RFI-612-21-SIPE-01_Final.pdf

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI)

RFI Number RFI-612-21-SIPE-01

Issuance Date April 12, 2021

Closing Date/Time May 6, 2021

Subject Strengthening Parliament’s Role in Malawi’s Development

Dear Stakeholders:

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Malawi, is in the process of designing an Activity tentatively called “Strengthening Parliament’s Role in

Malawi’s Development” Given the critical nature of the activity, the Agency seeks contributions and comments from all interested organizations in this related portfolio.

The following are the purposes of this Request for Information (RFI):

1. To allow interested organizations and all stakeholders to review, comment, and provide suggestions on the proposed scope under the draft Concept Note (CN);

2. To solicit stakeholder responses to the questions below; and

3. To increase USAID's knowledge of capabilities of potential partner organizations and solicit information that will enable USAID to better prepare a solicitation that meets the needs of host country Malawi, for this potential procurement.

Through this RFI, USAID/Malawi is conducting market research by publicly consulting with interested actors involved in the governance sector. We are requesting information, opinions, and recommendations on approaches for the implementation of the described activity. Stakeholder comments are requested to help refine the potential activity scope to ensure clarity, maximum development impact, sound coordination with existing activities, and alignment with the

Government of Malawi’s top priorities, while also supporting USAID’s Country Development

Cooperation Strategy (CDCS).

Eligibility criteria: USAID/Malawi will accept responses from all interested local non-governmental organizations.

THIS IS A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ONLY and is issued solely for information and planning purposes. It does not constitute a request for proposal/application/quotation, an invitation for bids or solicitation, nor any proposals/applications. If submitted in response to this request, they will not be considered. The information provided in the RFI is subject to change and does not bind the Government. This RFI does not commit the U.S. Government to issue a solicitation.

Furthermore, USAID/Malawi is not at this time seeking applications and will not accept unsolicited applications. Respondents are hereby notified that all costs associated with responding to this RFI will be solely at the interested party’s expense. The U.S. Government will not pay for any information or administrative costs incurred in response to this RFI, and release of this RFI shall not be construed as a commitment or as authorization to incur costs for which reimbursement would be required or sought.

Responses to this RFI are strictly voluntary and will not be returned. Respondents will not be notified of the result of the review. If a solicitation is issued, it will be announced on beta.SAM.gov or www.grants.gov at a later date.

It is your responsibility to monitor the indicated websites and interested parties are responsible for checking these websites for further information and updates. Respondents are advised that USAID is under no obligation to acknowledge receipt of the information, answer questions, or provide feedback to respondents with respect to any information submitted. It should be noted that respondents to this RFI will not obtain any advantage and will not be precluded from participation in future solicitations, if any are issued.

RESPONSES:

Interested parties are requested to respond to this RFI including any documents that support their comments. Respondents may provide responses through email or through attachments to email in

Microsoft Word compatible format or Adobe Acrobat formats electronically to oaa-malawi-solicit@usaid.gov with a copy to lchimangeni@usaid.gov by not later than May 6, 2021 at

17.00hrs Lilongwe time. Responses to the RFI must be written in English, submitted in Microsoft

Word compatible formats and use 12pt font. Please number each page consecutively and please include the title RFI-612-21-SIPE-01 in the subject line of your e-mail.

Please note that there will not be a Q&A opportunity during this RFI. We would appreciate comments being concise and specific. To expedite USAID’s review of replies, please keep responses to four (4) pages or less in length (excluding any attachments). Responses must at a minimum contain the following:

(1) Name and address of the responding organization;

(2) Primary point of contact, phone number and e-mail address.

Responses may be used by USAID without restriction or limitation, therefore, proprietary information should not be sent. Again, your voluntary responses will be used to inform USAID’s strategy and activity design. The comments received may or may not be incorporated into any future solicitation. Please note again, that respondents will not receive individualized feedback.

All submissions will be considered Government property and will not be returned.

http://beta.sam.gov/ http://www.grants.gov/ mailto:oaa-malawi-solicit@usaid.gov mailto:oaa-malawi-solicit@usaid.gov mailto:lchimangeni@usaid.gov

Again, USAID is not obligated to procure any of the services described herein, nor should the release of this request be construed as such a commitment on the part of USAID.

Thank you for your interest in USAID/Malawi activities.

Sincerely, Dion Glisan

Contracting/Agreement Officer

KEY QUESTIONS

As part of the consultation process, USAID is interested in receiving stakeholder perspectives on the proposed approach including past successes and failures of these types of activities as well as opportunities to leverage existing efforts and resources.

In view of the draft Concept Note (CN), respondents are requested to provide answers, comments, and recommendations in response to the specific question below in the CN context:

1. The current draft Concept Note contains an ambitious agenda by focusing on the three components. To achieve this will require various partners who offer complementary skills and experience. Is this a reasonable request? Can these skills and experience be found in

Malawi?

2. An important component of the CN is investment in Parliamentary committees to lead in an effort of improving Parliamentary effectiveness. How should the current draft CN be modified to clearly and best address this aim? Are particular protections / requirements needed for this to be successful?

3. Does the respondent /organization have capacity or interest in recruiting and managing international experts? Is that capacity or interest necessary for this type of activity?

4. Does the respondent /organization have experience in providing support to Parliament and or Parliamentary Committees? Internationally? In Malawi?

5. This activity will involve substantial amounts of funding. Please specify amounts the respondent organization has managed, for understanding of capacity.

6. To perform and successfully reach goals described in this concept note, what approximate amount of funding does the respondent / organization envision should be committed to this activity?

7. Does the respondent / organization have experience in working with statutory oversight institutions? Experience working with the media?

8. What else do you think is important for USAID to consider with an activity such as is described?

Annex 1: Concept Note

STRENGTHENING PARLIAMENT’S ROLE IN MALAWI’S DEVELOPMENT

1. Purpose

USAID/Malawi would like to contribute to Malawi’s democratic governance by supporting the

Parliament of Malawi (POM) to better fulfill its legislative, oversight and representative functions. The goal of the activity is to support the effectiveness of Parliament by providing technical support to selected constitutional and standing committees, coordination between

Parliament and statutory oversight institutions around public integrity issues, and CSOs and media’s demand for accountability. This activity will contribute to the USAID’s Country

Development Cooperating Strategy- CDCS (2020-2025).

2. Background: Malawi’s Political System

Malawi is a presidential system of government. The republican constitution provides for separation of powers among the three branches of government, namely Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. However, three features define a Malawi’s presidential system; first, the executive power is vested in a one-person office; secondly, the executive has its own electoral mandate, in other words, the President is elected and not dependent on the confidence of the legislature; and thirdly that the executive is in office for a fixed term: the president cannot be sent away by the legislature through a motion of no-confidence but only through impeachment. The last two features of presidential system point to separation of powers as an underlying principle of presidentialism.

The political system, however, retains certain features of the Parliamentary system. In Malawi, the President has wide powers to appoint ministers from Parliament or outside Parliament.

When this happens, it may enhance the power of the executive through its possibility to control the legislature thus leading to executive dominance; and conversely, the legislature may achieve a degree of control over (part of) the executive, forming a counterbalance to executive power and that despite constitutional proclamation of Parliamentary supremacy, legislative-executive fusion usually strengthens the position of the executive. In other words, because presidentialism is combined with features of Parliamentary systems, functional or personal fusion between the executive and legislative branches strengthens executive dominance. None of the institutional and legal features allowing a powerful presidency has been changed with the transition to multi-party politics. Instead, as Cranenburgh argues, the executive must work with a legislature containing opposition parties, or in the most extreme case, the possibility of ‘co-habitation’ when the legislature is controlled by the opposition. (in: Salih, 2003 p. 192).1

1 Salih Mohammed, M.A. (ed.) African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance, Pluto

Press, 2003

Parliament as a house of representatives is extremely important in a democracy. Its mandate is achieved through passing legislation, overseeing government action, and facilitating public participation and international participation. The role of Parliament includes the promotion of the values of human dignity, and equality under the Constitution. It upholds our citizens' political rights, the basic values and principles governing public administration, and oversees the implementation of constitutional imperatives. Malawi Parliament is one of the oldest institutions as it has existed since the colonial government of the British. During the one party MCP regime that ended in 1994, Parliament was merely an extension of the ruling party and the executive.

With the re-introduction of multipartyism in 1994, much of Parliament's focus has been on legislative reforms, and representation of constituents. Members of Parliament are largely considered as agents of community development. In this process, Parliament's oversight function received less attention, and was compounded further by the reality that the Constitution deals with Parliament's legislative authority in more detail compared to its oversight role. In giving credence to its increasingly important oversight role, the current leadership in Parliament realizes that to undertake the management of the legislative and oversight programme of Parliament demands capacity, competence, and collective action. Current mechanisms for oversight and accountability by Parliament is through plenary debates, clusters for budget scrutiny, and committees. Committees can interact with civil society organizations, organized business, experts and professional bodies as a way of enhancing accountability and can call Ministers and departmental heads to account on any issue relating to any matter over which they are exercising accountability. However, research shows that Parliamentarians and their staff do not have adequate skills and resources to conduct oversight.

2.1 Civil Society and the Media

One true mark of political liberalization in the country is the availability of more political space for electoral and political actors to enjoy their civil and political rights and liberties. Since the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 1993, the civil society, in general, has utilized this space to effectively hold political actors accountable and in their resolve to stop abuse of power. The civil society and the media have evolved from a culture of silence under the 30 years of one-party regime to a culture of political activism. In short, “Malawi’s process of democratisation started as a popular movement; a social protest against a political regime that failed to meet the expectations of its people” (Patel & Chirwa in: Ott, et al, 2000 p. 89)2. Civil society, as “the realm of organised social life standing between the individual and the state” is necessary for democratic accountability because it is ‘an aggregate of institutions whose members are engaged primarily in a complex of non-state activities – economic and cultural production, voluntary associations and household life – and who in this way preserve and transform their identity by exercise of all sorts of pressures or controls upon state institutions’ (Sachikonye, 1995; Keane, 2 Ott, M. et al, (eds.) Malawi’s Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems and Prospects, Kachere Series, 1988 cited by Chirwa, ibid. p. 90).3 In Malawi, the media, an integral part of civil society, operates under a reasonable legal framework. In particular, the Communications Act (1998) regulates the media in Malawi. The Act establishes the Malawi Communications Regulatory

Authority (MACRA) with powers to issue licenses and regulate both public and private media institutions in the country. It promotes open access to information, efficiency and competition among media personnel, fosters the development and operation of media institutions in accordance with international standards and works independent of any interference. However, the president appoints members including the chairman of MACRA.4

Civil society and the media have been instrumental in exposing abuse and misuse of public resources in Malawi. Since 1994, the most cases of corruption have been exposed through the media and corruption suspects have been named and shamed. The media and the civil society generally, have been characterised by an anti-corruption frenzy with calls for dealing with corruption. In this process, the media has raised public awareness disseminated information about corruption. Publicity can contribute powerfully to accountability, especially where information about misdeeds has been concealed, but accountability itself requires penalties beyond publicity – at the very least the capacity to remove an office holder from office. Without political or legal sanctions, publicity can remain at the level of mere allegations that the powerful often find ways to manage. What is known, however, is that the right to know is linked inextricably to accountability. Informed appraisal of government by the public, press and

Parliament is a difficult, even impossible, task if government activities and decision-making processes are obscured from public scrutiny. In short, civil society and the media need to play concerted roles on enhancing political accountability, participation, a plural and democratic political culture, improving the quality of political representation, disseminating civic education, linking the governors and the governed and, above all, being the voices of the voiceless.

