About this file

This document is a Justification and Approval (J&A) for the use of other than full and open competition for three related federal contract opportunities.

The key details are:

  • The contracts will provide for the continued development, integration, and production of the Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS) Weapon System (WS) for the Navy's ZUMWALT class destroyers and the Army's Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW). The contracts will have a combined period of performance from November 2021 through December 2028 and a total estimated value of over billion.
  • The sole source contractor is Lockheed Martin Sippican (LMS), who is the incumbent and has developed specialized expertise and integration capabilities that are critical to meet the Navy's and Army's required delivery schedules for this hypersonic strike capability.
  • A competitive approach was considered but determined to result in unacceptable delays of up to 3 years to qualify a new source and commence production.
  • The Navy and Army acquisition efforts for the CPS WS and LRHW are being managed independently, though the program offices are coordinating the integrated weapon system development and delivery.

View the file

On GovTribe

Work with this file on GovTribe

  • Download the original file
  • Contacts named in this file
  • Similar government files
  • Ask GovTribe AI about this file

Text version

CJ&A SPJA24-20

Code: SPN601

(1)

b. CPS Platform Specific Integration and Production for ZUMWALT Class Destroyers

Contract Modification (Contract No. N00030-22-C-1025). This contract currently has a PoP of

10 November 2021 through 02 February 2027, with deliveries expected through 30 March 2027, and a total value of . As a result of this scope increase, the ZUMWALT contract PoP will be extended to 31 December 2028, and the value will be increased by with a new contract total value of . Of this increase, is for additional Navy effort and is for support of . The ZUMWALT contract will also provide integration development for the CPS WS design

The Navy increased scope includes the following:

The Army increased scope includes the following:

c. WSIFO Contract. The anticipated contract will have a PoP from 30 June 2025 to 29 June

2030 (base plus four one-year options), with deliveries expected through 30 September 2031, and an estimated value of The WSIFO contract will provide for systems engineering, testing, logistics support, production of the CPS WS, and provisioning. The contract will contain the following program requirements:

The table below provides a summary of the funding:

(CUI) Projected Cost Summary (Millions of Dollars)

Note: The contracts will each include contract text permitting an optional increase of not to exceed 30 percent of the total value associated with each level of effort contract line item to accommodate emergent in-scope requirements. This increase is not accounted for in the above table.

The Army Program Executive Office Missile and Space (PEO M&S) Simplified Acquisition

Management Plan (SAMP) for the LRHW WS dated 17 July 2023 covers the Army’s portion of this acquisition. Since Army’s requirement development is outside of the Navy’s purview, Navy and Army acquisition planning documents are prepared and approved independently.

All values set forth above are conditional upon Congressional authorization and appropriation of funds.

4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition. 10 U.S.C. §

3204(a)(1), only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

5. Rationale Justifying use of Cited Authority. Pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 3204(b)(B)(ii), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii)(B), supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of follow-on contracts for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment when it is likely that award to any other source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements.

. Award to any source other than LMS for each of the requirements listed above in paragraph 3 would result in unacceptable delays to both the Navy’s and Army’s hypersonic strike capabilities.

It is estimated that it would take to qualify a second source for CPS WS development.

Consistent with system maturity expected of a Rapid Prototyping MTA, , the CPS WS Technical Data Package (TDP) is still under development by LMS on the WSI contract. The TDP is not expected to be delivered until . The TDP will be delivered with Unlimited Rights, except for the technical data outlined in the negotiated Data

Rights Assertions List. Therefore, the estimate of is reflective of initiating a second source capable of meeting the requirements in Paragraph 3 above, effectively by reinitiating a development program. This estimate is based upon (1) historical development and qualification data and timelines, and (2) CPS performance affiliated with the current Rapid Prototyping MTA.

In addition, a transition to a new contractor during this critical time would cause unacceptable delays, posing a significant risk to delivering the nation’s first hypersonic strike capability. Any delay to the current testing schedule will deem it impossible to field CPS to ZUMWALT Class

Destroyers . Further, transition to a new source threatens the current timeline to field

Army’s LRHW Battery 1 starting in , the nation’s first hypersonic strike capability. The synergy from LMS as the primary WS integrator with engineering support from the Government

National Team (GNT) and various Research Laboratories is crucial to the design and development of this hypersonic WS. Fielding a capability that encompasses stationary land-based launch from Army Batteries, surface maritime launch from ZUMWALT Class Destroyers, and underwater launch from VIRGINIA Class Submarines, requires involvement from multiple program offices, which are not aggregated into a joint program, and is uniquely complex. LMS has developed highly specialized personnel familiar with cross-command and cross-agency weapon system design, as well as detailed knowledge of subsystem and system level testing across all three platforms, to support hypersonic WS integration.

