Redacted_Limited Sources Justification_47QFSA2F0124_Jul 02 2021.pdf

Federal Acquisition Service Assisted Acquisition Services Division

Southeast Sunbelt Region

Limited Sources Justification FAR 8.405-6(a)(1)(i)(B)

1. Requiring and Contracting Activity:

a. Requiring Activity: Department of Air Force 409 SCMS/GUEA F-15 Supply Chain Management 235 Byron Street, Suite 19A Robins AFB, GA 31098

b. Contracting Activity: General Services Administration Federal Acquisition Service Assisted Acquisition Services Division 77 Forsyth Street SW Atlanta, GA 30303

c. Contracting Officer: Kimberly Guest

d. Task Oder Acquisition ID: 47QFSA21K0034

e. Estimated Value:

f. Contract Vehicle: Professional Services Schedule Engineering Services Special Item Number 871-5

2. Nature/Description of Action:

The General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Acquisition Services (FAS), Assisted Acquisition Services Division (AASD) received a requirement from the US-Air Force (USAF) 409 Supply Chain Management Squadron (SCMS) for the procurement of engineering services.

These services include performing engineering investigations in support of Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR) and Material Improvement Programs (MIP) for the F-15 aircraft peculiar avionics.

This requirement is a follow-on to Contract Number GS-00F-128CA, Order Number GSQ0416DB0050 also awarded by GSA FAS AASD on behalf of the USAF 409 SCMS. The order was awarded on 09 September 2016 to Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (NGC).

This requirement will be procured with a time and material type structure utilizing the GSA Multiple Award Schedule (MAS), Professional Services, NAICS Code: 541330ENG in accordance with FAR 8.405-6 (a)(1)(i)(B) procedures.

3. Description of Services Required:

a. Description of Services:

The F-15 Supply Chain Management Engineering Organization, 409 SCMS, provides the technical expertise and engineering staff necessary to implement the hardware and software updates, F-15 production support, and modifications necessary to maintain and improve the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) of the F-15 peculiar avionics.

This effort is for the performance-based engineering services required to perform engineering investigations in support of Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR) and Material Improvement Programs (MIP) for the F-15 aircraft peculiar avionics. These investigations encompass performing system level maintenance analysis, part’s qualification testing, Test Program Set (TPS) re-host analysis reviews, logistic/engineering studies, vertical testability analysis, and engineering investigations for the 409 SCMS and the organizations that they support. These services require extensive hands-on application in order to gain the experience needed to operate the unique test stations for the various avionics equipped on the F-15. The supplier must have a Quality Assurance (QA) program and systems engineering process to minimize the potential of any deficiencies, mitigate risk, and to avoid schedule slips.

This effort would continue a twenty-seven year sole-source contractor sustainment effort that corrects system level deficiencies, which if not resolved would adversely impact F-15 avionics performance and availability. No other contractor could successfully provide the needed service without unacceptable delays which could become a detriment to the Government.

b. Period of Performance:

The Period of Performance (POP) will consist of a one-year basic period, four one-year option periods, and a six-month extension period in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Clause 52.217-8.

Basic Period: 09 September 2021 to 08 September 2022 Option Period One: 09 September 2022 to 08 September 2023 Option Period Two: 09 September 2023 to 08 September 2024 Option Period Three: 09 September 2024 to 08 September 2025 Option Period Four: 09 September 2025 to 08 September 2026 Extension Period: 09 September 2026 to 08 March 2027

c. Source:

Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation (NGC) 7575 Colshire Drive McLean, VA 22102-7508

In-depth knowledge of the unique and specific functionality of fifteen different F-15 peculiar avionics systems’ Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) stations used to test and troubleshoot the systems. This knowledge and understanding includes operation of station equipment and components needed to test systems and the ability to evaluate the suitability and capability of the ATE to accurately and consistently perform testing.

In-depth knowledge of the peculiar avionics systems’ and ATE’s Test Program Sets (TPS) language and design which are specific and unique to each system. This knowledge and understanding includes Abbreviated Test Language for All Systems (ATLAS), Programming Language for Automatic Checkout Equipment (PLACE), F- 15 Adapted PLACE ATLAS (FAPA), Teradyne L-200, Logic Automation Stimulus And Response (LASAR), Hewlett Packard (HP) BASIC, Formula Translation (FORTRAN), UNIX, Virtual Memory System (VMS), Microsoft (MS)-DOS, MS Windows, and the multiple Warner Robins Air Logistic Center (WR-ALC) databases used in managing assets.

