Attachment_J.1_-_STATEMENT_OF_OBJECTIVES_(SOO).pdf

ATTACHMENT J.1. STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

Program Title: Afghanistan’s Measure for AccouNtability and Transparency (AMANAT)

1 SCOPE

This SOO describes the objectives of USAID/Afghanistan for an anti- corruption activity that will improve the performance, legitimacy, and capacity of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). This SOO is provided in lieu of a U.S. Government (USG) written statement of work (SOW) in that it does not state how the work is to be accomplished, but provides potential offerors with the flexibility to develop cost-effective solutions and the opportunity to propose innovative approaches to meet the stated objectives.

Based on this SOO, a Performance Work Statement (PWS) must be submitted that describes the approach to achieve the objectives of the activity. The PWS must enable USAID to assess the performance of the work against specific, clear, and measurable performance standards (i.e., in terms of quality, quantity, timeliness, etc.) and show the method of assessing contractor performance against the performance standards.

2 PURPOSE

The purpose of AMANAT is to reduce and prevent corruption in government public services. AMANAT means “entrusted” in both Dari and Pashto.

Interventions will strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the government and improve service delivery to the Afghan people. This activity will:

1) Strengthen Afghan non-governmental and governmental institutions in identifying vulnerabilities to corruption in the delivery of public services and developing corresponding recommendations to address these vulnerabilities.

2) Support select Afghan government institutions with technical and financial assistance to plan for and implement procedural reforms based on those recommendations.

3) Strengthen local CSOs capacity to test and monitor the effectiveness of those reforms and to advocate for their implementation where necessary.

AMANAT is meant to complement USAID’s current support of the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC) in carrying its mandate to identify corruption issues through the Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment (VCA) process and to develop recommendations to address these issues. In addition AMANAT is designed to build on and scale up anti-corruption interventions currently being carried out by the USAID-funded Advancing Effective Reforms for Civic Accountability (AERCA)1 project, which focuses on streamlining business processes2 related to the delivery of key public services and strengthening civil society monitoring efforts.

3 BACKGROUND

Transparency International’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Afghanistan 166 out of the 168 countries and territories assessed.3 Next to North Korea, Afghanistan is the worst performer in the Asia Pacific region. Corruption poses a serious threat to Afghanistan’s state-building and development.

Corruption pervades virtually every aspect of government operations and the daily life of citizens in Afghanistan. Organized and entrenched corruption involving networks in Afghanistan’s political upper echelon as well as pervasive petty corruption has become the norm. The direct financial costs as well as the distortions and inefficiencies resulting from corrupt practices pose a serious threat to Afghanistan’s development agenda. Perceptions of persistent and systematic corruption further undermine the credibility and perceived legitimacy of the government and fuel widespread resentment. According to a recent survey of the Afghan people, corruption, unemployment, and insecurity were the greatest issues of concern and causes for pessimism towards the current Government among Afghans.4

In a 2014 report, Integrity Watch Afghanistan (IWA) noted that the complexity of bureaucratic procedures, coupled with citizens’ lack of information about these procedures, contributes to the spread of bribery and other types of corruption. Citizens accessing many public services, including healthcare, employment, admission to schools, and electricity, had to pay bribes.5 Bribes are also paid to register property, start a business, transfer work location, or build a home. Entrance to state universities may require a bribe and additional payments help secure grades and even degrees. Citizens pay officials to obtain a driver’s license and avoid traffic violation infractions. Corruption in tax administration reduces effective revenue collection and has spawned elaborate schemes to steal the little revenue collected.

Citizens that pay bribes do so out of desperation for obtaining public services and report having negative feelings about paying bribes and officials demanding bribes.6

1 Previously known as the Afghanistan Elections Reform and Civic Advocacy (AERCA) activity. This activity’s period of performance ends June 30, 2017.

2 Business processes refer to a collection of tasks, organized activities, and/or structures which at the end allow for the delivery of services to a customer, i.e. Afghan citizens.

3 Afghanistan scored 11 on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean) on TI’s 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index.

