SOL-121-17-000002_SACCI_UKRAINE_RFP.pdf
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FULL ANNOUNCEMENT SOL-121-17-000002 SACCI RFP
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Date Issued: November 21, 2016 Deadline for Questions: December 2, 2016, 16:00 Hours Local Kyiv Time Closing Date: January 17, 2017 Closing Time: 16:00 Hours Local Kyiv Time
SUBJECT: Request for Proposal (RFP) No. SOL-121-17-000002
REFERENCE: Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program in Ukraine
Dear Sir/Madam:
The United States Government, represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Regional Mission for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, contemplates award of a five year Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Completion contract to implement the “Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program” in Ukraine. The anticipated award date is May 2017. The cost range of the contract is $18-$20.5 million, subject to the availability of funds.
This procurement will be conducted under full and open competition procedures, pursuant to Part 15 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (Far) (48 CFR Chapter 1). USAID encourages your organization to indicate its interest in this solicitation by submitting a proposal in accordance with the instructions in Section L - Instructions to Offerors.
USAID will evaluate the responsive proposal in accordance with the evaluation factors provided in Section M – Evaluation Factors for Award.
USAID encourages the participation to the maximum extent possible of U.S small business (SB) in this activity as prime or subcontractors in accordance with Part 19 of the FAR.
Offerors are encouraged to read the entire solicitation. Special attention should be paid to Section L – Instructions to Offerors and Section M – Evaluation Criteria. Offerors must comply with FAR Clause 52.204-7, System for Award Management and adhere to the requirements set forth in Section K- Representation, Certifications, and Other Statements of Offerors.
Any amendments to this solicitation will be made available through the Government homepage at http://www.fbo.gov. It is the offeror’s responsibility to check this site periodically for official updates and amendments of the solicitation.
Only electronic responses are required (See Section L). Please submit your proposals to the email addresses below by 16:00 Hours Local Kyiv Time, January 17, 2016. Receipt time is when the proposal is received by AID/Washington internet server. The addresses for the receipt of proposals are: morlova@usaid.gov and oluchukvysotska@usaid.gov. Hand delivered proposals (including commercial courier) and facsimile transmission will not be accepted.
The Technical Proposal has a strict sixty (60) page limit including annexes. Offerors are advised that any pages exceeding this limit will not be evaluated. Offerors are reminded that evaluators have to be able to read the proposals, so presentation and legibility are crucial. The Statement of Work (SOW) is provided in Section C.
The RFP does not obligate the United States Government to pay any cost incurred in preparing and submitting your proposal. In addition, the Government reserves the right to reject any and all offerors, if such action is considered to be in the best interest of the Government. Furthermore, the Government reserves the right to make an award without discussions.
http://www.fbo.gov/ mailto:morlova@usaid.gov mailto:oluchukvysotska@usaid.gov
1. THIS CONTRACT IS A RATED ORDER RATING PAGE OF PAGES
UNDER DPAS (15 CFR 700)
2. CONTRACT NUMBER 3. SOLICITATION NUMBER 4. TYPE OF SOLICITATION 5. DATE ISSUED 6. REQUISITION/PURCHASE NUMBER
SEALED BID (IFB)
NEGOTIATED (RFP)
7. ISSUED BY CODE 8. ADDRESS OFFER TO (If other than Item 7)
NOTE: In sealed bid solicitations "offer" and "Offeror" mean "bid" and "bidder".
9. Sealed offers in original and _____________________________ copies for furnishing the supplies or services in the Schedule will be received at the place specified in Item 8, or if hand carried, in the depository located in until local time _______________________ (Hour) (Date)
CAUTION - LATE Submissions, Modifications, and Withdrawals: See Section L, Provision No. 52.214-7 or 52.215-1. All Offers are subject to all terms and conditions contained in this solicitation.
A. NAME B. TELEPHONE (NO COLLECT CALLS) C. E-MAIL ADDRESS
AREA CODE NUMBER EXT.
(X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S) (X) SEC. DESCRIPTION PAGE(S)
PART I - THE SCHEDULE PART II - CONTRACT CLAUSES
A SOLICITATION/CONTRACT FORM I CONTRACT CLAUSES
B SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICES/COSTS PART III - LIST OF DOCUMENTS, EXHIBITS AND OTHER ATTACH.
C DESCRIPTION/SPECS./WORK STATEMENT J LIST OF ATTACHMENTS
D PACKAGING AND MARKING PART IV - REPRESENTATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
E INSPECTION AND ACCEPTANCE
F DELIVERIES OR PERFORMANCE
G CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION DATA L INSTR., CONDS., AND NOTICES TO OFFERORS
H SPECIAL CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS M EVALUATION FACOTRRS FOR AWARD
K REPRESENTATIONS, CERTIFICATIONS AND OTHER
STATEMENTS OF OFFERORS
NOTE: Item 12 does not apply if the solicitation includes the provisions at 52.214-16, Minimum Bid Acceptance Period.
12. In compliance with the above, the undersigned agrees, if this offer is accepted within _180_ calendar days (60 calendar days unless a different period is inserted by the Offeror) from the date for receipt of offers specified above, to furnish any or all items upon which prices are offered at the price set opposite each item, delivered at the designated point(s), within the time specified in the schedule.