In-depth knowledge of the testing and repair processes and procedures unique to F-15 peculiar avionics to ensure Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness (OSS&E). This knowledge and understanding includes all levels of testing from aircraft to system/LRU/SRU, performance of SRU, assembly, component level repair and/or replacement, Air Force technical data, and Technical Order (T.O.)

documentation controlling the operation of depot equipment and repair of avionics systems.

In-depth knowledge allowing the identification of causes of LRU and SRU low reliability, to include high failure components, obsolete parts, and the use of components and subassemblies in a manner inconsistent with their original design and how these identified problems impact next higher assemblies (LRU, major aircraft systems).

In-depth knowledge to specify whether a problem is an inherent reliability or maintainability deficiency due to LRU or SRU design or whether a problem is due to TPS design deficiency.

In-depth knowledge which can determine, through analysis, solutions to each problem identified and the R&M performance improvement to be gained by each solution.

In-depth knowledge to identify specific test incompatibilities and deficiencies with ATE design, TPS, and compilation and provide integration of proposed corrections or changes to improve ATE capability and/or eliminate fault identification/isolation problems.

In-depth knowledge to conduct the proper testing to verify that modifications do not adversely impact system ATE operation, that existing maintenance testing concept is minimally impacted, if at all, and that the intended design of the solution has been met.

In-depth knowledge to generate quality T.O., schematic, and Illustrated Parts Breakdown (IPB) documentation changes that occur as a result of the findings.

NGC has a proven history of performance of these requirements; over the course of this performance, NGC has gained invaluable knowledge and understanding of the functional use of the F-15 avionics systems. This knowledge enables NGC to possess the unique capabilities necessary to perform the required services.

Historically, many examples are available in relation to the knowledge posed by NGC which equates into the level of quality necessary for mission success. These examples not only show the need for the current level of quality; however, they also provide insight into the mission impacts if the services were not provided to the current level of quality. It is to be noted, that the mission impacts discussed below are not solely related to these example/issues, many aspects of the requirement can lead to the same mission impacts if the level of quality is not provided at the current state.

The Flight Control Computer (FCC) is one of the F-15 peculiar avionics systems covered under this requirement. The FCC is a highly complex system and was the number four grounding supply item for the F-15 fleet in 2009, having been as high as number two. As of 29 May 2009, the FCC accumulated over 10,000 Mission Impaired Capability Awaiting Parts (MICAP) hours. The average number of backorders for the FCC was seventy; there was only thirty-four world-wide assets and eight SURGE backorders.

There was also an average of eight to fifteen SURGE requirements on any given day. The FCC is carcass constrained (in limited supply with limited repair parts) and about two years away from having enough carcasses to cover demands. Therefore, based on the above statistics, each FCC that comes in for repair or engineering investigation (Product Quality Deficiency Report/Material Improvement Program (PQDR/MIP)) equals a grounded aircraft, making the turn-around time critical in supporting the war fighter.

Utilizing the knowledge and experience gained since working for the Government, NGC has been able to complete approximately of all FCC engineering investigations in less than thirty days. Another contractor would have to navigate a learning curve to perform this task in less than thirty days. It is highly unlikely another contractor could successfully navigate that learning curve, without negatively impacting F-15 avionics systems and causing unacceptable delays in the Government’s requirement to support the warfighter. These negative impacts would include a significant decrease in the number of assets able to be repaired driving an increase in holes in the aircraft, an increase in the number of MICAPs and SURGEs, and an increase in grounded planes which would be detrimental to the mission. Additionally, if the learning curve could not be navigated in order to perform the tasks to repair the item, there could be a need to procure additional assets to replace the item they are not able to repair or repair timely. The procurement of the new assets would drive costly modification programs to the F-15 platform, as most items within the system are obsolete and a replacement item would have to be incorporated into the current system through the modification process, thus costing the Government an unforeseen amount of money and time.

Due to aging aircraft, increasing legacy obsolescence, high flying hours, hardware afflicted with latent physical defects, environmentally stimulated intermittent failures, and inconsistencies between system Built-In Test (BIT) and Intermediate Level (I-Level) tests or between I-Level tests and Depot Level tests, the F-15 peculiar avionics suffers from R&M problems. These R&M problems cause avionics hardware to cycle between Organizational Level (O- Level) and I-Level and between I-Level and Depot Level.

Hardware ultimately identified and submitted for the PQDR and MIP can be tied up indefinitely in the supply/repair pipelines. Immediate applicable engineering attention to analyze and correct the previously described R&M conditions has been necessary.

Failure to continue with this immediate applicable engineering attention would lead to unacceptable supportability conditions. The unacceptable supportability conditions include increased cost due to repeated unnecessary maintenance repair cycles, poor reliability behavior of aircraft installed systems which would result in degraded mission capability and potential sortie rate degeneration, along with part’s unavailability due to obsolescence.

Over the past fifty-one months, NGC investigated and returned to service 138 LRUs and eighty-three SRUs due to MIP investigations. Each of these investigations were the result of multiple Could-Not-Duplicate (CND) occurrences. NGC has also performed 324 other engineering investigations including seventy-four 202s (Nonconforming Technical Request and Reply) and thirty-four DLA 339s. Failure to eliminate these types of issues will result in increases in maintenance costs due to repeated, unnecessary maintenance repair cycles. The poor reliability behavior of systems will result in degraded mission capability and sortie rate degeneration. These investigations are estimated to have saved at least 1650 flight hours. In addition, CND rates, along with parts unavailability due to obsolescence, will make the purchase of more spares necessary. Without investigation, the avionics will eventually become “Condemned” in place due to reliability issues and no longer available for use. The eighty-three SRU investigations resulted in over $38.2M worth of avionics being returned to service and $7.4M in maintenance dollars saved.

The above examples demonstrate the value of the level of quality provided currently by NGC.

NGC represents years of investment which has equated to valuable knowledge.

As mentioned above, the Market Research conducted indicated there are other potential sources;

however, in order for them to successfully perform this effort at the required level of quality a lengthy learning curve period is required. NGC is the only company who can currently supply, with a high degree of confidence, the unique knowledge needed to successfully meet the Government’s requirement without any significant or maybe even detrimental learning curves.

There are multiple companies that offer engineering services; however, all would face a learning curve. This learning curve is based on the fact that a new contractor would have to obtain the required unique skill set that NGC has built over the past twenty-seven years. Not only would a learning curve be experienced with a new contractor, but the Government would also need to implement a transition period of approximately nine to twelve months, in which the Government would have to pay both NGC and another contractor. This would allow some of the knowledge that NGC has obtained over twenty-seven years to be passed on. This transition period could reasonably cost the Government up to based on the current estimate for the Basic Period within the Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE). Even with this transition period and the learning curve, the Government estimates approximately three years, before the contractor would be at an acceptable, but not an experienced, level in regard to skill set.

This learning curve could have negative effects in relation to loss of mission time and cost to the Government. We examine these negative impacts based on the reasonable scenario that a MIP type LRU or SRU would typically experience. This scenario assumes that a “Bad Actor” MIP type LRU or SRU would cycle between the aircraft and the repair back shop a number of times before eventually being deemed “Not Repairable This Station” (NRTS) and subsequently sent into the depot. On average, each time the LRU or SRU is cycled between the aircraft and the repair back shop it equates to one hour of aircraft mission time lost, give or take depending on the issue. Therefore, logically, the more iterations from the aircraft and the repair back shop, the more hours of aircraft mission time lost. A learning curve would logically increase the amount of time the LRU and SRU will spend in this cycle before being sent into depot, this is based on the fact that diagnosing the problem will likely take longer and many avenues may have to be ruled out before the LRU or SRU is sent to depot. A specialized skill set cuts down on the diagnosing avenues necessary prior to the LRU or SRU being sent to depot. Over the course of five years, the loss of one hour per iterations/per LRU or SRU would greatly affect the aircraft’s mission and likely be costly to the Government, as the Government will pay for each iteration through the above mentioned cycle.

Continuation of incumbent contractor support results in significant risk and cost avoidance.

Though it is likely another contractor could obtain enough knowledge over the course of three years to perform reasonably, the Government would face needless burdens, additional costs, and a detriment if the level of quality currently provide by NGC is not obtained.

Accordingly, NGC is the only firm capable of providing the services described in Section 3 above without the USAF experiencing unacceptable delays in fulfilling its requirements.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition:

The Government is currently working several efforts to move toward developing replacement units for several F- 15 avionics systems which drive high availability issues (redesign efforts). It is anticipated with these efforts that the Government would procure full data packages on the redesigned systems. Over the past forty-eight months, there was an effort to redesign the multipurpose display. Unfortunately, the redesign was ultimately a failure as it could not pass all the procurement specifications and it also failed at flight testing. Subsequently, a new effort has been started, in regards to the multipurpose display. Additionally, the Air Force is also working an obsolescence refresh on the Up Front Control Panel, which is in its early stages. The Air Force will continue to work efforts to redesign F-15 avionics systems with high availability issues. The more systems that are redesigned and accompanied with full data packages, the more likely it will be for the Government to open some or parts of the instant acquisition up to competition. Additionally, if the redesign efforts are successful, newly developed replacement systems will provide for increased reliability, maintainability, and supportability. These benefits should aid in reducing the critical nature of the services described herein. A reduction to the critically of the services provided by BAE should allow the Government to more reasonably absorb the impacts in relation to the learning curves of a contractor other than BAE and reduce unnecessary risk to the mission and warfighter.

Were the above efforts to come to fruition prior to the end of the effort described in Section 3 above, the Government would evaluate the competitive environment prior to exercising the next option year.

7. Contracting Officer Determination:

The Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the Government for this acquisition will be fair and reasonable, as services offered on the GSA MAS have already been determined fair and reasonable. Further actions are anticipated to ensure the reasonableness of the price and they will be accomplished with the procedures and criteria contained in FAR Subpart 15.404, as appropriate. The Contracting Officer will use various price analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price. Examples of such techniques may include but are not limited to: comparison with competitive published price list in GSA MAS and comparison of the proposed prices with the IGCE. Additionally, the Government will seek a price reduction prior to placing an order per guidance within FAR 8.405-4.

Previous Limited Sources Justification

Federal Acquisition Service Assisted Acquisition Services Division

Southeast Sunbelt Region

Justification for an Limited Sources

FAR 8.405-6(a)(1)(i)(B)

1. Requiring and Contracting Activity:

a. Requiring Activity: Department of Air Force

409 SCMS/GUEA F-15 Supply Chain Management (SCM) 235 Byron Street, Suite 19A Robins AFB, GA 31098

b. Contracting Activity: General Services Administration

Federal Acquisition Service

Assisted Acquisition Services Division

401 West Peachtree St., NW Suite 2700 Atlanta, GA 30308

c. Contracting Officer: Kimberly Guest

d. Task ID: ID04160042

e. Estimated Value:

f. Contract Vehicle: Professional Services Schedule (PSS), Professional Engineering Solutions, SIN 871-5

g. Period of Performance: Basic : 31 Aug 2016 to 30 Aug 2017 Option One: 31 Aug 2017 to 30 Aug 2018 Option Two: 31 Aug 2018 to 30 Aug 2019 Option Three: 31 Aug 2019 to 30 Aug 2020

Option Four: 31 Aug 2020 to 30 Aug 2021

Nature/Description of Action:

The General Services Administration (GSA), Federal Acquisition Services (FAS), Assisted Acquisition Services Division (AASD) received a requirement from the US-Air Force 409 SCMS/GUEA F-15 Supply Chain Management (SCM) for the procurement of engineering services. These services include performing engineering investigations in support of Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR) and Material Improvement Programs (MIP) for the F-15 aircraft peculiar avionics.

This requirement will be procured Time and Material (T&M) utilizing the Professional Services Schedule (PSS), Professional Engineering Solutions (PES), SIN 871-5 in accordance with FAR 8.405-6 (a)(1)(i)(B) procedures. This acquisition is conducted under the authority of the Multiple Award Schedule Program (see FAR 8.401).

3. Description of Services Required:

Description of Services:

The F-15 Supply Chain Management Engineering Organization, 409 SCMS/GUEA, provides the technical expertise and engineering staff necessary to implement the hardware and software updates, F-15 production support, and modifications necessary to maintain and improve the Reliability and Maintainability (R&M) of the F-15 peculiar avionics.