4 The Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People.

5 Id.

6 Integrity Watch Afghanistan, National Corruption Survey 2014, p. 4.

Current and Past USAID Interventions

USAID has supported numerous activities aimed at preventing, reducing, and mitigating corruption across its development portfolio. Currently, USAID/Afghanistan is funding activities that focus on improving the delivery of public services by reducing or eliminating opportunities for corruption in the delivery of these services. Toward this end, USAID is supporting the MEC’s efforts to generate vulnerability to corruption assessments (VCA) that identify corrupt practices and provide recommendations for curing those practices. USAID currently has a five-year agreement, starting in May 2015, with the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to fund the MEC’s technical efforts. The Afghanistan Civic Engagement Program (ACEP) supports civil society organizations to raise awareness of, monitor, and report on corrupt practices.

The AERCA project, ending in June 2017, provides technical assistance and financial support to government entities to plan and implement reforms recommended by VCAs; and supports watchdog efforts by civil society organizations (CSOs) to test and monitor the implementation of those reforms and to advocate their implementation in instances where target government entities fail to follow through on implementation of reforms.

USAID’s current anti-corruption activities and the AMANAT activity build on USAID assistance provided through the Assistance for Afghanistan’s Anti-Corruption Authority (4A) Project, which ended in November 2013. 4A provided technical assistance to the High Office of Oversight and Anti- Corruption (HOOAC) and trained the HOOAC’s Corruption Prevention Directorate and the MEC in VCA methodology. The activity also worked with civil society organizations to reduce and prevent corruption.

Relationship to the Government of Afghanistan Strategy

The AMANAT anti-corruption activity is designed to align with GIRoA development priorities. As part of its commitment to tackle corruption, the National Unity Government of (GNU) presented Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership policy framework paper (RSR) at the London Conference on Afghanistan, held in December 2014.7 This anti-corruption activity aligns with the following strategic responses to tackle the underlying drivers of corruption identified by the GNU in the RSR paper: 1) Strengthening enforcement and reducing opportunities for corruption through specific interventions, which include implementing sets of anti-corruption recommendations by MEC; and 2) modifying existing laws, regulations, and procedures that encourage corruption in the provision of public services; 3) reforming public procurement procedures; and 4) strengthening the Supreme Audit Office. In addition, the GNU promises to institute better governance by increasing government accountability, 7 Realizing Self Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership, Dec. 2014, http://www.afghanistan-un.org/2014/12/realizing-self-reliance-commitments-to-reforms-and-renewed-partnership/ performance, and ability to deliver results in areas such as judicial, public administration, and civil service reform.

GIRoA also has committed to fight corruption, as articulated in the Self-Reliance through Mutual Accountability Framework (SMAF), and Presidential Decree 45 on Governance and Anti-Corruption.

GIRoA is currently working on a new structure and framework for anti-corruption efforts moving forward. As GIRoA is currently developing its plans, USAID expects the implementer to remain flexible and agile to adapt programming to tie into higher level strategic goals and frameworks within GIRoA as they relate to AMANAT’s objectives and support higher level anti-corruption achievements in this activity.

4 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

AMANAT’s goal is to reduce and prevent corruption in government public services, to strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the Afghan government, and improve service delivery for the Afghan people.

Contractor’s Performance Work Statement (PWS), in response to the SOO, must contain a roll out strategy for AMANAT activity under the three objectives:

1) Strengthen Afghan non-governmental and governmental institutions in identifying vulnerabilities to corruption in the delivery of public services and developing corresponding recommendations to address these vulnerabilities;

2) Support select Afghan government institutions with technical and financial assistance to plan for and implement procedural reforms based on those recommendations; and

3) Strengthen local CSOs capacity to test and monitor the effectiveness of those reforms and to advocate for their implementation where necessary.

