PdM VPS SK RFI.pdf

Request for Information for Soft Kill (SK), Active Protection System (APS), System Development

Program 22 August 2023

Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

DESCRIPTION OF INTENT:

THIS IS A REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI) ONLY. (An “ * “ indicates a Term Defined in the final section of this document, as per the Department of Defense (DoD) Source Document).

The United States Government (USG) is soliciting Industry assistance in conducting a survivability* and protection* subsystem RFI for Active Protection Systems (APS) specific to Soft Kill (SK) technologies. This RFI’s intent is to collect data and information on existing SK APS capabilities as a complete system or its related components, as well as information on the ability to mature, test, and integrate those systems with the VPS Base Kit (VBK). Information regarding these technologies and capabilities is for current and future platforms tasked to maneuver through the enemy’s disruption zone as part of a combined arms team for the purpose of creating an advantageous position relative to the enemy, by providing survivability and protection, while manned or remotely operated (this description represents the breadth and depth of potential current and future scenarios ranging from limited contingency operations to large scale combat operations, or multi-domain operations simultaneously). This RFI is issued solely for information and planning purposes by the USG. No contract award will result from this announcement. This is not a Proposal Request or an announcement of a forthcoming solicitation, nor is it a request seeking contractors for placement on a solicitation mailing list.

Responses to this RFI are voluntary and no reimbursement will result from any costs associated with providing information to it or any follow-on information requests. All information submitted in response to this RFI is not returnable. No solicitation exists at this time, and calls requesting a solicitation will go unanswered.

PRODUCT MANAGER INTENT:

The U.S. Army, Program Executive Office Ground Combat Systems (PEO GCS), Project Lead Capability Transition and Product Integration (PdL CTPI), Product Manager Vehicle Protection Systems (PdM VPS), and the United States Government (USG), is interested in collecting data on existing SK APS capabilities, both as a complete system or capability-related components.

The USG will utilize responses to inform SK APS acquisition planning.

This notice is posted as an effort to engage with Industry, to inform potential industry partners a, that the USG SK APS development program is conducting market research on current industry technology that supports a SK APS capability.

DISCLAIMER:

Reference herein to any specific commercial company, product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the USG or the Department of the Army (DA). The opinions of the authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the USG or the DA and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.

PROPRIETARY INFORMATION:

It is the responsibility of Industry, when providing any responses, to properly mark such information that is considered proprietary or is otherwise restricted. The USG is not obligated to protect unmarked data. Nor is the USG obligated to protect data in possession of third parties or for data which is afterwards placed in the public domain by the contractor or by third parties through no fault of the USG. Should the USG need to reproduce the protected data for distribution purposes between Government offices, all such data reproduction will clearly annotate restrictive legends.

The USG acknowledges its obligations under the Federal Acquisition Regulation 3.104-4 to protect confidential information provided to the Government (18 U.S.C. §1905). Pursuant to this statute, the USG is willing to accept any trade secrets or proprietary restrictions placed upon qualifying data forwarded in response to this RFI and to protect such information from unauthorized disclosure, subject to the following:

• Qualifying data is clearly marked PROPRIETARY and is accompanied by an explanatory text so that the USG is clearly notified as to exactly what data so qualifies.

• Mark only data that is truly confidential.

• Do not mark data that is already in the public domain or is already in possession of the

USG or third parties on an unclassified basis.

• Proprietary data transmitted electronically must have a PROPRIETARY legend on both the cover of the transmitted information as well as on each applicable page therein.

• Proprietary information contained within the correspondence shall use the legends:

"PROPRIETARY PORTION BEGINS" and "PROPRIETARY PORTION ENDS."

Support Contractors: The USG has the option to utilize support contractors for evaluating responses. Responses that contain proprietary information may receive less consideration since the respondent's marking of data as "PROPRIETARY" will preclude disclosure outside the USG and therefore will preclude disclosure to these support contractors assisting the evaluation effort. The USG will use its best efforts to evaluate those responses that contain proprietary information without using support contractors consistent with the resources available.

GENERAL INFORMATION:

There is no risk to respondents for participating in this RFI. Participation in this effort is strictly voluntary, resulting in no cost or obligation incurred by the USG. The USG is not bound to this information if any solicitation is issued. However, this is an important opportunity for industry to provide input on this program. This RFI, and all information herein, is for informational planning purposes only and does not constitute a proposal request of any kind. All respondents therefore understand that there is no commitment by the USG.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR RESPONDING TO THIS REQUEST:

Review questions focused herein to aid the USG in conducting a survivability and protection analysis for existing SK APS capabilities as a complete system or its related components.

Provide formal responses in the form of a Memorandum, White Paper, Presentation, or another medium commonly used within your organization (formal responses are not limited by length, format, or supporting documentation). Formal responses are not required to address every aspect of this RFI, whereas respondents may focus submissions on or within their area of expertise and internal production capabilities and interests. The USG recommends all formal responses remain within the scope of a respondent’s area of subject matter expertise and represent the survivability and protection capabilities for SK systems that are currently available from Industry, specifically at a Technology Readiness Level (TRL) of 6 or above.

The USG will not publish any notifications regarding the results of this RFI, or any information identifying the respondents of this RFI.

Responses are expected to remain solely UNCLASSIFIED for this RFI. To ensure NO CLASSIFIED DATA is provided, all respondents shall submit via hardcopy (2) with compact disc (2) (DVD/CD) to the following UNCLASSIFIED mailing address:

Outer wrapping addressed to:

U.S. Army Contracting Command – Detroit Arsenal (ACC-DTA) 6501 E. Eleven Mile Road ATTN: Jennifer L. Harris, Supervisory Contract Specialist

MS 105

Detroit Arsenal, MI 48397-5000

Inner wrapping addressed to:

U.S. ARMY TACOM / G2

6501 E. Eleven Mile Road

MS 105

Detroit Arsenal, MI 48397-5000 ATTN: Capability Transition and Product Integration (CTPI), Vehicle Protection Systems (VPS)

Responses are due no later than 1700 EST on 21 September 2023.

Responses received after the stated due date are not considered by the USG as part of this

RFI.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING THIS RFI:

1. Please respond to every question.

2. Number each response with the appropriate question number.

3. Questions do not have to be repeated in the response.

4. A “BLANK” or “No Response” is acceptable for any question with a “no” answer.

5. If a response will satisfy another question, state: “See response to question XX.”

6. Include relevant sales media and product manuals. If providing an ACROBAT formatted manual, annotate the manual to indicate which material is applicable to the questions. If preferred, include Internet Web links to locations where animations/videos may be viewed.

7. If providing sales media and/or manuals containing a restricted distribution statement, issue a release statement indicating that the restricted material may be distributed to Army personnel involved with this RFI.

8. Spell out any acronyms in their first instance.

9. Clearly mark any proprietary information. If applicable, please follow the guidance above in the “PROPRIETARY INFORMATION” Section.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION:

1. Manufacturer

a. Name:

b. Mailing Address:

c. CAGE: DUNs Number:

Business Type (Check all that apply);

8(a) Minority Owned Disabled Veteran Small Business Hub Zone Small-Disadvantaged Large Business Women Owned

2. Personnel Responding to this Questionnaire.

a. Name:

b. Title:

c. Responsibility/Position:

d. Telephone/Fax Numbers:

e. E-mail address:

Please send any Questions, Comments, or Concerns to: usarmy.detroit.peo-gcs.mbx.vps-operations@army.mil

BACKGROUND:

The Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) ASA(ALT), Acquisition Reporting and Management (ARM) Team, is supporting the VPS Program Office in the development of a SK APS capability and integration acquisition pathway. Formal Army Acquisition Executive (AAE) and PEO GCS consideration for leveraging a Middle-Tier Acquisition-Rapid Prototyping (MTA-RP) or Major Capability Acquisition strategy is pending.

PdM VPS’s mission is to deliver vehicle protection capabilities that give Soldiers confidence to act boldly and return home safely. There are four capability categories within VPS: Detection Avoidance, Threat Detection, Intercept, and Mitigation. It is the intent of the product office that any technology applicable to all these capability categories that require computation as part of the decision-making process are expected to connect and utilize the VPS Base Kit for those computations. Threat Detection and Intercept capabilities make up the PdM VPS APS portfolio.

Intercept includes Hard-Kill and Soft-Kill technical capabilities. The diagram below identifies the breakdown of capabilities while also identifying the technical capabilities included in the PdM VPS APS portfolio.

APS capabilities* are defined as autonomous hit avoidance vehicle defense systems that protect the vehicle from in-bound threats. APS capabilities typically include three key functions:

sense, compute, defeat*. Each of these functions shall be (1) autonomous – an automatic response to an incoming threat without requiring a manual input from the user, (2) quick – faster than relying on a user for authorization, and (3) decisive – determine action and respond accordingly, while ensuring once the response has been engaged, it cannot be rescinded.