This effort is for the performance-based engineering services required to perform engineering investigations in support of Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR) and Material Improvement Programs (MIP) for the F-15 aircraft peculiar avionics. These investigations encompass performing system level maintenance analysis, part’s qualification testing, Test Program Set (TPS) re-host analysis reviews, logistic/engineering studies, vertical testability analysis, and engineering investigations for the 409 SCMS/GUEA and the organizations that they support. These services require extensive hands-on application in order to gain the experience needed to operate the unique test stations for the various avionics equipped on the F-15. The supplier must have a Quality Assurance (QA) program and systems engineering process to minimize the potential of any deficiencies, mitigate risk, and to avoid schedule slips.

This effort would continue a twenty-two year sole-source contractor sustainment effort that corrects system level deficiencies, which if not resolved would adversely impact F-15 avionics performance and availability. No other contractor could successfully provide the needed service without unacceptable delays, delays which could become a detriment to the program.

Period of Performance:

The Period of Performance (POP) will consist of a one year basic period and four one-year option periods.

Source:

Northrop Grumman Technical Services, Inc. (NGC) 2340 Dulles Corner Blvd

Herndon, VA 20171-3400 Cage Code: OJRC1

Cost Breakdown:

Labor Travel Total

Basic Period

Option Year One

Option Year Two

Option Year Three

Option Year Four

Totals

4. Identification of Statutory Authority:

FAR 8.405-6(a)(1)(i)(B): Only one source is capable of providing the services required at the level of quality required because the services are unique and highly specialized.

5. Applicability of Authority:

Only one source is capable of providing the services required at the level of quality required because the services ordered are unique and highly specialized. It is to be noted that the tasks of performing system level maintenance analysis, part’s qualification testing, TPS re-host analysis reviews, logistic/engineering studies, vertical testability analysis, and engineering investigations, etc., are not unique or highly specialized. The unique and highly specialized aspect of the services is in relation to knowing the parts and systems in which the required tasks are related to. Without this knowledge, performing the required tasks would be time consuming; this inefficient use of time could be of great detriment to the Government. Therefore, the knowledge required to perform the services equates to the services having a highly specialized and unique nature in order to be delivered to the required level of quality.

Although Market Research identified other potential sources, none have the level of quality currently being performed by NGC. The vital need for a high level of quality to support the mission is identified below. In addition to the detriments associated with losing the level of quality currently being provided, competing the effort would pose monetary constraints to accommodate for a period of learning. The below will discuss all aspects in detail.

NGC has become intimately familiar with the F-15 avionics systems and test equipment and have obtained a vast amount of critical knowledge that is needed to quickly and successfully perform this requirement. Having worked the program for the past twenty-two years, the contractor possesses knowledge that cannot be duplicated over the course of a five year contract.

This knowledge includes, but is not limited to:

In-depth understanding of the unique functionality of 21 different F-15 peculiar avionics systems. This knowledge/understanding includes System/Line Replaceable Unit (LRU)/Shop Replaceable Unit (SRU) circuit design, system interfaces, capabilities, test requirements, and controlling/operating software (Operation Flight Program, Firmware).

In-depth knowledge of the unique and specific functionality of 15 different F-15 peculiar avionics systems’ Automatic Test Equipment (ATE) stations used to test and troubleshoot the systems. This knowledge and understanding includes operation of station equipment and components needed to test systems and ability to evaluate the suitability and capability of the ATE to accurately and consistently perform testing.

In-depth knowledge of the peculiar avionics systems’ and ATE’s Test Program Sets (TPS) language and design which are specific and unique to each system. This knowledge and understanding includes Abbreviated Test Language for All Systems (ATLAS), F-15 Adapted PLACE ATLAS (FAPA), Programming Language for Automatic Checkout Equipment (PLACE), Teradyne L-200, Logic Automation Stimulus And Response (LASAR), HP BASIC, FORTRAN, UNIX, Virtual Memory System (VMS), MS-DOS, MS Windows, and the multiple WR-ALC databases used in managing assets.

In-depth knowledge of the testing and repair processes and procedures unique to F-15 peculiar avionics to ensure Operational Safety, Suitability, and Effectiveness (OSS&E).