3. Problem Statement

Parliament is a foundation for democratic accountability. An effective Parliament provides oversight over government performance and follows up on the policy commitments by the incumbent government. Parliament should be able to take corrective action on the abuse of public resources, and poor performance by the state agencies. However, to meaningfully perform its oversight role, Parliament needs the capacity and a certain level of independence from the executive. Sadly, limited commitment by Parliament to strengthen accountability systems, as well as inadequate CSO’s capacity to demand accountability, undermine the whole notion of good governance.

The Malawi National Assembly has a total of 193 seats and of these, based on May 2019 elections, only 44 of the MPs are women. This figure represents 22.92% of the total population.

Participation and representation of women in most of the key committees is a challenge due to

3 Ott, M. et al, (eds.) Malawi’s Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems and Prospects, Kachere Series, 4 Section 7, The Communications Act, 1998 their low numbers. The Parliament of Malawi committee system has 18 committees. Some of the committees are established by the constitution while others by the Standing Orders.

Furthermore, the National Assembly created clusters for scrutinizing national budget estimates.

Committee hearings and clusters have been used by the National Assembly to receive briefings by MDAs and the CSOs on the performance of development policies and their implementation.

However, in practice, the scrutiny of the government budget, bills and other public sector policies by the legislature rarely result in significant change.

The portfolio committees provide external oversight to MDAs by overseeing public expenditure and adherence to approved budget lines as well as policy implementation. Although these committees have the power to operate as oversight mechanisms, they are restricted from doing so due to a few reasons including weak technical capacity in the committees, and that usually their recommendations are ignored. Poor funding also negatively affects committee work and constrains members from discharging their legislative and oversight duties. Parliament is funded by Treasury and resources are disbursed by the Ministry of Finance as they see possible and fit.

Usually if the resources are needed for an activity deemed anti-executive arm of government, there are artificial bottlenecks in the process.

The Parliament plays a very limited role in the budget formulation process. Parliamentarians only access the budget after its presentation by the Minister of Finance. After presentation of the budget by the Minister, Parliamentarians get into sectoral clusters to scrutinise the budget specific to their sectors or portfolios. This process takes 14 days at most. During cluster meetings, MDAs and the CSOs present their own analyses of the budget to members of

Parliament. Thereafter portfolio Committee chairpersons consolidate their comments and submit to the chairperson of the Budget committee for presentation in Parliament. The reality of this process is that there is no significant change to the original budget.

Importantly, there is limited research capacity at Parliament which affects the ability of the committees to technically scrutinise sector documents, ensure performance tallies with the allocated budget or ensure corrupt practices are prevented. Few year ago, Parliament established the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) to assist Parliamentarians with the analysis of the budget estimates and expenditure but again this office is poorly resourced with low-level officers employed on non-established positions. The PBO requires structural improvements so that it can attract and recruit high level analysts. Similarly, Parliament requires a robust legal department which will be responsible for legislative research and drafting of bills. Currently, most of the private members bills are drafted by consultants which is not a sustainable way of strengthening the capacity of Parliament.

Law making is one of the main functions of Parliament. The executive drafts and tables bills for consideration by Parliament, which then scrutinizes them, amends them if in disagreement, or passes them if they are found to be in the public interest.5 MPs may also submit bills of their own called private members’ bills. Whatever the origin of a bill, the role of Parliament is to assess

5 http://www.mim.ac.mw/books/Unima%20-%20Government%20and%20Politics%20book.pdf accessed on 18-02-

2021.

http://www.mim.ac.mw/books/Unima%20-%20Government%20and%20Politics%20book.pdf them on their merits and to pass them into law if found acceptable. The Legal Affairs Committee of Parliament plays a very important role of scrutinizing the bills before they are tabled in the

House. Although Parliament has exclusive powers of legislation, it is limited from doing so due to several reasons including weak technical capacity6 in the committees to draft and scrutinize bills, inadequate technical staff to provide legislative support to members of Parliament, and inadequate financial resources for committee business. The national assembly usually does not play an active role in drafting its own bills. Most of them originate from the Executive

(Government bills). Besides, Parliament through its relevant committees is usually not given enough time to scrutinize the bills before they are tabled in the Chamber.

Overall, Parliament faces several challenges that limit its effective functions. As discussed above, Committee members do not adequately participate in the budget development process, apart from the presentation they have from the Ministry, where a few changes are made to the draft budget estimates. Furthermore, national strategic development plans and strategic documents like MGDS, or Vision2063 are not made available for debate and approval by

Parliament. Parliament should, therefore, be given adequate time to scrutinize the national development plans, policies, legislation, and budget. Effort should be made to build their skills to be able to engage with the documents and give informed analytical feedback. There is need to ensure the national assembly is allocated adequate resources to allow Parliamentarians to perform their legislative and oversight functions efficiently and effectively. Also important is the need for Parliament to have its own calendar and be able to follow it. As of now, Parliament of

Malawi meetings are basically on a part-time basis if compared to other Parliaments within the region.

4. Development Hypothesis

USAID’s proposed support to strengthen Parliament is premised on the hypothesis that: If

Malawi combines efforts to (a) improve legislative and oversight role of Parliament, (b) strengthen institutional coordination in corrective action and public integrity management, and

(c) improve civic engagement via accountability processes, then corruption and wastage of public resources will be significantly reduced, resulting in more democratic and accountable governance.

5. Approach and Expected Results for the Activity

5.1 Approach

USAID will support the GOM’s commitment toward accountable and responsive governance with a goal to improve service delivery and expanding democratic practice. The activity will support the Malawi Parliament, to enhance its ability to hold the Executive to account for how it allocates and spends public funds, makes public policy, and makes decisions that affect the people in whose name it governs. Accountability is needed to ensure fairness, equality, and

6 Staffing and Legislative drafting very key for the Legal Section. With the Autonomy Bills to be table in the House shortly, capacity issues in the Legal Section will emerge as a key challenge equity in public decision-making. Without adequate accountability, the government will remain challenged in its ability to respond effectively to the needs of the people and set national agendas that are relevant and address current and important problems. A more accountable government is also necessary to avoid abuses of power and corruption as well as to dismantle the pervasive systems of patronage politics that undermine development efforts across different levels of government and sectors. This activity will likely have three components:

Component 1: Technical support to Selected Parliamentary Committees.

The effectiveness of Parliament depends on its committee system.7 It is in the committees that the real substance of Parliamentary business is conducted. Therefore, how well they function largely determine their degree of influence on policy-making. What is their composition, including chairmanship? Are they permanent? What resources do they have at their disposal, such as secretarial and research assistance? What autonomous powers are vested in them and what is their jurisdiction? Such variables affect the efficiency of the committee system.8 The

Malawi Parliament has established mechanisms to fulfil its oversight and accountability mandates as stipulated by the constitution, and the Standing Orders of Parliament. Parliament has committee clerks who provide technical support to Parliamentarians. The Committees can interact with CSOs, experts and professional bodies as a way of enhancing accountability and can summon heads of MDA to account on any issue relating to any matter over which there is public interest. This proposed Activity will target the following constitutional committees, standing committees, and caucuses; Public Appointments, Public Accounts, Budget and Finance, Legal Affairs, Government Assurance, Health, Agriculture and Natural Resources; Trade and

Commerce, and Education. The anticipated Activity will also provide technical assistance to the

Women’s Caucus, and the Youth Caucus. Largely, this will aim at developing a strong, specialized and adequately staffed committee system by improving staff knowledge and skills through training and mentoring (embedded experts, and reforms in committee staffing), and increasing resources for work of the committees.