There are two PdM VPS APS-Intercept categories, non-kinetic and kinetic: SK APS and Hard- Kill (HK) APS. A SK APS senses the environment for required threat information and employs a countermeasure (CM) in the form of obscurant(s) or electronic warfare (EW) to interfere with the guidance mechanism(s) or the operator of the susceptible threat(s) rendering it ineffective against the protected vehicle. A HK APS employs a CM that employs explosive fragments or blast pressure to inhibit the lethal mechanism(s) of susceptible threat(s) rendering it ineffective against the protected vehicle. This RFI will focus on SK APS EW capabilities only.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI):

What SK APS EW capabilities are currently available to include, but not limited to: system developers SK APS EW subsystem and related component technologies (i.e. countermeasures and sensor packages).

A system developer* is a single source capable of either consolidating subsystems and related components from various vendors, or a single source capable of developing and managing a SK APS EW capability.

A system* is a group of components, or subsystems, integrated together to deliver a specific capability available for integration on ground combat platforms.

COMPOSITION AND INTEROPERABILITY:

A. Provide a brief description of your company’s capabilities and the nature of the goods and or services you provide.

B. Describe your company’s knowledge and experience with SK APS systems, subsystems, and components, including, but not limited to countermeasures and sensors.

C. Describe your company’s experience integrating components to develop and manage systems, with the potential for multiple configurations dependent on Platform Type.

D. Does your company’s technology include foreign components? If so, please identify by component.

1. Would these components require End User Certificate(s) (EUC) if a developmental and future procurement effort were pursued?

2. Are there opportunities to make these components US-based?

E. Provide detailed information regarding specific subsystem(s) for inclusion:

1. Identify Components of the Soft Kill System:

a. Primary Control Station: ex, VPS Base Kit (VBK) or Modular Active Controller

(MAC)

b. User Interface Control Panel (UICP): Explain size, shape, function, and form in which a user interacts with the SK system.

c. User Interface Display Panel (UIDP), Explain the following:

i. What information is displayed for the User: e.g., System Status

On/Off/Sleep Mode/Boot-Up/Powering Down, etc.;

ii. Detection: Active/Passive;

iii. Engagement: Tracking/Active/Passive/Pre-/During-/Post-Event;

iv. Battle Damage Assessment (BDA): What actually occurred compared to the expected system performance or behavior

v. Visual Display (Screen / Touch Screen) or Indicator Lights, e.g.

Condition-Based: ex, Green, Yellow, Red, etc.

d. VBK/MAC, UICP and UIDP represent examples of current technologies, and/or options to address User needs as a function of maximizing productivity through a Human System Interface (HSI)

i. Relative to the example components provided, what differentiates your system’s subsystem

ii. How do your subsystem ensure optimization of HSI

2. Subsidiary Control Station(s): ex, Internal Processing Unit (IPU)

a. For a Radar System or Radar(s)

b. For Laser Warning Receiver(s) (LWR)

c. Soft Kill Countermeasure IPU

3. Primary Soft Kill Countermeasure

a. Define means of threat defeat: ex, Non-Material (not a Munition-Based)

Solution, i.e. EW

b. Define constraints or limitations: ex, Limited Magazine vs. Unlimited

Magazine, e.g. Countermeasure Useful Life

c. Explain Tactical Employment: Single Shot, Repeater or Burst, Variable Pulse

vs. Steady State (Not Munition-Based) F. Distinguish the recommended survivability and protection SK systems configuration as an integrated Platform solution with the VPS Base Kit (VBK)

1. As an integrated SK system, is the solution manned, unmanned, or man accessible, or a combination thereof, i.e., man in the loop, man on the loop, or man off the loop?

2. Additionally, are any components of the proposed survivability and protection SK system operable in both platform-mounted and man-portable configurations, to include but not limited to descriptions of:

a. SK Countermeasure types

b. SK Countermeasure handling systems, e.g., Gimble(s)

c. SK Target acquisition sensors, e.g., Radar(s), LWR(s), IPU(s)

d. SK Fire control systems, e.g., VBK/MAC, etc.

G. What is the Size, Weight, and Power draw of each recommended SK countermeasure system?

1. Provide any size, weight, and power considerations, or challenges.

a. For example, what is the power required for full operational functionality, or will any functions allow manual operations in the event of power loss?

