achieving many strategic development objectives (see Section C below). As a result, over the last decade USAID has developed a land tenure and property rights conceptual framework that guides all of the Agency’s work in this sector. USAID’s ―Framework‖ (see http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts) defines our conceptualization of key concepts, such as land and resource tenure; linkages between resource access and rights, and key strategic objectives such as improved agricultural growth and trade, reduced conflict, and better natural resource management and biodiversity protection.

USAID’s Land Tenure and Property Rights ―Matrix‖ is the heart of the Framework. It condenses the range of tenure challenges to a manageable theoretical construct and offers illustrative programmatic interventions. The Agency has used the Framework and Matrix over the last several years. Field-based experience coupled with increasing new analytical demands has led to the development of a broader, more nuanced Framework and Matrix to identify and address additional natural resource access and rights challenges for other assets such as forests, wildlife, water and minerals.

Nevertheless, the Framework and Matrix will be further refined under STARR. Moreover, under the

STARR IQC, the Framework and Matrix will increasingly be called upon to programmatically address tenure challenges as they relate to new USG strategic objectives in promoting food security and adaptation to and mitigation of climate change.

USAID has also developed a set of tools to guide implementation of the Framework, including using them for conducting resource tenure assessments, developing programmatic interventions, and transferring knowledge on best practices and lessons learned to USG staff and host-country decision-makers through briefings, films, and training courses. Illustrative examples of these tools are found at http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts. While the Framework and associated tools will continue to be revised to reflect best practice, under this IQC they will continue to serve as the intellectual foundation for all resource tenure work implemented by USAID. Successful firms bidding on this contract must demonstrate technical understanding of and ability to contribute to (rather than replace or work outside

of) USAID’s Land Tenure and Property Rights Framework and Matrix (see http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts).

C. Resource Tenure in Key USG Strategic Objectives and IQC Technical Areas

This contractual mechanism will provide USAID Missions and operating units and their partners with a broad range of technical assistance in order to address complex tenure challenges. STARR IQC awardees shall utilize innovative and integrative approaches to address the array of challenges described within each of the following USG strategic objectives, as synthesized in III. Technical Areas, described thereafter:

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1. Food Security, Agriculture, Poverty and Economic Growth

Broadening access to productive natural resources and securing property rights are necessary conditions for achieving food security. These must go hand-in-hand with well-functioning markets, improved technology and affordable access to credit and finance. Tenure security is also necessary for addressing poverty and providing a safety net when markets fail, or when coping with political or environmental disasters. (See Land Tenure, Property Rights and Food Security Issue Brief, http://usaidlandtenure.net/usaidltprproducts/issue-briefs/issue-brief-land-tenure-property-rights-and-food-security-emerging-implications-for-usg-policies-and-programming/view).

Tenure security creates incentives for producers of all sizes and both sexes to make longer-term investments, to purchase or lease land, and to employ sound resource-use practices. In Africa, programs promoting tenure security have led to increased agricultural productivity, and in some cases, increased household income. A USAID land certification program in Ethiopia reduced land conflicts, promoted small-scale investments by smallholders, opened up more land for leasing to larger commercial enterprises, and reportedly, for male and female smallholders who received certificates, improved income.

Remarkably, women also reported that, as a result of receiving land certificates in their names, they were more empowered to say ―no‖ to husbands who they thought had been infected with HIV/AIDS, suggesting that women’s economic and legal empowerment is a powerful tool in reducing the incidence of high-risk behavior and the spread of this disease. This case is illustrative of how increased decision-making power over land and resources can also empower women to take affirmative action on other household matters. This is a departure from many patriarchal systems, where men are the de facto heads of household and play the predominant role in decision-making about household and community level land and resource use. Research from Nepal found that children of mothers who own land are significantly less likely to be severely underweight because those women are more likely to have control over household decisions. Similar evidence is emerging elsewhere (e.g., Uganda and South Africa) indicating secure property rights and property ownership can enhance women’s ability to mitigate the consequences and common interaction between HIV/AIDS and gender-based violence, providing safe recourse and healthy alternatives for livelihoods and accommodation. This suggests the need for greater emphasis on increasing women’s access and decision-making over land and property. In order for this to be successful, men must also be included in this process and educated on the household benefits associated with such reforms.

Land privatization in Ukraine following the collapse of the Soviet Union led to a measurable increase in the number of people leasing out land to medium- and larger-scale producers. In that country, land-lease markets are now functioning and although problems remain with lease payments, landowners have been able to increase household income through renting-out land. At the same time, producers with access to capital and technology have been able to lease-in land and increase agricultural productivity. Ukraine is a good example of a country successfully transitioning from one predominantly characterized by land held by the state to one where land is predominantly held by private interests. However, it remains to be seen if a broad section of the population has benefited from this transition or if most of the benefits have been captured by a few well-placed individuals. In Ukraine, land privatization and tenure security alone may not be enough to achieve greater food security at the household-level. Further legal reforms combined with improved access to markets will likely broaden the benefits of this privatization reform effort.

Similar land privatization programs in Moldova and Kyrgyzstan have also given large numbers of people in those two countries access and rights to productive assets.

Tenure constraints challenging improvement in economic growth and food security are not limited to

Africa or the former Soviet Union. Similar challenges exist in Latin America, the Near East, Asia and

Central Asia.

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Increasingly, donors and host-country governments will be pressed to more fully consider differences between theory and practice in achieving food security. Importantly, this includes the potential trade-offs between promoting national food security via investments in commercial production and achieving food security by promoting broader economic participation for larger segments of society. Presently, we are witnessing a remarkable transformation around the world as public and private interests seek to secure land for food and energy security, conservation and to access inputs for commercial products. If conducted halfheartedly, this process may contribute to political instability (e.g. Madagascar) and may not ultimately lead to increases in national food security. Conversely, this process might lead to gross increases in national food security while undermining household food security for specific segments of the population.

USAID expects that work done under this IQC will help the Agency to develop best practices that will foster investment and also broad participation in the benefits of investment by the individuals, communities and states that hold property rights or have access to natural resources.

However, to achieve this goal, USAID will require a better understanding of intra-household land tenure dynamics. Research on the Maragra sugar plantations in Mozambique found that women enjoy equal rights to access land under the law; but they lack decision-making power over land held under customary rules. This has precluded most women from making long-term commercial leases with investors.

The STARR IQC will support the Agency’s strategy for addressing food security. The US Government’s

Food Security Strategy (http://www.feedthefuture.gov/), ―Feed the Future,‖ (FTF) highlights secure property rights and access to land as key factors for increasing agricultural productivity and promoting investment and sustainable resource use. STARR will advance USAID’s Way Forward

(http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2010/fs101118.html) and best practice by building knowledge in the following areas: (i) the economic trade-offs between land use for carbon sequestration, expansion of agricultural activities and bio-fuel production; (ii) the advantages and disadvantages of existing, new and alternative land tenure models promoting increased food production, in particular ―corporate tenure,‖ out-grower schemes, and other group-farmer arrangements; (iii) cross-country analyses of common and interrelated tenure challenges within FTF Focus Countries and within particular regions; and (iv) the interrelationships and impacts of secure property rights on key focus areas within the FTF Strategy including: gender equality, empowerment of women, adoption of specific agricultural practices and inputs, access to rural financial services, engagement in producer organizations and improved water and soil quality. STARR will endeavor to systematically test our hypotheses on the linkages between tenure and economic growth, stabilization, food security, and climate change. The results of the research will then be used to further the development of tools and programmatic interventions in this key priority area.

2. Governance, Conflict Mitigation, Stability, Rule of Law, Resettlement

Land is a strategic socio-economic asset which can be both symbolically and emotionally important, thus making it a central element in both socio-economic and political contests. As such, land issues can be both causal and aggravating factors in conflict and instability. Some of the primary ways that land is linked to conflict include land tenure insecurity, competing claims and uses, land-holding inequities, displacement and return of populations, lack of recognition of customary systems, elite capture of land-related benefits and post-conflict transitional issues. At the same time, it is important to remember that land is frequently a critical element in peace-building and economic reconstruction in post-conflict situations.

When land lacks adequate legal, institutional and traditional/customary protection it becomes a valuable commodity easily subject to manipulation and abuse. Weak governance leads to weak tenure systems, often depriving individuals and communities of essential rights and access to land and other natural assets http://www.feedthefuture.gov/ http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2010/fs101118.html and also contributing to poor land and resource management practices, which further degrade the limited resource base. Evidence from Uganda suggests that land conflict and subsequent insecurity results in a

5% - 11% loss in agricultural productivity. Tenure insecurity is generally a result of rights that are overly limited in breadth and scope; too short in duration to recoup investment; conflicting (including competing or overlapping claims); and/or inadequate or unenforceable. When tenure is insecure, resources can be co-opted through illegitimate means and maximized for personal gain at the expense of others thus fomenting competition and conflict. Tenure insecurity discourages investment, undermines sustainable resource use and contributes to tension among those competing for or displaced from access to land and resource benefits.

Competition over land and its resources, whether for the same or different uses, is at the nexus between land and conflict. Competition can occur between any number and type of identity groups, whether based on ethnicity, religion, class, sex, gender or generation. When that competition involves groups of people, rather than individuals, the risk of larger-scale violence increases. Moreover, the risk of violent conflict increases when there are real or perceived gross inequities in land-holding patterns. Grievances over such inequities are often based on a deep sense of injustice and thus aggravate the risk of conflict. Land-holding inequities and the associated grievances of marginalized populations have been a root cause of conflict in Zimbabwe, Brazil, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Colombia and Guatemala.

The eruption of violent conflict, whether episodic or prolonged, usually causes significant changes to land tenure and its administration. In times of conflict, people may be indiscriminately or forcibly removed from their land, often without fair compensation or due process, or they may abandon their land because of fear of violence. Upon their return (sometimes after weeks, months or years of displacement), former owners often find others occupying their property and utilizing their land. The process of displacement and return due to violence (or the threat of violence) can be cyclical and often results in multiple claims to the same parcel of land. Competing claims can then spawn conflict due to weak, biased or nonexistent enforcement of land tenure regimes, whether customary or statutory. Displaced and marginalized populations, especially in a post-crisis context, are then forced to compete among themselves or with newly settled groups for access to land and productive assets for survival. In a post-crisis context, this sort of competition can lead to new rounds of violence and/or environmental destruction, exacerbating and spreading the initial crisis. This ―post-conflict conflict‖ phenomenon has been documented in many countries including Uganda, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic

Republic of Congo, Kyrgyzstan, East Timor, Colombia and Sri Lanka.

Women and vulnerable groups’ land and property rights are commonly the most negatively affected by war and displacement. This is due to their already weak status in society and their more limited bundle of rights to property. Women often gain access to land and property through natal and marital affiliations.

When this is severed due to the…