13. DISCOUNT FOR PROMPT PAYMENT 10 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 20 CALENDAR DAYS (%) 30 CALENDAR DAYS (%) CALENDAR DAYS (%) (See Section I, Clause No. 52-232-8)
14. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF AMENDMENTS AMENDMENT NO. DATE AMENDMENT NO. DATE
(The offeror acknowledges receipt of amendments to the SOLICITATION for offerors and related documents numbered and dated:
CODE FACILITY 16. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON AUTHORIZED TO SIGN OFFER 15A. NAME AND
ADDRESS OF
OFFEROR
(Type or print)
15B. TELEPHONE NUMBER 17. SIGNATURE 18. OFFER DATE
AREA CODE NUMBER EXT. 15C. CHECK IF REMITTANCE ADDRESS IS DIFFERENT FROM
ABOVE - ENTER SUCH ADDRESS IN SCHEDULE
19. ACCEPTED AS TO ITEMS NUMBERED 20. AMOUNT 21. ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION
22. AUTHORITY FOR USING OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION: 23. SUBMIT INVOICES TO ADDRESS SHOWN IN ITEM (4 copies unless otherwise specified)
10 U.S.C. 2304(a) ( ) 41 U.S.C. 253(c) ( )
24. ADMINISTERED BY (If other than Item 7) 25. PAYMENT WILL BE MADE BY CODE CODE
26. NAME OF CONTRACTING OFFICER (Type or print)
Sarah R. Bueter
27. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 28. AWARD DATE
IMPORTANT - Award will be made on this Form, or on Standard Form 26, or by other authorized official written notice.
(Signature of Contracting Officer)
(REV. 9-97)
10. FOR INFORMATION CALL:
11. TABLE OF CONTENTS
STANDARD FORM 33
SOLICITATION, OFFER AND AWARD N/A
SOLICITATION
OFFER (Must be fully completed by Offeror)
AWARD (To be completed by Government)
SOL-121-17-000002
X
11/21/2016 REQ-121-17-000002
USAID/Ukraine/Regional Contract Office Department of State 5850 Kyiv Pl.
Washington D.C. 20521-5850
16:00 (Kyiv LT) 01/17/2017
Ms. Marina Orlova Acquisition Specialist morlova@usaid.gov
See Attached Table of Contents
X 1
X 4-5
X 6-16
X 17-18
X 19
X 20-31
X 32-35
X 36-60
X 61-71
X 72
X 73-82
X 83-109
X 110-114
USAID/Ukraine/Regional Contract Office
USAID/Ukraine/Office of Financial Management
Request for Proposal SOL-121-17-000002 Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI)
PART I - THE SCHEDULE
SECTION B - SUPPLIES OR SERVICES AND PRICE/COSTS
B.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this contract is to reduce corruption and increase the accountability and transparency of governance in Ukraine through the activity entitled “Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program” in Ukraine as described in detail in Section C. STATEMENT OF WORK.
B.2 CONTRACT TYPE
This is a Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) Completion Contract. For the consideration set forth in the contract, the Contractor must provide the results, deliverables and results described in Section C and Section F (to be incorporated at contract award). The Contractor must also comply with all other contract requirements.
B.3 ESTIMATED COST, CEILING PRICE, FIXED FEE, AND OBLIGATED AMOUNT
(a) The estimated cost for the performance of the work required hereunder, exclusive of fixed fee, if any, is __________ [ TBD ]. The fixed fee, if any, is _________ [ TBD ]. The estimated cost plus fixed fee, if any, is ___________ [ TBD ].
(b) Within the estimated cost plus fixed fee (if any) specified in paragraph (a) above, the amount currently obligated and available for reimbursement of allowable costs incurred by the Contractor (and payment of fee, if any) for performance hereunder is _________ [ TBD ]. The Contractor shall not exceed the aforesaid obligated amount.
(c) Funds obligated hereunder are anticipated to be sufficient through _________ [ TBD ].
B.4 PRICE SCHEDULE
(a) Cost Category Amount Total Estimated Cost TBD Fixed Fee TBD
Total Estimated Cost Plus Fixed-Fee TBD
(b) The inclusion of any costs in the above cost categories does not obviate the requirement for prior approval by the Contracting Officer of cost items designated as requiring prior approval by any of the terms and conditions of this contract, including the applicable cost principles (see FAR § 52.216-07, “Allowable Cost and Payment”); nor does it constitute a determination of allowability by the Contracting Officer of any item of cost, unless specifically stated elsewhere in this contract.
Also, these amounts may not be adjusted without a written modification signed by the Contracting Officer. The Contractor will not bill any amounts against this contract in excess of the amounts specified for each line item.
(c) The Contractor agrees to furnish data that the Contracting Officer may request on costs expended or accrued under this contract in support of the budget information provided herein.
B.5 INDIRECT COSTS
(a) Pending establishment of revised provisional or final indirect costs, USAID will reimburse allowable indirect costs on the basis of the following negotiated provisional or predetermined rates and the appropriate bases pursuant to the Contractor’s current executed Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate Agreement:
Description Rate Base Type Period % 1/ 1/ 1/
1/Base of Application:
Type of Rate:
Period:
(b) The Contractor will make no change in its established method of classifying or allocating indirect costs without the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.
B.6 CEILING ON INDIRECT COSTS (if applicable) [determination to include this clause in the contract will be made at the time of award in accordance with FAR 42.707(b)(i) ]
(a) Reimbursement for indirect costs shall be at the lower of the negotiated final (or predetermined) or the following ceiling rates:
Description Rate Base Type Period
% 1/ 1/ 1/
1/Base of Application:
Type of Rate:
Period:
(b) The Government will not be obligated to pay any additional amount should the final indirect cost rates exceed the negotiated ceiling rates. If the final indirect cost rates are less than the negotiated ceiling rates, the negotiated rates will be reduced to conform to the lower rates.
(c) This understanding will not change any monetary ceiling, obligation, or specific cost allowance or disallowance. Any changes in classifying or allocating indirect costs require the prior written approval of the Contracting Officer.
B.7 COST REIMBURSABLE
The U.S. dollar costs allowable will be limited to reasonable, allocable, and necessary costs determined in accordance with FAR § 52.216-7, “Allowable Cost and Payment,” FAR § 52.216-8, “Fixed Fee,” FAR § 52.232-20, “Limitation of Cost,” and FAR § 52-232-22, “Limitation of Funds,” if applicable, and AIDAR 752.7003, “Documentation for Payment.”
B.8 PAYMENT OF FIXED FEE
USAID will pay a proportion of the contractor’s fixed fee each month pursuant to FAR § 52.216-8, “Fixed Fee,” upon the receipt of an invoice deemed proper by the Office Financial Management (OFM) located in USAID/Ukraine.
[END OF SECTION B]
SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK
SUPPORT TO ANTI-CORRUPTION CHAMPION INSTITUTIONS (SACCI) PROGRAM
LIST OF ACRONYMS
ADS Automated Directives System CEPPS Consortium for Elections and Political Processes CSO Civil Society Organization EU European Union GOU Government of Ukraine IDP Internally Displaced Person IMF International Monetary Fund LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and Intersex NAPC National Agency for Prevention of Corruption NAUCS National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service NRC National Reform Council NGO Non-Government Organization SACCI Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions UNITER Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms Project USG United States Government USAID United States Agency for International Development
I. SUMMARY
Title: Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program
Purpose: The purpose of the Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program is to reduce corruption and increase the accountability and transparency of governance in Ukraine.
Objectives: Objective 1: Key Government Institutions Empowered to Fight Corruption
Objective 2: Public Support for and Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts Increased Objective 3: Public Tolerance of Corrupt Practices Reduced
II. BACKGROUND
Introduction
Ukraine remains the most corrupt country in Europe and one of the least transparent countries in the world.
Corruption is rampant and multifaceted throughout the public sector in Ukraine. ‘Grand Corruption’ in Ukraine includes the use of financial backing from oligarchs to influence governmental decisions, the payment of kick-backs for state contracts and construction rights, and the use of public funds for personal enrichment among high-level officials. ‘Petty Corruption’ is equally corrosive for the functioning of everyday governance and also has immediate impact on Ukrainians’ daily lives. Petty corruption includes payments for low- and middle-level state positions, as well as the host of bribes that riddle state services, including in education, healthcare, policing, permitting, land use, and nearly every other area where citizens come into contact with the state.
As long as these levels of corruption persist, Ukraine’s prospects for significant advances in democratic governance, economic growth, the rule of law, and security will remain low, as will prospects of meeting EU Association Agreement obligations. Corruption reduces public trust in state institutions and dissuades citizens from participating in politics and governance. It encourages citizens to evade paying taxes, because they do not believe that public money is used for the public good. The informal economy reduces the profits entrepreneurs can derive from their commercial activities, undermines property rights, and hinders investors from identifying and acting on business opportunities.
Since the 2013-14 EuroMaidan Revolution, a new wave of leaders has been elected and appointed to top positions in government on the promise of finally eradicating the complex corruption schemes and networks that have held Ukraine back since independence. A raft of anti-corruption laws were passed in 2014, and incremental progress has been made in reforming some Ministries and setting up new anti-corruption agencies. Nonetheless, significant opposition by those vested in the old system has undermined many reforms. The government is further constrained by the ongoing armed conflict in the East, the illegal annexation of Crimea, and attendant severe economic and humanitarian crises, all of which has fueled political instability and public impatience with the pace of reforms.
Challenges in Addressing Corruption
USAID has identified the following challenges to be addressed by SACCI:
Uneven political will to address corruption: The President and Parliament were elected with promises to fulfill citizen demand from the EuroMaidan Revolution. Ukraine’s new leadership devoted extensive rhetoric to fighting corruption, but implementation of anti-corruption commitments has been slow. While new institutions have been established and legislation passed, the political elites have been hesitant to irreversibly change the system. Such intransigence has led to the departure from government of some high profile reformers, including former Minister of Economic Development and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius, and called into question the level of commitment at the top.
‘State Capture’ and Lack of government accountability: Significant state capture allows oligarchs to influence laws, policies and regulations for their own financial interests through illicit payments to public officials and politicians. Anti-corruption reforms pose a significant threat to those who benefit from this system. Institutional reforms are undermined by ongoing collusion between oligarchs and public officials who continue to reap substantial private benefit from the proliferation of weak governance.
Too few in government or the public understand the idea of public service as the provision of a service for the public good; public service is more often seen as an opportunity to increase personal wealth. There is a high tolerance for corruption among public servants, and until recently, the GOU made little effort to hold public servants accountable. This institutional indifference has reinforced to civil servants and the Ukrainian public that ethical conduct is not a priority for the GOU or its employees. In addition, there are few institutional deterrents to corruption. The concept of ‘Conflict of Interest’, for example, is relatively new in Ukraine.
Tools such as whistleblower protection, public financial interest disclosure, and codes of ethics are not systematic among state agencies. Accordingly, bureaucrats have little to fear if they use their office to accumulate wealth. Excessive and opaque bureaucracy, impunity for officials who commit corrupt acts, and limited institutional experience in preventing or fighting corruption allow corruption to proliferate.
Weak capacity of state institutions to implement reform: While some Ukrainian institutions have prioritized and championed the fight against corruption, they often lack the capacity and resources necessary to move the process forward. New institutions such as the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), and the Special Anti-Corruption Prosecutors Office (SAPO) have been established, but are slow to make progress. At the same time, several Ministers have stepped up reforms in the institutions under their control, such as the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Ecology and Natural Resources, the Ministry of Infrastructure, and the Kyiv City Administration. Anti-corruption activities in these governmental institutions have primarily depended, however, on the presence and will of a select few motivated individuals.
Most still lack the institutional capacity and commitment required to make these efforts sustainable.
Poor Government Outreach, High Citizen Dissatisfaction and Low Engagement: Citizens have grown increasingly frustrated with what is perceived as little progress in the fight against corruption. Uneven progress on reforms and poor communication with the public about achievements has contributed to decreasing support for the President and Parliament in public opinion polls. A prolonged political crisis in spring 2016, resulting in the resignation of Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and appointment of a new Government, along with the resignation of some reformers in the government, has fueled skepticism about the GOU’s commitment to take transformative action against corruption.
The GOU lacks a coherent strategy for communicating with citizens about the challenges it faces in fighting corruption and the incremental progress it has made. Nor does the GOU effectively communicate about how citizens might contribute to the fight. While there is no doubt that the GOU needs to deliver more concrete achievements, such as prosecuting high-level corrupt officials, it also needs to reach out to inform citizens of its efforts, and articulate the need for public involvement in what will be a long and difficult fight against decades of entrenched practices and views.
Tolerance for Corruption: According to a recent assessment, while Ukrainians are outraged by grand corruption there seems to be little stigma associated with petty corruption to facilitate bureaucratic processes, to upgrade services, and to evade the law. Indeed, many Ukrainians perceive of corruption as immutable and, in some cases, preferable to an overbearing bureaucracy. This deters some individuals from challenging or, in some cases, even recognizing corrupt practices.
Reformers also express concern that citizens are ill-equipped to provide oversight and properly utilize new anti-corruption tools that have been developed, while many government institutions lack feedback loops that allow citizens to report corrupt practices. Many citizens are unaware of the corrosive effect that corruption has on their daily lives, for example, an increased number of traffic fatalities resulting from corrupt traffic police, a degraded environment due to lack of enforcement of environmental protection laws, and lower quality healthcare due to collusion and graft in the pharmaceutical sector.
This is not an exhaustive list of challenges; reducing opportunities for corruption can be found across the array of services provided by the government. SACCI is intended to complement other anti-corruption efforts focusing on other challenges, including those in areas such as the investigation and prosecution of corruption cases and use of technology to reduce opportunities for corruption.
Progress and Opportunities
Despite the challenges currently facing Ukraine, the country has powerful resources it can draw upon to reduce corruption. From 2014-15, following the EuroMaidan Revolution, significant legislation was enacted to strengthen the fight against corruption, including Laws on: Restoration of Trust to the Judiciary;
Authorizing Lustration of Civil Servants; Establishing the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU); Establishing the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC); and Public Procurement.
In early 2016, three additional anti-corruption laws were adopted to meet conditionality of the EU-Ukraine visa free regime package – two laws focused on freezing and confiscating instruments and proceeds of crimes and a third on the selection of leadership of the Specialized Anti-corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO).
Independent anti-corruption experts assert that Ukraine has comparatively strong anti-corruption legislation on the books. Significant challenges remain, however, in the implementation of this legislation.
The President and Government have appointed several technocratic experts to key positions in government in an effort to end business as usual and jump start reforms. One example is former Minister of Economic Development and Trade Aivaras Abromavicius. He resigned on February 3, 2016, citing not just a lack of political will within the GOU for reform, but affirmative efforts by others to retain control of profits generated by state-owned enterprises, stated that neither he nor his team “have any desire to serve as cover for covert corruption.” Additionally, the government has sought to reduce bureaucracy by reducing the number of monitoring agencies from 56 to 27 and their functions from 1,200 to 680. On the World Bank’s Doing Business Score, Ukraine placed 96th out of 189 economies in 2015, a considerable improvement from 137th in 2013, although the business community has yet to feel the real impact of these gains.