Please include the power required for the SK system overall, as well as each component, sub-component, etc.

b. For example, considering size or weight, what is the effect or effects to the recoil force of the SK countermeasure on the Platforms other subsystems, etc.? (Recoil Force: in terms of considering vehicle dynamics to stabilize SK countermeasure against threat, stabilize the platform, stabilize the Platform as a system of systems, etc.)

c. For example, what is the SK sub-systems or systems weight (include component breakdown and also consider items required for Platform integration, etc.)?

d. Furthermore, are there Models, Simulations, or Platform specific integration or feasibility analysis for the proposed SK system and, or sub-systems?

2. Provide additional details, to the extent applicable, in regard to experience and, or expertise in the following:

a. Provide any additional weight attributes (i.e. effects to host-platforms center of gravity, material properties, MSD analysis, etc.).

b. Explain, to the extent applicable, any design or detailed digital design considerations for the SK system

c. Explain, to the extent applicable, any digital engineering analysis considerations for the SK system

d. Explain, to the extent applicable, any experimentation or simulation modeling conducted for the SK system

PERFORMANCE:

A. How does the recommended survivability and protection SK solution operate (i.e. include descriptions of the system and related sub-systems and components:

1. Does each countermeasure provide continuous precise and accurate engagements, while stationary and on the move? Explain.

2. What is the countermeasure charge time, cool-down time, autonomous operation, user procedures, manual use of the countermeasure? Explain.

3. What are the elevation and depression limits (in degrees): from the turret, from the platform height, are the countermeasures on the corners of the vehicle or the side of the vehicle? Explain.

4. Does the survivability and protection solution provide aided threat recognition while manned, or autonomously while unmanned? Explain.

B. How does the capability achieve vehicle and crew survivability and protection? Explain the method used to assess achieving this effect?

C. How many and which types of Electronic Warfare (EW) are required to address the threat targets for the expected effect on target?

D. How many total countermeasures (on board) are recommended to provide adequate capability against the target sets; in ready*, in semi-ready*, in stowed*? How were the recommendations determined?

E. As applicable, within the recommended survivability and protection SK system configuration for PEO GCS Platforms, based on the threat target engagements identified, address the following inquiries regarding potential survivability and protection subsystem capabilities:

1. Does the survivability and protection SK system consist of multiple countermeasures capable of engaging multiple targets simultaneously?

2. Does the survivability and protection SK system provide overmatch against potential counter active protection systems (CAPS)?

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS:

A. What is the maximum effective range capability of the system for each target type? Is the system’s performance limited by any specific technological factors (i.e., sensors, power, frequency, interference, fire control: VBK/MAC, other systems on the Platform(s) already, etc.?) If so, what is the plan to improve any limiting factors for optimal engagement?

B. Is the system performance limited by terrain (i.e., trees, mountains, etc.)? If so, what type?

Provide supporting data, if collected.

C. Is the system’s performance limited by any type of environmental conditions (i.e., cold, hot, humidity, etc. in MIL STD 810G)? If so, what is the plan to address the limitation(s)?

D. Are there any major interdependencies to other subsystems within a PEO GCS Platform that may limit survivability and protection capability performance? If so, identify, explain, and recommend a solution to overcome any limitations caused by system or subsystem interdependencies?

E. Does the SK subsystem contain any components and, or technologies that include foreign components?

F. If so, please describe and identify by component and, or technology.

G. If so, please describe and identify if the components and, or technology require End User

Certificate (EUC)?

H. Do opportunities exist to make these components U.S. based?

GROWTH:

A. Does the SK system have growth potential (i.e., growth margins and open architecture required for rapid upgrades and insertion of future technologies)? If so, explain.

B. As a VBK/MAC and Modular Active Framework (MAF) architecture compliant SK solution, are there growth margins or upgrades required to the VBK/MAC and MAF compliance pathway, to enable the SK solution pathways future? If so, explain.

C. Is the SK system designed with Modular Open System Architecture (MOSA) in mind? Is it designed with open architecture in mind? How mature is the SK system? Provide supporting data, if collected.

D. Does the SK survivability and protection system include any state-of-the-art technologies available for USG acquisition that enable improvements (i.e. automated survivability and protection systems, man in the loop, or man on the loop, etc.) to achieve overmatch via reduced threat target acquisition and Soldier engagement decision timelines (automated search, threat target identification, prioritization, or simultaneous engagements, etc.)?

