JA Final signatures Redacted.pdf

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC SYSTEMS PROGRAMS

1250 10TH STREET SE, SUITE 3600

WASHINGTON NAVY YARD, DC 20374-5127

CLASS JUSTIFICATION AND APPROVAL (CJ&A)

J&A No. 20,017 Code: SPN306

FOR USE OF OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

1. Contracting Activity. Department of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs Office (SSP) located at the Washington Navy Yard, 1250 10th Street SE, Washington, D.C. 20374.

2. Description of the Action Being Approved. This CJ&A covers the following class of contract actions: The award on a sole source basis to Boeing of a Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF) and Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPIF) - Level of Effort (LOE) and Firm Fixed Price - Completion contract with a period of performance of one ( 1) year and one ( 1) year of option period and any contract modifications within the scope described below. The current estimated value of the action being approved is $59,900,000. Authority to act under this CJ&A expires on September 30, 2022.

3. Description of Supplies/Services. The procurement being approved is in support of the Strategic Systems Programs' Command-Wide Capability Sustainment and Improvement function for U.S. Navy TRIDENT II (D5) and Strategic Weapon Systems (SWS) programs and the United Kingdom Dreadnought programs. Specifically, the procurement will provide Systems Engineering and Training Support, Security Engineering, Independent System Safety and Surety Support, Trident Training to United Kingdom Royal Navy, Ship Submersible Guided Nuclear (SSGN) Support and Life Extension II (LE2) System Support. The anticipated period of performance is from 01 October 2020 through 30 September 2022 (inclusive of all option periods). The above-described contract will include a provision to increase the LOE portion by up to thirty percent (30.00%). The following table delineates the estimated contract value with appropriation type and inclusive of all option periods.

Estimated Dollar Value

Appropriations FY 2021 FY 2022 Total

OP,N $0 $0 $0

O&MN $26,800,000 $29,500,000 $56,300,000

US Total $26,800,000 $29,500,000 $56,300,000 UK Total* $1,500,000 $2,100,000 $3,600,000 Grand Total $28 300.000 $31 600.000 $59.900 000

*In accordance with 10 U.S. C 2304 (f)(2)(E), the United Kingdom FY 2018 POLARIS/TRIDENT II Procurement Memo, and the Jan 1986 UK Memo, identifies UK funding as non-appropriated and not requiring J&A approval.

4. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition. 10 U.S.C.

2304(c)(l). Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

5. Rationale Justifying Use of Cited Statutory Authority. The incumbent contractor, Boeing, is the only contractor that possesses the depth of experience, expertise and capability to perform the

J&A No. 20, 017 Code: SPN306 required efforts during the proposed period of performance. Performance under the proposed contract requires a source that possesses the following:

a. Extensive experience with and knowledge of:

(1) Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) weapon system design, including the missile and guidance flight systems, as well as the shipboard systems (Launcher, Navigation, Fire Control and Instrumentation);

(2) The evolutionary requirements of understanding of how welding currents flow through the submarine hull and the D5 Missile;

(3) The evolutionary requirements of understanding of how Electromagnetics Inte1ference (EMI) and RADHAZ expertise flow through the submarine hull and the D5 Missile;

(4) How nuclear materials affects the safety issues related to the Trident II Weapon System;

( 5) How to evaluate the entire SWS and its individual subsystems for Security Engineering threats;

(6) Adapting the United States training procedures for the United States Trident II Weapon System to United Kingdom Royal Navy submarine hulls and their weapon system;

(7) Integrating Conventional Weapon Systems (CWS) into retired Ballistic Missile Submarine hulls designed to cany the D5 Missile System;

(8) Lessons learned of developing the Trident II Weapon System during original development, which can be leveraged to promote success of the development of the LE2 system design and support;

(9) SSP's program management policies and procedures for the technical, programmatic and operational aspects of the TRIDENT II FBM Weapon Systems, the TRIDENT Submarine Program, as well as the management and structure of the other SSP support programs;

(10) Technical and operational issue tradeoffs to the degree necessary to support the requirements of SSP management;

(11) Surety policy, planning and guidance supporting evaluations for Nuclear Weapons Systems, Conventional Systems and Non-Nuclear Systems;

(12) TRIDENT missiles C4 and DS SWS program definition, design, production and deployed support; and

(13) System security engineering requirements (both DoD and program specific) and how they apply to the specific requirements of the FBM program and its associated highly sensitive information.

b. Subject-are expertise and capability, including:

(1) Expertise in strategic planning for long-term program goals, assessment methods to measure effectiveness of system wide operations, organizational theory as applied to large complex organizations, and approach to implementing change;

(2) Expertise in engineering technical management and business management as applied to major weapons systems, approaches for managing continuous improvement including leaning, six sigma and value stream mapping, and understanding of acquisition policy and processes within Department of Defense (DOD), Department of the Navy (DON), and SSP;

(3) Ability to support the ensuring of the safe conduct of industrial and fleet nuclear, non nuclear, and CWS and subsystem operations during design, development, production and fielding;

( 4) Senior analyst expertise related to nuclear materials effects and safety issues;

( 5) Expertise related to energetic materials effects and safety issues; and

(6) Ability to provide the required senior independent evaluation and review of software development practices.

c. Technical knowledge, including detailed knowledge relating to:

(1) Strategic Weapons Facilities (SWF) design and operations

(2) Fleet operations and support requirements;

(3) The SSP approach to such technical disciplines as configuration management, interface control, requirements flow-down and allocation, assessment and evaluation, testing, quality engineering, risk assessment, system safety, system security engineering, and other disciplines as captured in T-9001B;

(4) SSP's program management policies and procedures for the technical, programmatic, and operational aspects of the TRIDENT II FBM Weapon Systems and the TRIDENT Submarine Program, as well as the management and structure of the other SSP supp01i programs; and

(5) System safety reviews and surety policy, planning, and guidance supp01iing evaluations for Nuclear Weapons Systems, Conventional Systems, and Non-Nuclear Systems.

d. A deep understanding of and extensive experience with SSP, particularly with respect to its organizational strncture, business practices, policies, mission, and history, including:

(1) An understanding of how SSP has evolved into the current organizational structure;

(2) An understanding of how this strncture supports and affects the technical and business management approaches employed by SSP, the respective roles of the individual Technical Branches and the Technical Division;

(3) An understanding of and experience with the relative roles and interfaces of the Technical Division and the Plans and Programs Division;

( 4) An understanding of and experience with the management approach as embodied in SSP's Board of Directors (BOD);

(5) An understanding of the technical and operational issue tradeoffs to the degree necessary to support the requirements of SSP management;

(6) An understanding of the evolving missions of SSP, as SSP has taken on such nontraditional (non-SWS) functions as Nuclear Powered Crnise Missile Submarine (SSGN), altemative payloads integration, nuclear security, and Conventional Prompt Strike (CPS); and

(7) Established lines of communication with key technical staff and weapon system subsystem managers, as well as with the principal contractor organizations involved in issues concemed with and relevant to SSP's FBM program.

(8) As indicated in the following paragraphs, Boeing possesses a unique depth of experience, expertise and capability in all of the above required areas for this procurement:

(a) Boeing has been performing related tasks in support of SSP over 50 years. This procurement is a follow-on to contract N00030-19-C-0002, which was awarded to Boeing on a sole-source basis. Contract N00030-l 9-C-0002 was a follow-on to contract N00030-17-C-0002 and N00030-15-C-0002 which was also performed by Boeing.

(b) Boeing has unique technical expertise developed over 45 years of designing and developing high performance inertial navigation equipment that meets the TRIDENT SWS Navigation Subsystem accuracy and availability requirements. Inertial navigation equipment design and development involves specialized knowledge in stochastic processes, Kalman Filter algorithms, inertial sensor characterization and integration, and the hardware and software specific to the stable platform mechanizations required to achieve the unique strategic weapons requirements. These proven technical capabilities qualify Boeing as fully capable in providing SWS Navigation Subsystem Navigator.