This knowledge and understanding includes all levels of testing from aircraft to system/LRU/SRU, performance of SRU, assembly, and component level repair and/or replacement, Air Force technical data, and Technical Order (T.O.) documentation controlling the operation of depot equipment and repair of avionics systems.

In-depth knowledge allowing the identification of causes of LRU and SRU low reliability, to include high failure components, obsolete parts, and the use of components and subassemblies in a manner inconsistent with their original design and how these identified problems impact next higher assemblies (LRU, major aircraft systems).

In-depth knowledge to specify whether a problem is an inherent reliability or maintainability deficiency due to LRU or SRU design or whether a problem is due to TPS design deficiency.

In-depth knowledge which can determine, through analysis, solutions to each problem identified and the R&M performance improvement to be gained by each solution.

In-depth knowledge to identify specific test incompatibilities and deficiencies with ATE design, TPS, and compilation and provide integration of proposed corrections or changes to improve ATE capability and/or eliminate fault identification/isolation problems.

In-depth knowledge to conduct the proper testing to verify that modifications do not adversely impact system ATE operation, that existing maintenance testing concept is minimally impacted, if at all, and that the intended design of the solution has been met.

In-depth knowledge to generate quality T.O., schematic, and Illustrated Parts Breakdown (IPB) documentation changes that occur as a result of the findings.

NGC has a proven history of performance of these requirements; over the course of this performance, NGC has gained invaluable knowledge and understanding of the functional use of the F-15 avionics systems. This knowledge enables NGC to possess the unique capabilities necessary to perform the required services.

Historically, many examples are available in relation to the knowledge posed by NGC which equates into the level of quality necessary for mission success. These examples not only show the need for the current level of quality; however, they also provide insight into the mission impacts if the services were not provided to the current level of quality. It is to be noted, that the mission impacts discussed below are not solely related to these example/issues, many aspects of the requirement can lead to the same mission impacts if the level of quality is not provided at the current state.

The Flight Control Computer (FCC) is one of the F-15 peculiar avionics systems covered under this requirement. The FCC is a highly complex system and was the number four grounding supply item for the F-15 fleet in 2009, having been as high as number two. As of 29 May 2009, the FCC accumulated over 10,000 MICAP hours. The average number of backorders for the FCC was seventy. There were only thirty-four world-wide assets and eight SURGE backorders. There was also an average of eight to fifteen SURGE requirements on any given day. The FCC is carcass constrained (in limited supply with limited repair parts) and about two years away from having enough carcasses to cover demands. Therefore based on the above statistics, each FCC that comes in for repair or engineering investigation (PQDR/MIP) equals a grounded aircraft, making the turn-around time critical in supporting the war fighter. Utilizing the knowledge and experience gained since working for the Government, NGC has been able to complete approximately of all FCC engineering investigations in less than 30 days. Another contractor would have to navigate a learning curve to perform this task in less than 30 days. It is highly unlikely another contractor could successfully navigate that learning curve, without negatively impacting F-15 avionics systems, causing unacceptable delays in the Government’s requirement to support the warfighter. These negative impacts would include a significant decrease in the number of assets able to be repaired driving an increase in holes in the aircraft, an increase in the number of MICAPs and SURGES, and an increase in grounded planes which would be detrimental to the mission. Additionally, if the learning curve could not be navigated in order to perform the tasks to repair the item, there could be a need to procure additional assets to replace the item they are not able to repair or repair timely. The procurement of the new assets would drive costly modification programs to the F-15 platform, as most items within the system are obsolete and a replacement item would have to be incorporated into the current system through the modification process, thus costing the Government an unforeseen amount of money and time.

Due to aging aircraft, increasing legacy obsolescence, high flying hours, hardware afflicted with latent physical defects, environmentally stimulated intermittent failures, and inconsistencies between system Built-In Test (BIT) and I-Level tests or between I-Level tests and depot level tests, the F-15 peculiar avionics suffers from R&M problems. These R&M problems cause avionics hardware to cycle between Organizational Level (O- Level) and Intermediate Level (I-Level) and between I-Level and Depot Level.

Hardware ultimately identified and submitted for the Product Quality Deficiency Reports (PQDR) and Material Improvement Programs (MIP) can be tied up indefinitely in the supply/repair pipelines. These factors have and will continue contributing to unsatisfactory F-15 MICAP conditions. Immediate applicable engineering attention to analyze and correct the previously described R&M conditions has been necessary. Failure to continue with this immediate applicable engineering attention would lead to unacceptable supportability conditions. The unacceptable supportability conditions include increased cost due to repeated unnecessary maintenance repair cycles, poor reliability behavior of aircraft installed systems which would result in degraded mission capability and potential sortie rate degeneration, along with part’s unavailability due to obsolescence.

The above examples demonstrate the value of the level of quality provided currently by NGC currently. NGC represents years of investment which has equated to valuable knowledge.

As mentioned above, the Market Research conducted indicated there are other potential sources;

however, in order for them to successfully perform this effort at the required level of quality a lengthy learning curve period is required. NGC is the only company who can currently supply, with any degree of confidence, the unique knowledge needed to successfully meet the Government’s requirement without any significant or maybe even detrimental learning curves.

There are multiple companies that offer engineering services. This learning curve is based on the fact that a new contractor would have to obtain the required unique skill set that NGC has built over the past twenty-two years. Though another contractor would likely not be able to duplicate that skill set, the Government estimates approximately three years, before the contractor would be at an acceptable, not per say experienced, level in regards to skill set.

This learning curve could have negative effects in relation to loss of mission time and cost to the Government. We examine these negative impacts based on the reasonable scenario that a Maintenance In Process (MIP) type Line Replaceable Unit (LRU) or Subsystem Repairable Unit (SRU) would typically experience. This scenario assumes that a “Bad Actor” MIP type LRU or SRU would cycle between the aircraft and the repair back shop a number of times before eventually being deemed “Not Repairable This Station” (NRTS) and subsequently sent into the depot. On average, each time the LRU or SRU is cycled between the aircraft and the repair back shop it equates to 1 hour of aircraft mission time lost, give or take depending on the issue.

Therefore, logically, the more iterations from the aircraft and the repair back shop, the more hours of aircraft mission time lost. A learning curve would logically increase the amount of time the LRU and SRU will spend in this cycle before being sent into depot, this is based on the fact that diagnosing the problem will likely take longer and many avenues may have to be ruled out before the LRU or SRU is sent to depot. A specialized skill set cuts down on the diagnosing avenues necessary prior to the LRU or SRU being sent to depot. Over the course of five years, the loss of 1 hour per iterations/per LRU or SRU would affect the aircraft’s mission and likely be costly to the Government, as the Government will pay for each iteration through the above mentioned cycle.

Based on the fact that a learning curve would exist, it is reasonable to assume that due to the depth of knowledge and experience and the highly specialized skill set that NGC possesses, there would need to be a transition period of 9 to12 months, in which the Government would have to pay both NGC and another contractor. This transition period could reasonably cost the government up to based on the current estimate for the basic period within the IGE

Continuation of incumbent contractor support results in significant risk and cost avoidance.

Though it is likely another contractor could obtain enough knowledge over the course of three years to perform reasonably, the Government would face needless burdens, additional costs, and a detriment if the level of quality currently provide by NGC.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition:

The Government is currently working an effort to move toward developing replacement units for the F-15 avionics systems which drive the highest availability issues. If the effort is successful, newly developed replacement systems will provide for increased reliability, maintainability, and supportability. These benefits should aid in reducing the critical nature of the services described herein. The reduction of the critical nature should allow the Government to more reasonably absorb the impacts in relation to the learning curve of a contractor other than NGC, with a more acceptable level of detriment to the war fighter.

Were the above effort to come to fruition prior to the end of the effort described in section 3 above, the Government would evaluate the competitive environment prior to exercising the next option year.

7. Contracting Officer Determination:

The Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the Government for this acquisition will be fair and reasonable. Actions anticipated to ensure the reasonableness of the price will be accomplished with the procedures and criteria contained in FAR Subpart 15.404, as appropriate. The Contracting Officer will use various price analysis techniques and procedures to ensure a fair and reasonable price. Examples of such techniques may include, but are not limited to: comparison with competitive published price list in Professional Services Schedule (PSS) and comparison of the proposed prices with the Independent Government Cost Estimate. Additionally, the Government will seek a price reduction prior to placing an order per guidance within FAR 8.405-4.

8. Market Research:

Market Research was conducted as outlined by FAR 10.002. The research consisted of internet