COST:

A. What is the estimated life cycle cost of the recommended SK survivability and protection system?

1. Include assumptions and cost details per SK survivability and protection system, subsystem, system simulators, EW countermeasures, etc.

2. Provide both recurring and non-recurring costs for each, if available.

B. Provide unit cost information, per quantity, for both proposed Prototypes and EW countermeasures, as well as any assumptions used.

1. Provide cost and quantity breakpoints, for example, Prototype quantities, etc.?

2. Provide a metric for economic order quantity and rationale?

C. Are any initiatives available for cost reduction: i.e.: Price breaks at larger quantities;

Technical data package procurement; Transfer of intellectual property or patents, etc.?

D. What is the estimated cost for initial testing, if the survivability and protection system does not have existing testing data? Provide breakdown by subsystem: e.g.,

1. Primary survivability and protection SK system

2. Secondary survivability and protection SK system, if applicable

3. LWR subsystem

4. Radar subsystem, etc.

E. What is the estimated annual cost of sustainment? Provide breakdown by subsystem: e.g.,

1. Primary survivability and protection SK system

2. Secondary SK system, if applicable

3. LWR subsystem

4. Radar subsystem, etc.

F. Where along the development phase / product life cycle is the system? Is the system still in development? Is the system in production? Is the system a fielded system?

1. If available, provide any associated cost for hardware and software Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) required to mature the technology.

2. Are there any future planned upgrades to the technology? If so, what are they? And what is the cost associated?

3. If in production, please describe the current production capabilities, including facility locations as well as monthly/yearly production capacities.

RISK:

A. What is the overall maturity of the SK system(s) as well as each sub-system?

1. What is the Technology Readiness Level (TRL),

2. Integration Readiness Level (IRL),

3. Manufacturing Readiness Level (MRL)

B. Is the current Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) for each survivability and protection system and subsystem(s) based on the latest version of the Department of Defense (DoD) Technology Readiness Assessment (TRA) Guidance? (Available at https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a554900.pdf).

1. If so, provide supporting documentation.

2. If not, provide any additional data supporting the TRL, IRL, or MRL of the survivability and protection suite proposed in the formal response to this RFI.

C. Does the system utilize technologies developed in cooperation with the US DoD or subsystems already employed by the DoD? Does the developed technology include the opportunity for continued development and maturation? Explain.

D. Does the system utilize technologies developed in cooperation with foreign ministries or departments of defense, or include subsystems already employed by those entities? Does the developed technology include the opportunity for continued development and maturation? Explain.

E. Are there any known risks with the system; integration/technical, schedule, human (i.e. toxic fumes), etc. If so, provide supporting documentation.

F. Is a safety assessment report, a safety case summary, or a safety and environmental case report available? If so, provide an executive summary with references to supporting documents to enable further analysis.

RELIABILITY, MAINTANABILITY, AND TRAINING:

A. Is there an assessment of reliability and maintainability (R&M) for subsystems in the survivability and protection SK System?

1. If so, please provide and include metrics such as Mean Uses Between System Abort

(MUBSA);

2. Mean Uses Between Essential Function Failure (MUBEFF);

3. Field Level Maintenance Ratio (MR);

4. Sustainment Level MR;

5. Field Level Mean Time to Repair (MTTR);

6. Crew Max Time to Repair (MaxTTR), etc., for all survivability and protection SK systems, subsystems, countermeasures, and related components.

B. If available, also include a mandatory replacement and repair parts lists for components of the system, subsystems, and related components, for example: the number of sequential Uses prior to an EW countermeasure change requirement, etc.

C. If available, provide supporting data (test data, Modeling & Simulation, R&M block diagrams, Failure Mode Effects Analysis, Failure Reporting and Corrective Action System (corrective actions implemented and impact on R&M metrics), etc.), and describe the environmental/usage conditions, mission profile(s), and failure definitions these R&M characteristics are based on.

D. How often do operators require training to include: training, refresher training, etc., and what is the estimated cost of training? Provide a breakdown by system, subsystem, EW countermeasure, related component, and relative training support Material and Non-Material Items required (e.g. bore lighting equipment, user manuals, simulators, live fire training threats, etc.)

LOGISTICS SUPPORT:

A. Describe experience and capability with lifecycle logistics product development and the 12

Integrated Product Support (IPS) elements as outlined in the IPS Elements Guidebook?

