JA_SSR_HCA__Redacted.pdf

Control No. 17-009

J&A Control No. 17-009

JUSTIFICATION REVIEW DOCUMENT

FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

System Support Representative (SSR) W9133L-11-C-0033

Authority: 10 U.S.C.2304(c)(1) Amount:

Prepared by: Name:

Title:

Email:

Contracting Officer: Name:

Title:

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Technical Representative: Name:

Title:

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Requirement Representative: Name:

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Reviews: I have reviewed the justification and find it adequate to support awarding the bridge contract under the sited authority for other than full and open competition.

Program Manager: Name:

Title:

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Legal Counsel: Name:

Title:

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Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting: Name:

Head of the Contracting Activity: Name:

1. Contracting Activity:

National Guard Bureau Operational Contracting Division 111 S. George Mason Drive Bldg. 2, 4th Floor Arlington, VA 22204-1373

2. Nature/Description of Action Being Approved: The System Support Representative (SSR) service contract is being extended for an additional nine (9) months to prevent a disruption in performance and allow for sufficient time to conduct a competitive acquisition for the follow-on contract. The extension is an out-of-scope modification to the contract required to continue uninterrupted performance, abating significant disruption of the Air National Guard (ANG) current flight and mission operations to include loss of information which equates to severe readiness degradation affecting real-world flight operations. Loss of information also affect fighter data link, threat warning awareness, crypto logical functions, mapping and imagery and other critical flight operations. This will be a Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract with a period of performance of 1 May 2017 through 31 January 2018. The estimated award date for the completed contract is 31 December 2017. The estimated cost to support the extension modification is and will be using Operational & Maintenance (O&M) funds.

3. Description of Services: Air National Guard A2/3/6 System Support Representative contract provides for the entire spectrum of mission planning support for the 98 Air Guard flying units.

The SSR contractor is responsible for maintaining mission planning software updates, threat warning updates, maintaining airspace and de-confliction data updates to include a myriad of other services vital to real-world and training missions. The contracted personnel are highly skilled in flight operations, mission planning and intelligence information systems. Current budget constraints are just one issue preventing the requiring activity from executing the full capability for combat effectiveness in today’s environment with the necessary supplemental contract service support. Some of the primary tasks of the SSR contract support are outlined below:

a. Plans, executes, and debriefs the full range of missions assigned to the ANG to include homeland defense, defense support to civilian authorities, deployed operations in support of Combatant Commanders requirements and local training.

b. Fulfills mission critical functions in tactics and scheduling shops at flying wings, ensures execution of over 800 missions and 900 flying hours/day at home stations and deployed locations.

c. Maintains complex and highly technical mission software and systems on modern combat aircraft and within the squadron operations facilities.

d. Provides vital mission planning support to 10 ANG Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) units and 11 ANG Distributed Common Ground System (DCGS) units providing 24/7/365 direct support to overseas contingency operations (OCO). In FY17, ANG RPA units are providing 23% of the Air Force’s total processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) capacity required by OSD to meet COCOM demand. SSRs at ANG RPA and DCGS sites maintain software keys to situational awareness and airspace visualization throughout the mission these units conduct.

e. Maintains ANG Patriot Excalibur (PEX) servers and software which provide training, scheduling, standardization and evaluation, and readiness reporting functionality. SSRs are responsible for PEX server updates/patches and software upgrades. PEX ensures instantaneous access to accurate Go/No-Go and readiness data.

f. Provides vital updates monthly to the Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) which is the database for the Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS), the mission planning software used by a majority of ANG assets. Without monthly updates to DAFIF, aircrews will not have access to critical airspace situational awareness, de-confliction and mission planning information.

4. Authority Cited: 10 United States Code 2304(c) (1) as implemented by FAR 6.302- 1(a)(2)(iii)(B), Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

5. Reason for Authority Cited: These services are currently in progress under contract W9133L- 11-C-0033 and will expire on 30 April 2017. The extension of nine (9) months would prevent disruption of performance and allow the Government to complete the competitive procurement process already in progress with projected award in first quarter fiscal year 2018. As set forth in the cited statutory exception to full and competition, the services are available only from the current contractor in this follow-on contract for the continued provision of highly specialized services. Award to any other source to fulfill this requirement would result in substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition.