4.1 PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVES

The AMANAT activity is designed to align with the USAID/Afghanistan Mission’s Results Framework Development Objective (DO) 3, which seeks to improve GIRoA performance and legitimacy by strengthening governance at the national and sub-national levels and by having Afghan citizens hold their government accountable. Interventions carried out under AMANAT must also contribute to the fulfillment of the following corresponding Intermediate Results (IR) and Sub-Intermediate Results (Sub-

IR):

● IR 3.1: Citizens Hold the GIRoA Accountable o Sub-IR 3.1.2: Civil Society’s Ability to Advocate Reform Strengthened

● IR 3.2: Governance at the National and Sub-national Level Strengthened o Sub-IR 3.2.3: Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms Strengthened

In accordance with USAID’s Logical Framework methodology,8 DO 3 corresponds to AMANAT’s goal or higher-level result. Similarly, the activity’s Framework IRs and Sub-IRs correspond to the following purposes and sub-purposes:

Goal: Citizens Hold the GIRoA Accountable and Governance at the National and Sub-national Level Strengthened

Purpose 1: Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms Strengthened

Sub-purpose 1.1: GIRoA-led initiatives to identify vulnerabilities to corruption enhanced

Sub-purpose 1.2: Capacity of GIRoA institutions to implement anti-corruption reforms strengthened

Purpose 2: Civil Society’s Ability to Advocate Reform Strengthened

Sub-purpose 2.1: Civil society capabilities to assess and improve GIRoA anti-corruption efforts strengthened

4.2 ACTIVITY APPROACH AND MAIN COMPONENTS

Underpinning AMANAT’s logical framework is the following theory of change:

● If Afghan government officials demonstrate sufficient commitment to decrease corruption in government services,

● And if Afghan government officials are provided with the appropriate technical and financial assistance to develop and implement strategies to address and reduce opportunities for corruption in the accessing of government public services,

● And if Afghan non-governmental institutions can develop a sufficient level of technical expertise and institutional capacity to identify vulnerabilities to corruption, to develop workable recommendations to address these vulnerabilities, to access resources to implement the recommendations to address identified vulnerabilities, and to monitor the implementation of these recommendations,

● Then there will be a corresponding decrease in opportunities for corruption and government services will be provided more effectively and efficiently, 8 For more information on USAID’s Logical Framework Methodology, please see USAID Technical Note: The Logical Framework, Number 2, Version 1.0, December 2012 @ https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource /files/2012_12%20Logical%20Framework%20Technical%20Note_final%20(2).pdf

● And there will be a resulting increase in public confidence in the performance and legitimacy of the Afghan government.

COMPONENT 1 (CLIN 0001)

Purpose 1: Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms Strengthened (approximately 45% of contract efforts)

Sub-purpose 1.1: GIRoA-led initiatives to identify vulnerabilities to corruption enhanced

Interventions should strengthen the capacity of Afghan institutions to identify vulnerabilities to corruption and to develop sound policy/procedural recommendations that address these vulnerabilities. This should involve technical and financial support to Afghan governmental and/or non-governmental entities that enhance their technical understanding of targeted business processes and improve analytical processes used to carry out audits and/or VCAs. For example, interventions could also include strengthening Afghanistan’s audit function, focusing on the same business processes and/or ministries in public service delivery identified. Interventions should also build upon past institutional support to the MEC9.

Sub-purpose 1.2: Capacity of GIRoA institutions to implement anti-corruption reforms strengthened

The contractor must work with the respective government entity to design interventions for building their capacity to plan for and to implement recommendations related to the delivery of public services. It is expected that this will focus on streamlining business processes of a specialized technical nature.

Targeted government services could include those where citizens either directly interface with government agencies, such as obtaining drivers licenses or copies of education degrees, or where they do not directly interface with government agencies, such as government procurement or the importation of medicines, but are impacted significantly by the presence of corruption in business processes.

Purpose 2: Civil Society’s Ability to Advocate Reform Strengthened (approximately 35% of contract efforts)

Sub-purpose 2.1: Civil society capabilities to assess GIRoA anti-corruption efforts strengthened

Interventions under this sub-purpose relate to the programmatic pillar geared toward strengthening local CSOs capacity to test and monitor the effectiveness of those reforms and to advocate for their implementation. Interventions should increase civil society’s and independent institutions’ ability to

9 As USAID already provides financial assistance to the MEC through an agreement with DFID, assistance to the MEC will likely only require technical assistance.

monitor and provide oversight of implemented reforms, including increased feedback on the efficacy of governmental reforms to targeted government entities and to the MEC.

