Aerothermal_Analysis_Support_-_SOW_-_Copy_for_posting.docx

SLBM REENTRY BODY THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS

MATERIALS, STRUCTURES AND AEROTHERMAL ANALYSIS SUPPORT

STATEMENT OF WORK

1.0 BACKGROUND

The US Navy fields the Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) weapon system. Each missile of an SLBM carries a number of warheads. Each warhead is installed on a Reentry Body (RB), and each RB is protected through the atmospheric reentry process by a Thermal Protection System (TPS).

The SLBM program is managed by the Strategic Systems Programs (SSP) Office at the Washington Navy Yard. The Navy Reentry Systems Office (RSO) NSWCDD-A06 was established and retained by SSP as the Navy’s in-house subject matter experts (SME’s) with regard to RB TPS Materials and Structures, RB TPS Aerothermal Analysis, and RB Flight Mechanics.

In keeping these legacy systems operational, the Navy RSO is tasked with performing Aerothermal analyses of current systems, identifying replacements for obsolete TPS materials and structures, and performing Aerothermal, and other, materials/structures analyses of these replacements. This requires knowledge of the Aerothermal analyses and material & Structures development processes associated with design, fabrication, test, production and qualification of the legacy Mk.4 and Mk.5 systems. As the Navy goes about this process, it is helpful to have a knowledge of the trade-offs and what-ifs that were performed before/during the identification of the current SLBM RB TPS configuration.

As Navy RSO staff has retired and transferred to other organizations, the “corporate knowledge” relative to the development of the legacy Mk.4 and Mk.5 system, as well as knowledge of the full capabilities of the models and tools used in TPS Aerothermal Analysis, and the TPS Materials and Structures process, has become diminished. This has happened at the same time as a new cadre of engineers has joined the Navy RSO.

The intent of the activities described in this Statement of Work is to engage SLBM Reentry Body Thermal Protection System subject matter experts with knowledge and understanding of current deployed systems, legacy Aerothermal and other analysis codes, and legacy TPS materials/structures development, testing and certification. These subject matter experts will engage with current generation Navy RSO engineers and scientists so as to ensure knowledge transfer and development of SLBM RB TPS SME competency.

2.0 SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS (SMEs)

This work will require the consultancy services of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) in the field of US Navy SLBM Reentry Body Thermal Protection Systems – Aerothermal Analyses and Materials/Structure Support.

2.1 Materials & Structures Analysis SME

The work requires a technical specialist well versed in current generation Navy SLBM RB TPS. In addition, they should have materials and structures expertise as applied to the development and design of very high temperature thermal protection systems for advanced Navy reentry systems and the life extension of current Navy reentry systems. Experience working with Navy system contractors, material fabricators, material testers and ground test facilities is necessary. A minimum of 20 years’ experience with Navy Reentry Systems, the last five of which should be at the GS-15 level, or equivalent, is required with an advanced degree in mechanical or aerospace engineering.

2.2 Aerothermal Analyses SME

The work requires a technical specialist well versed in the areas of reentry body Aerothermal analysis of current generation Navy SLBM RB TPS. In addition, they should have expertise with thermal performance of advanced materials for current generation Navy SLBM RB TPS as applied to the development and design of advanced Navy reentry systems and the life extension of current Navy reentry systems. A minimum of 20 years’ experience with Navy Reentry Systems, the last five of which should be at the GS-15 level, or equivalent, is required with an advanced degree in mechanical or aerospace engineering.

The government will provide one (1) cubicle space and one (1) NSWCDD A06 RDT&E computer for use by the contractor in the execution of this SOW. NSWCDD A06 Cubicle space and computer will be located at the US Naval Observatory.

6.0 SECURITY

All Key Personnel associated with this contract will be required to have, at a minimum, a DoD “Secret” clearance at time of award. The contractor will have access to information and compartments with a “Secret” classification. All deliverables associated with this contract are “unclassified” unless otherwise specified. Access to classified spaces and material and generation of classified material shall be in accordance with the attached DD Form 254.

The contractor shall require access to Restricted Data, Critical Nuclear Weapon Design Information and Formerly Restricted Data in order to provide analytical support. Access to Foreign Government Information is required to obtain United Kingdom documents on specific weapon systems. For Official Use Only (FOUO) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) generated and/or provided under this contract shall be safeguarded and marked as specified in DoD 5400.7-R Chapters 3 and 4. All above accesses are needed to support and provide the engineering, technical and analytical support required in the analyses of Navy Reentry Bodies for NSWCDD.

6.1 Facility Clearance: The Contractor shall possess and maintain a SECRET facility clearance as verified within the Industrial Security Facility Database.

6.2 Physical Security: The Contractor shall be responsible for safeguarding all Government information or property provided for Contractor use. At the end of each work period, Government information, facilities, equipment and materials shall be secured as specified by the NISPOM and the NSWCDD Command Security Manual. SECRET storage is required at the contractor’s facility in order to meet requirements of receiving and generating classified material in accordance with this contract.

6.3 Electronic Spillages(ES): ES are unacceptable and pose a risk to national security. An electronic spillage is defined as classified data placed on an information system (IS), media or hardcopy document possessing insufficient security controls to protect the data at the required classification level, thus posing a risk to national security (e.g., sensitive compartmented information (SCI) onto collateral, Secret onto Unclassified, etc.). The contractor's performance as it relates to ES will be evaluated by the Government. ES reflects on the overall security posture of NSWCDD and a lack of attention to detail with regard to the handling of classified information of IS security discipline and will be reflected in the contractor's performance rating. In the event that a contractor is determined to be responsible for an ES, all direct and indirect costs incurred by the Government for ES remediation will be charged to the contractor.

6.4 ES Corrective Action: NSWCDD Security will continue to be responsible for the corrective action plan in accordance with the security guidance reflected on the DOD Contract Security Classification Specification - DD254. NSWCDD Security will identify the contractor facility and contract number associated with all electronic spillages during the investigation that involve contractor support. NSWCDD Security will notify the Contracts Division with the contractor facility name and contract number, incident specifics and associated costs for clean-up. The Contracting Officer will be responsible to work with the Contractor Facility to capture the costs incurred during the spillage clean up. The Contractor is also responsible for taking Information Security Awareness training annually, via their Facility Security Officer (FSO), as part of the mandatory training requirements. If a spillage occurs additional training will be required to prevent recurrence.

6.5 Portable Electronic Devices (PEDs: Non-government and/or personally owned portable electronic devices (PEDs) are prohibited in all NSWCDD buildings with the exception of personally owned cell phones which are authorized for use in spaces up to and including Controlled Access Areas. The Contractor shall ensure the onsite personnel remain compliant with this PED policy. NSWCDD instruction defines PEDs as the following: any electronic device designed to be easily transported, with the capability to store, record, receive or transmit text, images, video, or audio data in any format via any transmission medium. PED’s include, but are not limited to, pagers, laptops, radios, compact discs and cassette players/recorders. In addition, this includes removable storage media such as flash memory, memory sticks, multimedia cards and secure digital cards, micro-drive modules, ZIP drives, ZIP disks, CD-RWs, DVD-RWs, MP3 players, iPADs, digital picture frames, electronic book readers, kindle, nook, cameras, external hard dish drives, and floppy diskettes.

PED’s belonging to an external organization shall not be connected to NSWCDD networks or infrastructure without prior approval from the NSWCDD Information Assurance and Compliance Branch. This approval will be granted using the TARIS form and action tracker process.

Personally owned hardware or software shall not be connected or introduced to any NSWCDD hardware, network or information system infrastructure.

7.0 TRAVEL

The contractor will be required to travel in performance of this contract. The number of trips and types of personnel traveling shall be limited to the minimum required to accomplish work requirements and shall be coordinated with the technical point of contact. All travel shall be conducted in accordance with the Federal Travel Regulations (FTR). The contractor shall include all travel cost in their quote. Since this is a firm fixed price order, the contractor will be compensated for the travel cost provided in the quote.

The following travel is anticipated: two (2) local travel trips by one (1) person to NSWCDD, Dahlgren, VA throughout the period of performance.

8.0 TECHNICAL POINT OF CONTACT

To be provided at time of award.