Component 2: Coordination of preventative and corrective mechanisms

Parliamentary committees conduct public hearings and enquiries to take preventive or corrective action against alleged misconduct by public officials. However, effective corrective action requires Parliament to coordinate with other statutory oversight institutions such as the

Ombudsman, Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB), Finance Intelligence Authority (FIA), Public

Procurement and Disposal of Assets Authority (PPDA), Office of the Auditor General (AG), the

Director of Public Prosecution (DPP), Office of the Director of Public Officer’s Declarations

(ODPOD) among others. This coordination and collaboration will ensure that decisions of

Parliament are followed-through by the relevant agencies in the Executive. It will also ensure that efficient and effective disciplinary hearings are held to determine appropriate corrective

7 Shaw, Malcolm (1998). "Parliamentary Committees: A Global Perspective." Journal of Legislative Studies 4(4):

225-251.

8 Nandini Patel and Arne Tostensen, “Parliamentary-Executive Relations in Malawi 1994-2004”, CMI Working

Paper 2006: 10 action based on the type and details of each case. In other words, this component hopes to achieve two things, (a) relevant Parliamentary committees receive, debate, and act on reports submitted by statutory institutions; (b) relevant statutory institutions act on, or enforce the recommendations made by Parliament on a particular accountability, disciplinary, or legislative issue.

Component 3: Public Outreach and Citizen Engagement

Considering the existence of access to information legal framework, the CSOs and the Media can do great work by enhancing transparency and accountability. This activity will support CSOs and the Media to create a consortium that works with Parliament to actively pursue and obtain explanations, and justifications regarding the management of preventative and corrective actions.

It will support them to investigate and analyse evidence of instances of the ineffective use and or the abuse of public resources, and the adequacy of reported preventative and corrective actions.

CSOs and the Media will also assist the Parliament by following up on actions taken by relevant

MDAs over decisions recommended by Parliament or its committees. This activity will also support investigative journalism, and sustained media campaigns. In addition, this component will also enhance Parliament's representational role by supporting efforts to communicate with the public through the media and constituent services.

5.2 Illustrative Results

Focusing on the three components of the program as described above, below are illustrative expected results:

• Parliamentary committees effectively influence national development planning and resource allocation to reflect citizens’ demands.

• Improved capacity of Parliament to independently review old legislation, and draft new pieces of legislation.

• Parliamentary committees and CSOs monitor and report progress on government commitment over approved policies and programmes.

• Parliament and statutory institutions take timely preventive and corrective action on public integrity issues.

• The Women caucus, and the Youth Caucus of Parliament effectively represent their interests and influence legislation and budgets.

• CSOs and the media fully utilize the access to information legislative framework and build a constructive relationship with Parliament to advance the public interest.

5.2 Illustrative Interventions for Proposed Activity

The Activity will strengthen the effectiveness of the Malawi Parliament by ensuring that there is improved detection and prevention of abuse, less arbitrary behavior, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of the government and public agencies; improved detection of waste within the public service and agencies as well as to hold the government to account in respect of how the taxpayers’ money is used; improved policy commitment ensuring that policies and programmes announced by government and authorized by Parliament are delivered;

increased transparency in government operations and enhanced public trust in the government.

The following illustrative activities, though not exhaustive may be implemented:

• Create stronger institutionalized budget and oversight functions by strengthening the

Parliamentary Budget Office and conducting regular pre- and post-budget reviews.

• Develop a strong, specialized and adequately staffed committee system by improving staff knowledge and skills through training and mentoring (embedded experts, and reforms in committee staffing), and increasing resources (advocacy and TA in the budget process)

• Link civil society groups, think tanks and experts to Parliamentary Committees to facilitate effective review and analysis of national development plans, policies, bills, legislation, and national budget estimates and expenditures.

• Support by helping CSOs systematically follow-up and publicize executive responsiveness to decisions taken by Parliamentary committees, and whether sanctions are enforced for non-compliance.

• Support coordination between Parliament, and the statutory oversight institutions to improve the preventive and corrective action mechanisms.

• Support Public Hearings and enquiries using the media with wide coverage

• Advocate for allocation of adequate resources towards the work of Parliamentary committees.

• Public Awareness heightened about the role of Parliament and the work of its committees

• Support disciplinary mechanisms, and civil/criminal litigations against alleged poor performance, abuse, or misuse of public resources.

-END of RFI-