NAS15-10000 Boeing Extension 2031 JOFOC_Redacted.pdf

Rev.:1/2023

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER (JSC)

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

(JOFOC)

FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION (ISS) VEHICLE

SUSTAINING ENGINEERING CONTRACT, NAS15-10000, CONTRACT

EXTENSION TO 2031

1. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.303-2(b)(1) – Identification of the agency and the contracting activity, and specific identification of the document as a “Justification for other than full and open competition.”

This document is a justification for other than full and open competition prepared by

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Johnson Space Center (JSC).

The procuring agency is NASA and the center for contracting activity is JSC.

2. FAR 6.303-2(b)(2) – The nature and/or description of the action being approved:

This justification provides the rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition to award an extension to contract number NAS15-10000, with The Boeing Company (Boeing), for the ISS Vehicle Sustaining Engineering Contract (hereafter referred to as the “Boeing 10K Contract”). In accordance with “Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) Act” (signed August 9, 2022), the Government intends to continue to maximize the productivity and the use of the ISS with respect to scientific and technological research and development, advancement of space exploration, and international collaboration to support full and complete utilization of the ISS through at least 2030.

NASA/JSC intends to issue a modification to the Cost-Plus Award-Fee (CPAF) contract for Boeing to continue to perform integration, verification, sustaining engineering, and Post- Production Support (PPS) (corrective and preventative maintenance) of the ISS Vehicle, by extending the current contract by seven (7) years, from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2031. JSC is requesting the Period of Performance (PoP) extend one (1) year past the current Congressional authorization of the ISS program listed in the CHIPS Act. This request is due to the separate contract action for a United States Deorbit Vehicle (USDV) which is currently scheduled to de-orbit the ISS in January of 2031. This additional year of PoP will be included as an option period and will only be exercised if Congress provides additional funding for the ISS sustainment for fiscal year 2031. The Government’s Request for Proposal (RFP) will include a four-year base PoP (October 2024 through September 2028) and three (3) one-year options (October 2028 to September 2029, October 2029 to September 2030, and October 2030 to September 2031).

A separate deviation is being sought from NFS1817.204(e)(1) for a PoP, inclusive of options, greater than five (5) years. This deviation is currently in review.

3. FAR 6.303-2(b)(3) – A description of the supplies or services required, to meet the

Agency’s needs (including the estimated value):

NASA has a requirement for ISS sustaining engineering support and hardware integration through at least 2030. As the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) for the U.S. On- Orbit Segment (USOS) and the contracting mechanism for Functional Cargo Block (FGB) spares, extension of the Boeing 10K contract is critical to maintenance of continuous ISS operations, crew health, and maximization of the vehicle for both research and as an exploration test bed. No other contractor currently has the data or skills necessary to sustain key ISS systems and provide PPS.

As noted above, the Boeing 10K contract provides services/hardware needed to ensure the basic operation of ISS and support various governmental/commercial/academic research programs which advance global knowledge and provide benefits to the nation. The research conducted on ISS involves experiments in various disciplines including, but not limited to, life science, earth science, and materials research. Additionally, technologies used aboard the ISS, and by the ISS Program, will aid in achieving the Agency’s goals and objectives for human space flight and exploration, such as advanced Environmental Control and Life Support Systems (ECLSS) and deep space docking systems. Specific examples of these technologies include the Advanced Oxygen Generation Assembly (AOGA) and NASA Docking System (NDS) Block 2 (B2), for use on the Gateway and Orion Programs. The ISS either serves as a testbed for these advanced technologies which will be used in future NASA human exploration missions, or the basis of the design being evolved for deep space use (NDSB1 was designed for interface with ISS). Furthermore, the ISS allows for continued collaboration with International Partners/Participants (IP/Ps) and provides opportunities for collaboration with domestic commercial firms. These actions not only satisfy the Agency’s requirements and directly align with NASA’s strategic goals, but also align with the intent of, and are in accordance with, the CHIPS Act.

In order to maximize the cost effectiveness of long-term space exploration and utilization activities, the ISS Program will support human exploration beyond low-earth orbit by specifically providing a test bed for research data and technology development.

The functional elements to be performed in support of the ISS Program under this contract include:

• Sustaining engineering of USOS hardware, software, and common hardware provided to

IP/Ps; Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) developers; commercial providers and Payload Developers (PDs).

• Integration of the USOS with IP/Ps, GFE, payloads, Visiting Vehicles (VVs), and commercial provider hardware and software.

• PPS of USOS hardware and common hardware provided to the IP/Ps, GFE developers, PDs, VVs, and commercial providers.

• Technical integration across all ISS segments (USOS, IP segments, and visiting vehicles).

• ISS end-to-end subsystem management for the majority of ISS subsystems and specialty engineering disciplines (materials and processes, electric, electronic and electromechanical parts, environments, electromagnetic effects).

• USOS and integrated system certification of flight readiness.

• Design, development, certification and production of hardware and software for the ISS

Program.

The Boeing 10K contract has supported the ISS throughout the Program lifecycle (development, sustaining and maintenance). The Boeing Company has over two decades of experience with NASA and the ISS Program, which cannot be replaced. This includes an extensive relationship with key suppliers who retain some of the data required to repair and sustain key hardware and software over time. The support the contract currently provides, and will continue to provide after this extension, will include the above-mentioned tasks to allow for continued operation of the ISS in support of Agency requirements.

The basic PoP for this contract extension is expected to be four (4) years, from October 1, 2024, through September 30, 2028. There will then be three (3) one-year options to exercise, as needed. The three (3) option years will continue at roughly the same level of support as the base period, with no changes in scope; deorbit work (analysis to enable, etc.) is currently ground ruled out of both the basic and the options. As referenced above, there is currently a separate action underway at JSC to procure a deorbit vehicle, the USDV. The impacts of this potential new contract, and the uncertainty of the option years due to this new contract, are driving the use of options during this extension. While NASA is currently in the planning stages for the end of the ISS life with the USDV, and there will be changes to the sustaining of the ISS as we get closer to this date, none of the base or option periods will have any scope tied to the de-orbit of the ISS. Once NASA’s plan and schedule are more concrete, a contract change will be issued under the Boeing 10K contract to add the de-orbit support to the contract. When a deorbit or commercialization date is finalized, the contract will be updated with requirements specific to either deorbit or commercialization and negotiated as required.

The contract value is currently $21.4 billion, and the estimated value of this extension period is $2.8 billion, for an estimated total contract value of $24.2 billion.

4. FAR 6.303-2(b)(4) – An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C.

3204(b)(i), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1 “Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.”

The statutory authority for proceeding with this acquisition under other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C. 3204(b)(i), as contemplated by the provision of FAR 6.302- 1(a)(2)(ii), which states that full and open competition need not be provided when “supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, including major components thereof.” Additionally, as contemplated by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii), for NASA contracts “services may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of follow-on contracts for the continued provision of highly specialized services.” These exceptions are applicable when it is likely that award to any other source would result in “substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Agency’s requirements”, as is the case with the Boeing 10K Contract.

5. FAR 6.303-2(b)(5) – A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited:

The rationale supporting the use of 10 U.S.C. 3204(b)(i) is awarding to any other source would result in “substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Agency’s requirements” as described below.

ORIGINATION/HISTORY OF 10K CONTRACT

Boeing has a long and successful history as the Prime contractor on the NAS15- 10000 contract. The Boeing 10K contract was started with a Letter Contract in 1993, and definitized in 1995. Boeing has been the Prime contractor on the 10K contract for 30 years. Boeing has seen several historical events occur while being the Prime, such as the decommission of the Space Shuttle, the development, launch, and assembly of every segment of the ISS, and resolution of significant on-orbit anomalies.

Additionally, since the Space Shuttle Program has ended, Soyuz and US Commercial partners have been the only means to ferry astronauts and cargo to the ISS. Boeing has the historical knowledge and proven track record to meet the Government’s needs, as no other contractor has dealt with these scenarios.

COMPLEXITY OF WORK

The highly complex nature of space flight, and the daily engineering challenges which go into the sustainment of the ISS, requires a contractor with specialized expertise and experience. Boeing's experience in designing and building space hardware, including the ISS, makes it uniquely qualified to perform the highly specialized tasks required for ISS sustainment. Furthermore, the uniqueness of the ISS and the specialized systems required for its operation make it difficult for other companies to compete for the 10K contract. Boeing's expertise in system integration, and its past experience in developing and building space hardware, make it the only contractor currently suitable to sustain the ISS. In addition, the limited rights data and GFE associated with the ISS make it difficult for other contractors to quickly come up to speed and provide effective sustainment services. Boeing's previous experience with the ISS, and its extensive knowledge of the associated systems and processes, make it the best candidate to continue providing high-quality support for this critical asset.

The ISS on average supports 3-4 American astronauts. Transitioning to a new Contractor would involve a significant, and lengthy, learning curve, requiring the new

Contractor to understand the complex technical and safety protocols, and operation intricacies specific to the ISS. Such a transition, if not managed correctly, could introduce uncertainties, delays, and potential safety/health hazards. Crew safety and health are paramount, and the ISS Program works to minimize all potential risks, to maximize crew safety and health to ensure optimum utilization of the ISS.

COST OF ALTERNATIVE CONTRACTOR

Starting a new contract with a contractor other than Boeing would be cost prohibitive due to several factors. Firstly, the highly specialized nature of the work required for sustaining the ISS would require a new contractor to invest significant time and resources to become familiar with the unique systems and processes involved. This would involve significant training and ramp-up costs, which would be passed on to the Government. This new contractor’s efforts would lead to a substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.

The ISS program cost estimators, estimate and several months, if not years, to obtain this data for transition. Additionally, the magnitude of the data alone would require an incoming contractor to spend months reviewing the data to ensure it was complete and to understand it. Boeing would need to be available to address concerns associated with the data for a substantial length of time, which would drive additional costs as well.

