DD254 Attachment J.1 Rev 1.pdf

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V DEPARTMENT

CODE 10 / COMMAND

H DEPARTMENT

M DEPARTMENT

PLACE THIS NEAR YOUR TELEPHONE

For assistance with OPSEC contact your Department Security Coordinator/OPSEC

Coordinator or the

COMMAND OPSEC PROGRAM MANAGER:

GISELLE POZZERLE 540-653-7614

DEPARTMENT OPSEC COORDINATORS:

M/R/00/01/02; Cindy Howard 540-653-7385

A: Chris Cabaniss 540-284-0520

B: Rheannon Burns 540-653-0044 E: George Konen 540-653-2083 H: Lauren Maples 540 653 8912

CRITICAL

INFORMATION &

UNCLASSIFIED

• Proprietary and business sensitive information;

• Specific details about missions, threats, gaps, vulnerabilities, requirements, or urgent needs that NSWCDD supports or mitigates;

• Information about capabilities, vulnerabilities, and limitations or information revealing a security weakness;

• New, projected, or expanded secure communications capabilities;

• Specific details about current or future exercises/operations;

• Key personnel or very important person schedules and itinerary;

• Information system and network capabilities and vulnerabilities;

• Security measures and countermeasures taken to protect a system;

• Combat System and Warfare System specifications/design details for all Surface Ship Combat Systems including AEGIS, Aegis BMD (ABMD), Ship Self Defense System (SSDS), FFG(X), Large Unmanned Surface Vehicle (LUSV), DDG 1000, Littoral Combat Ships (LCS), and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), including tactical and virtualized environments;

• Baseline Development, Cost Analysis, Testing, Installation and Delivery Schedules of Surface Navy Combat Systems including AEGIS, ABMD, SSDS, FFG(X), LUSV, DDG 1000, USCG and LCS;

• Development of netted, flexible, automated and rapid capabilities for the integrated combat system that will be nodes in the distributed maritime operations;

• Warfare and Combat System capabilities or limitations;

• Interoperability and Combat Control systems capabilities or limitations including concept and design , Shipboard Gridlock System/Automatic Correlation, System Track Manager/Track Server Cooperative Engagement Capability, Cryptologic Technician Network, Navigation and Ground Based Air Defense;

• Information system/network capabilities and vulnerabilities;

• Laboratory/test site locations, capabilities, operational and access requirements for the Integrated Warfare Systems Lab Complex, and other Combat System support laboratory/test sites;

• Security measures/countermeasures taken to protect a system;

• Identification of special access elements within a program;

• Specific Program Protection Plan implementations;

• Combat system virtualization efforts, virtualization experimentation, and virtualization prototypes;

• Combat system development for unmanned surface vessel prototyping;

• Battle management aid/tactical aids and mission planning tools for surface Navy.

• Details of counter-improvised explosive device projects commissioned by combatant commands, services, and agencies;

• Battle Management System concept of operations;

capabilities; performance, and limitations;

• TOMAHAWK, AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), AEGIS Weapons Control System, AN/SQQ-89, Computer Aided Dead Reckoning Tracer, Vertical Launch Systems capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, degradations, test results, errors, problems, actual performance, fleet exercises, tactical operations, threats, missions, data and algorithms;

• Association of specific projects with non-Navy sponsors, information identifying our non-Navy sponsors and stakeholders;

• Locations and schedules of Navy ships, personnel deployment and outdoor testing facilities and

• Correlation of project titles with development spaces and laboratories.

• Information concerning specific mission analysis;

• Specific details about missions, threats, gaps, vulnerabilities, requirements or urgent needs that NSWCDD supports or mitigates;

• Digital threat characterizations and traceable threat products;

• Threat models used to develop threat assessment products;

• Weapon’s effects and lethality of threats, and TTP’s;

• Surface Warfare models and simulation products;

• Force analysis and warfare studies examining force structures and architectures to be utilized for investment decisions;

• Mission-level and force-level capabilities and limitations;

• Counter threat strategies. UPDATED: JAN 2021

• Association of abbreviations, acronyms, nicknames or code words with projects or locations designated as CUI;

• Security operating procedures and emergency plans;

• Physical security pitfalls related to physical security maintenance and improvement;

• Deployment schedules, dates, and locations.

USING THIS CIIL

Refer to your department CIIL when writing for public release or releasing outside the DOD. This includes awards, academic papers, presentation slides, etc.

Refer to the CIIL when conducting business phone calls to ensure you do not inadvertently disclose critical information.

V: Monica Drummond 540-653-6595

Dam Neck: Jon Reid 757-492-6757

B DEPARTMENT

E DEPARTMENT

DAM NECK ACTIVITY:

R DEPARTMENT

A DEPARTMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED

• Re-entry systems trajectory details;

• Re-entry systems material properties and fabrication methods;

• Reentry systems vulnerabilities, degradations, limitations, problems, or errors in the system that could be exploited;

• Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile/Submersible, Ship Guided Missile, Nuclear (SLBM/SSGN) vulnerabilities, degradations, limitations, problems or errors in the system that could be exploited;

• SLBM/SSGN systems capabilities;

• SLBM targeting capabilities;

• Ship, submersible, ballistic, submarine guided nuclear ship schedules, deployment dates, and locations;

• Plans and schedules associated with strategic targeting changes;

• SLBM/SSGN facilities and capabilities;

• Mean time between failures and mean time to repair values for maintenance plan;

• Public network internet protocol addresses associated with combat system elements;

• Combat system capabilities and limitations;

• Deployment of capabilities upgrades and schedules for rapidly prototyped systems;

• Technical details of support efforts for Department of Defense (DoD) and non-DoD infrastructures and networks;

• Information concerning specific mission analysis;

• Near Real Time and surge operations in response to natural and man-made events;

• Infrastructure site assessment locations, and;

• Nuclear Command and Control Recapitalization.

• Analysis of system performance, target capabilities or

• Current system technological, organizational, or operational vulnerabilities;

• Counter technology efforts;

• Specific chemical, biological, and radiological

• Capability gaps and/or limits of protection associated with fielded or developing CBR defense equipment and/or systems;

• Scientific and technical or test and evaluation data for CBR defense related research.

• Details of plans, programs, operations, test events and exercises, contracts, designs and milestones before approved public release;

• Specific explosive experimental area capabilities and limitations;

• Specific information related to Railgun and Hypervelocity Projectile and associated testing;

• Specific information relating to hypersonic technology, programs, and associated testing;

• Contents of magazines;

• Targets of interest, analysis of target capabilities or

• Weapon’s effects and lethality on targets; tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP’s);

• Unmanned aerial vehicle capabilities and detailed results of testing;

• Specific frequencies of operations;

• Waveform specifics; e.g. frequency and pulse width;

• Power on target;

• References to transitioning existing systems and their applications as a weapon system;

• Electromagnetic interference measurement and ratings;

• Specific information relating to laser technology, testing and high power microwave technology and testing;

• Current system technological, organizational, or operation vulnerabilities and;

• Counter technology efforts.

“It is said that if you know your enemies and know yourself, you can win a thousand battles without a single loss. If you only know yourself, but not your opponent, you may win or you may lose. If you know neither yourself nor your enemy, you will always endanger yourself.” ~Sun Tzu, The Art of War

• Installation and delivery schedules of ships and submarines;

• Research & development technical information: new, projected or expanded technical capabilities, performance data, vulnerabilities and limitations for ships, subs, missiles, littoral mine warfare systems and integrated warfare systems;

• Details of plans, programs, operations, test events, exercises, contracts, designs, and milestones before approved public release.

Specific exercises will provide separate OPSEC lists if required;

• Travel details of any kind revealing information which could impact Causality Reports or ship status;

• Procurement of sensitive items or higher technology;

• Maintenance and material support that could reveal sensitive projects;

• Special codes assigned to platforms in association with other platform-specific information.

Indicators are detectable actions which point to vulnerabilities or critical information. They may seem insignificant to you but to an adversary they are small pieces of a much larger puzzle.

• Specific frequencies of operation;

• Targets of interest;

• Test data, specifically effects on a target, to

• include no effect;

• Specific power on target;

• References to transitioning existing systems and their applications as a weapon system;

• General system parameters;

• Radar cross sections;

• Electromagnetic interference measurement data, analysis results, predictions, and risk ratings;

• Advanced technology applications;

• Specific knowledge of targets tactics, techniques, and procedures;

View Notification

The following changes have occurred for 1R7A4 Iridium Satellite LLC:

A verification request was created for this facility.

*This information is valid as of 06/01/2021

This is to advise you that the following information is current verification information for the facility.

CAGE Code: 1R7A4

Facility Name: Iridium Satellite LLC

Physical Location: 1750 Tysons Boulevard, Suite 1400

McLean VA 22102-4244

Classified Mailing Address:

Classified Hardware Mailing Address:

This facility is NOT approved to receive overnight mail via FedEx/UPS.

Classified Overnight/Commercial Carrier Address:

Facility Clearance Status/Level: Active / Top Secret

Status Date: 09/08/2011

Document Safeguarding Level: None

Authorized Access to:

FCL Limitations: None

Special Limitation Notes:

Facility Security Officer: Sims, Cynthia

Facility Security Officer Phone Number: (480) 752-1114

FSO Email Address: Cindy.Sims@iridium.com

DCSA Field Office: Alexandria3 Field Office

DCSA Field Office Phone Number: 571-551-7960

DCSA Email address: dss.ncr.dss-isfo.mbx.dss-alexandria-3-fo@mail.mil

You will be notified of changes in this information until 06/01/2024

Tuesday, June 1, 2021 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Page 1 of 1

BIDDING 002-21

CONTINUATION – DD FORM 254 ITEM 13

DODI 5200.48

JULY 2020

CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI)

1. DEFINITION. Controlled Unclassified Information is defined as unclassified information meeting standards for safeguarding and dissemination controls pursuant to law, regulations, and government-wide policies under Executive Order 13556, which establishes a uniform program for designation of information meeting the standards for CUI, uses standardized marking, and ensures information is only controlled when needed.

2. CATEGORIES OF CUI. CUI consists of the following;

For Official Use Only (FOUO) information;

Privacy Act Information (See PII attachment);

Department of State Sensitive But Unclassified (SBU) information;

Department of Defense (DoD) and Department of Energy (DoE) Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI);

Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Sensitive Information;

Foreign Government Information (FGI);

National Geospatial Intelligence Agency Limited Distribution Information

3. GENERAL GUIDANCE: Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) such as FOUO, Security Classification Guides (SCG), and other information with Distribution Statements B thru F, are not authorized for public release and cannot be placed on a publicly accessible web site or web server.

a. All contractors supporting an NSWCDD contract will comply with the crawl, walk, run CUI implementation stages as determined by DUSN (I&S). NSWCDD is currently in the crawl stage.

At the moment the ONLY required marking on what was traditionally FOUO is to mark the TOP and BOTTOM of the documents as “CUI”.

Unclassified//FOUO is now CUI. Headers and Footers are considered the very top and bottom.

During the crawl stage paragraph or portion markings are optional. For example: (U//FOUO) is now (CUI).

Emails containing CUI will be marked with CUI in the subject line “(CUI)” followed by the subject and CUI banner lines at the top and bottom of the email. Subject: FOUO-Privacy Sensitive is now (CUI) followed by subject.

Information systems, databases and websites shall start the transition to remark their banner lines from legacy marking to CUI markings during the crawl phase. i.e. https://wwwdd.csd.disa.mil/ homepage currently marked Unclassified//FOUO shall now be marked CUI.

b. Distribution statements for classified documents will be determined by the Security Classification Guide used to mark the document.

b. All technical data provided to the contractor by the government will be protected from public disclosure in accordance with the markings contained therein.

d. Any material produced under the terms of this contract will be classified directly from the source document(s) from which it was obtained. It will be marked with the most restrictive downgrading/declassification statement contained in such documents.

4. TRANSMITTAL. All emails containing such information or attachments must be appropriately marked, and digitally signed and encrypted if being transmitted within Navy networks, or outside a Navy network to an approved contractor email address. All transmissions to personal email accounts (AOL, Yahoo, Hotmail, Comcast, etc.) are prohibited.

5. OFFSITE HANDLING. The contractor shall provide adequate physical protection to such information as to preclude access by any person or entity not authorized such access by the government.

6. DISCLOSURE POLICY: All other information relating to the items to be delivered or services to be performed under this contract may not be disclosed by any means without prior approval of the authorized representative of the contracting officer. Dissemination or public disclosure includes, but is not limited to, permitting access to such information by foreign nationals or by any other person or entity; publication of technical or scientific papers; advertising; or any other proposed public release. Due to the sensitivity of this program, no classified material received or generated under this contract will be transferred to any other contractor or agency without the approval of the Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR).

7. FACILITY VISITS: All visit requests for contractor personnel visiting NSWCDL shall meet the following requirements;

a. Requests must be sent through the Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS), under SMO code 001785 for GENSER and 001783 for SCI.

b. Visit requests for Contractor Personnel not submitted via JPAS shall be faxed to the COR, TPOC or the respective department administrative office no later than five (5) working days prior to the intended visit for NEED-TO-KNOW certification. All requests shall contain the information required by Chapter 6, NISPOM, and shall not exceed 12 months.

c. Visit requests for subcontractors to other activities will have a NEED-TO-KNOW certified by the prime contractor.

d. Information on this contract is not releasable to personnel possessing limited (reciprocal) clearances without the written approval of NSWCDD.

Additional guidance can be found at DODI 5200.48.

NON-SCI – DD254 CONTINUATION SHEET

NON-SCI

1. DEFINITION: Foreign Intelligence information is defined in SECNAVINST 5510.36 as the product from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all available information which concerns one or more aspects of foreign nations or of areas of foreign operations which is immediately or potentially significant to military planning and operations.

2. MARKING: Distribution statements for classified documents will be determined by the Security Classification Guide used to mark the document.

a. Intelligence data reports and/or documents utilizing data derived from intelligence sources - distribution statement a follows: “FURTHER DISSEMINATION ONLY AS DIRECTED BY COMMANDER, DAHLGREN DIVISION, NAVAL SURFACE WARFARE CENTER (CODE 105), DAHLGREN, VA 22448-5100 OR THE OFFICE OF NAVAL

INTELLIGENCE (ONI-52)”

3. DISCLOSURE POLICY: All technical data provided to the contractor by the Government will be protected from public disclosure in accordance with the markings contained therein. All other information relating to the items to be delivered or services to be performed under this contract may not be disclosed by any means without written approval of the Contracting Officer.

a. Dissemination or public disclosure includes, but is not limited to permitting access to such material by foreign nationals or any other person or entity; publication scientific or technical papers; advertising; or any other proposed public release. The contractor shall provide adequate physical protection to such information as to preclude access by any person or entity not authorized such access by the Government.

b. Due to the sensitivity of this program, classified material received or generated under this contract will not be transferred to any other contractor or agency without the written approval of the Contracting Officer or Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR). For intelligence data reports see the intelligence supplement.

c. Information on this contract is not releasable to personnel possessing reciprocal clearances without the written approval of NSWCDD. For intelligence data reports see the intelligence supplement.

d. Any material produced under the terms of this contract will be classified directly from the source document(s) from which it was obtained. It will be marked with the most restrictive downgrading or declassification statement contained in such documents.

4. GENSER VISITS: All GENSER classified visit requests for the Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center should be submitted in the following manner:

a. Joint Personnel Adjudication System (JPAS), under SMO code 001785.

b. Visit requests for Contractor Personnel not submitted via JPAS shall be faxed to the COR/TPOC or respective department administrative office no later than five (5) working days prior to the intended visit.

c. All visit requests not submitted via JPAS must have "NEED-TO-KNOW" certified by the individual identified in Item 13 (COR/TPOC). All requests must contain the information required by Chapter 6, NISPOM, and must not exceed 12 months.

NON-SCI

NON-SCI – DD254 CONTINUATION SHEET

d. Visit requests for subcontractors to activities other than Intelligence Community (IC) activities will have “NEED-TO-KNOW” certified by the prime contractor. Visit requests to IC activities shall be on a case-by-case basis and determined by the IC.

5. SECURITY SERVICE AGREEMENT: For this contract where NSWCDD office space is provided and occupied by contractor personnel, the following provisions of 1-108e of DOD 5220.22R apply:

a. Periodic inspection of work and facilities will be conducted by the NSWCDD SSO to ensure procedures are in accordance with those outlined by the Statement of Work for this contract and applicable NSWCDD, Department of the Navy (DON), and Department of Defense (DOD) security regulations.

b. Annual Security Awareness refresher briefings will be provided to contractor personnel, and, where applicable, NSWCDD M-5510.4, Command Security Manual, will be furnished for contractor reference.

6. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION: Intelligence information required in connection with performance must be acquired under the direction of the Dahlgren Division, Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWCDD) Technical Intelligence Office (TIO), Code V14. Foreign Intelligence will be provided in accordance with DOD Directive DOD-0000-151C-95, DODIPP Production Procedures; OPNAV Instructions 3880.6 and 3811.1C; and NSWCDD Instructions 3880.6A and

3811.1. The following conditions of release apply to intelligence information;

a. The material does not become the property of the contractor and may be withdrawn at any time. Upon expiration of the contract, all foreign intelligence information and any material using Data from such intelligence shall be returned to the NSWCDD Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for final disposition. Only with the prior authorization of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI-52) via the NSWCDD SIO may the contractor retain such material.

b. The contractor must not release the foreign intelligence material to any activity or person of the contractor’s organization not directly engaged in providing services under the contract or to another contractor (including subcontractors), government agency, private individual, or organization without the written approval of the NSWCDD SIO or ONI-52 via the NSWCDD SIO.

c. Intelligence material shall not be released to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens who may be employed by the contractor, regardless of their level of security clearance or access authorization, without the written approval of ONI-52 via the NSWCDD SIO.

d. The contractor shall maintain records which contain the names of all individuals granted access to foreign intelligence material in the contractor’s custody. These records shall be furnished to the NSWCDD Contracting Officer or the NSWCDD SIO on demand.

e. The contractor shall ensure all individuals granted accesses to intelligence information are aware of and abide by the controls set forth above.

f. Intelligence material shall not be reproduced without the prior approval of the NSWCDD SIO, or ONI-52 via the NSWCDD SIO. All intelligence material shall bear a prohibition against reproduction while in the custody of the contractor.

Navy DD Form 254 SCI Addendum August 18, 2017

RELEASE OF SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) INTELLIGENCE

INFORMATION TO U.S. CONTRACTORS

ATTACHMENT TO DD FORM 254 FOR CONTRACT NO.: BIDDING 002-21

ORDER NO.: N/A

CONTRACT ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE (ECD):N/A

SCI NETWORK ACCESS REQUIRED: JWICS

The Cognizant Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) has exclusive security responsibility for all Sensitive

Compartmented Information (SCI) classified material released to or developed under the contract and held within the Contractor’s SCI Facility (SCIF). Access to SCI Intelligence material requires adherence to the requirements set forth in the following: Department of Defense (DoD) Manual

(DoDM) 5105.21, Volume 1, SCI Administrative Security Manual: Administration of Information and

Information Systems Security; DoDM 5105.21, Volume 2, SCI Administrative Security Manual:

Administration of Physical Security, Visitor Control, and Technical Security; DoDM 5105.21, Volume 3, SCI Administrative Security Manual: Administration of Personnel Security, Industrial Security, and

Special Activities; ICD 403, Foreign Disclosure and Release of Classified National Intelligence; ICD 703, Protection of Classified National Intelligence Including Sensitive Compartmented Information; ICD

703-02, Reporting Requirements for Individuals with Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information;

ICD 703-03, Protection of Classified National Intelligence Including SCI Shared with Entities Outside the

Intelligence Community; ICD 703-04, Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence (FOCI); ICD 710, Classification Management and Control Markings Systems; ICPG 710.1, Application of Dissemination

Controls: Originator Control (ORCON); DoD 5220.22-M, Change 2, National Industrial Security

Program Operating Manual (NISPOM); and DoD 5220.22-R, DoD Industrial Security Program.

Contractor’s will comply with all regulations/manuals/directives stated therein which provide the necessary security and classification guidance for personnel, information, physical, automated information security (AIS), and technical security measures and is a part of the SCI security specifications for the contract. Inquiries pertaining to SCI classification guidance or interpretations shall be directed to the Contracting Officer Representative (COR).

1. Requirements for access to SCI:

a. All SCI will be handled in accordance with special security requirements, which will be furnished by the Command Special Security Officer (SSO).

b. SCI will not be released to contractor employees without specific release approval of the originator of the material as outlined in governing directives; based on prior approval and certification of "need-to-know" by the designated COR.

c. The contractor must restrict access to only those individuals who possess the necessary security clearance and who are actually providing services under the contract with a valid need to know. Further dissemination to other contractors, subcontractors, other government agencies, private individuals or organizations is prohibited unless authorized in writing by the originating agency through the COR.

Navy DD Form 254 SCI Addendum August 18, 2017

d. Names of contractor personnel requiring access to SCI will be submitted to the COR for approval. Upon receipt of written approval from the COR, the company security officer will submit request(s) for special background investigations, in accordance with the

NISPOM, to the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA).

e. SCI material must not be released to foreign nationals or immigrant aliens whether they are consultants, U.S. contractors, or employees of the contractor and regardless of the level of their security clearance, except with advance written permission from the originator. Requests for release to foreign nationals shall be initially forwarded to the

COR and shall include:

i. A copy of the proposed disclosure.

ii. Full justification reflecting the benefits to U.S. interests.

iii. Name, nationality, particulars of clearance, and current access authorization of each proposed foreign national recipient.

f. Contractor personnel must maintain accountability for all intelligence materials released to their custody.

g. SCI material will not be reproduced without prior approval of the originator of the material. All SCI material shall bear a prohibition against reproduction while in the contractor’s custody.

h. Inquiries pertaining to classification guidance on SCI will be directed through the Command

SSO to the responsible COR as indicated on the DD Form 254.

i. SCI released to cleared-DoD Contractors, all reproductions thereof, and all other information generated based on, or incorporating data from, in support of this contract, remains the property of the U.S. Government. Upon completion or cancellation of the contract, all SCI material furnished will be returned to the direct custody of the supporting SSO, or destroyed IAW instructions outlined by the COR.

j. SCI will be stored and maintained only in properly accredited facilities meeting the physical security requirements in ICD 705, SCI Facilities and ICS 705, Technical Specifications for

Construction and Management of SCI Facilities

k. The NSWCDD SSO will recognize the above noted estimated completion date (ECD) as the completion date for the contract. The SSO will initiate action to debrief contractor personnel with access to this contract unless extensions or modifications to the contract are received by the SSO office no later than 30 days after the established completion date.

Navy DD Form 254 SCI Addendum August 18, 2017

l. The contractor is governed by ICD 704, ‘Personnel Security Standards and Procedures Governing

Eligibility for Access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) And Other Controlled

Access Program Information’ and may be supplemented by additional SSO Navy guidance.

Contractor personnel that are eligible for access to SCI or currently possess an SCI personnel security clearance with another non-DoD agency must have their SCI eligibility accepted and entered into JPAS by the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility (CAF) prior to having access to SCI information retained by NSWCDD, unescorted access to NSWCDD spaces, and receipt of an NSWCDD issued contractor badge. The Facility Security Officer (FSO) will identify, in writing, contractor personnel assigned to this contract by NAME, SSN, Date and Place of Birth, and provide this documentation to the COR identified. The COR will identify the SCI caveats for the contract and forward a copy of this documentation to the SSO for processing. This documentation will be marked and protected under the Privacy Act of 1974.

m. Electronic processing of SCI must be accomplished on equipment accredited in accordance with

DoDM 5105.21 Volumes 1- 3, ICD 503, Information Technology System Security Risk

Management, Certification and Accreditation, and the DoDIIS Joint Security Implementation

Guide (DJSIG), Appendix D.

n. SCI security management issues shall be directed to Sherrie Malaguti, NSWCDD ASSO, (540)653-2487.

o. In accordance with Director of National Intelligence Memorandum 5 May 2017, Access to North

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Information by Intelligence Community (IC) Personnel and

Naval Intelligence Security Policy Directive 17-008 Revision, Mandate for North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) Information by Intelligence Community (IC) Personnel, all DoN

Contractors with SCI access and access to JWICS or SIPRNet must be briefed into NATO Secret

Information.

**NOTE**: ADDITIONAL SECURITY GUIDANCE SPECIFIC TO THE SCI CONTRACT WILL BE

PROVIDED BY THE COR AND COMMAND SSO TO IDENTIFY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

GUIDES AND PROGRAM SPECIFIC SECURITY GUIDANCE THAT DEFINE TECHNICAL AND

SAFEGUARDING REQUIREMENTS IDENTIFIED IN THE SOW/PWS/SOO.

STATEMENT OF WORK

SECTION C – DESCRIPTION/SPECIFICATION/WORK STATEMENT

C.1 BACKGROUND

This Statement of Work (SOW) defines the requirements to supply novel and enhanced Iridium

Command, Control and Communications (C3) Services in support of research, development, test, and experimentation efforts that may be implemented for use in tactical, operational and strategic-level activities. This effort will include enhancements to the existing Asymmetric

Command and Control for Expeditionary Systems and Services (ACCESS) service, as well as new architectures, hybrid architectures, and new services. This effort will also include hardware and software integration with 9523, 9602, and 9603 modems as well as future Software Defined

Radios for services utilizing ACCESS, Iridium Short Burst Data (SBD), and Global Data

Broadcast (GDB), Certus, and other Iridium services.

C.2 SCOPE

The scope outlined in this contract includes tasking to: a) maintain the operations of the

Geographic Broadcast Controller (GBC) and Location Server (LS) located at the Iridium Test

Support Center (TSC), and virtual private network (VPN) to Dahlgren’s Operational Controller

(OC); b) maintain service availability of ACCESS, SBD, Certus, and other Iridium services utilized by the government team issuing this contract; c) develop and refine the Global Data

Broadcast (GDB) Service; d) assist in the future development of new handheld end user devices that operate the ACCESS system and replace the current Radio Only Charlie (ROC), and; e) assist in the development and integration of devices utilizing SBD and GDB enabled modems as well as software defined radios. As part of this effort, the Contractor shall evaluate the potential netted and/or broadcast communications architectures and shall recommend a course of action, which may include more than one architectural implementation, or the hybrid implementation(s) of multiple architectures. Among the improvements and enhancements that will be implemented under the ACCESS and SBD architectures are the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs): a) global range; b) increased capacity; c) improved service resilience to interference and jamming;

d) and awareness and mitigation of network contention or congestion. To design, build, and effectively test and evaluate the efficacy of these system enhancements, ongoing support for component-level and total system testing is required. Additionally, this contract also supports the identification, development, enhancement and implementation of other Iridium-based services, products, and architectures.

C.3 REQUIREMENTS

C.3.1 ACCESS - The Contractor shall provide support to complete tasks needed to meet the requirements leading towards a field usable or operational ready capability. These tasks shall include the following:

C.3.1.1 The Contractor shall continue the design and development of an operationally suitable

User Equipment (UE). Efforts include:

Improving the graphical user interface (GUI) for usability

Achieving ruggedization standards (e.g., applicable elements of MIL-STD 810 G)

Reducing the number of external antennas, increasing maintainability, and increasing the number of receivers from 2 to 3 (as per the recommendation from the relevant analysis of alternatives)

Range Extension Solution (Global Range allowing nets to be established worldwide)

Broadcast Voice

Broadcast Data

Broadcast Position Location Information (PLI)

Broadcast Commands (Ability to send command messages to listeners and receive automatic responses back to the talker)

Decentralized Net Management (Ability to manage [add/delete, enable/disable] nets, handsets and PLI from a location not at the gateway)

User Equipment Reference Design (Includes the design and testing of a transceiver

(TRX) and the design and development of an application board)

ACCESS Handset/Radio (Development, test and transition to manufacturing a ACCESS tactical radio/terminal for ACCESS service)

Real Time User Prioritization With the Space Vehicle (SV) (Ability to center on a user’s acquisition class for implementing a priority and preemption mechanism)

ACCESS Chat (Ability to deliver a real-time chat application among multiple users with improved reliability and user experience)

Managed Net (Ability to use coordinated access techniques to control transmit access to the satellite system)

C.3.1.2 The Contractor shall provide support to develop, integrate, test, and migrate ACCESS hardware (e.g., Geographic Broadcast Controller (GBC), Location Server (LS), and Operational

Controller (OC)) and associated software from the initial development stage to a high availability

(e.g., 99.999%) state in support of Experimentation and Demonstration enablement, field testing and evaluation, operational readiness reviews, and limited operational use cases.

C.3.1.3 The Contractor shall provide hardware integration support in the Government effort to build hardware interfacing with Iridium modems that provide ACCESS service to the end user.

C.3.1.4 The Contractor shall provide software integration support in the Government effort to build end user devices interfacing with Iridium modems that provide ACCESS service to the end user.

C.3.1.5 The Contractor shall provide support in regards to self-certifying and field testing

Government built hardware integrated with Iridium modems.

C.3.1.6 The Contractor shall provide support to review and update the existing System

Functional Specification with new functional revisions.

C.3.1.7 The Contractor shall provide support to review the current Interface Control Documents

(ICDs), complete the implementation of each existing element, specify elements marked with placeholders (e.g., “TBD”), add and implement any additional Government requested elements missing from the ICDs, and generate/implement new ICDs needed for existing and/or future

Government defined subsystems.

Existing ICD elements supporting the following are prioritized for implementation:

Long Application Messaging Service (AMS)

Over-the-Air (OTA) re-keying

Hot Nets, Warm Nets, and Cold Nets (to include Ad Hoc Nets and configurable Net

Persistence)

Managed Nets (to include Net Beacon, latency mitigations for multi-beam and multi-SV nets)

Paging

GBC Indications, including the following specific ICD elements:

o SV connection change indication o Feeder link usage indication o Access congestion indication Distributed Tactical Communications System

(DTCS) Broadcast Control Channel (DBCCH) o Replication conflict indication o Theater Net broadcast area change indication o Theater Net invalid UE indication UE access request indication o UE network attach expired indication o GBC to LS messaging (including Coverage Request, Coverage Response, Satellite Vehicle Latitude Longitude Altitude (SVLLA) request, and SVLLA response)

UE TRX and Application (APP) board control through the UE Peripheral interface

Major missing elements (to be supported through an existing or to-be-developed ICD) include but are not limited to:

OC ability to query Location Server (LS) solutions (past, present, and future—up to 48 hours in advance)

OC ability to query LS metadata (e.g., date/time of last ephemeris update; date/time of last restart; system loading—% RAM in use, % CPU in use; SV/Beam laydown table(s);

SV/Beam exclusion list; etc.)

Packet collision control and mitigation techniques and solutions (e.g., GBC multiple frame buffer)

Managed Net enablement/support through access to the transport and physical layer messaging protocol of the UE TRX through the UE Application Board and the UE

Peripheral Device interface including the following messages:

o Undirected Broadcast Max Uplink Power System Parameter Word o Directed Broadcast PuCH Location Burst o Uplink and Downlink Link Control Word data

Payload Type

Control Data

Congestion Indicator o Phase 2 type and Direct Access Tactical Net Request and Link Maintainer

Channel Assignment o Registration Attach Request o Net Access Request o System Information Frames of the DTCS Broadcast Control Channel (DBCCH) o Net Information Frames of the DBCCH o Handoff Candidate List Indication

Ability to control UE handset and receive status information through UE Peripheral interface (as an alternative to the UE GUI) including:

o Change primary and secondary nets o Receive listening status unsolicited o Receive transmitting status unsolicited o Receive signal strength unsolicited every 5 seconds o Receive DBCCH Status Indications (e.g., correlating to GUI Display “X”, “D”, “3” indications.

o Force registration o Accept external Global Position System (GPS) data o Receive radio firmware version o Use net flag Push-to-talk (PTT) for data operations o Boot while Springboard application is sending messages

Receipt of telemetry data at the OC including real-time noise measurements on a per

Iridium sub-band, SV, panel, and beam basis

C.3.1.8 The Contractor shall support the migration or duplication of the ACCESS subsystems

(hardware/software) from the Iridium Technical Support Center (TSC) Test Facility to more operationally-focused Iridium or Government facilities to include the Enhanced Mobile Satellite

Services (EMSS) Gateway in Hawaii.

C.3.1.9 The Contractor shall provide support to develop, test, integrate, and employ tools and applications for ACCESS Command and Control Monitoring (e.g., health, status, congestion, quality of service), System Management, Billing, Test & Performance Analysis, and

Troubleshooting.

C.3.1.10 The Contractor shall develop, implement, and test hardware and software systems to monitor ACCESS Gateway performance ensuring service reliability requirements are met.

C.3.1.11 The Contractor shall conduct modeling and simulation (M&S) as necessary to validate the ACCESS system architecture and associated performance metrics. The Contractor shall modify or update their existing modeling and simulation tools as necessary to be able to simulate

ACCESS service performance and impact on the system.

C.3.2 Short Burst Data (SBD) Service – SBD is a network transport capability for transmitting and receiving short data messages between equipment and centralized host computer systems.

The short data bursts are typically less than 2 kilobytes per transmission. The contractor shall provide support for the systems engineering process and design of the SBD Service. This support shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

C.3.2.1 The Contractor shall provide support for the development of enhanced SBD. Enhanced

SBD will allow for the encryption of the message header for all SBD messages.

C.3.2.2 The Contractor shall provide support for the development of the SBD Service

Architecture. Elements of the architecture include, but are not limited to Space Vehicles (SVs), Ground Nodes (Iridium Gateway elements and other control elements), and User Equipment.

C.3.2.3 The Contractor shall provide support for the development of a Technical

Implementation Plan. The plan shall, at a minimum, outline the approach to implementing the

SBD System Architecture and maintaining high quality of service (QoS) service in balance with other existing Iridium services

C.3.3 Global Data Broadcast (GDB) Service – GDB is a one-to-many global data broadcast service enabling enterprises to send data to an unlimited number of devices anywhere on Earth whether inside buildings, in-vehicles or aboard aircraft. GDB provides a practical, cost-effective option for transmitting data to a large number of remote devices across a country or continent.

The Contractor shall provide support for the systems engineering process and design of the GDB

Service. This support shall include, but not be limited to, the following:

C.3.3.1 The Contractor shall provide support to conduct analyses of alternatives (i.e., trade studies) needed for planning, designing, developing, and integrating GDB from the legacy satellite constellation and Iridium NEXT (CDRL A004).

C.3.3.2 The Contractor shall provide support for the development of the GDB Service

Architecture. Elements of the architecture include, but are not limited to Space Vehicles (SVs), Ground Nodes (Iridium Gateway elements and other control elements), and User Equipment.

C.3.3.3 The Contractor shall provide support for the development of a Technical

Implementation Plan. The plan shall, at a minimum, outline the approach to implementing the

GDB System Architecture and maintaining high quality of service (QoS) service in balance with other existing Iridium services (CDRL A004).

C.3.4 Iridium-based Services, Products, and Architectures – The Contractor shall support the identification, development, enhancement, and implementation of other Iridium-based services, products, and architectures that may be based upon existing Iridium services, or may

“spin-off” of efforts under development.

C.3.4.1 The Contractor shall provide support to conduct research and analyses for the planning, design, development, and integration of architectures, systems, products, and services with the objective of improving DoD command, control and communications (C3) capabilities in challenging environments and for diverse missions. This effort includes enhancing the existing

ACCESS, SBD, Certus, and GDB systems and services.

C.3.4.2 The Contractor shall provide support with the development of new services, products, and architectures to include hybrid combinations of ACCESS, SBD, Certus, and GDB.

Additionally, completely new services may include: position, navigation and timing (PNT) initiatives; “Iridium-as-sensor” initiatives, and other initiatives not yet formally identified. Such initiatives will augment and support C3 capabilities.

C.3.4.3 The Contractor shall support development, testing, training, experimentation, demonstrations, and other R&D activities and events by making available access to an operational Iridium constellation. This access to the constellation shall be at no fee for purposes of the aforementioned activities.

C.3.4.4 The Contractor shall provide support to plan and execute tests, exercises, and demonstrations of products, services, and architectures developed under the scope of this contract. These activities may be conducted CONUS or OCONUS.

C.3.4.5 The Contractor shall provide a report when the satellite system is compromised to inform the Government of when the system was compromised, for what period of time, in what areas, and what service(s) was compromised.

C.3.5 Iridium NEXT - The Contractor shall provide NSWCDD a technical understanding of the Iridium NEXT Satellite Network and Architecture via, but not limited to, access to existing documentation, new documentation, briefs, technical interchange meetings, subject matter experts, and scheduled Iridium events. This understanding shall describe the capabilities, requirements, specifications, services planned, and the implementation schedule of events. This shall include, at a minimum, the Initial Capabilities Document, Functional Capabilities

Document, System Functional Specification, System Requirements Specification, Monthly

Briefing Packages, responses to Government technical questions, or Industry equivalent documents. Additionally, the contractor shall provide access to and awareness of scheduled

NEXT events (briefings, technical reviews, etc.) and R&D, production, and integration facilities on a, at minimum, “not to interfere” basis to NEXT schedule or personnel except by explicit

Iridium arrangement.

C.3.5.1 The Contractor shall conduct an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) study to analyze the effects of and mitigation strategies to jamming and other common A2/AD techniques on

ACCESS and SBD services through Iridium NEXT in terms of, but not limited to, capacity, throughput, and robustness (CDRL A004). This analysis shall include system modeling and simulation cases, scenarios, and results. The study shall provide:

A direct comparison to the analysis and results previously completed for the Legacy

Constellation

Additional results for both NEXT and the Legacy constellation accounting for system dynamics (e.g. low earth orbit) and their effects on service in the face of A2/AD techniques.

C.3.6 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) – The Contractor shall provide support to develop, implement, test, and demonstrate security and resiliency enhancements needed to mitigate the effects of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats to Iridium (e.g., ACCESS, SBD, and GDB) and US Government systems as they support the enhancement of Low Probability of Detection

(PLD) and Low Probability of Interception (PLI) objectives. This shall include the following:

C.3.6.1 The Contractor shall provide support to develop and execute anti-jamming/anti-interference testing of the Iridium system. Such testing shall evaluate both the A2/AD effects due to jamming/interference as well as the effectiveness of implemented mitigation techniques.

C.3.6.2 The Contractor shall provide support to plan and execute exercises and demonstrations of ACCESS, SBD, and GDB.

C.3.6.3 The Contractor shall provide support to plan and conduct ACCESS, and Iridium Certus

UE installations aboard aircraft, ships, and other platforms in support of exercises, demonstrations, and system deployments. This support may include assisting the Government in obtaining the lease of aircraft, surface vessel, and/or ground vehicles for mission test and evaluation during flight operations using aircraft-supplied pods and GFE test equipment (to be decided by the Government).

C.3.6.4 The Contractor shall provide support to develop and implement near and long-term strategies, techniques, and solutions for detecting, locating, identifying, and mitigating congestion and contention (e.g., A2/AD effects due to interference/jamming) on both the Legacy and NEXT constellations. The Contractor shall identify and prioritize solutions that can be implemented without requiring SV modifications. The Contractor shall place an emphasis on solutions enabling multiple steps of the Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) Resolution Process.

C.3.6.5 The Contractor shall provide support to develop and implement solutions and techniques for detecting, locating, identifying, and mitigating A2/AD interference effects on

USG systems. The Contractor shall place an emphasis on solutions enabling the EMI Resolution

Process.

C.3.6.6 The Contractor shall provide modeling, simulation, and analysis support for paragraphs

C.3.6.1 – C.3.6.5.

C.3.7 Technical Support and Information – The Contractor shall provide technical support and information in the areas of:

System Engineering Trade Studies for new products, services, and architectures (CDRL

A004)

Modeling and Simulation (M&S) support in the development and evaluation of new and existing architectures

Testing and Analysis support for new and existing products, services, products, and architectures

Hardware and Software support for products and services that interface with all components of the Iridium system (space vehicles, ground nodes, platforms and user equipment).

C.3.7.1 The Contractor shall develop and support Payload Software for the Iridium Space

Vehicles (both legacy and NEXT), as required for an architecture, system, or service implementation.

C.3.7.2 The Contractor shall develop and support Ground Node Hardware and Software as may be required to execute signal processing, control and management by the Iridium network.

C.3.7.3 The Contractor shall develop and support Hardware and Software for User Equipment

(UEs) or Terminals to include…