T-44 Part I deficiencies.doc

BREAKDOWN

1. SIM 4 is currently capable of training all CPT, BI, and Contact EP Sim events (11 total events).

2. If the additional discrepancies pertaining to the Flight Director and FMS are corrected the additional 55% (11 Events) of training may be accomplished.

3 Currently we have 23 C-model Aircraft on the ramp with #24 through #26 due in the near future. The maximum student loading at 26 aircraft is 78 students.

Recommendation

-----------------SIM 4 Current Status @ 40% MC -------------------------------------------------------

1. Flight Director Functionality

2. FMS

-Glide Slope Calc.

-360 mode display during MA on PFD

-ILS Auto Tune/ Nav-Nav Transfer

-VNAV Operation

-Departure Arrival Index Page

-Cancel/Exit Option

-SID Input

-Performance INIT Page

-TOD alert

-RAIM Check

----------------SIM 4 @ 100% Mission Capable----------------------------------------------------------- SN4 Current Status:

· Total Sim events: 22

· All CPTs (7 events) and BIs (4 events) can be accomplished with Instructor workarounds

· RI events (11 events) are negatively affected to varying degrees

· Flight Director Functionality:

· The erratic operation of the flight director during multiple phases of a normal instrument approach is unacceptable. Students are taught that the key to successful instrument flying is to make small and smooth corrections. The current simulator FD representation directly violates and negates that flying philosophy. The simulator is supposed to instill confidence into the student to trust the FD when it is set up correctly. However, since the FD makes many uncommanded and unnecessary turns during normal maneuvers, the student will learn to disregard the very tool that they are learning to use, the FD. This FD functionality Part I deficiency results in unavoidable negative training and causes a lack of confidence in the Flight Director and consequently the simulator as a whole.

· Flight Management System:

· The Flight Management System (FMS) is a critical system of the T-44C. It is part of the upgraded avionics system that enables VT-31 to uniquely train students for their follow-on advanced operational aircraft. The current operation of the FMS prevents proper accomplishment of an essential training system capability. The inability of the FMS to function correctly will result in significant training degradation. Workarounds required by the student are unacceptable and will have negative consequences.

· The specific functions of the FMS that are incorrect are as follows (listed by priority):

1) GLIDE SLOPE CALCULATION (GPS app VDI): During various hand-flown FD approaches, when approaching the FAF, the VDI, or glideslope indicator “star”, would rise up to 1 dot and then rapidly drop to the bottom of the indicator. Following the FD required the evaluation pilot to raise the nose to match the FD and then forcefully push the nose back down to regain the indicated glideslope. The instability of the VDI/FD would cause the student to distrust the glideslope and negate the very lesson they should be taught—trust your instruments. While learning to fly instruments in the simulator, an unstable (jumping) glideslope will distract the student pilot and cause them to over control the aircraft and/or doubt the simulator’s ability to mimic the aircraft. The star in the VDI should smoothly move to represent the aircraft’s position on glideslope. Ideally, if the aircraft is on the FAF altitude, when approaching the FAF, the star will begin at the top and continue to the middle, indicating the aircraft is on glideslope. On final, there should be one descent (VDI display) from the aircraft’s current altitude to the MDA/RWY. As built, the simulator starts on one descent just before the FAF and then the VDI rapidly changes its position multiple times on the PFD before settling out and displaying reliable information.

2) 360 MODE DISPLAY ON PFD DURING MISSED APPROACH PROCEDURES (CDI on MA): When conducting a missed approach procedures with FMS primary in 360 mode, the CDI pointer was incorrectly displayed and stopped working on the PFD. During the OE, the simulator had to be paused and it took two pilots and the IOS operator 5 minutes to determine what the FMS was displaying because troubleshooting the CDI pointer distracted the evaluation pilots. The CDI pointer should pointed towards the missed approach point with the course corresponding to the course figured out by the FMS. Additionally, the CDI should have worked and showed deflection when the aircraft was off of the course. The incorrect functionality of the CDI pointer will prevent the pilot from flying the missed approach procedure without an overlay navaids needle up. This will be a problem for a student pilot while shooting a GPS-only approach, when there are no navaids able to be received. This problem is extremely critical during the missed approach procedures if there is an “arc” or a turn involved in the missed approach procedure. This is severe negative training since a student pilot will be prevented from determining what the CDI pointer is pointing at. Since the 360 mode is the primary display mode used to train students, this display needs to function correctly. The 360 mode is used in training to provide student pilots with a solid foundation of basic instrument flying. If as student is unable to accomplish this basic training, then he/she cannot move onto more advanced instrument flying.

3) ILS AUTOTUNE and NAV-to-NAV TRANSFER (PFD & ILS): When the evaluation pilot loaded the ILS approach into the FMS, the autotune and NAV-to-NAV sequence did not work properly. The ILS armed the NAV-to-NAV transfer on the PFD before it autotuned the NAVAIDS (it incorrectly treated the active frequency as the localizer frequency). Then when the NAVAIDS were tuned, the ILS de-armed and did not allow for the NAV-to-NAV transfer to occur. The pilots were unable to complete the approach with the AUTOTUNE and NAV-to-NAV capability unless the simulator was paused and moved back to the previous location. Negative training would occur since it would take extra steps to manually return NAV1 and NAV2 back to the correct frequencies. Moreover, a student would be distracted and confused by the actions of the FMS. In the aircraft, the FMS will tune the localizer frequency and enter it into the preselector. Then once the APPR button is selected on the FGP, the NAV-to-NAV transfer would occur.

4) VNAV OPERATION (VNAV func): During all VNAV descents, when the evaluation pilot selected the SEC FLPN page on the CDU, the VNAV functionality ceased to work. This occurred multiple times throughout the OE. In one instance the pilot was attempting to modify the flight plan without executing it, and the VNAV function stopped. The inaccurate functionality of the FMS will not allow the student to input a secondary flight plan for the VNAV to work. Dynamic profiles flown in the simulator for training would be significantly hindered. If a student pilot attempts to “get ahead of the aircraft” and load up a secondary approach for the next airfield, the VNAV glideslope will never appear and the student will be forced to reattempt the approach even through they did nothing wrong. If the student knew they should be descending, and the VNAV glideslope is inoperative, they would either have to follow the FD and remain level or build a bad habit pattern of mistrusting the FD. This is unacceptable negative training. The VNAV function should always function no matter what page of the FMS a student is monitoring.

5) DEP/ARR INDEX PAGE: When the evaluation pilot tried to load an instrument approach, the ARR LSK of the Origin airport did not work on the DEP/ARR INDEX page. The evaluation crew was unable to select the arrival instrument procedure of the Origin/Departure airport. This is a critical shortcut that student pilots are expected to learn. If there is an emergency return needed, a student pilot should easily load up the approach. During an approach to landing, any extra keystrokes required could be fatal. This discrepancy is also present in the SEC FPLN airport. In the aircraft, pressing the RSK1 next to the departure airport on the ARR page functions the same as pressing the ARR airport next to the destination on the Dep/ARR index page, but loads the approach page for the origin airport. The same function is available to load an approach at the origin airport on the airport present in the Secondary Flight Plan.

6) CANCEL EXIT OPTION: Whenever the evaluation pilot entered a HILO procedure turn, the “Cancel Exit” option was not working until after the INTC point. In the aircraft, this option is immediately available once crossing the Initial Approach Fix (IAF). If a student was to use this option before passing the INTC point, the aircraft would actually hold off the INTC waypoint, instead of the holding fix. If this option is not available in the simulator until reaching the INTC waypoint, a student would never experience using the “Cancel Exit” option, which is negative training. Furthermore, in the aircraft, the Cancel Exit option is not available after passing the INTC waypoint, because the aircraft thinks you are attempting to fly the approach. The Cancel Exit option should only be available after initially crossing the Holding fix until the INTC waypoint.

7) STANDARD INSTRUMENT DEPARTURE (SID input): Whenever the evaluation pilot loaded Standard Instrument Departure (SID), he was forced to load it before the instrument approach was loaded. If these inputs into the FMS were not done in this order, the pilot was unable to load the SID. If a student pilot does not know about this issue in the trainer, unnecessary time would be spent troubleshooting the deficiency. Students will be forced to load the FMS in a non-standard way in order to overcome the simulator’s programming. There are no procedures on the specific sequence a user follows to load the FMS with regards to a SID/arrival instrument approach/flight plan. A pilot should be able to load the SID any time; before or after loading an approach/flight plan. After the pilot has loaded everything, the active legs page should show SID—discontinuity—flight plan—discontinuity— arrival airport approach. While this problem is not seen at KNGP, it was observed at KSAT, KIAH, and KDFW. This inconsistency will only allow students to fly the two departure procedures from Corpus Christi NAS. With this current problem, the students will not be able to fly and train on any other departure procedure away from Corpus Christi NAS.

8) PERFORMANCE INIT PAGE DURING FLIGHT (Perf Init): When pilot entered 1000’ into the CRZ ALT on the Perf Init page, during flight, the FMS recalled previously passed legs and displayed these legs on the CDU. The current waypoint the aircraft was flying towards changed to those recalled legs. This incorrect response caused unnecessary discussion between the two pilots as to what actually happened to the flight plan. In a student event, this deficiency will cause a break in training as the students and/or instructor question the deviation of the flight plan. The flight plan would have to be reloaded/ resequenced before training could continue. In the aircraft, changing the CRZ ALT in-flight would just change the CRZ ALT. The waypoints on the Legs page would never be altered. If flying at a higher altitude then what a user enters, the CRZ ALT displayed would be the altitude selected in the PSA. If flying a lower altitude then what a user enters, the CRZ ALT displayed would be the newly entered altitude.

9) TOD ALERT (TOD display): When the evaluation crew flew below the Glideslope on any FMS approach (with the FMS as the primary navigation source), a TOD visual and aural alert occurred after the FAF. The alert occurred in error and created unnecessary noise which distracted the crews’ attention during the landing. Students are trained to execute the dive and drive method of accomplishing non-precision approaches where they will be below the advisory glideslope. There should never be a TOD after the FAF. If misinterpreted, a student pilot could potentially arrest their descent and wait for the TOD. After time, a student could potentially disregard all TOD indications as being false. There shouldn’t be a TOD in front of the aircraft on final approach.

10) RAIM AVAILABLITY DISPLAY (RAIM Check): When the evaluation pilot checked the RAIM on the GPS control page on the ground, the RAIM displayed “NOT AVAIL” before a time was inputted. The APPR RAIM field should have been blank before a time was inserted. Student pilots are taught to check the RAIM for an approach to make sure they are legally and safely able to fly the approach. If the habit pattern is created to just check the page without actually inputting a time, the student has failed to ensure they are safe to fly. “AVAILABLE” should only display when a time is inputted and RAIM is available during that time. Additionally, if the RAIM is unavailable at the specified time, the APPR RAIM filed should state, “UNAVAIL” per Figure 20-20 GPS Control Page in the T-44C NATOPS.