Secondly, the procurement process for a new contractor would take time, meaning that a new contract could not be started before September 30, 2024, which is the current end date for the Boeing 10K contract. This could potentially leave an unacceptable gap in ISS sustainment services, which could result in disruptions to research and other critical activities on the ISS.

Finally, a new contractor would likely pass high costs on to the Government due to the high level of expertise and specialized equipment required for ISS sustainment.

Boeing's experience with the ISS and its extensive knowledge of the associated systems and processes mean that it can provide services more efficiently and cost-effectively than a new contractor would be able to.

In summary, the cost of starting a new contract with a contractor other than Boeing would be prohibitive due to the specialized nature of the work, the time required for a new contractor to ramp up, and the high costs that would be passed on to the Government. For these reasons, it is in the Government’s best interest to continue working with Boeing for ISS sustainment services.

The ISS Program is the most complex, international civil engineering collaboration undertaken to date. The Boeing Company, under the Boeing 10K contract, designed, tested and built the majority of the hardware for the USOS. Additionally, Boeing integrated all the international elements and all VVs (including commercial VVs) into the ISS configuration, and the U.S. Government does not own all the data required to sustain and maintain the on-orbit vehicle and associated ground assets (some data remains at the supplier level). Given this history, it would not be practical or cost efficient to expect another company to have the abilities to efficiently or effectively manage this requirement.

6. FAR 6.303-2(b)(6) – A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

A notice to the Government Point of Entry (GPE) website (Sam.gov) was published on January 20, 2023, in accordance with FAR Subpart 5.2. This posting informed potential sources of NASA’s intent to award this sole-source extension to the Boeing 10K Contract.

The results of this synopsis are summarized in Section 10 below.

7. FAR 6.303-2(b)(7) – A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The CO’s signature on this document indicates that the CO has determined that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable. The Contractor shall be required to submit a proposal to be evaluated and negotiated by the Government. Prior to execution of the contractual instrument, a proposal analysis will be performed. The proposal analysis will ensure that the final agreed-to price for the contract action is fair and reasonable.

In order to demonstrate that the Government has received a fair and reasonable price, the Contractor will be required to provide the Government with cost and pricing data in accordance with FAR 15.403-4 and will be required to provide a certificate of current cost or pricing data in accordance with FAR 15.406-2. In addition to the Technical Evaluation (TE) that will be developed by the requiring technical organizations, an Independent Government Estimate (IGE) of the proposal will be conducted by the ISS Assessments, Cost Estimating and Schedules (ACES) Office. Furthermore, the NASA Enterprise Pricing Office (EPO) will provide pricing expertise as needed, and a Forward Pricing Rate Agreement (FPRA) or Forward Pricing Rate Recommendation (FPRR) will be provided from Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).

The Government has successfully negotiated seven (7) contract extensions with Boeing under this contract. Based upon past experiences, and the data and resources available to the CO (to include audited rates with the prime Contractor), it is anticipated that the Government will be able to negotiate a fair and reasonable price for these services.

8. FAR 6.303-2(b)(8) – Description of the market research conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted:

A non-competitive synopsis was issued on January 20, 2023, with a closing date of February 6, 2023, and serves as a market survey for the proposed contract modification. As a result of this market survey, no company expressed either any interest in or capability to perform this work. Furthermore, AbilityOne was contacted to ascertain if the AbilityOne program would be able to fulfill the Government’s requirements. AbilityOne responded that due to the technical nature of the requirement, they would not be able to fulfill the Government’s requirements, and they would not recommend adding AbilityOne subcontracting language to the request for proposal. Additionally, the Government queried the NASA Strategic Sourcing Searchable Repository and found three contracts with similar scope: Integrated Mission Operations Contract (IMOC) II - NNJ14RA01B, Human Space Flight Technical Integration Contract (HSFTIC) - 80JSC020C0017, and Advanced Guidance, Navigation, & Control (GN&C) and Avionics Technology Development and Analysis Services (GN&C III)

– 80JSC021DA005. However, upon review of the scope of work for each of these contracts, none would be able to completely fulfill the Government’s requirements. Additionally, NASA has not identified any company that could acquire the skills and knowledge necessary to perform the critical and complex activities associated with this contract in such an abbreviated period of time

9. FAR 6.303-2(b)(9) – Any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

None.

10. FAR 6.303-2(b)(10) – A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed an interest in writing in the acquisition:

A notice of NASA’s intent to award this sole-source action was synopsized on the GPE website (Sam.gov) per FAR Subpart 5.2 (See Section 6 above). At the time of posting closing, no potential contractors contacted the CO expressing an interest in performing this work as the Prime contractor.

11. FAR 6.303-2(b)(11) – A statement of actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

The Agency will continue to examine the market in the future for alternative solutions or new sources before executing any subsequent acquisitions for the same requirements.