Lesson Learned and Prop Stand TIM 6-13-25 R3.pdf

Lessons Learned and Gaps in Standards Related to Controlling Catastrophic Hazards for Human Spacecraft Propulsion Systems

6-13-2025

Presentation to Industry TIM

Eric Hurlbert / JSC EP4

John Albright / JSC EP4 Trivector

With inputs from the NASA propulsion community

Public Use Permitted 1

Public Release Statement

This document has been reviewed for Proprietary, SBU, and Export Control (ITAR/EAR) and has been determined to be non-sensitive. It has been released to the public via the NASA Scientific and Technical Information (STI) Process DAA# 20250004573.

Incorporate NASA’s Lesson Learned and Technical Bulletins

• Gathered inputs and review comments from many engineers at GRC, MSFC, JSC, etc over the last couple of years

• Read NASA STI Reports on Lessons Learned

• Public reports written by the responsible engineers across all centers and industry

• Includes AIAA, etc

• NASA Public Lessons Learned System inputs from all centers

• Public NESC Technical Bulletins and Reports

Public Use Permitted

Scope of Human Rated Spacecraft Propulsion Standard

• Address Existing and New Spacecraft Propellants

• Hydrazine

• Hypergolic Liquid Bipropellant (MMH/NTO)

• Gaseous Oxygen, Gaseous Methane , Gaseous Hydrogen ,

• Hydrogen Peroxide / Kerosene

• Cryogenics; such as Lox, LCH4, LH2

• Other propellants that are in work also have a path

• I.e., Green propellants

• New Capabilities or configurations

• Integrated High Thrust Liquid Abort systems and engines

• Pump-fed systems

• Exceptions to scope of document

• Does Not Include Electric Propulsion Thruster, however Xenon fluid system would be encompassed by requirements

• Does not include cryocooler requirements

JSC 67723 Human Rated Spacecraft Propulsion Standard

• Most of the JSC-67723 requirements are margins, inspections, fault detection capability, or test requirements that address a cause for catastrophic hazard

• The word “shall” is used as it is derived from the need to control catastrophic hazards

• In many cases we elevate guideline document that say “should” to “shall”

• The words “in best practice” or “should” may appear in the Guidance/Rationale

• “Shall”s are contained in the JSC-67723 document with the intent that this is a Type 2 document or requirement

• Type 2 = “shall” standard or requirement

• Type 3 = “reference or guideline”

• Tailoring

• Tailoring of this NASA Technical Standard for application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or project requirements and approved by the responsible Technical Authority in accordance with NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements.

• A Tailoring Matrix in Excel Format will be provided

• If document is levied as a Type 3, then “shalls” become “should in best practice”, except for those requirements specifically called out as Type 2 or in program requirement documents.

• Alternate Standard or Design Approach

• In some situations, an alternate or design approach may satisfy the intent of the JSC-67723 requirement for controlling the hazard

• JSC-67723 is not intended to eliminate design approaches that meet the intent

• Verification of the alternate requirement or design approach shall include test or inspection

• Industry Review

• This review process is intended to gather industry as well as additional NASA feedback

Purpose of the Industry TIM is to get some specific feedback on individual requirements

Conclusion

• Lesson Learned provide key rationale for the requirements

• Great Input from NESC TDT members

• NASA Lesson Learned database is a valuable tool

• Lesson Learned and experience reports by the engineers are critical

• NESC Technical Reports and Bulletins are a backbone to improvement to technical standards

• JSC 67723 identifies the existing standards that apply to human rated propulsion systems and more importantly provides clarification and gaps, based on lessons learned, that are needed to control catastrophic hazards

• Forward Plan

• Releasing document as a baseline that is publicly available

• Conducting an Industry TIM and gathering industry feedback will help strike an appropriate balance of competing cost/schedule/technical aspects without sacrificing safety

• Planning Update and release as a rev A in August timeframe

References

• (ref 3.1.9-1) page 2 in “Slosh Anomaly in Apollo Lunar Module Propellant Gage (Scholl, 1971), 19710028365.pdf

• (ref 3.1.9-2) Apollo 11 Mission Anomaly Report No. 3 Service Module Entry (McDivitt, 1970), ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/19710017109/downloads/19710017109.pdf

• (ref 3.1.12-1) Boeing CST-100 Starliner Pad Abort Test | NASA Image and Video Library

• (ref 3.1.14-1) Donald D. Arabian, J. E. Apollo 15 Main-Parachute Failure. Houston: NASA - JSC. (1973). Apollo 15 main-parachute failure - NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

• (ref-3.1.14-2) page 18 in KSC-2010-045R, Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20100042352

• (Ref 3.2.2-1) LLIS-1196 Test as You Fly, Fly as You Test, and Demonstrate Margin (1998) https://llis.nasa.gov/lesson/1196

• (Ref 3.2.5-1) SSC20210116_GR9312 | NASA Image and Video Library

• (Ref 3.2.5-2) page 2 Martinez, H. E. (2011). Lessons Learned from the Design, Certification, and Operation of the Space Shuttle Integrated Main Propulsion System (IMPS). Houston:

AIAA. https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20110013223/downloads/20110013223.pdf

• (Ref 3.3.5-2) AFRL-RZ-ED-TP-2008-184 Nitrous Oxide Explosive Hazards 14 December 2007

• (ref 3.3.6-1) page 25 in Hernandez, F. J. (2011). Selected Lessons Learned in Space Shuttle Orbiter Propulsion and Power Subsystems. Houston: NASA https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20110015485/downloads/20110015485.pdf

• (Ref 3.4.3-1) Page 27 Nufer, B. (2010). HYPERGOLIC PROPELLANTS: THE HANDLING HAZARDS AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM USE. KSC: NASA. KSC-2010-045R.pdf

• (ref 3.4.8-1) Mars Science Laboratory (MSL). Fabrication of Propulsion Tubing for the MSL Descent Stage https://llis.nasa.gov/lesson/14201

• (ref 3.5.1-1) Treatment of Transient Pressure Events in Space Flight Pressurized Systems - NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

• (ref 3.6.3) NESC Technical Bulletin 19-02, 90/95 POD Radiography Concern for COPVs and Metal Tank Welds.

• (Ref 3.6.6) Orbiter OMS and RCS technology (Boudreaux, 1983) (ref) Page 6 and 21. Shuttle OMS and RCS tank retention safety factors

• (Ref 3.7.1-1) ref page 2 Hurlbert, E. (1990). Methods used to investigate and resolve the Space Shuttle helium pressure regulator instability. AIAA 90-2749.

• (Ref 3.7.3) Guernsey, C. S., 2001, "Propulsion lessons learned from the loss of Mars Observer", https://hdl.handle.net/2014/36825, ['37th AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE Joint Propulsion Conference', 'Salt Lake City, UT, USA'], JPL Open Repository; 01-1441.pdf , Mars Observer spacecraft, reference (LLIS-485) Isolate the Propulsion Pressurization System from the Propellant Tanks (LLIS-485, 1996). See also Juno Spacecraft, (LLIS-28105) High Oxidizer Vapor Content May Cause Vapor Reaction in Bi-Propellant Systems. (LLIS-28105, 2017).

References

• (ref 3.8.3-1) page 25 in Hernandez, F. J. (2011). Selected Lessons Learned in Space Shuttle Orbiter Propulsion and Power Subsystems. Houston: NASA https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20110015485/downloads/20110015485.pdf

• (ref 3.8.4-2) page 11 Martinez, H. E. (2011). Lessons Learned from the Design, Certification, and Operation of the Space Shuttle Integrated Main Propulsion System (IMPS). Houston: AIAA.

https://ntrs.nasa.gov/api/citations/20110013223/downloads/20110013223.pdf

• (ref 3.9-1) page 3 and 7, NASA TN D-6740 Apollo Experience Report Lunar Module Reaction Control System. Vaughan, C. (1972). NASA-JSC. Houston: 19720014237.pdf

• (ref 3.10.2-1) Skylab Mission Report Second Visit (Kleinknecht, 1974, pp. 17-4 to 17-10),

• (ref 3.10.2-2). “Lessons Learned from 50+ Years in Human Spaceflight and Safety,” (Johnson, 2018, p. 7). and (Nufer, 2010, pp. 36-41)

• (Ref 3.11-1) NASA SVS | Robotic Refueling Mission

• (Ref 3.12-2) Shuttle filter study. Volume 1: Characterization and optimization of filtration devices - NASA Technical Reports Server (NTRS)

• (Ref 3.13-1) TB 23-01 Pyro Best Practices 031523.pdf

• (Ref 3.13-2) Page 8 . NASA-SPEC-5022, NASA Manufacturing and Test Requirements for Normally Closed Pyrovalves. 2021-07-16_nasa-spec-5022_w-change_2_revalidation_w-edit-admin_chgs_final.pdf

• (Ref 3.14-1) ref Hurlbert, E. (1990). Methods used to investigate and resolve the Space Shuttle helium pressure regulator instability. AIAA 90-2749. Page 30

• (Ref 3.15-1) page 1 “Study of propellant valve leakage in a vacuum Phase I report” Gift, 1966, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19660008733

• (Ref 3.15-2 NASA TN-7969; “APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT - GUIDANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: CSM SERVICE PROPULSION SYSTEM GIMBAL ACTUATORS” William A. McMahon. Lyndon B.

Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas 77058, July 1975, https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/19750017908

• (ref 3.16-1) Failure Investigation of an Intra-Manifold Explosion in a Horizontally-Mounted 870 lbf Reaction Control Thruster. Durning, J. G. (2011). Houston: NASA-JSC.

• (Ref 3.17-1) pp 312-321, NASA SP-4203, On the Shoulders of Titans: A History of Project Gemini. (Hacker, 1977, pp. 312-321)

• (Ref 3.18.2-1) page 10 JS-2018-009, NNJ13RA01B Lessons Learned from 50+ Years in Human Spaceflight and Safety. NASA JSC. Johnson, G. (2018).

• (Ref 3.18.2-2) page 11 KSC-2010-045R, Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20100042352

• (Ref 3.18.2-3) Page 16-17 at KSC, 42 at WSTF as referenced in KSC-2010-045R, Hypergolic Propellants: The Handling Hazards and Lessons Learned from Use (https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20100042352