( c) Boeing operates and maintains in house system and component test facilities, software development and test suites required to enable the Fleet to meet strategic operational requirements. Boeing provides on-site support of shipyard and forward site operations with an

J&A No. 20,017 uniquely experienced technical staff. This particular group of personnel is capable of developing, conducting and evaluating complex test procedures and results used for Boeing equipment installation testing on SSBNs. They have successively accomplished five DS Modernization installations up to date of this justification and have the specialized knowledge to commence with the four SSBN Modernization installations scheduled for this contract period.

(d) Boeing has extensive knowledge and expertise of the ESGN operational and interface requirements, Fleet operability issues, and the human factors, necessary to provide detailed engineering information to the SWS Navigation Subsystem Manager in order to allow for accurate and complete development of the Navigation Operating Procedures, Standard Maintenance Procedures, Technical Manuals, and all activities associated with Fleet personnel training. Boeing also has the unique knowledge and experience in complex navigation theory, SSBN operations and data analysis techniques in support of the Navigation Subsystem Manager in performance analysis and problem investigations related to inertial equipment.

( e) Boeing retains complete familiarity with the design, manufacturing, assembly skills and test requirements of the ESGN. Boeing has developed and implemented a series of exacting manufacturing processes with specialized tooling required to manufacture, overhaul, and refurbish inertial navigators. Boeing has the specialized experience and test equipment to repair inertial navigator components. Fleet Logistics support is maintained at a high level state of readiness by an experienced and dedicated group of engineers, logisticians and quality assurance personnel. Boeing developed qualified sources for all ESGN hardware including historical data on the capabilities of suppliers. Boeing is capable of meeting the requirements of the SSP T9001B Technical Program Management and Quality System Requirements for Navy SSP Acquisition.

(f) SSP estimates that the cost of moving the Boeing inertial equipment repair contract to an alternative vendor would incur costs of approximately $15 million dollars and take at least 3 years to complete. These costs are based on actual relocation efforts that began in 2009. In addition, it would require an extensive and costly period to become familiar with the technical details of the equipment and setup an infrastructure in both skilled personnel and facilities before work could be perfo1med. Even then, newly repaired product would require extensive at-sea test and evaluation before it could be reliably deployed as paii of the strategic weapon system. This estimate consists of developing duplicate facilities as well as education and training another workforce. Developing duplicate test facilities would include the following activities:

1- Development and delivery of special tooling and test equipment; qualifying of design, tooling, test equipment and production processes by the production of qualification models, test and examinations;

.f.· Preparation of detailed program plans to included production, maintenance, training, logistics, and support of TRIDENT II facilities;

J. Preparation of documentation for shipboard installation and test, and the operation, maintenance, and provisioning of the navigation subsystem;

J&A No. 20,017

(g) However, since a duplicate set of tactical navigation equipment with which to populate these new facilities does not exist; it would have to be produced. Transferring tactical equipment from one contractor to another would create an unacceptable period of non-support to the fleet for approximately 1-1. 5 years during the installation, grooming, testing, and recertification process. Therefore, new equipment would have to be produced. However, the sources for these equipment have been out-of-production for several years, and new source(s) would have to be established. Establishing these new sources would require significant start-up and qualification costs.

(h) A contract award with any other firm would result in duplicative costs for engineering and sustainment. Only Boeing has the engineering personnel with specific in-dvpth knowledge of the design requirements, concepts, operations, and maintenance of the inertial instrumentation used on TRIDENT II (D5) Navigation Subsystems and its relationship with both the other p01tions of the FBM Weapon System and to the SSBN ship systems. Their knowledge and expertise has been acquired over years of experience and continuing evolution of the Navigation Subsystem. For example, Boeing has supp01ted the SSBN Engineering Refueling Overhauls (ERO). Failure to meet ERO schedules would result in schedule and readiness impacts to the fleet and the additional costs to purchase spares and perfo1m repair during non ERO times. This slippage would require ships in the fleet to be out of services for extended, unscheduled time periods which would adversely impact fleet readiness. Educating and training another workforce is estimated to take a minimum of two years while impacting the ability of Boeing to support its cu.neut requirements.

(9) For reasons stated above, Strategic Systems Programs considers Boeing to be the only known somce available with the background of design, knowledge, and operational experience relative to the ine1tial instrumentation used on TRIDENT II (D5) Navigation Subsystems to provide the quality and timeliness of service needed without undue technical risk to the FBM Strategic Weapon System. No other source could provide these services within the lead time proposed for this procurement assuming that an alternative contractor capable of meeting this need was even available. In attempting to develop another source, the Government would encounter substantial duplication of cost that is not likely to be recovered through competition.

Procuring these services from an alternative source would present an unacceptable technical, schedule, and cost risk to the TRIDENT II (D5) Navigation Subsystem program.

6. Description of Efforts Made to Solicit Offers from as Many Offerors as Practicable. The Government issued a Sources Sought Notice number N00030-21-R-0002 to industry via the Government-wide Point of Entry (beta.sam.gov) on 16 January 2020 with a closing date of 30 January 2020. No sources responded to this notice with any capability statements meeting the requirements of the posted draft Statement of Work (SOW). Given the complexity of the efforts being procured, (i.e. specialized engineering supp01t of U.S. TRIDENT II weapon systems and research in the application of technologies to supp01t TRIDENT II (D5) Guidance and Reentry Systems, SSP's past experience procuring the same or similar efforts, and the extensive knowledge of SSP's technical personnel regarding all sources for the efforts, including commercial sources), market research was limited to a high level, inf01mal analysis by SSP technical personnel. Analysis included review of the Air Force facilities: Boeing, Newark Ohio;

Northrop, Hawthorne CA; BAE, Silver Springs MD and NASA, Houston TX. This examination emphasized the unique nature of the TRIDENT II (D5) missile subsystem, thus underscoring the reliance on our current source. Other strategic market research has been an ongoing effort by surveying inertial Navigation System technologies and systems. The SP24 engineers actively monitor relevant DoD activities in this area of precision navigation development. At this time, the strategic market research confirms that it is not practical, for the reasons discussed in paragraph 5 above, for any company other than Boeing to provide the required services and supplies in this contract given the complexity of the efforts being procured in this highly specialized and unique submerged inertial navigation subsystem requirements.

a. The conclusion derived from all market research is to continue with the current prime contractor. Change from the cunent one would result in programmatic impacts regardless of the new source selected.

b. The proposed contract was synopsized on the Beta.Sam.gov website on 16 January 2020 and no other companies expressed an interest in this requirement

7. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost. By using such tools as the SSP technical analysis, the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) audit and the use of past actuals where appropriate, the Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the Govenunent of the supplies/services covered by this CJ&A will be fair and reasonable.

8. Actions to Remove Barriers to Future Competition. Due to the substantial duplication of cost an unnecessary delay that would result from assigning this effort to a contractor other than Boeing, SSP does not have plans at this time to compete future contacts for the types of supplies/services covered by this document. However, if another potential source emerges, as discovered through the continual tactical and strategic market research processes, sources sought notices, and synopses, SSP will assess whether competition for future requirements is feasible.

CERTIFICATIONS AND APPROVAL

TECHNICAL/REQUIREMENTS CERTIFICATION

J&A No. 20,017 Code: SPN306

I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance which are included in this Justification and its supporting acquisition planning documents, except as noted herein are complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Technical Cognizance:

LEGAL SUFFICIENCY REVIEW

CONTRACTING OFFICER CERTIFICATION

Signature Name (Printed) Code Phone No. Date

Signature Name (Printed) Code Phone No. Date

HEAD OF THE CONTRACTING ACTIVITY

Code: SPN306

I certify that the facts and representations under my cognizance which are included in this justification and which form a basis for this justification are complete and accurate.

Date