PLSO_solicitation_-_RFI_draft.pdf

JUBA Partner Liaison Security Operation (PLSO) DRAFT Statement of Work (SOW)

1. BACKGROUND

Since the outbreak of civil war in December 2013, South Sudan has experienced a continuous rise in crime and armed conflict resulting from a failing economy, displacement of over one third of the population, weak or nonfunctional institutions, and the abrogation and dissolution of fragile political arrangements. In addition, years of civil war and tribal conflict have provided the population with ready access to weapons and experience in their use. Violent crimes (murder, armed robbery, home invasions, cattle raiding, extortion, kidnapping) and non-violent petty theft and harassment occur in all parts of South Sudan. Violence against aid workers and the looting of assets have been regular occurrences.

Between January and September 2018, the UN reported 613 violent incidents that disrupted humanitarian operations. Since the start of the conflict in 2013, at least 110 aid workers have been killed. Within this context, the U.S. Government (USG) security ratings for South Sudan are as follows:

(a) Political Violence – Critical;

(b) Terrorism – Medium; and

(c) Crime – Critical.

The U.S. Department of State’s South Sudan Travel Warning, found here:

https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/republic-of-south-sudan-travel-warning.html details South Sudan’s security environment.

On August 5, 2018 the Government of South Sudan (GoSS) and most opposition groups signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) which included a ceasefire, integration of opposition forces into a reconstituted national military and governing arrangements. Since the signing of the R-ARCSS, conflict among armed groups has declined significantly. However, the root causes of crime and traditional forms of conflict (e.g. cattle raiding) remain and the peace is tenuous.

USAID finances and oversees significant U.S. Government’s (USG) development and humanitarian programs in South Sudan implemented through over 50 implementing partners (IPs) who, in turn, contract with numerous local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Programming focuses on building a more stable and socially cohesive country by strengthening resilient and conflict-resistant communities. Activities include conflict mitigation, democracy and governance, education, health, and economic stabilization services and technical assistance alongside one of the Agency’s largest Humanitarian Assistance programs. The State Department finances an additional 5 organizations that may wish to benefit from PLSO services.

While USAID’s legal relationship prohibits providing prescriptive guidance or reporting on security, the Mission supports a Partner Liaison Security Operation (PLSO) as a tool to help IPs, and their sub-awardees to better manage and mitigate their respective security risks. The PLSO’s efforts contribute to more effective delivery of USG funded assistance, as it will enhance the IPs’ ability to stay abreast of security concerns and better secure their operations so that IPs can more aptly perform and advance development and humanitarian objectives under their respective agreements and contracts.

https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/republic-of-south-sudan-travel-warning.html https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/republic-of-south-sudan-travel-warning.html

Juba PLSO DRAFT Solicitation SOW

2. FUNCTIONS OF USAID PLSOs (from ADS chapter 573)

USAID is increasingly called upon to implement programs in countries and regions identified by the Department of State as High Threat Posts. In these areas the need for a consistent and appropriate level of safety and security support for the Agency’s Implementing Partners is critical. While IPs are ultimately responsible for the safety and protection of their employees and programs, the PLSO is intended to provide safety and security related support to USAID’s IPs, regardless of their organization’s country of origin. The PLSO also serves in an information sharing role helping to disseminate open source information and promote security best practices. PLSOs work very closely with Embassy Regional Security Offices (RSO) to ensure full understanding and support of the program.

3. GOALS OF USAID/SOUTH SUDAN PLSO

• Provide contextual and trend analysis of key contributors to the high threat security environment in

South Sudan with an emphasis on actionable information that could be used to improve the operational safety of USAID IPs and their sub-partners. Topics could include traditional sources of conflict such as cattle raiding; kidnapping patterns; political tensions; sub-regional dynamics; etc.

• Build the capacity of USAID IPs and their sub-partners to reduce personal risk and appropriately plan for, and manage, operational security risks.