Furthermore, if the Government were to pursue a competitive approach after receipt of a TDP, that is, after , an award to a source other than LMS would result in a subsequent delay to production. The estimated timeline for the delay until a new source can commence production of the WS is explained below:

a. to complete Government TDP review and verification.

b. 12 months to conduct a competitive procurement.

c. for a new source to develop equivalent or adequate capability by hiring experienced staff, conducting engineering reviews to achieve a technical understanding of the

CPS WS, and establishing appropriate facilities for production of the CPS WS.

d. Based on the above timeline, the estimated timeframe for a new source to begin production of the CPS WS is . With current production build time of , the AUR+Cs will not be delivered until . This is an unacceptable delay that would induce a gap in delivery of capability to the fleet of , with potentially tactical

AUR+Cs in naval service until that time . Additionally, the Army’s current requirement for AUR+C deliveries begins in early to support training and tactical assets required for Army fielding; on-time delivery is required to meet critical need dates.

Therefore, LMS is the only responsible source capable of providing the engineering and production efforts required to meet Navy and Army hypersonic capability fielding schedules.

Award to any other offeror would cause unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Government’s requirements.

6. Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable

a. A Sources Sought Notice (SSN) was posted to the System for Award Management (SAM) website on 10 May 2022. The scope of work contained in the SSN covers WSIFO requirements outlined in paragraph 3 in this CJ&A. Formal responses were received from two interested parties, and the incumbent contractor, LMS. The technical review of showed that a small business, is not capable of performing as the prime contractor for this effort. has some Information Technology (IT) support experience, but their submission provided no relevant expertise, experience, or capabilities that can be directly applied to the development, production, and evaluation of the CPS WS or LRHW WS. Further, does not have the facilities infrastructure in place to perform as the prime contractor for this effort. While no other sources have been identified to provide prime contractor support, LMS will be required to promote competition where opportunities exist in selecting subcontractors and suppliers.

b. In accordance with FAR Part 5, the Government issued a pre-solicitation notice on

February 24, 2023, with a response date deadline of March 10, 2023.

submitted a white paper expressing interest. The white paper was forwarded to the CPS WS Program Office (SPC) for review and determination of capability. SPC provided a comprehensive review and identified the following shortfalls:

(1) cannot perform the work in the timeline required without major investment in additional integration and production equipment. The Government will not be able to transfer current Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) to without incurring a gap in effort because the current incumbent is using it on active government contracts.

(2) white paper does not clearly identify capability to integrate and produce missile bodies with glide bodies.

(3) response did not explain how they are going to produce and integrate the other CPS WS components, such as the WCS and APMs. also fails to mention the ability to build the Army Canister and ability to integrate it with the AUR.

(4) Most importantly, is not capable of performing the CPS system engineering, integration, and production requirements within the established, required mission schedule without a CPS TDP available, which the Government does not expect until .

c. The Head of the Contracting Activity waived the requirement to post sources sought notice or request for information in accordance with DFARS PGI 206.302-1(d) for the three efforts described in Paragraph 3.

7. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost. The Contracting Officer has determined the anticipated cost to the Government of the supplies and services covered by this CJ&A will be fair and reasonable.

8. Actions to Remove Barriers to Future Competition. For the reasons set forth in Section 5 above, SPC has no plans at this time to compete future contracts for the types of supplies and services covered by this CJ&A. If another potential source were to emerge, as discovered through continual tactical and strategic market research processes, SSNs, and synopses, SPC will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible. Because these are follow-on contracts for supplies and services previously awarded on a non-competitive basis, in accordance with DFARS PGI 206.304(a)(S-70)(i), the prior J&As were provided to the approval authority for review. Approval of this CJ&A signifies the approval authority has made the determination required by DFARS PGI 206.304(a)(S-70)(ii).

The Government has contracted for delivery of a TDP in that could enable a competitive approach to obtaining future requirements. Based on the TDP, the program will develop a strategy that considers competition for future requirements.

File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .