Oman Phase 2 Exception to Fair Opportunity Justification_Redaction_Public.pdf

Control Log No: JA-20-D-507 Contractor: Advanced Technology Systems Company

Program: Mobile Border Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance System, Ph 2

Version – February 2017 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1

JUSTIFICATION REVIEW DOCUMENT

FAR PART 16 Exception To Fair Opportunity Justification

For Actions Exceeding the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT)

Program/Equipment: This requirement is for Phase 2 support (as set forth below) of the Royal Army of Oman (RAO) Border Security Initiative via Security Assistance Management Directorate (SAMD), Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case QE-B-UFT.

Authority: 10 U.S.C. 2304c(b)(2) as implemented by FAR Part 16.505(b)(2)(i)(B) – Only one awardee is capable of providing the supplies or services required at the level of quality required because the supplies or services ordered are unique or highly specialized.

Amount: $9,843,981.25

Prepared by: PH:

Contract Specialist Date:

E

Contracting Officer: PH:

Contracting Officer Date:

E

Technical: PH:

FMS Case Manager Date:

Em

Requirements: PH:

FMS Case Manager Date:

Em

Program: Mobile Border Intelligence, Surveillance & Reconnaissance System, Ph 2

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The following capabilities are required for the Phase 2 MBISRS to support the Oman border protection objectives:

Provide a near real time situational awareness of the border environment Maintain the highest level of border surveillance consistent with cost effectiveness Delivered as a Turnkey Solution

Period of Performance: September 2020 to September 2022

As set forth in the table below, approximately % of the Phase 2 dollar value is for services while the other % is for hardware. The FSR rate is based on hours over a 2-year contract performance. Unit and total cost are based upon Phase 1 contract.

Total Value: $9,843,981.25 includes the following:

Item Description QTY Unit Cost Total Cost

Spares Extended Two-Year Warranty Contractor Furnished CONUS and OCONUS Operator and Maintainer Training

Contractor Furnished OCONUS Field Service Representative (FSR)

Contractor Furnished CONUS and OCONUS Design, Engineering, and Integration Support

Total $9,843,981.25

Type of Funding: The program will be funded by 10 U.S.C. 333 security forces funds.

Also known as pseudo funds, 10. U.S.C. 333 funding is for the purpose of building the capacity of foreign security forces.

4. Authority Cited: 10 U.S.C. 2304c(b)(2) as implemented by FAR 16.505(b)(2)(i)(B) – Only one awardee is capable of providing the supplies or services required at the level of quality required because the supplies or services ordered are unique or highly specialized.

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5. Reason for Authority Cited: ATSC is the only responsible source that can deliver a Phase 2 Mobile Border Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance System (MBISRS) solution to the United States Government (USG) and Royal Army of Oman (RAO) that will meet schedule requirements without downtime, be fully interoperable with the deployed Phase 1 RAO MBSS systems and existing training curriculum, and meet cost requirements. Only ATSC can work from day 1 of the Phase 2 follow on requirement without unacceptable delays and downtime that would be required for another offeror to onboard and meet the requirement. Only ATSC can proceed without incurring additional anticipated costs that would not be recovered through a competition.

The reason for the unacceptable delay and system downtime is that the core of the MBISRS system is the software, which is proprietary to ATSC. The Government reached out to ATSC in April of 2020 to see if ATSC would provide other contractors with access to the software, but ATSC responded that it would not do so and that the software is exclusive to ATSC and its exclusive subcontractor. Accordingly, the Government does not own sufficient software rights to permit another contractor to access or modify the ATSC provided software solution Instead, any other contractor would incur approximately of non-recurring engineering (NRE) delays required to develop a new software package that would either be fully compatible with currently fielded systems or entirely replace the current software suite. Additionally, any newly developed software suite would need to pass Factory Acceptance Tests (FAT) and Site Acceptance Tests (SAT). This process in and of itself would take approximately

, with further delays likely due to the COVID-19 pandemic. COVID-19 has resulted in limited travel capability, meaning that the Government representatives who must conduct the FAT and SAT may not be able to do so in a timely fashion, causing additional lead/lag times. With the COVID-19 pandemic interrupting travel worldwide, the requirement to travel to the awardee’s facility and then to Oman to verify integration and interoperability for any new software suite and the legacy sensors/hardware could cause additional delays well beyond .

At the same time as a new contractor would be working on the new software, there would also be delays while the contractor worked to develop a new training curriculum for the new software and any new hardware that would need to be fielded. Any new software and hardware would either need to be integrated into current curriculum or an entirely new curriculum would need to be developed. The training curriculum for Phase 1 required to develop and implement, with training incurring over a 2 year period. This training process would need to be repeated in its entirety if a new software system is implemented. Further, the RAO has stated that they do not have the time or resources to retrain previously trained personnel. Accordingly, the new software would need to work exactly the same as the pre-existing software.

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Further, in addition to software and training delays, there would be associated hardware delays as well. Delays would include non-recurring engineering of at least to assess hardware previously purchased by the Government for potential reutilization.

Integration of those systems into a cohesive follow-on system and/or development of entirely new hardware systems that meet specifications required under the Performance Work Statement (PWS) would then ensue. Additionally, as stated above, any new hardware systems or reutilized/reconfigured systems would need to pass FAT and SAT.

Since current travel capability for Government representatives is limited due to the COVID-19 pandemic, it is anticipated that there would be additional delays well beyond

As a result of the foregoing, it is expected that an unacceptable period of delay and downtime would result if any contractor other than the incumbent were to receive the award. During this time the systems will sit in Oman unacceptably inoperable. This is because, as described in the cost breakdown in section 3 above, approximately % of this procurement, by dollar value ( out of $9,843,981.25), is for services relating to the software and hardware. These services include operating and maintainer training, field service representatives, and personnel to provide design, engineering, and integration support. Any non-incumbent would need of time to assess and understand the software and the hardware from Phase 1 before being able to fully perform the corresponding services required for Phase 2. Accordingly, it is anticipated that a new contractor would take to assess the system purchased in Phase 1 before being fully capable of providing the service support that is required in Phase 2.

Without the contractor personnel providing these services immediately upon award, the hardware would quickly become inoperable, which would entirely prevent the RAO from utilizing existing platforms to perform the mission that this equipment was purchased to facilitate. This loss of capability will put the Security Assistance mission at risk, as well pose a potential threat to the security of the host nation.

(a) Costs Not Anticipated to Be Recovered Through Competition:

Description/Type of Duplication of Costs

Estimated Duplication of Costs

NRE of New

Software

Labor for Assessing Phase 1 equipment in Oman

Labor for NRE to Reutilize Phase 1 Hardware

Supply Chain Infrastructure

Training $ Total Cost $

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Substantial duplication costs to the government, not expected to be recovered through competition, for replacement of Phase 1, are estimated at for non-recurring engineering of Software, Assessing and Reutilizing Phase I hardware, Supply Chain Infrastructure and Training Program Development.

Total cost and delay estimates are calculated as follows:

a) Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) of new C2 software for all current and future fielded systems with same specifications and requirements as set forth in sources-sought notification:

Cost: $ Delay: months or more

b) NRE and fielding of replacement Phase I hardware major sub-assemblies:

Estimated labor and delay costs to access and assess Phase I equipment currently fielded in the host country to determine reutilization potential.

Cost: $ , Delay: months

Estimated NRE labor and delay costs to reutilize major sub-assemblies of Phase 1 fielded equipment and field a cohesive replacement system.

Cost: $ , Delay: months

c) Building supply chain infrastructure to support replacement of Phase 1 fielded hardware:

Cost: $ , Delay: months

d) Training program development and implementation:

Cost: $ , Delay: months

e) Maintenance and training personnel hiring, processing, training, and placement:

Cost $ , Delay: months (assuming incumbent personnel are not hired after contract award.)

(b) Limitations and Additional Impacts.

ATSC is the only supplier that can fully satisfy the requirements of the USG and RAO for the fielding of the Phase 2 MBISRS Program for the following reasons:

1) Any new mobile border security platforms in the Oman Theater must be fully interoperable and compatible with the existing RAO MBSS systems to enable a