Award to any other source would also result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements. As stated in detail below, only the current contractor will be able to fulfill the agency’s requirements without unacceptable delays—and resulting disruption—to ANG’s mission.

a. If the Government encounters a break in contracted services, this will absolutely translate into a disruption, and potentially a complete discontinuation, of critical flight operations and intelligence support. The Government does not have the ability to provide continuation of these services through the use of in-house military or civilian personnel. In other words, if contracted services stop, flight operations (both domestic and abroad) will cease. Additional details addressing the real-world impacts of a break in service are further described below. See paragraph 5.d.

b. The extension is absolutely critical to ensure the National Guard maintains critical SSR mission support execution while completing the follow on effort (currently underway) that promotes full and open competition and transparency. During the term of this contract, the National Guard has diligently worked to complete this entire requirement. Due to the highly technical, complex, and continuously changing nature of the requirement, the Government encountered multiple unexpected obstacles that slowed the follow-on acquisition process.

Specifically, during the development of the follow-on procurement products, additional time was required to develop a performance-based work statement with well-defined tasks and associated metrics that will facilitate improved contractor performance and associated Government oversight. Consequently, the follow-on procurement will not be ready for award prior to the expiration of the current contract as originally projected.

c. Failure to award this extension while the Government completes the competitive acquisition would result in a disruption of services, jeopardizing the NGB’s ability to execute its critical SSR support missions. This extension of services will allow a reasonable time to complete the follow-on competition and allow for 30 days transition time. An award to any contractor other than the incumbent would result in a break in service leading to complete mission failure, inability to maintain operational readiness as detailed in 5.d below, and substantial duplication of costs that are not expected to be recovered through competition if award is made to any contractor other than the incumbent contractor during this short duration while the Government finalizes the competitive acquisition. .

d. Real-world impacts of a break in service of the support services provided by the A3 SSR contract are catastrophic as these services are essential to the ability of the National Guard to protect our homeland, effectively support contingency operations, and avert loss of life, property, and maintain advantage over our adversaries. As stated above, SSR provides critical system and data services required at the vast majority of ANG wings for training and operational mission preparation, planning, and execution. The specific impacts are stated below:

i. Scope of Impact. This contract provides direct support to 103 total sites; 80 NGB/A2/3/6/10 sites (18 of these sites are roving, meaning covered by an SSR from another permanently based site) and 23 NGB A2 sites (3 roving sites). The roving sites can normally be serviced as infrequently as once a month by the SSR. The contract supports all weapons systems at each location to maintain complete mission readiness. Loss of the ability to train soldiers and airmen on current mission spectrum software would immediately result in mission degradation with high potential for eventual mission failure. A break in service alone will result in the inability to maintain weapon systems’ support systems and current level of operational readiness.

For example, map and target data will not be updated for missions resulting in the grounding of many weapon systems dependent on SSR and associated systems’ support. Failure in ANG flying units to utilize updated mission planning data and services can directly lead to mission failure. The ability to conduct tactical and operational mission planning will be severely hindered and safety of flight operations will be jeopardized since the most recent software data will be unavailable to weapon systems and mission planners.

ii. Current Overseas Contingencies Flight Operations. A break in service will negatively affect all 98 ANG units in the execution of over 800 missions executed on a daily basis, both real world and in the training environment. Therefore, this break in service will affect both readiness and combat capability immediately, the first day of the break in service. The ANG has units deployed currently, supporting real-world Component Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements that rely on SSR contractor support to accomplish the mission. Starting on 1 May 2017, imagine an A-10 conducting counter-ISIS operations that can no longer get into the fighter data-link, no longer has updated threat warning data, does not have updated airspace awareness, and does not have the correct crypto-logical keys to allow him to communicate securely with command and control. A break in service will render that A-10 combat ineffective and is only one example of the strategic impact of this contract.

iii. Aerospace Control Alert Operations (ACA). Air National Guard air defense operations will immediately cease, putting national security at risk. ANG units provide 15 of the 16 air defense sites throughout the country. For example, without the proper and updated Fighter Data Link crypto-logical keys uploaded into the mission planning system, ANG fighters that are launched from alert (“scrambled”) on air defense missions will not be able to join the Fighter Data Link, thus eliminating a critical enabler for command and control between National Command Authorities and Air National Guard Air Defense Control Officers on the ground and Air National Guard fighter pilots in the air to execute their missions and shoot down hostile targets. This is but one example of how air defense operations will be degraded. The ANG has many other alert missions for KC-135 air refueling tankers, rescue helicopters, and HC-130 aircraft, all of which rely on SSRs for mission critical support.

iv. Safety of Flight. Serious risk will be introduced to a high-percentage of flying missions because there are no equivalent unit-level trained personnel. This compromises safety of flight for both the aircrew and the aircraft, and exceeds the acceptable level of risk as defined in operational risk assessments.

v. Flying Training Equals Combat Capability. The ANG flying hour program consists of over 215,000 flying hours at a cost of over $1.5B annually. ANG mission failure will directly and immediately impact the U.S. Air Force’s (USAF) support to CCDR missions and negatively impact USAF readiness if ANG units cannot execute their training or operational missions. To put this in perspective, the ANG currently operates roughly 40 percent of the USAF’s fighter inventory, supports roughly 50% of the CCDR-required theatre security packages, and supports 95% of the aerospace control alert missions that support homeland defense, the SecDef’s number one priority. Every one of those fighter units will be negatively affected by a break in service.

vi. ISR Support. Additionally, failure to provide timely SSR services will impact the nation’s ability to respond to attack through vital Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities and the operational SSR requirements of ANG air defense units.

vii. Weaponeering and Minimizing Collateral Damage. A break in service to SSR support at ANG RPA and DCGS units could result in mission failure if the mission planning software at these locations is not accessible, either due to software malfunction or lack of required updates. In addition, these SSRs provide geospatial and weaponeering software support to six ANG targeting units. Accurate weaponeering is essential to minimizing collateral damage in the modern battlefield. Throughout FY17, the Air Force is providing Military Personnel Appropriation (MPA) resources to place Guardsmen at these six locations on Title 10 orders to meet CENTCOM’s counter-ISIS target production requirements for Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (OIR). A break in service to SSR support at ANG targeting units could result in degraded/delayed targeting solutions and bomb damage assessment being provided to OIR Coalition air forces.

viii. Training and Readiness Monitoring. For ANG RPA, DCGS and ACA units, access to Go/No-Go criteria is critical due to their 24/7/365 missions. A break in service could threaten access to that data due to a loss of PEX functionality. In November 2017, a new PEX version will be released with upgraded training and stan/eval functionality, as well as provide the ability for PEX to make direct data injects into the Air Force – Input Tool (AF-IT) Readiness reporting system and receive ancillary training data injects from the Air Force’s Advanced Distributed Learning Service (ADLS) system. Without SSR availability to load this new PEX version, ANG wings will not be able to take advantage of the enhancements the new software will provide.

ix. Geospatial Awareness Support. A break in service will eliminate the capability for every unit that uses Portable Flight Planning Software (PFPS), which is a majority of ANG units, to update critical DAFIF database information. This will result in map drive outages in PFPS and will prevent new imagery from being loaded for new requirements or evolving real- world emergencies or contingency operations. A break in service will mean that PFPS will not receive critical upgrades and repairs, rendering the critical mission planning software irrelevant and ineffective.

x. Impact to Total Force. The requirement for this flying program is vital to the ANG CONUS/OCONUS mission. A work stoppage will potentially ground a large portion of the ANG flying mission by rendering aircraft and mission planning tools unusable– mission failure – which could cost lives and result in wasted funding. This mission includes the MQ-1, MQ-9, KC-135, EC/HC/LC/MC-130, C-17, A-10, F-16, F-15, F-22, E-8 J-STARS and HH-60, DCGS, Intelligence, and Cyber units in addition to test and operations centers. If this contract is allowed to lapse, the cost and effort of requisite training and employment will be exponentially greater due to lack of corporate knowledge, as well as double the transition time for a new contractor.

xi. Homeland Defense and National Security. This requirement remains essential to CNGB’s overall mission readiness posture as well as Homeland Defense and National Security.

The training, support, and services provided by this contract are critical to the nation’s ability to employ its forces in response to attack, initial strike, terrorist actions, or in the course of preparatory training for the range of military operations.

e. As stated above, the nature of the work under this contract extension is unique, technically complex and requires highly specialized experience and skill sets on numerous specialized Air Force proprietary systems and applications. Further, the vendor must have in-depth knowledge and experience in managing, updating and troubleshooting the cross-level interfaces between these systems. The vendor must understand the complex functional (i.e. operational and tactical) inputs and outputs that are processed through these systems. All of this work requires a vendor who has this highly specialized experience and knowledge (much of which is Guard-centric), not only at an employee level, but also at an organizational/management/enterprise level to ensure contractor employees can manage the continuous changes and updates of the multiple systems.

Finally, the complexity and uniqueness of this requirement necessitates a deliberate and extensive transition approach. This transition has been accounted for in the forthcoming competitive solicitation. However, due to the complexity, uniqueness and continuously changing nature of the services, no vendor other than the incumbent can perform such a short-notice transition without resulting in dramatic learning curve and degradation to services which would jeopardize real-world missions.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition: The Government is currently conducting a competitive acquisition for the follow-on contract. The Government is contemplating a competitive small business set-aside based on research efforts accomplished for the follow-on contract. In concert with the actions described below (para. 7), the Government has been actively planning for competition, as shown by acquisition planning activities, and the preparation of Solicitation No.

W9133L-17-R-0007. The Government has posted a pre-solicitation notice, which included a draft Performance Work Statement. The Government expects and plans for the Solicitation to be published in the near proximate future.

7. Actions to Increase Competition: This non-competitive contract action is designed specifically to allow the Government the time to promote and provide for competition, and to provide the most advantageous contract for the government for the enduring, follow-on requirement. This non-competitive award would allow the Government to fulfill the competition mandates of CICA and the FAR. The Government is planning for the release of Solicitation No.

W9133L-17-R-0007 in the near proximate future and the Government expect that the contract competition (to include soliciting and receiving offers, evaluation activities, source selection activities, agency approvals, etc.) will nearly wholly coincide with the instant non-competitive contract action.

Further, to the Government has undertaken efforts to promote competition by seeking a robust competitive base for the re-compete, which included sources sought notice posted on 10 March 2016, an initial Industry Day on 10 November 2016, and a second Industry Day on 3 March 2017. Consequently, there is significant interest from the industrial base, to include multiple small business firms, , and these action described in this paragraph will hopefully have the effect of yielding a competitive pool of qualified offerors capable of performing SSR duties.

8. Market Research: Market Research efforts included a sources sought notice posted on 10 March 2016, an initial Industry Day 10 November 2016, and a second Industry Day on 3 March 2017. The research also entailed a review of the Active Air Force SSR program. The active Air Force has an “Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ)” contract referred to as Mission Planning Support Contract (MPSC) II. Prior to the current contract award, the ANG SSR program was supported by the MPSC I contract. Active Air Force is in the beginning stage for their new re-compete and offered the ANG a chance to be part of the new acquisition. The offer was declined because of the following:

i. Insufficient Scope to Meet ANG Requirements. There are a few factors in the scope of the Hill MPSC contract that make it unsuitable for the use by ANG warfighters. The Hill MPSC contract explicitly limits support to sustainment of infrastructure for Mission Planning Environments. The definition of mission planning spectrum on the Hill contract references activities related to the use of mission planning software and/or hardware only. The Hill SSR will only maintain the hardware and will not support the ANG on live mission deployments. The ANG requires full spectrum support in their mission planning and execution.