Additionally, CSOs should receive similar training to that of their government counterparts on specific business processes and sector reforms to be able to effectively monitor government reforms. CSO understanding of the business processes they are expected to monitor will result in strengthening the ability of CSOs to monitor the implementation of reforms.

COMPONENT 2 (CLIN 0002)

Special Programming Mechanism (20% of contract)

USAID is including a special programming mechanism in AMANAT to complement and supplement its planned technical and financial assistance to Afghan stakeholders. The Supplemental Technical Assistance (STA) will be a line-item Indefinite Delivery, Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) designed to provide USAID maximum flexibility in responding to time-sensitive, unanticipated, or compelling needs and opportunities to reduce corruption and strengthen the rule of law. To enable supplemental technical assistance to be available and to respond to changing circumstances within the Performance Work Statement (PWS), supplemental technical assistance may be ordered by CPFF Term Level of Effort (LOE) Task Orders under the IDIQ Cost Line Item Number (CLIN) of the contract. Two separate CLINs will be utilized – one for the completion portion of the basic contract and the other for the IDIQ portion of the contract. Task Orders will be ordered if and when the need arises. When the supplemental technical assistance is needed, the CO will place task orders in accordance with FAR 16.505 and as required in the contract.

The STA may be used to support interventions that contribute to the achievement of all of AMANAT’s activity purposes and may include but are not limited to some of the following illustrative examples:

● Standing up new technical systems or processes identified by the VCA process or by targeted government agencies that reduce opportunities for corruption;

● Supporting GIRoA access to resources - technical, physical or financial - to implement recommendations to reduce opportunities for corruption and strengthen systems that permit and/or encourage corruption;

● Supporting GIRoA efforts to strengthen its institutional framework to tackle corruption (ex. Support to High Council for Good Governance of Anti-Corruption and the Secretariat to work with Ministries to implement reforms, build their internal control mechanisms, and hold them accountable).

● Supporting the rapid geographic expansion of CSO watchdog functions beyond the original scope;

● Researching and developing proposals submitted to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

(ARTF) to fund the implementation of systems that are beyond the ability of AMANAT to support;

● Expanding the number or type of technical assistance interventions and/or training activities provided by the contractor;

● Changing the modalities or types of technical assistance provided to Afghan stakeholders in response to changes in the Afghan security environment;

● Developing sectoral monitoring, analysis, and assessments as well as partner communication plans and outreach activities;

● Promoting dialogue between rights stakeholders and partners; exchange programs; pilot programs;

public-private partnerships.

5 CONSTRAINTS

In early 2016, USAID and DI under AERCA conducted a political economy analysis (PEA), which also served as a prioritization of interventions exercise, (see Attachment J.2 for a Summary of the PEA). The mapping exercise laid out an initial direction for anti-corruption interventions, identifying specific government services and government ministries on which AERCA’s assistance would focus. USAID will continue to look at its anti-corruption programming by utilizing PEA to allow for important snapshots overtime to make programming decisions about this activity. The contractor will build on USAID and DI’s PEA exercise, enabling USAID and AMANAT’s implementing partner to determine whether the initial set of priorities remains valid or whether adjustments in the activity’s priorities need to be made.

The contractor may be called upon by USAID to assist in conducting the PEA and will adapt interventions based on the findings to allow for maximum results in a dynamic and fluid environment.

This set of activities should be Afghan-led to ensure that it is demand-driven and includes other donors in the field of anti-corruption for better coordination and to avoid redundancies in assistance.

5.1 COLLABORATING, LEARNING, AND ADAPTING

USAID seeks to promote learning across stakeholders involved in the implementation of AMANAT through Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting (CLA).10 Program learning is intended to benefit all stakeholders – Afghan citizens, community representatives, activists, CSOs, GIRoA institutions, private sector, and domestic and foreign based academicians, researchers, and students.

CLA Objectives:

a. Generate Knowledge. Contractor will generate new knowledge and evidence around learning questions identified together with USAID and other stakeholders, as well as questions that may emerge

10 See: https://usaidlearninglab.org/library/collaborating-learning-and-adapting-more-effective-development-programs and https://usaidlearninglab.org/library/ads-series-200-programming during the course of implementation. In filling these knowledge and evidence gaps, the contractor will provide reporting, data, analysis, and gather partners for inclusive reviews of the project goals and results.

b. Share Knowledge. The contractor will increase knowledge sharing with stakeholders, including sub-grantees, local organizations, national and local level GIRoA, sectoral experts, donors, regional and international organizations, and others through communities of practice to encourage more widespread learning across teams, mechanisms, and sectors. The contractor will work together within a learning network to share information with implementing partners of other USAID activities, such as local stakeholders and other development partners. The contractor will convene forums to share knowledge and will also use existing forums, such as the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and donor co-chaired International Community Transparency and Accountability Working Group (ICTAWG). The contractor should attend and participate in this meeting.

This activity will support the provision of case studies, lessons learned, success stories, and learning events to share among partners and stakeholders working in the anti-corruption field. This includes working with USAID, GIRoA, CSOs, domestic and foreign academia, and other partners to identify lessons learned from previous and ongoing anti-corruption programming and USAID’s ongoing PEA at the problem-level of corruption in Afghanistan to inform this activity, and other anti-corruption initiatives.

The contractor will stay up to date on anti-corruption research and provide in the annual report a two-page summary of at least three publications dealing with integrity and accountability which are relevant to the activity, including how, if at all, this activity can learn from and incorporate leading practices and innovations into ongoing and future programming. This is done to ensure that the latest best practices are widely disseminated and employed in the field in real time.

c. Incorporate Agile and Adaptive Processes. Contractor will develop adaptive management and implementation processes to allow course correction to respond to unintended effects, changing/emerging realities, and priorities. Together with USAID, the activity’s work plan, quarterly reports, and periodic progress review meetings will provide a forum for an adaptive approach to change course or make corrections based on lessons learned and evolving country context. A continual focus on PEA for snapshots into the current Afghan context will form the basis of how USAID and the contractor review activity decisions, work plans, and reporting to adjust interventions to reach activity objectives.

Additionally, activity designs and annual work plans will allow for responding to windows of opportunity, which includes responding to national dialogues initiated by the government. Implementers will stay abreast with political or cultural shifts and recognize when there are windows of opportunity and moments of political and social change when reform is more likely to take root. The contractor will prioritize activities together with the COR during work planning and review the prioritization during the quarterly reporting period. If circumstances arise, activity designs can and should be altered with approval from the COR to accommodate the window of opportunity, as long the reprogramming does not hold the USG to incurring additional costs unless otherwise directed by the CO. These windows of opportunities may also be captured within interventions proposed in the Supplemental Technical Assistance (STA).

d. Guiding principles. USAID suggests consideration of several guiding principles in developing program approaches. Contractors may recommend modifying and/or expanding these principles.

Promoting local leadership

As recognized in principles of aid effectiveness, local ownership, and leadership are critical to the success and sustainability of any development intervention. Programmatic approaches should place local actors and communities in the position to shape and direct programs inputs, building on their strengths and expanding their capacity to increase their effectiveness and sustainability.

Appreciating and building on the positive, using local assets

It can be easy for development practitioners to get caught up in analyzing and treating problems.

Appreciative, asset-based approaches look for what works and what can be built upon. They encourage individuals and communities to own the development process and focus on optimizing use of local resources, which may mitigate creation of dependency on outside resource flows.

Fostering participation across all sectors of society

No one set of actors has sole interest in or a leadership monopoly on anti-corruption efforts. Contractors should seek holistic community approaches that engage communities, including as appropriate women, youth, communities, government, media, religious leaders, traditional leaders, elders, private sector, and other marginalized groups.

5.2 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is a critical part of USAID’s programming. According to the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy, the Agency “use[s] evaluation findings to strengthen our efforts and sharpen our decision-making … and to inform resource allocation.” The close scrutiny given to USG assistance in Afghanistan makes this policy all the more critical. At the same time, the current security situation in Afghanistan makes implementation of M&E activities highly challenging. Consistent with USAID’s Evaluation Policy, contractor must incorporate a structured monitoring and evaluation component from the onset of award. Continuous monitoring of performance objectives will not only support accountability but also ensure measurable results.

USAID/Afghanistan will also conduct an independent mid-term and/or final performance evaluation of the award and its related civil society grants to measure progress over time, verify the development hypothesis, and inform programming.

USAID’s Multi-Tiered Monitoring Approach

Given the M&E challenges USAID faces in Afghanistan, the Kabul Mission has developed the Multi- Tiered Monitoring (MTM) Approach, which gathers and triangulates information and performance data from multiple sources. The contractor must also undertake M&E activities that feed into USAID/Afghanistan’s multi-tiered monitoring approach, specifically in Tier 2. The contractor will work directly with the COR in determining how the multi-tiered monitoring data can support the activity’s learning and adaptation. The following are the five MTM monitoring tiers:

1. Tier 1- U.S. Government Direct Observation: The USAID COR, activity manager, or other USG staff will observe activities. When actual participation is not feasible due to security concerns, the implementing partner may be asked to assist in setting up video or streaming to view events and trainings to data-capable handheld (mobile) devices and/or computers. Contractors are encouraged to propose other innovative ways to further USAID observation of activities in their M&E.

2. Tier-2: Implementing Partner: The USAID implementing partner will provide USAID with weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual progress reports on AMANAT’s progress and monitor the work of the CSO sub-grantees.

3. Tier-3: Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and other donors: GIRoA will be responsible for monitoring the participation of its ministries in the training sessions, assessments, and working group sessions.

4. Tier-4: Civil society, local organizations, and the beneficiary population: CSOs will monitor the work of the government and how ministerial staff follow-up on and implement reforms. CSO representatives should be present and take part along with their government counterparts in VCA assessments and review of ministerial mitigation plans.

5. Tier-5: Independent Monitoring Contractors: USAID Monitoring Support Project (MSP) may independently monitor AMANAT’s activities, providing an additional layer of data on activity implementation.

5.3 GRANTS UNDER CONTRACT

The Contractor will be authorized to use grants under contract (GUCs) to issue grants to CSOs and other non-governmental partners to support the activities under the relevant components of the AMANAT activity. Groups not registered with the Government of Afghanistan, specifically non-governmental organizations not registered with Ministry of Economy, will not be eligible for grants under contract (See ADS 302.3.4.12). USAID must be significantly involved in establishing grants guidelines and selection criteria and must approve the grant recipients. All requirements that apply to USAID-executed grants in ADS 303, will also apply to grants executed by the contractor. USAID will retain within the contract the ability to terminate unilaterally any grant activities under extraordinary circumstances. USAID does not authorize contractors to execute or administer agreements on its behalf.

The total number of grants made to NGOs under this provision will not exceed $12 million. Grants made under this contract will be made to carry out activities that are consistent with the Objectives in the Statement of Objectives (SOO). Grants will be made under CLIN 0001 of AMANAT.

5.4 USAID, USG, AND OTHER DONOR COORDINATION

Given the pervasive nature of corruption in Afghanistan, USAID/Afghanistan anti-corruption efforts must be part of a multi-tiered partnership that coordinates interventions within the USAID Mission, the USG interagency, other donors, and implementing partners.

As a cross-cutting theme of USAID/Afghanistan’s programming, anti-corruption interventions are incorporated across almost all of its technical sector activities. For example, ODG is currently working closely with USAID’s Office Health and Nutrition to assist the Ministry of Public Health to conduct a set of VCAs in partnership with the MEC and to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy.

USAID also coordinates closely with its interagency counterparts, particularly the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), which is currently implementing anti-corruption-related activities and may expand further into this area of development, particularly as it pertains to rule of law and law enforcement strengthening.

Contractors are expected to be aware of programming work by USG’s interagency institutions, and where appropriate coordinate and complement such interventions to leverage resources, avoid duplications of efforts and increase the overall effectiveness of anti-corruption-related assistance in Afghanistan.

Finally, there are a number of bilateral and multilateral donors implementing anti-corruption activities in Afghanistan. This includes the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark, the European Union, the World Bank, and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). The contractor will coordinate and cooperate with anti-corruption interventions being carried out by these donors, where appropriate, so as to increase the overall effectiveness of anti-corruption-related assistance in Afghanistan, leverage resources more efficiently, and avoid duplication of assistance.

5.5 GEOGRAPHIC FOCUS

The contractor must establish a main office in Kabul. USAID generally expects this assistance will occur at the national level, however there may be opportunities for pilot activities at the provincial or district level which could be scaled. If contractors propose activities at the provincial level, they should clarify how these interventions avoid duplication of USAID’s SHAHAR and ISLA projects, which provide governance-related assistance to Afghanistan’s provincial and district government authorities respectively.11 The contractor should also consider provinces and districts where USAID has other public service delivery programs and how this activity can complement and strengthen existing efforts.

5.6 GENDER CONSIDERATIONS

Promoting gender equality is high-priority, cross-cutting theme in all of USAID’s assistance activities.

Hence contractors must include interventions that advance gender equality in the context of the AMANAT’s anti-corruption focus and indicators that measure the success of these interventions in their M&E matrices. This may include some of the following approaches:

● Procedures to recruit qualified women to increase their inclusion in anti-corruption initiatives on both the supply (government) and demand (civil society) sides.

● Increasing the number of women in more junior governmental positions and articulating a plan to build their skills and experience to a professional level in order to address skills deficits.12

● Setting aside dedicated resources and developing targeted training activities for women involved with CSOs.

● Coordinating activities with USAID’s Women in Government (WIG) activity, currently focused on hiring practices to bring more women into civil service employment and build the capacity of women in Gender Units.

● Promoting women’s empowerment and activism to fight corruption in coordination with the Mission’s new civil society activity Musharikat, which supports the formation and advancement of a women’s movement in Afghanistan.

11 Strong Hubs for Afghan Hope and Resilience (SHAHAR) will improve transparency and accountability by improving e-governance mechanisms within provincial government. VCA recommendations might point to the need for more e-governance and could build upon SHAHAR efforts. The Initiative to Strengthen Local Administration (ISLA) works to strengthen the sub-national government system in Afghanistan to enable the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to improve provincial governance in the areas of fiscal and development planning, representation of citizens, and enhanced delivery of public services.

12 Based on interviews conducted with hundreds of employers and female job-seekers in Afghanistan for USAID Gender Analyses in 2011-2013 and A Guide to Gender in Afghanistan, USAID/Afghanistan 2013.

5.7 SUSTAINABILITY CONSIDERATIONS

Ensuring sustainability of the activity’s results will be monitored throughout the entire period of the activity’s implementation and will constitute one of the focal points of its interim and final evaluations.

Contractors must include measures that promote sustainability as part of their proposed set of interventions. Illustrative approaches to sustainability may include the following types of interventions:

● Using locally available and appropriate technologies and ensuring that these solutions are cost-effective and can be supported by the host ministries.

● Using to the greatest extent possible local organizations to implement interventions either through sub-grants or sub-contracts.

● Engaging local organizations to implement technical assistance and training whenever possible.

● Strengthening the capacity of targeted government ministries and local organizations to conduct their own training and to develop internal processes with assistance from USAID’s implementing partner that increase their ability to address corruption. This will likely require longer periods of time and increased resources to achieve these results.

All activities will be conducted in close cooperation and partnership with local counterparts to ensure their full ownership and transition, future sustainability, and growth of targeted sectors. The assistance must— whenever possible—be designed to favor long-term solutions that could be performed by or later taken over by existing Afghanistan institutions and organizations. Particular attention should be given to activities that support USAID Forward’s13 emphasis with those interconnected sets of actors—governments, civil society the private sector, universities, individual citizens, and others—that jointly can produce particular outcomes related to efficiency and accountability of affected Afghanistan public systems.

Interventions should also employ current and emerging technologies to gather information on occurrences of corruption and assessing the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures which are appropriate to Afghanistan’s level of development.

[END OF ATTACHMENT J.1]

13 USAID Forward is a reform agenda which includes the strengthening local capacity for sustainable development.