International support has also been critical in supporting the fight against corruption. Donors such as EU, Canada, and the U.S. are committed to helping Ukraine reform. The EU Association Agreement, signed in 2014, includes specific clauses designed to reduce corruption, in particular requiring the implementation of international standards required by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has committed to providing up to $17 billion in loans, with strong conditionality requiring reforms, and the Ukrainian parliament has passed wide-ranging legislation at the IMF’s behest.
Relevant Analyses
SACCI builds on USAID’s long-standing anti-corruption work and draws on the findings of independent assessments and evaluations such as:
Changing Corrupt Behaviors Assessment; Addressing Everyday Corruption in Ukraine (Oct. 2015), available at: https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1863/changing-corrupt-behaviors-assessment-addressing-everyday-corruption-ukraine-0. The assessment examined the potential for tackling Ukraine’s systemic corruption through a bottom-up attitudinal and behavioral change approach. Researchers concluded if the new government is serious about adopting difficult structural reforms and the citizenry supports these reforms by both bolstering vertical accountability and resisting corrupt behaviors, the potential for societal transformation exists. Citizens stressed that they were unlikely to change their own corrupt behaviors if they did not see that the government was making serious efforts to reform its own structures and to go after corrupt officials at all levels.
Democracy Human Rights and Governance Assessment of Ukraine (Oct. 2015), available at:
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KX12.pdf. This assessment concluded that Ukraine confronts challenges in each of the following five elements of USAID’s democracy, human rights, and governance analytical framework: consensus; inclusion; competition and political accountability; rule of law and human rights; and https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1863/changing-corrupt-behaviors-assessment-addressing-everyday-corruption-ukraine-0 https://www.usaid.gov/documents/1863/changing-corrupt-behaviors-assessment-addressing-everyday-corruption-ukraine-0 http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00KX12.pdf government responsiveness and effectiveness. It found three challenges directly related to SACCI: endemic corruption; public skepticism regarding reforms; and high public expectations and waning patience.
III. RELATIONSHIP TO MISSION STRATEGY
SACCI will contribute to the USAID/Ukraine Mission Country Development and Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) Development Objective 1: “More participatory, transparent and accountable governance processes,” in particular Intermediate Result 1.2: “Improved Citizen Oversight and Engagement in Governance” and IR 1.3: “The GOU is More Accountable to its Citizens and Adherent to the Rule of Law.”
USAID’s approach to anti-corruption has been cross-cutting, with activities in energy; agriculture; financial sector; public financial management; legal, regulatory and policy development; education; public health; rule of law; political processes; civil society; media; and public administration. USAID will continue to integrate anti-corruption activities across its programs. SACCI will also support the USAID Ukraine Recovery and Reform Strategy objective to increase GOU accountability through anti-corruption and justice sector reform.
IV. TECHNICAL GUIDELINES AND CONSIDERATIONS
1) Strategic Approach: USAID Ukraine seeks to empower government institutions to prevent, detect and fight corruption; increase citizen awareness of and intolerance for corruption; and strengthen government-citizen-CSO engagement on anti-corruption efforts. SACCI’s strategy is to apply both top-down and bottom-up approaches to the corruption equation.
Key elements of SACCI’s strategic approach include:
Focus on government: The GOU has the primary responsibility for fighting corruption in Ukraine.
SACCI will focus on strengthening the government’s institutional capability to detect and deter corruption, communicate with the public, and engage citizens and civil society in state-led anti-corruption efforts.
Change incentives in the system: USAID recognizes the uneven political will to fight corruption within the government is linked to the incentive system in place that perpetuates corrupt practices and undermines genuine attempts to reform the system. Accordingly, SACCI will target the incentive structure by strengthening systems of mutual accountability and increasing public awareness and participation in the fight against corruption.
Flexibility: SACCI will be flexible and responsive to the dynamic and fluid environment by responding quickly to new opportunities and changing course when obstacles arise. The implementer will regularly assess political will to prevent, detect and fight corruption, and identify triggers for adjusting interventions to ensure continued impact in a dynamic political environment.
2) Developing a constituency for reform: SACCI will strengthen the government’s ability to develop and support a core constituency of anti-corruption reformers, and empower the public to engage with the government to provide oversight of corrupt practices.
3) Engage Broadly with Government Anti-Corruption Efforts: SACCI must engage broadly across the government of Ukraine and will coordinate closely with Ukraine’s anti-corruption institutions including, as appropriate, the NRC, NAPC, NABU, Council on Anti-Corruption Policy, the Verkhovna Rada Anti- Corruption Committee, the Judiciary, and Presidential Administration, as well as selected ministries, oblast, rayons, and municipalities.
4) Coordination with other USAID Projects: Coordination with other USAID activities in democracy and governance, economic growth, health, agriculture, and energy is essential. Specifically, SACCI will coordinate with:
● Local partners of the UNITER civil society strengthening program (e.g. the Reanimation Package of Reforms, Transparency International Ukraine, Anti-Corruption Action Center, Nashi Groshy, etc.), which ended September 2016;
● The ENGAGE civic participation activity, which includes a substantial focus on demand-side, citizen and CSO engagement in anti-corruption efforts;
● Local Governance and Decentralization Programs, including the Policy for Ukraine Local Self
Governance (PULSE) and the Decentralization Offering Better Results and Efficiency (DOBRE) activities;
● The Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration (TAPAS) activity, which focuses on strengthening e-Governance, e-Procurement and Open Data;
● The Nove Pravosuddya and other US-supported Rule of Law activities;
● The Ukraine Responsible and Accountable Politics Program (U-RAP) (implemented by CEPPS- IRI/NDI/IFES), particularly in relation to political finance;
● Other democracy and governance, health, economic growth, and humanitarian assistance programs as appropriate, including: RESPECT and SIAPS health procurement reform activities; the Civil Society Capacity Building activity implemented by ISAR-Ednannia; The Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment activity implemented by UCIPR; Human Rights in Action Program implemented by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union; Domestic Oversight of Political Processes in Ukraine Program implemented by OPORA; and the new Reform Communication Activity.
5) Coordination with Other Donors: Other donors work on addressing high-level corruption, procurement reform, anti-corruption law enforcement institutions (such as NABU, the State Bureau of Investigation), civic education, budgetary reform, court reform, local governance, and healthcare reform.
USAID/Ukraine coordinates with other donors through the Anti-Corruption Donor Coordination Group, currently organized by OECD. SACCI will coordinate with other related technical assistance projects.
6) Sub-Grants to Local Organizations: The Program is expected make available at least $2 million in sub-grant support to civil society, media organizations, and other local partners. Sub-grants should further program objectives while also building the capacity of local partners to carry out anti-corruption-related activities.
7) SACCI Common Branding: To enhance impact, SACCI must develop, together with its counterparts, a common anti-corruption brand that can be identified across a range of activities, uniting them and cultivating a larger societal movement. The brand should have an identifiable symbol that can be used in a variety of activities, making all actors feel they are a part of a larger movement addressing corruption in the country. SACCI should coordinate closely with GOU and other donor programs to link ongoing anti-corruption efforts throughout the country through the common branding and coordinated messaging.
V. PROGRAM OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED RESULTS
The purpose of the Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions (SACCI) Program is to reduce corruption and increase the accountability and transparency of governance in Ukraine. This purpose will be achieved through three interconnected Objectives and six Expected Results (ERs):
Objective 1: Key Government Institutions Empowered to Fight Corruption
ER 1.1: Comprehensive anti-corruption legal and policy framework developed and adopted.
ER 1.2: Government capacity to implement anti-corruption policies, tools, and mechanisms strengthened.
Objective 2: Public Support for and Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts Increased
ER 2.1: Government outreach on anti-corruption reforms and successes improved.
ER 2.2: Engagement of citizens in the fight against corruption increased.
Objective 3: Public Tolerance of Corrupt Practices Reduced
ER 3.1: Public understanding of corruption and its costs increased.
ER 3.2: Youth increasingly reject corruption as a social norm.
Objective 1: Key Government Institutions Empowered to Fight Corruption
Under Objective 1, SACCI will empower Ukrainian governmental institutions that are committed to fighting corruption. Such anti-corruption champion institutions might include, for example, the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the National Reform Council (NRC), the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Infrastructure, select Oblast Administrations, Kyiv City Administration, the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service (NAUCS), or other bodies that demonstrate the political will to increase transparency in governance and its accountability to citizens and the law. It is expected that champion institutions will be more successful if they leverage the work of civil society organizations and the media, both in promoting public education about their activities and supporting their work in deterring corrupt practices.
Selection of partner institutions will be done in consultation with USAID based on a set of criteria including political will, the significance of the institution in fighting corruption, and the replicability and scalability of the potential interventions and initiatives. Once anti-corruption champion institutions are identified for support, SACCI will collaboratively develop, implement and institutionalize sound anti-corruption policies and processes, and engage citizens in shaping and overseeing anti-corruption efforts. SACCI will assist these institutions in contributing to Ukraine’s national anti-corruption legislative framework and facilitate inclusive dialogue.
Expected Result 1.1: Comprehensive anti-corruption legal and policy framework developed and adopted.
While anti-corruption experts assert that Ukraine has some of the most extensive anti-corruption legislation on the books, much of it has not been effectively implemented. Among the barriers to implementation are gaps in the legal, budgetary, and regulatory framework, as well as weaknesses in the system of checks and balances that help ensure accountability and prevent abuse both across and within institutions (e.g., weak protections for whistleblowers). SACCI will address these legal gaps and weaknesses by working with institutions to develop legislation, budget requirements, policies, regulations, orders, decrees, and other norms to strengthen the legal and policy framework for anti-corruption reform while removing legal obstacles to its implementation. SACCI should share and promote the application of European standards and international best practices in the field.
The participation of key anti-corruption champions, as well as political actors and civil society, in the legislative and policy-making process is essential in order to address the uneven political will and help counter efforts to obstruct anti-corruption reform. SACCI will engage a range of stakeholders, while encouraging swift action on necessary legislation, regulations, and policies. The Program will facilitate dialogue and partnership among government institutions, civil society, academicians, the Verkhovna Rada, Cabinet of Ministers, Presidential Administration, and others to promote an efficient, inclusive, and transparent rule-making process.
Expected Result 1.2: Government capacity to develop and implement anti-corruption policies, tools, and mechanisms strengthened.
SACCI will assist anti-corruption champions to implement tools and mechanisms that increase transparency and accountability, and thereby deter corruption in government. Targeted support to key anti-corruption institutions should help consolidate Ukraine’s anti-corruption foundation, while support to ministries, state agencies, local governments, and others should help mainstream anti-corruption practices across the government. SACCI may, through research and methodologies such as risk assessments, vulnerability assessments, internal efficiency assessments, or integrity audits, evaluate state institutions and processes to determine which relationships, functions, and services are most subject to corruption.
Based on its own analyses and the self-assessments of counterparts, SACCI will work with anti-corruption champions to develop, adapt, and administer tools and procedures to increase transparency and accountability (both internal and external) while reducing opportunities for corruption and graft. Such assistance may include, for example, staff training, materials and equipment, or development of policies and procedures that support the implementation of codes of ethics, financial asset and interest declaration systems, lifestyle monitoring and audits, whistleblower protections, etc. Assistance may also support the introduction of institution-specific tools or processes, such as citizen scorecards or customer feedback mechanisms, to help monitor institutional performance in reducing corruption.
As the primary GOU institution for preventing corruption and promoting accountability among civil servants, the NAPC should be a priority for SACCI assistance. SACCI might, for example, support technical assistance to help the NAPC stand up operations, implement online financial declaration systems, train staff to review and audit reports, engage with civil society, communicate with the public, or apply best practices achieved in establishing corruption prevention agencies in other countries Other institutions that play a special role in fighting corruption, such as the National Agency of Ukraine on Civil Service and the National Academy of Public Administration, might receive similar assistance in areas such as implementation of civil service reform legislation, merit-based selection procedures, or revision of compensation and benefit systems.
Objective 2: Public Support for and Engagement in Anti-Corruption Efforts Increased
As discussed above, progress in addressing corruption post-EuroMaidan has been uneven, and public perception of these efforts is highly cynical. Government communication about anti-corruption remains mostly ineffective, and the public is often unaware of the reforms and results that have been achieved.
SACCI will work with targeted institutions such as the NAPC and NRC, and other anti-corruption champion institutions across the government, along with civil society and media, to raise awareness of corruption, and communicate successes. It will help government engage citizens in the fight against corruption, while helping to build the capacity of civil society organizations as collaborative partners in these efforts.
Expected Result 2.1: Government outreach on anti-corruption reforms and successes improved.
SACCI will help champion institutions widely publicize anti-corruption actions and successes in order to deter malfeasance, recognize honest political actors, and increase public confidence in anti-corruption reforms. Effective implementation of reforms and visible results will send the clearest signals of a commitment to reducing corruption. SACCI will help government institutions in communicating about such successes, while also helping them explain their anti-corruption strategy and how various actions will contribute to progress in the future. Assistance might be provided in a range of areas, from concept and message development to training communications officers to development of media products.
Expected Result 2.2: Engagement of citizens in the fight against corruption increased.
Citizen participation in the fight against corruption is crucial to the success, legitimacy and sustainability of Ukraine’s anti-corruption reforms. As noted, citizens are ready to participate in anti-corruption efforts, but many lack the knowledge and tools to join the fight. To address this issue, SACCI will work with government institutions to increase opportunities for citizens to engage in state-led anti-corruption efforts, contribute to anti-corruption policy-making processes, innovate with the government to develop anti-corruption tools and mechanisms, and amplify strategic communications on anti-corruption reforms. These opportunities will only be effective in fighting corruption if citizens see their value and understand how to take advantage of them.
While working with the government to make its processes more open, transparent, and inclusive, SACCI should also empower citizens to use the mechanisms available for citizen oversight of government in Ukraine.
SACCI may assist champion institutions in promoting these tools while also directly engaging with citizens and civil society to raise awareness and understanding of the role citizens can play in holding their leaders accountable.
SACCI will facilitate a collaborative relationship among citizens, CSOs and anti-corruption champion institutions. Such collaboration should foster greater trust and confidence between citizens and government, while increasing the reach, effectiveness, legitimacy and sustainability of anti-corruption measures. SACCI will work with CSOs to close the gap between government and citizens by strengthening CSO capacity to serve as representative, expert, advocate, communicator and implementer of anti-corruption reforms. This interaction should help to raise citizen expectations about the behavior of public officials and direct the incentive structure toward more responsive and transparent institutions.
Objective 3: Public Tolerance of Corrupt Practices Reduced
In addition to anti-corruption reforms and more accountable governance, the fight against deeply rooted corruption requires a corresponding shift in social attitudes and habits. In addition to working with champion institutions on implementing and communicating about anti-corruption reforms, SACCI will support public awareness and civic education efforts that educate citizens about the costs of corruption and discourage the acceptance and continuation of corrupt practices as part of Ukrainian life.
The attitude of the next generation of Ukrainians towards corrupt behavior will play a critical role in how the country develops. While steps must be taken by adult Ukrainians today in order to alter the course of systemic corruption, it will likely be their children whose attitudes will determine whether profound and sustainable change can be achieved.
Expected Result 3.1: Public understanding of corruption and its costs increased.
The Program will engage key actors – governmental and non-governmental – in activities to foster respect for the law and individual accountability, while demonstrating the harmful effects of corruption and how reducing it will benefit society. SACCI may employ a multi-dimensional approach using a variety of partners, including media, schools, civil society, business organizations and others, to ensure that these communication and education campaigns reach audiences across Ukraine.
Expected Result 3.2: Youth increasingly reject corruption as a social norm
SACCI should cultivate among Ukrainian youth an attitude towards corruption that differs from that of their parents’ generation. In particular, it should help youth move away from the views that giving a bribe or cheating the system is a necessary fact of life and that widespread corruption is an immutable feature of governance in Ukraine. For this reason, SACCI will be expected to make activities targeting youth a priority.
The program will employ various tools and media to reach youth, through school curricula and extracurricular activities, television, social media, sports and entertainment figures, popular culture and other channels, with messages that will help erode social tolerance of corruption.
VI. MONITORING AND EVALUATION
SACCI’s interventions must be driven not just by opportunity, but also by quantitative and qualitative evidence. Accordingly, the Offeror will describe its system for monitoring results at the Program Goal, Objective, and Expected Result levels. The Offeror must submit as a part of its proposal a monitoring and evaluation plan to describe how it will set baselines, measure progress, and identify results achieved in reaching the expected outcomes of the Program. The Offeror must use indicators supporting the Foreign Assistance Standardized Program Structure and Definitions for anti-corruption reforms (PROGRAM AREA DR.2: Good Governance / Program Element DR.2.4: Anti-Corruption Reforms– see http://www.state.gov/f/indicators/ ), indicators used by local and international organizations working in Ukraine, as well as indicators used by the GOU to measure progress.
To ensure local ownership, CSO and other relevant institutions will play a key role in determining the indicators used. All data collection and analysis for each indicator must be disaggregated by gender, ethnicity and disability. The Offeror must integrate a baseline diagnostic for the activity, which must lead to a clear development hypothesis with realistic expectations of the value and scale of results, and understanding of implementation risks. Further, the Offeror must be able to develop and administer flexible monitoring tools where country program goals and objectives may change, baselines and control groups may be lacking, cause and effect do not always follow a linear relationship, and programs rely on quick turnaround of data and analysis to inform programming decisions. When possible, trainings should have pre- and post-tests, and follow-up testing to gauge learning and retention.
If requested by the USAID COR, the Offeror will be required to cooperate with and facilitate the work of an independent Contractor who will design and implement a performance or impact evaluation of the Program, in accordance with USAID policy. The Offeror should expect periodic performance evaluations conducted by USAID or its Contractor (see http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation/USAID_EVALUATION_POLICY.pdf).
VII. PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
Management Plan
The Offeror must include a management plan in its proposal, describing the main roles of Key and non-Key Personnel as well as the organizational relationships among staff, sub-Contractors, grantees, and consultants (including a graphical organizational chart). Ukrainian staff, advisors, contractors and grantees should be provided prominent roles in the Program. The Management Plan should detail any particular efficiency or cost-saving measures the Offeror may wish to propose. Internal financial and management controls should also be discussed to assure USAID that the Offeror, its sub-Contractors, and sub-grantees will manage U.S.
taxpayers’ money with accountability.
Grants Under Contract
The Contractor is authorized to award sub-grants to U.S. Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and non- U.S. NGOs. Subgrants to U.S. NGOs (not-for-profits or for-profits) are limited to $100,000 total per recipient (ADS 302.3.4.13). This limitation does not apply to grant awards to non-U.S. NGOs. Contractor-issued subgrants shall be awarded and administered in accordance with the policies, procedures, and regulations set forth or referenced in Automated Directives System (ADS) 303 for Grants and Cooperative Agreements to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as periodically amended.
All sub-grants shall be awarded competitively with exceptions to be approved by the Contracting Officer. The use of fixed amount awards (FAAs) and the Simplified Grant Format are authorized when the conditions in ADS 303.3.24 and ADS 303.3.25 are met. ADS 308, Awards to Public International Organizations are also applied to grants that a USAID contractor executes.
The Contractor must ensure that the grantee does not appear on the “List of Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Non-Procurement Programs.”
The Contractor must acquire a signed Certification Regarding Terrorist Financing from the proposed grantee and the Contractor must confirm that the proposed grantee: (i) does not appear on the master list of Specially http://www.state.gov/f/indicators/
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons, which list is maintained by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and is available online at OFAC’ s website: http://sdnsearch.ofac.treas.gov/ and (ii) is not included in any supplementary information concerning prohibited individuals or entities that may be provided by USAID to the Contractor and (iii) has not been designated by the United Nations Security (UNSC) sanctions committee…
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