The ANG also requires support and flexibility for SSR deployments. The ANG has a very efficient and timely method of deploying SSRs through DoD Synchronized Pre-deployment & Operational Tracker (SPOT) program. The MPSC II contract requires the ANG to comply with AFMC, Hill Logistic Center, and Sustainment Wing processes of employment contract personnel. This cumbersome process often stops the SSRs from deploying and oftentimes will not meet the timeframes required for the mission deployment. SSR support for the crews' arrival at the deployed location is critical for the first few days of overseas operations. On the current ANG SSR contract, we have not missed a single deployment requirement for the supported warfighters.

Furthermore, the Hill MPSC II contract does not provide ancillary support.

ii. Minimal ANG Manpower. These efforts are executed in an Active Duty squadron by the captive fulltime manning the active duty enjoys. A typical ANG squadron only has 25% of its personnel in a fulltime status and cannot support the myriad of requirements. The ANG SSR contract is more comprehensive and requires a level of support that is outside the scope of the MPSC contract. Contractors are required to perform ANG SSR duties given that the ANG has 75% less personnel who can perform these highly technical duties compared to the active duty Air Force.

These extensive market research efforts have revealed that there are numerous firms that are qualified and experienced in performing the enduring requirement. However, the Government did not identify interested parties that possessed the experience, knowledge and capabilities necessary to overcome a potential extensive learning curve without a deliberate and lengthy transition process. In other words, the Government did not identify any firm that would be able to step in and perform this work with short notice without significant disruption of services and dramatic impact to mission success.

9. Interested Sources: Considering the approaching expiration of the current contract and the time it would require to source a new contractor, the Government has determined that there is not a viable source that could make a successful and seamless transition for this interim support effort.

10. Other Facts:

a. Procurement History: These services are currently being provided by HX5, LLC under contract W9133L-11-C-0033. The contracting office is currently preparing the pre-solicitation/award documents for the follow-on competitive procurement.

ii. This technical support contract has existed in various forms since 2002. The services provided have evolved to coincide with ANG SSR mission growth, and continues to change as ANG SSR missions evolve. Contract W9133L-11-C- 0033 was competitively awarded with a POP of 1 October 2011 – 30 April 2016. The award was protested and delayed the contract start until 1 May 2012 after the protest was resolved. The current contract, W9133L-11-C-0033, (POP 1 May 2012 through 30 April 2016 was competitively awarded to HX5, LLC. The last contract action for this requirement extended the contract by six (6) months under the “Only One Responsible Source” exception to competition found in FAR 6.302-1, and the current contract’s period of performance ends on 30 April 2017.

iii. NGB is currently in the process of re-procuring these services utilizing small business competition. However, because of the estimated size of the contract and refinement of the requirement, there is insufficient time to finalize the competitive acquisition and award a new contract by 30 April 2017.

b. Acquisition Data Availability: Technical data, a performance work statement, and performance metrics have been prepared, and are currently in the review and approval phases.

c. Subcontracting Competition: The new procurement will be small business set- aside.

It is conceivable that large business may be part of a small business proposal.

11. Technical Certification:

I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Date:

Name:

12. Requirements Certification:

I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

13. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination:

I hereby determine that the anticipated cost to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable based on comparison to previous and current contracts for similar requirements.

Additionally, certified cost or pricing data will be required for this action.

14. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Typed Name:

04/21/2017

04/21/2017

21 April 2017

Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC): Request for Approval to the Head of the Contracting Activity at National Guard Bureau.

Typed Name:

Approval

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve J&A Control No. 17-009 for the modification of the Air National Guard Bureau Systems Support Representative Contract on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant to the authority of 10 U.S.C.2304(c)(1) and FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii)(B), subject to availability of funds and provided that the services and property herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition.

Typed Name: Date: