RFP_SOL-660-17-000001_amendment_02.pdf
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The purpose of this amendment 02 is to: 1) attach "TRANSITION OBJECTIVE 3 (TO 3) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT (PAD)"; and 2) extend the closing date of the RFP everywhere it appears from January 5, 2017 to January 9, 2017 by 16:00hrs Kinshasa time.
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TRANSITION OBJECTIVE 3 (TO 3) PROJECT APPRAISAL DOCUMENT (PAD)
Date of Final Draft: August 11, 2015 Lead Technical Office: Transition Objective 3 Period of Performance: August 11, 2015 – August 11, 2020 Project Design Leader: Michael Chelius Project Deputy Leader: Kai Beard
Contents
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
RESULTS FRAMEWORK
LIST OF SELECT ACRONYMS
BACKGROUND
RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRANSITION OBJECTIVE TO THE CDCS
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, DONOR AND GDRC PROGRAMS
SUMMARY PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Overview
Technical Approach
IR 3.1: Practical solutions to specific drivers of conflict identified and accepted
IR 3.2: Promising interventions to establish or solidify peace implemented
IR 3.3: Humanitarian and protection services provided
Geographic Targeting and Coordination
Map 1: CDCS TO 3 Geographic Targeting
Operating Principles
Management Plan
Assistance, Acquisitions, and Implementing Mechanisms
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
MONITORING AND EVALUATION PLAN AND LEARNING APPROACH
ANALYTICAL AND SUSTAINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS
Gender Analysis
Sustainability Analysis
Environmental Analyses
ANNEXES
Annex 2: CDCS Results Framework
Annex 3: Gender Analysis
Annex 4: Sustainability Analysis
Annex 8: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy 2013-2017 Executive Summary (October 28, 2013)
I. DIAGNOSIS
1. Conflict Analysis and Mapping
2. Policy and Programmatic Responses ISSSS First Phase (2008-2012)
3. The New Political and Strategic Environment
II. STRATEGIC CONCEPT
1. Defining ‘Stabilization’ in the DRC
2. Three-pronged Strategic Approach to Stabilization
3. Theories of Change for the Revised ISSSS
III. OPERATIONALIZATION
1. Operational Principles
2. Area-Based Stabilization Programming
3. Coordination
4. Monitoring and Evaluation
5. Strategic Communication
Annex 9: Conflict-sensitive Livelihoods and Food Security Concept
Annex 11: Geographic Targeting – Description of Analysis
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This Project Appraisal Document (PAD) authorizes the development assistance activities for the Transition Objective (TO) with an estimated total cost of $408 million from 2015-2019. This, combined with humanitarian assistance activities reaches an estimated total cost of $1 billion to achieve Transition Objective 3: “Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)”. The TO 3 project will undertake operations research to propose practical, implementable solutions to specific drivers of conflict (Intermediate Result 3.1 (IR 3.1). This research agenda and lessons learned from previous programs will inform USAID, GDRC and other donor activities at community, local, provincial, national, and regional (Great Lakes) levels to achieve sustainable peace and improve the quality of life (IR 3.2). Since not all conflict will be mitigated during this strategic period, USAID will also ensure that the humanitarian and protection needs of citizens are met (IR 3.3), while continuing to work on conflict mitigation and resolution. USAID will coordinate with other USG actors, Congolese stakeholders, and the international community to ensure complementarity with diplomatic engagement (IR 3.4) and security sector reform (IR 3.5) activities, both critical to achieving the TO goal but outside of USAID’s direct manageable interest.
The TO 3 region encompasses the provinces of North and South Kivu, northern Katanga, and parts of Orientale and Maniema. TO 3 development activities will be concentrated in the territories of Walungu, Kabare, and Kalehe in South Kivu and Masisi and Walikale in North Kivu in order to facilitate greater synergies amongst interventions, economies of scale, and impact. However, there may be rationale for some development programs to operate in additional or different areas. Stabilization and humanitarian activities will be conducted where there is an ascertained need. Analytic activities under IR 3.1 will be implemented throughout the TO area and at national and regional levels. There will likely be areas where some or all types of programs – humanitarian, stabilization, and development – operate given the fluidity of instability in eastern DRC.
Key elements of the TO 3 approach are:
• Programs designed and implemented with sensitivity to conflict dynamics;
• Improved coordination amongst technical sectors and humanitarian, stabilization, and development interventions;
• Integrated programming that achieves multi-sectoral results through joint planning, funding, and management;
• Greater alignment with Government of DRC (GDRC) provincial and territorial development and stabilization plans;
• Emphasis on GDRC involvement, local ownership, and linking community interventions to territorial and provincial interventions;
• Flexibility incorporated into programs to respond to changing conditions and opportunities;
• Strengthened quality of youth and women’s participation; and
• Improved learning and adapting.
After five years, demonstrable progress will be made if some of the following results are achieved in targeted areas:
• At least two new or existing Congolese organizations that received mentoring and support through TO 3 activities are able to independently produce public policy research and gendered conflict analysis and participate in mediation activities that help stabilize eastern DRC;
• Members of target communities understand their role in community improvement and are engaged in governance and community development decision making processes;
• Access to quality health, education, justice, and social protection services steadily increases;
• New possibilities for economic growth, beyond incremental improvements in subsistence agriculture, exist in targeted areas;
• Steady progress in establishment of responsible minerals trade as demonstrated by an increased number of validated artisanal mining sites in target areas;
• Decrease in number of children under two years of age suffering from malnutrition and fewer families suffering from food insecurity;
• Increase in women’s leadership and participation in governance, economic activities, and other key decision making processes;
• USAID supported women-led and women-focused civil society organizations participate in public policy debates and fill leadership roles in committees and processes;
• Vulnerable youth and ex-combatants learn skills and are able to make a living, thus reducing their interest in joining armed groups;
• Humanitarian, protection and early recovery activities respond effectively to needs and are increasingly linked to stabilization and development programs; and
• Reduction in need for humanitarian assistance and number of IDPs and refugees.
Illustrative high-level TO 3 indicators that may be monitored to indicate progress toward, and achievement of, the project objective are:
• Level of Humanitarian Assistance in target communities in eastern DRC (expressed as the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance);
• Level of social cohesion and resilience of target communities (measured by a Social Cohesion Assessment Tool);
• Country political stability and absence of violence point value score (measure by the World Bank);
• Public perceptions in target communities of security, justice, political and economic progress (as indicated by Harvard
Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) polling data); and
• Human Development Composite Score for target communities in eastern DRC. (Index could include composite of indicators from multiple sources and across sectors.)
RESULTS FRAMEWORK
3.1 Practical solutions to
specific drivers of conflict identified and accepted.
3.1.1 Strengthened
capacity of Congolese organizations to conduct policy-oriented operations research.
3.1.2 Increased context-
specific data, analysis, and research on drivers of conflict in target areas.
3.1.3 Improved
mechanisms to agree on proposed solutions to conflict.
3.2 Promising
interventions to establish or solidify peace implemented.
3.2.1 Increased
community engagement in conflict resolution, recovery and peacebuilding activities.
3.2.2 Strengthened
resilience through increased availability of services and enhanced economic activity.
3.2.3 Increased
women’s participation in developing and implementing solutions for peace and security.
3.3 Humanitarian and
protection services provided.
3.3.1 Life-saving
assistance delivered to newly displaced persons.
3.3.2 Early recovery activities
provided to restore livelihoods and basic living conditions for conflict-affected populations in target areas of eastern DRC.
3.3.3 Strengthened community-
based prevention of and response to sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).
TO 3: Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern DRC
3. 4 A political agreement to peace in eastern DRC is established and implemented.
3. 5 Comprehensive security sector reform is initiated.
LIST OF SELECT ACRONYMS
ADF Allied Democratic Forces (armed group) ALPs Alternative Learning Programs C-LRA Programs to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army CAROU USAID Central Africa Regional Operating Unit (based in Kinshasa) CARPE USAID Central African Regional Program for the Environment DCA Development Credit Authority agreements DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration DFID United Kingdom Department for International Development DRL State/Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor FDLR Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (armed group) GDA Global Development Alliances GDRC Government of the DRC HHI Harvard Humanitarian Initiative I4S International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy ICGLR International Conference on the Great Lakes Region IDPs Internally Displaced Persons INL State/Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement IR Intermediate Result MONUSCO United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC OCHA UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs PSCF Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework PRM State/Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration S/GWI State/Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues SSU MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit STAREC GDRC Plan/Office for Stabilization and Reconstruction of Zones Affected by Conflict
SGBV Sexual and Gender-Based Violence RMT Responsible Minerals Trade WPS Women, Peace, and Security
BACKGROUND
Eastern DRC has remained volatile for the last 20 years. Between 1996 and 2003, the DRC experienced two wars in which nine foreign armies and over thirty armed groups clashed within its borders. Since 2003, conflict has continued periodically in various parts of the east. The signing of the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSCF) in Addis Ababa in February 2013 between eleven African countries and four regional bodies, accompanied by the appointment of high-level international envoys to the region, created a sense of optimism within the international community that the prospects for peace were the highest they had been in years. The PSCF provides an opportunity to galvanize local, regional, and international players to take a renewed look at finding solutions to underlying issues and recognizes that changing the political and economic dynamic between the DRC and its eastern neighbors is essential to lasting peace. However, the long list of previous peace agreements and continued conflict tempers the optimism that the PSCF will achieve lasting results.
Research on fragile states has shown that post-conflict countries have a much higher tendency to fall back into conflict than stable ones1. Transitioning to a normal development trajectory, marked by inclusive growth, takes a long time and strong political leadership to prevent a return to conflict and fragility. This accentuates the challenges in the DRC where political dialogue processes have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and leadership or because they did not address the fundamental grievances that prompted the conflict. One major finding of the USAID-funded DRC Gender Assessment is that, despite considerable activism, women’s attendance at peace negotiations has been minimal, and they have had virtually no role in decision making. Fostering leadership and enhancing the quality of the participation of women, particularly to play a decision-making role in peace processes from the community to international levels, will be essential if the DRC is to make progress towards a democracy that is representative of its population and embraces citizen’s aspirations for peaceful, participatory, sustainable development.
Previous efforts to stabilize eastern DRC have mostly been unsuccessful. Both formal and informal evaluations and assessments identified both problems and successes with the implementation of the first phase of the Stabilization et Reconstruction des Zones Sortant des Conflits Armés (STAREC) program and the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S) that need to be considered.
Despite some positive developments, much of eastern DRC remains marked by continued instability. Although M23 was routed in December 2013, the lack of an effective Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) program, delays in neutralizing the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), and a variety of new armed groups establishing themselves resulted in ongoing insecurity in certain zones of eastern DRC with some internally displaced persons
1 Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Måns Söderbom, Post-Conflict Risks, Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, August, 2006
(IDP) still being forced to move around the region. The return of Congolese refugees from neighboring countries and the influx of refugees and asylum seekers from Burundi, combined with decentralization and plans for Presidential and local elections in 2016, could bring further instability.
Nonetheless, some areas have been relatively stable for several years and communities are eager to engage in productive activities and return to normalcy. Production of limited quantities of high quality export crops (cacao in North Kivu, coffee in South and North Kivu) shows that given appropriate technical interventions it may be possible to lift families out of poverty and put them on a path to sustainable growth. While conflict over land and minerals remains acute in certain places, the existence of 100 certified and validated conflict free mining sites where people are beginning to increase their incomes shows that progress is possible. However, ongoing hostility about expanding industrial and certified mines demonstrates that vested interests can still be threatened despite efforts for improvement.
In 2014 there was a shift in the discourse between Congolese and development partners on approaches to achieve lasting peace in eastern DRC. Many Congolese highlighted the need to focus on development interventions and economic growth opportunities in addition to conflict mitigation and stabilization activities. Although there remain large areas of instability, there is a sense that the proper coordination of humanitarian, stabilization and development interventions in targeted areas is paramount for the establishment of peace and security in the region. The approach to achieving TO 3 detailed in this PAD was developed taking into account the shift in discourse and the experience described above.
RELATIONSHIP OF THE TRANSITION OBJECTIVE TO THE CDCS
TO 3 contributes to USAID/DRC’s CDCS goal of a “long-term transition to more effective and empowering development in the DRC” by: seeking solutions to the drivers of conflict to create a basis for peace, improved governance, and economic development;
implementing a variety of interventions to establish or solidify peace; and ensuring that humanitarian and protection services are maintained in the volatile eastern part of the DRC.
The TO development hypothesis is: When practical solutions to the specific drivers of conflict are identified and accepted and appropriate responses are implemented, coupled with steady progress in citizens’ basic needs being addressed, then USAID will have contributed to strengthening the foundation for durable peace in the eastern DRC. Underlying this hypothesis is a need for political agreements to be implemented and security sector reform to be underway. While a foundation for peace can be established without these last two elements, it will not be durable in their absence. Little will change and no durable transition out of crisis can be expected. Significant political will and engagement of both the GDRC and international actors will be necessary. To achieve effective and empowering development, many different Congolese actors must play key roles in shaping peace processes.
USAID/DRC’s three CDCS objectives2 have overlapping and mutually reinforcing objectives and interventions that can aid in breaking down the barriers to coordination across technical sectors that are typical in a conflict environment. USAID/DRC’s cross-sectoral approach to helping national institutions implement their mandates will contribute to TO 3’s stability objectives in eastern DRC. TO 3 activities that focus on research and analysis will inform local as well as national-level programs. While TO 3 will focus primarily on local and community level activities in eastern DRC, it will also target important national level institutions and programs that are critical to peace and stability in the region and overarching peace processes, such as the PSCF. Many awards under this project will also contribute to both DO 1 and DO 2 objectives.
RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, DONOR AND GDRC PROGRAMS
USAID’s CDCS is fully incorporated into the FY 2015-2017 U.S. Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) for the DRC. USAID activities under the TO contribute directly to Objective 7 of Foundation for durable peace strengthened in eastern DRC. The ICS also includes activities implemented by various diplomatic and defense sections of the U.S. Embassy that contribute to ICS Objective 3, Comprehensive security sector reform is implemented, as well as two TO IRs outside of USAID’s direct manageable interest, IR 3.4:
A political agreement for peace in eastern DRC is established and implemented and IR 3.5: Comprehensive security sector reform (SSR) is initiated.
USAID co-leads, with the Department of State, an interagency working group focused on eastern DRC. The group fosters coordination between TO 3 and activities implemented by other USG agencies active in the region, including the Department of Defense and various sections of the State Department such as: the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM), the Secretary's Office of Global Women's Issues (S/GWI), the Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, and the Office of Security Cooperation. A number of linkages exist between the TO and other USG activities including the appropriate deployment of INL trainees as mine police or election security providers. USAID programs also will help reintegrate demobilized soldiers or members of armed groups when the demobilization and disarmament is assisted by another agency.
2 See Annex 2 for full Results Framework
TO 3 activities will be coordinated with and support MONUSCO diplomatic and stabilization initiatives. The USG funds nearly 30 percent (approx. $430 million) of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), which has a lead role in stabilization activities in the DRC. USAID supported the revision of the 2008 International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (I4S3) through a grant to the MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit (SSU). MONUSCO and the GDRC have defined stabilization in the revised I4S as “an integrated, holistic but targeted process of enabling state and society to build mutual accountability and capacity to address and mitigate existing or emerging drivers of violent conflict, creating the conditions for improved governance and longer term development.” Working with MONUSCO and through donor coordination mechanisms, USAID activities will be aligned with STAREC provincial stabilization strategies as well as the GDRC’s DDR plan.
TO 3 will also collaborate with the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) as well as the World Bank, Sweden, and the Netherlands among others to address stabilization and conflict issues. TO 3 will also partner with USAID’s Central Africa Regional Operating Unit (based at the bilateral mission in Kinshasa), which includes the Central African Regional Program for the Environment (CARPE), support to the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), and programs to counter the Lord’s Resistance Army (c-LRA).
SUMMARY PROJECT DESCRIPTION
Overview
The TO 3 project will undertake operations research to propose practical, implementable solutions to specific drivers of conflict (IR 3.1). This research agenda and lessons learned from previous programs will inform USAID activities to achieve sustainable peace and improve the quality of life (IR 3.2). Since not all conflict will be mitigated during this strategic period, USAID will also ensure that the humanitarian and protection needs of citizens are met (IR 3.3), while continuing to work on conflict mitigation and resolution.
USAID will engage with other USG actors, Congolese stakeholders and the international community to ensure complementarity of diplomatic engagement (IR 3.4) and security sector reform (IR 3.5) activities.
Key elements of the approach are:
• Programs designed and implemented with sensitivity to conflict dynamics;
• Improved coordination amongst technical sectors and humanitarian, stabilization and development interventions;
3 See Annex 8: International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy 2013-2017 Executive Summary
• Integrated programming that achieves multi-sectoral results through joint planning, funding, and management;
• Greater alignment with Government of DRC (GDRC) provincial and territorial development and stabilization plans;
• Emphasis on GDRC involvement, local ownership, and linking community interventions to territorial and provincial interventions;
• Flexibility built into programs to respond to changing conditions and opportunities;
• Strengthened quality of youth and women’s participation; and
• Improved learning and adapting over the course of project implementation.
After five years, demonstrable progress will be made if some of the following results are achieved in targeted areas:
• At least two new or existing Congolese organizations that received mentoring and support through TO 3 activities are able to independently produce public policy research and gendered conflict analysis and participate in mediation activities that help stabilize eastern DRC;
• Members of target communities understand their role in community improvement and are engaged in governance and community development decision making processes;
• Access to quality health, education, justice, and social protection services steadily increases;
• New possibilities for economic growth, beyond incremental improvements in subsistence agriculture, exist in targeted areas;
• Steady progress in establishment of responsible minerals trade as demonstrated by an increased number of validated artisanal mining sites in target areas;
• Decrease in number of children under two years of age suffering from malnutrition and fewer families suffering from food insecurity;
• Increase in women’s leadership and participation in governance, economic activities, and other key decision making processes;
• USAID supported women-led and women-focused civil society organizations participate in public policy debates and fill leadership roles in committees and processes;
• Vulnerable youth and ex-combatants learn skills and are able to make a living, thus reducing their interest in joining armed groups;
• Humanitarian, protection, and early recovery activities respond effectively to needs and are increasingly linked to stabilization and development programs; and
• Reduction in need for humanitarian assistance and number of IDPs and refugees.