Specifically:

1. Product Support Management

2. Supply Support

3. Sustaining Engineering

4. Maintenance Planning and Management

5. Design Interface

6. Support Equipment

7. Manpower & Personnel

8. IT Systems Continuous Support

9. Facilities & Infrastructure

10. Packaging, Handling, Storage & Transportation

11. Technical Data

12. Training & Training Support

B. Describe supply support experience, including the procurement, management, packaging, handling, storage, shipment, and disposal of parts and material and any USG tools and/or applications used to perform these activities.

C. Describe capabilities and experience in development of technical data for the operation, maintenance, testing/evaluation, repair parts support, demilitarization and disposal of materiel systems. Include any experience using MIL-STD-40051 and any previous experience creating DATMs.

D. Describe experience with developing and providing full or partial TDPs.

E. Describe experience, skill, and capability of developing Logistics Product Data, Logistics

Product Data Summaries, LMI using DoD adopted industry standard GEIA-STD-0007 & GEIA-HB-0007 Logistics Product Data, and military standards MIL-PRF- 49506 and MIL-

STD-1388-2.

F. Describe experience in planning and developing New Equipment Training (NET) Packages, and executing training in field and facility environments.

G. Describe experience developing and providing Training Support Packages.

H. Describe experience in the development of an end item Supportability Strategy and associated documentation.

I. Describe experience developing, reporting, and fielding MWOs.

J. Describe experience with performing a Level of Repair Analysis (LORA).

a. What tools were used to conduct the LORA (e.g. Computer Optimization Model for Predicting and Analyzing Support Structures (COMPASS), Equipment Designer’s Cost Analysis System (EDCAS))?

b. Describe existing capabilities and or infrastructure in place?

K. Provide a list of USG logistics applications and tools the company currently has access to.

L. Explain the plan to flow down product support requirements to any subcontractors.

M. Is there a pre-developed product support scope of work for sub-contractors (e.g. in order to obtain LMI, LORA, and engineering source data)?

POINT OF CONTACT INFORMATION:

PEO GCS, CTPI, VPS

6501 E. Eleven Mile Road Detroit Arsenal, MI 48397-5000 usarmy.detroit.peo-gcs.mbx.vps-operations@army.mil

*DEFINITIONS:

a) APS capabilities are defined as autonomous hit avoidance vehicle defense systems that protect the vehicle from in-bound threats.

b) APS capabilities typically include three key functions: sense, compute, defeat.

Each of these functions shall be (1) autonomous – an automatic response to an incoming threat without requiring a manual input from the user, (2) quick – faster than relying on a user for authorization, and (3) decisive – determine action and respond accordingly, while ensuring once the response has been engaged, it cannot be rescinded.

c) A system developer is a single source capable of either consolidating subsystems and related components from various vendors, or a single source capable of developing and managing a SK APS EW capability.

d) A system is a group of components, or subsystems, integrated together to deliver a specific capability available for integration on ground combat platforms.

e) Survivability: in its common usage, refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence, or as a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission.

f) Protection: is the preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area: Active defensive measures to protect friendly forces, civilians, and infrastructure; Passive defensive measures to make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy when active measures are limited or unavailable; The application of technology and procedures to reduce the risk of fratricide; Emergency management and response to reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to accidents, health threats, and natural disasters

g) Defeat: An effect achieved when the target threat is no longer capable of continuing or completing its combat role or mission.

h) Incapacitate: An effect achieved by causing a threat target becoming unable to perform functions at a level required for combat effectiveness, or to perform the physical or mental tasks required for a particular combat role.

i) Suppression: An effect achieved when rounds strike or detonate within the vicinity or proximity of the threat target area and render the threat target unable to return effective fire or maneuver against friendly forces or neutral parties.

j) Ready: Countermeasure gimble position that is ready for the system or subsystem to fire, either in the weapon or in the ammunition handling system.

k) Semi-ready: Countermeasure gimble position that is easily accessible and loaded into the weapon by a Soldier starting in their normal fighting position, remaining under armor. To meet this condition, a Soldier (or Soldiers working together) are able to: start from their normal fighting position, access the rounds, load the rounds into the ammunition handling system, and return to their normal fighting position, all while remaining under-armor.

a) Stowed: Countermeasure gimble position stowed on a USG platform that is not in a ready or semi-ready position, accessible by the crew without the use of tools.

b) Capability Gaps: A technology, system, or subsystem maturation level that prevents USG Platforms from detecting and destroying threat target munitions at a range to ensure survivability and protection of the platforms crew and to the platform.