• Collaborate with other security support entities (e.g. the NGO Forum) to collect and share with the Embassy, USAID and relevant IPs information on security threats and trends.

4. ORGANIZATIONAL LOCATION

Although operations related to this contract are expected to be primarily located in Juba, South Sudan, the Contractor will offer support to IPs operating throughout the country.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES AND ACTIVITIES

The PLSO will be expected to complement, rather than duplicate, existing security related support to the NGO community in South Sudan, focusing on the specific needs of USAID IPs and sub-partners and striving for cost efficiency and effectiveness. In addition to security advisors who are employees and/or contractors of international and local NGOs, there are several membership based organizations in South Sudan that provide information and advice to the IP community. While the activities listed below may appear comprehensive, USAID seeks services to fill gaps, improve the quality of such support, and diversify options for capacity building in security planning, implementation, monitoring and budgeting.

In addition, the PLSO is expected to collaborate with the Mission’s technical teams, other USG agencies in South Sudan, and existing security forums which, at a minimum, should include:

The International NGO Safety Organization (INSO) opened an office in South Sudan in January, 2018.

With funding from various donors, its mission is to support the humanitarian community with information, analysis and advice that enhances situational awareness, supports informed decision-making, strengthens operational practice and enables humanitarian access. Services include 1).

providing NGOs with credible, reliable and quality safety information, analysis and advice in a timely and appropriate manner; and 2) provide the knowledge and skills to mitigate personal risk and improve organizational safety management.

The South Sudan NGO Forum’s mission is to facilitating coordination of NGOs to effectively operate in South Sudan. The Forum is an independent coordinating body of over 100 national, and nearly 130 international, NGOs that serves and facilitates the work of its members to address the humanitarian and development needs of South Sudan. The Forum’s security team supports members through information sharing; analysis; and advice and guidance to enhance situational awareness, inform operational decision-making and help enable humanitarian activity. Services include emergency response, including re-locations; flash and daily incident updates; an incident data base; information sharing platforms; and analysis of incidents.

The goal of the Overseas Security Advisory Council's (OSAC) Program is to enhance the exchange of timely and relevant security-related information between the local representatives of U.S. private sector organizations operating abroad and U.S. embassies and consulates. Country Councils offer security representatives the opportunity to network, share security concerns and best practices, and learn about and take advantage of resources available to them through the U.S. embassy. In Juba, there is a robust Country Council that is convened by the OSAC Steering Committee and meets regularly. The Juba Council discusses threats against personnel, risk, and other topics such as crime, natural disasters, disease outbreak, and crisis management and contingency planning.

Activities should include:

ACTIVITY FREQUENCY

Information Sharing

Coordinating with relevant in-country entities such as the United Nations (UN), international NGOs, forums, the Government of South Sudan (GoSS), and international donors for the purpose of sharing and aggregating security information among partners working in the same environment. Information collected will be shared with relevant USAID offices at the Mission and Washington and well as IPs.

Ongoing

Staying informed of USAID and Embassy safety and security policies, practices, and notifications, especially as they apply to, or affect, USAID’s IPs. Ongoing

Participating in regular meetings with the EXO and other relevant USAID offices at the Mission to report on PLSO activities, IP issues and the overall security situation in South Sudan.

Weekly

Meeting with, and providing informational briefings, to newly arrived international staff of USAID IPs tailored to suit the IPs organizational approach and area of operations. Briefings may also include personal security advice at the request of the individual IP. All briefings should provide a balanced perspective on the realities of operating in South Sudan.

As needed

Participating as a member of the Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC). Monthly Capacity Building tailored to suit the needs and approach of individual IPs

Assist partners in identifying needs and issues relevant to their safety and security and develop, implement and/or identify training programs relevant to IP field operations including security analysis; security planning; and the implementation, monitoring, evaluation and budgeting of such plans.

Ongoing

Research, organize and provide references and guidelines for effective standard operating procedures for operating throughout South Sudan. As needed

Provide and/or source training for USAID IPs and their sub-partners in personal security that is relevant to South Sudan context and contributes to the operational As requested safety of IP staff (e.g. “HEAT” and related trainings) Coordinate with NGO Forum and other security support entities to build the capacity of USAID IPs to use and share security information to help IPs better manage and mitigate their respective security concerns.

On-going

Participate in the development of bespoke security strategies aligned to the IP’s respective risk tolerances, available resources, and ability to absorb complexity to enhance off-site operations. Share non-prescriptive best practices in security plan development or updates among IPs.

As requested

Provide non-prescriptive guidance to IPs regarding security upgrades and security-related contract modifications in coordination with the Contracting/Agreement Officer Representative (AOR/COR).

As needed

Analysis Draft and distribute medium and long-term contextual analysis relevant to IP security, USAID staff and the RSO based on information received from IPs, security databases, systems, and other relevant sources. These analyses should include trend assessments that complement incident reporting from other security support entities.

Weekly

Utilizing existing information, provide site specific assessments of security situation in support of USAID site visits.

As requested by USAID and RSO

Reporting If the PLSO becomes aware of a security incident directly affecting a USAID IP, provide immediate notification to relevant USAID offices. The notification will include the source of the reporting (e.g. NGO Forum; IPs; etc.) the date, time, and location of the incident, if available, as well the type of incident and any other relevant information.

On going

Producing an activity report for USAID/South Sudan which contains comprehensive information regarding the Contractor’s activities, services provided to IPs, and security issues and concerns communicated by IPs, if any.

Monthly

Informing USAID on potential and actual security factors affecting USAID operations. On going

6. SECURITY INFORMATION

a. Type of Security Information

The term “security information” as used in this Contract shall mean information related to security that is hostile or threat-related in nature received voluntarily from implementing partners or their subcontractors as well as relevant security support entities. It also includes information from security databases, systems, and other relevant and reliable sources that are publicly available. The security information shall not be independently verified by the Contractor and will not be considered comprehensive of the security environment.

b. Use of Security Information

The security information is designed to provide IPs, USAID, and the Regional Security Officer (RSO) with potentially useful information regarding the security environment in South Sudan. Each IP will decide how it utilizes or does not utilize the information to effectively manage its risk profile. The security information is intended for informational purposes only. Decisions regarding security of facilities, personnel and travel should be based on Department of State travel advisories, OSAC advisories or other authoritative guidance, and the policies and practices of the IP’s organization.

c. Disclosure of Security Information Reported by IPs

The source of the security information received from IPs shall not be disclosed to anyone other than the EXO in order to protect the privacy of the IPs’ locations, business purpose, operations, and other proprietary information. In addition, the information shall not be disclosed to anyone within the contracted organization other than relevant project personnel. Further, it shall not be used in any way other than in the production of USAID contracted work product. To further protect the IP privacy, the Contractor shall not investigate the validity of the security information reported by IPs.

Although the source of the security information is protected, the actual underlying security information is unclassified and open-source information.

d. Method of Collecting Security Information

IPs will not be expected to report security incidents and the Contractor shall not actively monitor IP movements or activities through the country in order to obtain information.

7. TRAVEL

Occasional travel by the Contractor to IP activity sites may be required under the contract as needed and requested for briefings, site visits and trainings. USAID is unable to identify how many trips may be required per year for budgeting purposes so the Contractor will be asked to propose a firm-fixed price which includes all estimated travel costs.

8. STAFFING PLAN

The Contractor should have a management structure that clearly defines duties and enables effective execution of objectives and deliverables. The proposed staffing pattern must provide an adequate skill mix to meet the needs for implementation and management of the contract. This staffing plan must clearly demonstrate the ability to have staffing resources available for simultaneous efforts. The staffing plan should outline qualifications, experience, language abilities, and appropriateness of the professionals available to the team.

a. Key Personnel:

This contract envisages one Key Personnel position, the Operations Manager. The Contractor should propose an Operations Manager who shall be responsible for the efficient and effective management of all aspects of the operation. The Operation Manager should possess significant high-level experience working on similar activities as required by this Contract and meet the following minimum qualifications:

• 10 years’ experience in a relevant field (e.g., criminal science, police service, military or security operations, crisis management, international development);

• Bachelor’s degree, in any field, preferred;

• Specialized expertise and demonstrated knowledge of managing, on a day-to-day basis, the overseas security operations of a USG agency, bilateral or multilateral organization, international non-governmental organization or private company;

• Minimum 6 years of experience working in developing countries with humanitarian relief operations and NGOs on security related tasks in high risk environments; and

• Demonstrated capacity to network and communicate orally and in writing to stakeholders at multiple levels in a clear, concise, and well-organized manner on security related issues.

b. Reporting Structure

The Contractor has a legal and direct relationship with the USAID EXO, as such all official communications under this Contract shall go through the USAID EXO.

9. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY and STRUCTURE

The Contractor must have proven experience in working on security matters in high threat settings, preferably in localities similar to South Sudan. The Contractor must be able to access to public domain databases, systems, and other relevant information which will allow the Contractor the ability to analyze, assess and report on security information, as applicable to USAID South Sudan IPs. The Contractor must be available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to IPs and USAID/South Sudan EXO.

The Contractor shall work independently carrying out assigned responsibilities and duties at USAID EXO’s request. The Contractor shall have no authority to make fiscal commitments, but is expected to make personal contacts with senior U.S. Embassy, USAID/South Sudan, Implementing Partner, as well as UN personnel and GoSS officials to preform duties under this Contract. The Contractor cannot solicit outside business from USAID IPs while preforming duties under this award.

The organization must be willing to share the details of its ownership structure, including legal or financial arrangements with South Sudanese nationals or entities.

10. LOGISTICAL INFORMATION

The Contractor shall be responsible for furnishing all logistical support to meet the terms and conditions of the contract. These shall include, but are not limited to, all support for database and systems, travel arrangements, communications, appointment scheduling, administrative services, report preparation services, printing, and duplicating.

11. NO CONCURRENT SECURITY ACTIVITIES

The Contractor or its affiliates may not provide security/protection services (e.g. guard services) to any entity in South Sudan at any time during the performance of this contract. Organizations performing security/protection services in South Sudan at the time of solicitation will be excluded from competing for this contract. Information, analytic or training services are not included in the definition of “security services” for the purposes of this bidding requirement.

12. MONITORING, EVALUATION, AND LEARNING (MEL)

The Contractor must integrate monitoring, evaluation and learning through the implementation of a set of activities in a continuous process in order to achieve results outlined in the PLSO project.

Performance monitoring will focus largely at the activity level and inform day-to-day programming and implementation decisions. The Contractor will also conduct pre-activity/pre-training surveys and/or focus groups with stakeholders as necessary. Well-constructed quantitative and qualitative baseline data collection exercises will be critically important for establishing indices of service delivery quality and systems sustainability against which progress can be measured.

The Mission is also committed to incorporating “learning” into all aspects of its programming through a variety of means from assessments, portfolio reviews, data analysis, etc. USAID/South Sudan seeks to continually learn and strengthen its efforts as it relates to the security of our IPs.

USAID/South Sudan will fund both the external mid-term and/or final evaluation of the award separately from this Contract. USAID/South Sudan may use the midterm results and recommendations to inform critical programmatic decisions. USAID/South Sudan may also conduct an external final evaluation of the award.

13. OTHER TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Security Considerations All work under this contract will be unclassified, and thus no special information security requirements are applicable.

The Contractor will be responsible for its own cost-effective security under this contract and is responsible for maintaining the security of its personnel, materials, and equipment commensurate with the circumstances involved. All employees of the Contractor must meet the requirements of their work site, which may include background checks, security/restricted area clearance, drug-free workplace, safety training and/or other inspections/requirements.