Illustrative high-level TO 3 indicators that may be monitored to indicate progress toward, and achievement of, the project objective are:
• Level of Humanitarian Assistance in target communities in eastern DRC (expressed as the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance);
• Level of social cohesion and resilience of target communities (measured by a Social Cohesion Assessment Tool);
• Country political stability and absence of violence point value score (measure by the World Bank);
• Public perceptions in target communities of security, justice, political and economic progress (as indicated by Harvard Humanitarian Initiative (HHI) polling data); and
• Human Development Composite Score for target communities in eastern DRC. (Index will include composite of indicators from multiple sources and across sectors.)
Technical Approach
IR 3.1: Practical solutions to specific drivers of conflict identified and accepted.
While practical solutions to drivers of conflict can be identified by outsiders they will only be accepted when a Congolese voice is central to analysis and dialogue.
IR 3.1 Illustrative indicators:
• Number of studies published or conference presentations produced by Congolese researchers dedicated to resolving conflict as a result of USG assistance.
• Number of consensus building forums dedicated to resolving conflict.
3.1.1: Strengthened capacity of Congolese organizations to conduct policy-oriented operations research.
Despite the many years of chronic conflict and instability in the DRC, the voice of Congolese analysts on the causes of conflict and potential solutions has been largely invisible. Most analysis emanates from a few external organizations located outside of the country.
These organizations disseminate their research through publications, public events, electronic media, and other communication tools mainly externally. Currently there are a limited number of registered organizations in DRC who aspire to become “think tanks,” capable of producing research and analysis to influence decision making and public opinion in the DRC and the region.
Approaches under this sub-IR include the following:
● Development of partnerships between nascent Congolese and international research organizations: TO 3 will support partnerships matching an experienced outside organization with an aspiring local organization to work on topics related to drivers of conflict in eastern DRC. The outside organization will serve as an expert mentor responsible for upgrading their partner’s capacity to become internationally recognized as capable.
● Local capacity development of existing or aspiring Congolese research institutes: TO 3 will select a small number of local organizations that demonstrate an existing record of accomplishment or strong potential as policy research organizations. These organizations will be given organizational development support as well as technical capacity building in order to expand the number of credible local organizations that can provide analysis and/or mediation services between governments and other stakeholders in the region.
Illustrative interventions:
Most interventions below will be conducted through: Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, the new Solutions for Peace and Recovery (SPR) Program, MONUSCO Stabilization Support Unit (SSU) / STAREC Support, Data Collection on Peace Consolidation and Reconstruction in the DRC Polling / Data Collection Program), and the Community Recovery and Livelihoods Program (CRLP).
● Linking international research institutes and Congolese partners to conduct joint activities on common research projects.
● Congolese think tank capacity development through exposure to international experts to conduct ongoing coaching on research and dissemination techniques;
● Support for regional exchanges between research institutes in Kinshasa, Goma, Bukavu, and elsewhere;
● Training on techniques for conflict analysis, conflict mediation, political economy analysis, and social science statistical analysis;
● Training on organizational management, internal governance, strategic planning, fundraising, and communications;
● Networking and advocacy between Congolese research institutes and DRC decision makers at local, provincial, and national level to disseminate high quality research and analysis.
Illustrative indicators:
● Number of capacity building interventions held with Congolese organizations focused on policy-oriented operations research.
● Number of Congolese organization’s staff members trained to conduct qualitative and quantitative social science research and analysis related to drivers of conflict.
● Number of new groups or initiatives created, dedicated to resolving conflict.
3.1.2: Increased context-specific data, analysis, and research on drivers of conflict.
Although significant knowledge in this area already exists, there still is a need to develop a deeper and more contextualized understanding of key actors, power dynamics, and emerging political developments. This includes examining key actors’ history during various conflicts, their roles in reintegration, the role of militias, their fundamental divisions, loyalties, and alliances between themselves and other leaders, and the identification of new and emerging players. This research will also differentiate political grievances of armed groups from those who have a purely criminal agenda. Conflict and peace-building studies from other countries and regions can help identify some of the relevant triggers or factors to assess.
Other research topics may include: What is the relationship, if any, between the provision of basic services to communities and recruitment into armed groups? Is the lack of services, such as education, a driver of conflict? Does increased economic activity and related decreases in extreme poverty reduce the chance of conflict restarting? What are women and men looking for from the state versus services that can come from other sources? Who is profiting from illicit trade? Who are the “winners and losers” when conflict-free mineral supply chains are established? What impact does mining concession development have on local conflict dynamics? What are effective solutions to land conflict? What drives recruitment into local armed groups? What are effective approaches for reintegrating ex-combatants into communities? How does decentralization affect stability?
Emerging think tank or public policy institutions targeted under TO 3.1.1 will do the analysis, organize a debate around critical issues, and propose solutions. In the Congolese context, it may be difficult initially to identify credible and impartial organizations to play such a role. Thus, TO 3 may initially work with external organizations to do analysis and mediation while improving Congolese capacity to manage such processes in the future. Ultimately, local organizations will help to bridge the gap between the academic, policy-making, business, and civil society communities through the generation of policy-oriented research and analysis. Researchers will be paired with practitioners so that when a conflict driver is understood, practical solutions to resolve it can be identified, and the appropriate mechanism or process for getting stakeholder buy-in can be established. Identifying gender advocates and experts who can participate in this process will be a priority.
Approaches under this sub-IR will include the following:
● Operations research to identify specific drivers of conflict and potential practical solutions that will involve local, national, regional, and international researchers, practitioners, and diplomats. The operations research will assess to what extent certain factors either cause or reduce the outbreak of conflict and could range from participatory rapid appraisals to in-depth fieldwork.
● Public opinion polling to estimate public attitudes on issues of conflict, peace, justice, governance, and security and how they change over time.
● Thematic research to examine, for example, who is profiting from illicit trade; the role of mining concession development in local conflict dynamics; land tenure issues and interim solutions; drivers of recruitment into local armed groups; governance and decentralization to address grievances of minority ethnic groups; refugee and IDP returns; ex-combatant reintegration; and local coping strategies.
● Geographic-specific research to examine areas at high risk for potential violent conflict but also areas with increased potential for development.
● Support for quarterly public opinion polling data on access to security and justice services and community attitudes towards post-war social reconstruction. (Data Collection on Peace Consolidation and Reconstruction in the DRC (Polling / Data Collection Program))
● Assistance to the MONUSCO SSU for I4S revision and to conduct provincial and territorial conflict assessments. (SSU / STAREC Support)
● Efforts to identify critical development challenges in DRC, inform solutions through data collection and analysis, scale promising solutions to magnify positive impacts, and expand the global network of problem solvers. (Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, SPR, and CRLP)
● Congolese public policy research on provincial conflict drivers in extractive industries and links to political power centers and armed groups. (Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, SPR, and CRLP)
● Research on why youth join or leave armed groups. (Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, SPR, and CRLP)
● Participatory action research in target communities in North and South Kivu to develop conflict response mechanisms. (SPR and
CRLP)
● Analysis of causes of and trends in armed group violence, including sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and other human rights violations. (Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, and SPR)
● Research, in collaboration with ICGLR, to identify and address the regional causes of conflict. (Congo Peace Center / Texas
A&M, SPR)
Illustrative indicators:
● Number of conflict/fragility assessments or response mechanisms supported by USG assistance.
● Number of participatory community conflict analyses conducted.
● Number of cases or geographic areas where internationally accepted conflict analysis tools are selected and applied.
● Number of thematic sub-sector specific research products to inform policy and programming.
3.1.3: Improved mechanisms to agree on proposed solutions to conflict.
The third pillar to achieving this IR is to share and agree upon potential solutions to identified conflict drivers. Activities must extend beyond academic publications to peacebuilding forums and advocacy involving decision makers and ordinary citizens. Given the complexity national and regional nature of the conflict in eastern DRC, there must be consensus among actors at local, provincial, and national levels in the DRC, as well as the Great Lakes Region, in order to develop lasting solutions.
Approaches under this sub-IR may include:
● Dissemination of research and raising awareness: This includes publication of research reports and organization of events to present findings and recommendations.
● Multi-stakeholder civil society and government networking and advocacy: As a part of provincial or local processes, support for workshops or other bodies that meet on a regular basis composed of government, civil society, and other stakeholders to address key issues such as ethnic group representation in local elections or land conflict related to contested tenure and competing rights.
● Geographic-specific forums, workshops, and dialogue processes: Support for events and processes to discuss results of research, public opinion polls, conflict analysis, and participatory action research in key geographic areas of DRC and regionally.
● Media and public awareness activities: Sharing of information and analysis on drivers of conflict and recommendations through increased access to information in eastern DRC and across the region. This may include local radio, print media, new electronic media, and traditional forms of storytelling and participatory theater.
● TO 3 Advisory Group: As described later in this document, the TO Team will create an informal advisory group for validation of research, potential solutions and geographic priorities. This group will serve as a resource for USAID/DRC and its partners and provide expert peer review, vetting, and recommendations on addressing drivers of conflict.
Most interventions below will be conducted under: Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M, SPR, SSU / STAREC Support, the Polling / Data Collection Program, and CRLP.
● Public events in Kinshasa and provincial capitals to present the findings and recommendations of thematic or geographic research/scholarship;
● Small grants to enable civil society organizations to engage in peace processes based on expert research, analysis, and recommendations;
● Community forums bringing together local administrative and customary officials with local citizens to identify common areas of concern;
● Support for activities implemented by local peace committees resulting from participatory action research;
● National or provincial decrees to implement policy recommendations resulting from research on key issues such as citizenship and rights of return;
● Series of activities on women, peace and security (WPS) issues to create a network and policy platform on practical means for women to advance the peace process;
● Holding Advisory Group meetings every four months to review research produced, assess priority geographic areas, and offer programmatic recommendations;
● Public awareness campaign using radio call-in shows and listeners’ groups to allow public debate on addressing drivers of conflict.
Illustrative indicators:
● Number of events, training, or activities designed to build support for peace or reconciliation among key actors to the conflict.
● Number of consensus building forums held.
● Number of public policies introduced, adopted, repealed, changed or implemented consistent with citizen input.
● Percentage of the population involved in dialogue to find solutions for insecurity and instability at community level.
IR 3.2: Promising interventions to establish or solidify peace implemented.
A variety of recovery and conflict prevention efforts are required when acute conflict dissipates and before stability is achieved.
Employing solutions and lessons learned in IR 3.1 and during the last decade of implementation, IR 3.2 incorporates transitional/stabilization and development activities, and increased participation of community members, particularly women and girls, in decision making, peacebuilding, and economic life. Where communities or geographic regions show their readiness to move into traditional development, the interventions will be different than in zones where conflict persists. Conflict-sensitivity and increased citizen engagement in governance and decision making processes are essential elements of all interventions under 3.2.
Sub-IR 3.2.1 focuses on increasing community engagement in conflict resolution, recovery and peacebuilding, putting into practice practical solutions to conflict and re-establishing social cohesion and positive connections between citizens and government. Activities under sub-IR 3.2.2 support conflict resolution and peacebuilding efforts by increasing citizen engagement in governance and development through the availability of basic and social protection services, such as health and education, and enhanced economic activity. Finally because building a foundation for sustained peace must involve the active participation of women, sub-IR 3.2.3 will increase women’s participation in developing and implementing solutions for peace and security. The approach to sub-IR 3.2.3 will empower women to capture opportunities to engage as change agents at the community and provincial levels as well as throughout the Great Lakes Region.
The approach to each sub-IR is described below. In addition, a more detailed description of the Conflict-Sensitive Livelihoods and Food Security Program that integrates activities and funding from Food for Peace (FFP), Health, Economic Growth and Peace and Stability is attached in Annex 9.
IR 3.2 Illustrative indicators:
● Number of participatory local mechanisms in which citizens engage local authorities to address community needs.
● Number of individuals benefiting from enhanced livelihood activities.
● Number of new groups or initiatives created or strengthened that are dedicated to resolving conflict.
● Number of local women participating in a substantive role or position in peacebuilding processes.
● Proportion of females who report increased self-efficacy at the conclusion of training/programming.
3.2.1 Increased community engagement in conflict resolution, recovery and peacebuilding.
USAID/DRC has considerable experience with a variety of activities involving communities, local governments, and other stakeholders over the last 10 years, and under the previous I4S. One lesson is that addressing conflict drivers through resolution and recovery processes and fostering political inclusion is important to building lasting peace. Over time, that means building institutions that are representative, effective, and protective of all citizens. It is better to prevent crises by addressing communities’ grievances before they take up arms than to try to contain them later.
The approach to achieve this sub-IR will focus on increasing community engagement in conflict resolution, recovery, and peacebuilding; implementing practical solutions to conflict; and re-establishing social cohesion and positive connections between citizens and government.
The restoration or establishment of state authority and the promotion of good governance are frequently cited as needed to stabilize eastern DRC, and this commonly refers to local administration, security (police), justice, and prisons. Responsive and effective state authority is absent from most of the DRC and requires the GDRC to make commitments for recurring costs that it has been unable to fulfill. Thus, it is anticipated that empowering communities to play a stronger role to address their own needs or to interact with the government will best lead to achievement of the sub-IR.
The approach includes flexible response interventions meant to give government some credibility and recover from and prevent conflict such as inter-ethnic cultural and sports competitions, community dialogues, and assistance to local government to reestablish and improve operations. The approach also includes strengthening the capacity of community peace structures and local NGOs to resolve conflict, working with local development committees to identify and address community needs, and improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of government through the use of participatory budgeting among other interventions.
• Improve the capacity of community groups to mitigate conflicts over land, natural resources exploitation, inheritance, and local power disputes as well as establish sustainable management systems. (CARPE, CRLP, Integrated Governance Activity (IGA), Conflict-Free Supply Chain Infrastructure and Regulatory Reform (IOM))
• Flexible response activities to help communities prevent or recover from conflict such as administrative support to local government or community authorities, dialogue between ethnic groups, and small-scale peacebuilding activities. (CRLP, SPR, SSU / STAREC Support, Congo Peace Center / Texas A&M)
• Support implementation of the GDRC DDR program through the reintegration of children formerly associated with armed groups, negotiation to secure their release, and the prevention of future recruitment as well as the targeting of flexible response activities to communities reintegrating former combatants. (CLRP, SPR, and Child Protection and DDR Program)
• Strengthen community development committees to facilitate community dialogue and development of community development plans. (CRLP, FFP, and IGA)
• Improve citizen-government relations through training in public financial management and inclusive, integrated local development planning. (IGA, SPR, and CRLP)
• Introduce ‘community scorecards’ to increase government accountability for performance. (SPR, CRLP, and IGA)
• Increase the capacity and reach of community radio stations, and conduct journalism training to enhance the relationship between local officials and communities. (Media Support Development Program (MSDP))
• Facilitate multi-stakeholder groups to conduct dialogue between government, industry, and civil society on promoting conflict-free responsible minerals trade. (CBRMT, Public Private Alliance for Responsible Minerals Trade)
• Strengthen the ICGLR’s operational and strategic planning capacity so it can better conduct regional conflict analysis and mitigation initiatives. (Capacity Building for Responsible Minerals Trade (CBRMT))
• Provide civic and voter education, with specific attention to historically excluded communities and an emphasis on peaceful participation in local, provincial, and national elections. (Congo Demokrasia Voter Education Program)
• Strengthen capacity of election observation efforts to provide early warning of conflict in volatile locations. (Election Monitoring
Program)
Illustrative indicators:
• Inclusion of most vulnerable groups in decision-making at the community level.
• Change in public perception of GDRC performance in targeted communities.
• Number of groups trained in conflict mediation/resolution skills or consensus building techniques.
• Number of ethnicity/community-based violent incidents (Violence Gravity Assessment tool, integrated by incident reports).
• Number of community development plans created.
• Number of community development projects implemented.
• Number of community structures with activities to support citizen engagement in local governance, conflict resolution, and services.
• Number of previously existing land and natural resource-based conflicts resolved with fair outcomes for the most vulnerable populations and local communities.
3.2.2 Strengthened resilience through increased availability of services and enhanced economic activity.
Increased fulfillment of the compact between the GDRC and its citizens to provide access to quality services and livelihood opportunities is essential to community well-being and builds resilience to conflict. The improved provision of basic services is a prerequisite for long term peace and the enhancement of the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of its citizens. Improving food security and enhancing economic growth is essential, given that almost all of the population of eastern DRC is more vulnerable than other Congolese because of the history of conflict, repeated loss of assets, and difficulties accessing markets. Achieving this sub-IR will require more of a development focus than has been the norm for many programs in eastern DRC.
The approach to this sub-IR will include education, health, family planning, social service, water, sanitation, nutrition, and food security activities. These activities will be adapted to the particular challenges and opportunities of eastern DRC. For example, education programming will be responsive to the post conflict situation and may support accelerated, alternative learning programs (ALPs), centres de rattrapage scolaire (CRSs) and centres d'apprentissage professionel (CAPs) to facilitate the social-economic reinsertion of out-of-school and war-affected youth in the Kivus. To maximize the potential for economic growth, a concentrated effort will be made to coordinate and link FFP development programs with health, Feed the Future (FTF), and other funding to create synergies and build momentum that can bring people out of acute poverty and set them on a path toward sustained income growth.
New technologies will be piloted and adopted where feasible including new business models for the provision of social services. On land adjacent to protected areas, new income-generating activities including agriculture, sustainable use of forest products, or tourism will be tested. Activities to improve access to financial services also will be explored.
Given the importance of mining in eastern DRC, the approach also will include innovative public-private partnerships and Global Development Alliances (GDA) with mining companies and other private firms. These partnerships will develop new livelihood opportunities for artisanal miners in agricultural production, marketing, and processing as well as mining-related services. In addition, efforts to certify and validate artisanal mine sites as conflict-, child labor-, trafficking in persons (TIP)-free locations to ensure that minerals produced can be traded internationally will be linked to other governance improvements in the mining sector at provincial, national and regional levels including work with the ICGLR.
To the extent possible, health, education, economic growth, democracy, rights and governance, and food security programming will be implemented in the same geographic areas to enable synergy. However, in addition to operating in these same geographic areas, the governance, community mobilization, and peacebuilding intervention under sub-IR 3.2.1 will be conducted in locations beyond the reach of sub-IR 3.2.2 health, education, and economic growth programming. Also, where appropriate, linkages will be made with OFDA and FFP humanitarian activities to ease the transition from humanitarian response to stabilization and development.
Illustrative Interventions:
• Training to strengthen the capacity of local government actors responsible for delivering public services including healthcare, education, and economic development. (Integrated Health Program (IHP), IGA, and Food for Peace Development Programs
(FFP))
•…
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