JA BMC2 UCA_Redacted_VSS_Redacted 20261009.pdf

Department of the Air Force: Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition

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I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

24 September 201

21 September 201

24 September 2026

II

Date Technical and Requirements Personnel {RFO 6.104{b))

21 September 2026

II

I I ., -

I certify that the supporting data herein, which is my responsibility, is accurate and complete.

May2026

I. Agency and Contracting Activity (RFO 6.104-1(a)(1)):

Agency: Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC)

Contracting Activity: Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC/PZP), PAE C3BM/C3BYA

II. Nature and/or description of the action being approved (RFO 6.104-1(a)(2)):

This action is a sole-source contract this company ABCDEFGHIJ functioning as a follow-on to the research

& development Delivery Order issued against parent IDIQ contract This contract will provide continued fielding of the MR1-configured ABADS BMC2 systems.-is the original equipment manufacturer for the MR1 configuration, and the Government does not possess the technical data and license rights necessary for another contractor to timely perform the required sustainment.

This action formally defines, structures, and prices to ensure uninterrupted sustainment and product support of the capabilities successfully developed and fielded under the initial order. This phased structure provides the necessary contract runway to transition the program to a competitive acquisition utilizing a modular open systems architecture (MR2), currently being developed.

The proposed contract supports the Air Base Air Defense System for Missile Defense (ABADS MD) Middle Tier of Acquisition (MTA) program. This phase focuses exclusively on the sustainment, Configuration Management (CM), cybersecurity patching, and strategic re-purposing of USG equipment. To ensure robust financial management, execution oversight, and rigorous cost training, the scope will be distributed across--:H distinct CLINs. Work will be executed by installing 11111111:ommercially developed mission software onto government-provided/government-owned hardware and performing comprehensive secure enclave integration services.

To prevent a critical lapse in mission support, a UCA is required. On he Government �d a Not-to-Exceed (NTE) amount and a detailed spend plan to support the a-tioInrnes.onse, 111111111111tubmitted an initial spend plan estimating a �onthbase period cost of which serves as the basis for establishing the base period NTE pric�.The UCA w�e awarded atter the approval of this J&A. Terms, conditions, and pricing for the 111111115ubsequentllllllnonth option periods will be negotiated concurrently with the base period during the UCA definitization process. The total ln�ernment Cost Estimate (IGCE) value of this action, encompassing the base period andall-is

The action may use authorized contracting procedures, as applicable.

Ill. Description of supplies/services required to meet agency needs (RFO 6.104-1(a)(3)):

This acquisition provides critical sustainment and engineering services for the ABADS MD ecosystem and its core Battle Management Command & Control (BMC2) architecture. Furthermore, it provides 24/7 battle sight picture monitoring and airspace control across multiple combatant command Areas of Responsibility (AORs). T� Period of Performance (PoP) i-s consisting of-month base period and -monthoption periods to ensure uninterrupted mission continuity and operational flexibility. The contract will be funded with 3400 Operations and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations.

The contractor shall operate and maintain the primary ABADS Product Support Hub in

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Required services include providing immediate Help Desk support, hardware repairs, continuous Risk Management Framework (RMF) compliance engineering, software bug patching, and cybersecurity updates.

The contractor shall also deploy cleared Field Service Representatives (FSRs) to active operational sites globally to conduct on-site troubleshooting and system maintenance.

Additionally, the contractor shall provide comprehensive life cycle engineering and logistics support. This includes diagnosing, repairing, or replacing defective system components and hardware, as well as updating, maintaining, and distributing technical manuals, training curriculum, and system documentation.

Finally, the contractor shall integrate, sustain, and adapt the ABADS BMC2 software suite onto existing, modified, or re-purposed Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE). This includes configuring and optimizing the BMC2 software to run on mobile tactical nodes and centralized processing hardware.

IV. Statutory Authority Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition (RFO 6.104-1(a)(4)):

10 U.S.C.3204(a)(1), Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

V. Rationale for Use of Authority (RFO 6.104-1(a)(S)):

IAW RFO 6.103-1(c)(2) Company ABCDEFG is the only responsible source that can meet agency needs without a substantial duplication of cost and an unacceptable delay in fulfilling ABMS requirements. A sole-source

• ·tion is required because the US Government does not possess the appropriate rights to. proprietary command and control (C2) software. Further, it is the only contractor that fielded and

-rigorously tested and prepared its software for rapid fielding. The proprietary software includes:

This software serves as the foundational architecture for the actively fielded ABADS prototype system; therefore, -is the only source capable of sustaining this critical and highly effective capability in the timelin�d tomeet warfighter demands. Transitioning this short-term stop-gap requirement to another vendor would result in catastrophic schedule delays, unacceptable mission degradation, and substantial duplication of costs. Delay in meeting agency requirements.

Substantial Duplication of Costs

The US Government acquired the proprietary BMC2 software baseline (BC3 Ares, DTFS, MSCT, UCI Blaster) under the initial order with Restricted Data Rights. LM Aero, as the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) from the initial order, is the only source possessing the source code and data rights necessary to perform Cybersecurity patching and maintain the system's Authority to Operate (ATO).

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The system's active ATO will be in immediate jeopardy at any time should the Authorizing Official's (AO) office becomes aware that active OEM support has ceased. Thislack of active maintenance may result in the immediate issuance of a Denial of Authority to Operate (DATO), forcing the network administrators to terminate the system's network connection and halt critical theater operations.

The Government intends to salvage legacy TOC-L hardware slated for FY27 divestment by re-imaging it wit�BMC2 software. Contracting with a third-party vendor would require duplicating the initial development costs (re-creating the core logic of the BMC2 software), costing the Government tens of millions of dollars based on the initial development.

Unacceptable Delays

A transition to another vendor would require developing base software from scratch and integrating it with the BMC2 software developed under the initial order. Based on historical and market research data, this would take 24- 36 months. During this gap, the Government would suffer a critical lapse in service, immediately blinding active 24/7 monitoring sites protecting US forces, degrading the -andfailure to comply with Executive Order 14186 (Golden Dome for America) timelines.

Strategic National Security Alignment

ABADS MD is not a standard developmental program; it is a high-visibility,mission-criticalasset centrto:

Executive Order 14186 (Golden Dome for America - GOA): Serving as a primary pillar of the nation's highest-priority missile defense shield.

The 2026 National Defense Strategy (NOS): Directly addressing the Department of War's pacing threat in the lndo-Pacific.

Operating as the critical C2 node supporting PACAF. In May 2026, al ABADS C2 system was delivered and emplaced at the 36th Wing, --marking the first operational capability of its kind in the region. A� are slated for rapid emplacement to fill critical capability gaps and establish mandatory C2 redundancy within the AOR.

Unacceptable Operational Risks

a. Because ABADS is actively fielded to protect Department of the Air Force (OAF) assets and warfighters, the Government cannot accept a break-in-service period.

b. Negative operational impacts in realized delays to sustainment/deployment due to time required to compete and/or transition.

c. Mission Readiness: Immediate degradation of active, live air defense capabilities.

d. System Integration: Unacceptable delays to time-sensitive integration schedules.

e. Cybersecurity Interruption of critical security patching, triggering a crippling lapse in the system's ATO.

f. Fielding Schedule: significant delays to scheduled regional capability deployments, leaving US forces exposed.

A break in sustainment coverage would create unacceptable risk to continuity of operations and mission readiness.

Real-World Precedent: The Cost of Sustainment Disruption

The catastrophic risk of disrupting sustainment coverage is not theoretical; it is a proven, documented vulnerability. Recently, a temporary, administrative lapse in contractual coverage resulted in a 100% immediate loss of the C2 air picture for a forward-deployed PACAF Air Control Unit.

This minor contractual stop-work instantly translated into a total loss of airspace situational awareness, effectively

May 2026 Page 7 of 9 blinding the operational unit in a contested AOR. The severity of this outage was compounded by its timing, occurring di�uring a strategic theater assessment by the Direct Reporting Program Manager (0RPM) for-

Instead of validating the C2 capabilities foundational to the-the outage served as a critical failure event with visibility at the highest levels of DoW leadership.

In summary, utilizing a source other thanllllllllvouldresult in a substantial duplication of cost and unacceptable delays in meeting critical ABMS requirements.

Use of another source would result in substantial duplication of cost and unacceptable delay.

VI. Integrated Market Analysis and Efforts to Solicit Competition (RFO 6.104-1(a)(6), (8), and (10)):

Market Research

While industry interest exists, evaluation of other major portfolio contractors onfirms none possess the requisite OEM source code or data rights to LM's proprietary BMC2 software baseline or the requisite hardware infrastructure to support fielded warfighter systems on day one without significant transition time, re-creating base software with integration, and increased cost to the Government (See Attachment 1, RFI Response Analysis Matrix.})

This acquisition covers a critical 12-month period of performance designed to maintain continuous operations while a long-term competitive follow-on is finalized. Ten of the eleven RFI respondent-pt theincumbent) proposed transition, reverse-engineering, and modernization schedules ranging from months.

Because none of these ten alternative vendors possess the proprietary source code, data rights, major operational hardware solutions or active GFE testbeds, they cannot sustain the authorized system baseline, implement required cybersecurity patches (IAVAs), or resolve system failures on Day 1.•• ning this short-term effort to any of these vendors would guarantee an immediate break in service of onths, directly violating the Government's "Zero Break in Service" mandate, and jeopardizing the Authority to Operate (ATO).

Detailed Analysis of Vendor RFI Responses

1. [Incumbent]:�esigned, tested, and delivered the active ABADS BMC2 baseline. As the OEM, they hold full ownersh-h ource code and IP rights for the proprietary components (UCI Blaster, PIPES, and UCI Blaster Manager). is the only vendor that does not require a transition-in period, GFI transfers, or a reverse-engineering phase. They possess the active TOC-L testbeds and a fully staffed, cleared workforce maintaining the active ATO. They are technically prepared to perform all sustainment and modernization functions on Day 1.

2. Company ABFDEFG -proposed a highly advanced technical concept utilizing their commercial "Lattice" software platform to rebuild the proprietary Section 4.0 components clean-room from governm-ided Interface Control Documents (ICDs). While technically capable of open architecture integration, does not possess the proprietary OEM code. Rebuilding and accrediting the connectors would require a multi-month development and testing cycle, preventing them from supporting the legacy baseline on Day 1.

3. --proposed a parallel-path, phased modernization over 111,nonths, using Gitlab and Cameo for Model-Based Systems Engineering (MBSE). While SAIC has strong DAF C2 experience (CBC2, AOC Falconer), they require substantial GFI (UCI schemas, baseline configurations) and a transition period to capture incumbent knowledge and onboard cleared personnel. They cannot support the legacy proprietary baseline immediately.

4. -reposed a three-phase "Encapsulation,Shadow, Sever" modernization strategy o�onths, utilizing Apache NiFi. As the prime contractor for USAFE-AFAFRICA Point Defense capability, -has deep field-support expertise. However, they lack the proprietary source

May 2026 Page 8 of 9 code and would require a lengthy transition to wrap and replace legacy components, introducing immediate mission-continuityrisks.

5.

6. s the current performer for TOC-L MR2, giving them deep familiarity with the hardware baseline. They�osed aphased MOSA-aligned mm1ization over -months using mature COTS/GOTS tools. However,111111111:Joesnot possess the proprietary-ource code and requires a complete Bidders Library and a transition period to assume sustainment, making immediate execution impossible.

7. possesses over li'earsofOMS/UCI integration experience and serves as the UCI Schema Custodian. They proposed.cars, bridges, and translators or transitioning to a unified UCI v2.5.

Despite their deep standards expertise oes not have access to the proprietary code, requires a transition-in period for incumbent capture, and cannot support the existing baseline on Day 1.

7.-roposeda pha�ed month migration utilizing containerized microservices and a "black-box to open-box" reconstruction. as extensive air and missile defense systems engineering experience but requires a complete package o legacy repositories, build scripts, and a ramp-up period to capture incumbent staff, posing immediate day-one risks.

8. reposed a Modula�en Systems Approach (MOSA) "Strangler Fig" gradua rep acement strategy over onths. Although-has strong experience with RADSIL and the Ramstein ADOC, they require historical ticket logs, simulated target data, and third-party APls. They cannot support or patch the legacy proprietary software on Day 1.

9. reposed "Legion," an APl-first integration and orchestration platform, and their Expeditionary Command and Control Nodes (ECNs). Sourced as a non-traditional defense contractor, Picogrid focuses on open integration but requires a phased transition to replace legacy software. They lack the scale and clearance infrastructure for immediate global 24/7 sustainment of the proprietary baseline.

10. reposed thBlAiD-'SOAM" framework, a dual-track model separating sustainment from modernization over months. is a Woman-Owned Small Business with an Interim Secret Facility Clearance. They require a substant1a GFI package and cannot support the baseline or execute the proprietary sustainment functions without along transition.

11 -is a small business (HUBZone/SDB) with past performance in commercial facilities maintenance, basic IT service desk support, and local equipment calibration. They completely lack the technical capability, clearances, and domain expertise required for complex missile defense C2, UCI/OMS standards, or global 24/7 tactical air defense software sustainment.

12. An SBA-certified SDVOSB approved in June 2026 structured as a single-member LLC. While founder as Navy ISSO/ISSE experience, the newly formed entity lacks corporate technical depth, C2 software engineering resources, and active GFE testbeds. Their RFI response consisted entirely of generic cybersecurity boilerplate with no ABAD-specific technical analysis, indicating a complete lack of system-specific familiarity and presenting extreme execution and transition risks on

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Day 1.

No other source demonstrated possession of the rights, technical knowledge and immediate available sustainment capability necessary to meet the requirement.

Conclusion

Based on the market research and technical evaluation of the RFI responses, a sole source award to is the only option that satisfies the Government's requirement and assures support for the avoids violating-imelines,and minimizes vulnerabilities to vital national assets and deployed personnel by providing protection against pacing threats.

The recently experienced air picture outage incident serves as undeniable proof that the ABADS MD ecosystem cannot survive even a momentary break in sustainment. Attempting to transition this requirement to an unprepared third-party vendor will guarantee similar, but prolonged, total-system outages, resulting in an unacceptable and life-threatening loss of operational airspace awareness for the Joint Force.

-s currently performing all sustainment and engineering functions, possesses the necessary specialized equipment, hardware, and proprietary software data rights, and has the accredited infrastructure required to maintain the system's active ATO. All other eleven vendors are unprepared to fulfill the Government's critical needs on Day 1 due to their lack of proprietary data access, the absence of active testbeds, absence of active computing infrastructure geared to this capability, and their requirement for a •••lnonth transition and development period.

The Government's strategy to repurpose t�vestment hardware is not merely a technical upgrade; it is a highly efficient force multiplier. By utilizin�-to load the proprietary BMC2 software onto existing GFE, the Government instantly scales critical warfighter capabilities while acting as an exceptional steward of taxpayer dollars.

Awarding th-i onth effort to any other vendor would result in a substantial duplication of cost (exceeding tens of millions of dollars in infrastructure replication and reverse-engineering labor-cceptable, mission-threatening operational delays. Accordingly, the decision authority determines that is the only source capable of satisfying the Air Force's requirements for the ABADS BMC2 Product Support and Deployment contract, and this sole-source action is fully justified under RFO 6.103-1.

The Government evaluated responses through market research. Although interested sources demonstrated relevant capabilities, none demonstrated the proprietary technical rights, specialized knowledge, established sustainment environment and immediately available capability required to support existing system baseline without unacceptable delay or risk. Detailed market-research analysis is filed in the contract file.

VII. Determination of Fair and Reasonable Cost (RFO 6.104-1(a)(7)):

The Contracting Officer is responsible for evaluating, determining, and documenting the anticipated contract cost/price is fair and reasonable in accordance with RFO Subpart 15.4, Contract Pricing.

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VIII. Any Other Facts Supporting the Justification (RFO 6.104-1(a)(9)):

Prohibitive Schedule Impact & Joint Interoperability

The development of the current ABADS MD capability represents a highly complex, ont h engineering effort by LM Aero, validated through eight rigorous field test events and exhaustive integration laboratory cycles. Because the Government lacks the technical data rights to the underlying software baseline, onboarding an alternative vendor would mandate a complete restart of this multi-year developmental and testing lifecycle. This constitutes an unacceptable delay in fulfilling a critical agency requirement and national security architecture development.

Furthermore, over an intense eight-month period, -uccessfully engineered critical, bespoke integrations between ABADS MD and vital joint-force assets. A transition to a new vendor would immediately break these established links and force a totale re-engineering of the following joint interfaces:

everance of automated threat data sharing;

requires reverse-engmeermg propne ary trans a I0n protocols from scratch.

Loss of long-range early warning feeds into the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) C2 nodes.

Conclusion:

Creation of a joint-force "blind spot" ware re-integratioThe sheer technical density of the ABADS MD ecosystem constitutes an insurmountable barrier to entry. It is not merely impractical for another vendor to provide a timely solution; it is technically impossible within the mission window. Attempting to compete this requirement would guarantee a minimum ear capability gap, dismantle established joint sensor interoperability, and deliberately compromises the theater air defense posture while warfighters await a replacement system.

IX. Actions to Overcome Barriers to Competition (RFO 6.104-1(a)(11):

The current barrier to full and open competition is the continued fielding of the MR1-configured ABADS BMC2 systems. Because-s the original equipment manufacturer for the MR1 configuration, and the Government does not presently possess the technical data and license rights necessary for another contractor to timely perform the required sustainment-is theonly known responsible source capable of meeting the current requirement.

The Government's planned action to overcome this barrier is transition from the prototype MR1 configuration to the TOC-L MR2 solution. MR2 is currently undergoing initial testing and is projected for delivery by the end of the second quarter FY2027. Following delivery, MR2 will undergo regression operational and technical testing with ABADS, projected to conclude by the end of the third quarter of

FY2027.

MR2 is being developed using a ABCDEDGEGHJSHGFHGHHGJDJGHGKDKGJ , including Open Mission Systems (OMS) and Universal Command and Control Interface (UC) standards. This approach is intended to establish defined interfaces among system components and external data sources, reducing the Government's reliance on the proprietary interfaces and data-exchange methods associated with thelegacy MR1 configuration.The Deployed Digital Infrastructure (DOI) is a supporting element of the future MR2 architecture that enables the movement and management of required data within that architecture. DOI is not an alternative source for the current MR1 sustainment requirement; rather, it supports the future MR2 technical baseline to transition from the

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MR1 configuration.

Following successful MR2 delivery and testing, the ABADS MD PMO will define a follow-on sustainment requirement based on the MR2 technical baseline to support competition. The Government will then conduct market research and pursue full and open competition for the follow-on sustainment requirement. Based on current market research, transition to a competitively selected sustainment contractor is expected to require approximately onths after contractor selection.

Until the fully capable MR2 system and its supporting architecture are fielded, tested, and accepted, currently projected for the third or fourth quarter of FY 2027, and the Government completes a full and op�etition and subsequent transition to a follow-on sustainment contractor, continued reliance on -is necessary to ensure timely sustainment of fielded MR1-configured systems supporting avscfdeg and initiatives. The statutory authority is 10 U.S.C. § 3204(a)(1). The incumbent is the only known responsible source for the current system baseline.

The incumbent possesses necessary proprietary technical data, software rights, and specialized sustainment knowledge. The Government does not possess sufficient rights or data to transition the work immediately to another source. Another source would cause substantial duplication of cost and unacceptable delay. Market research found interested sources, but none could satisfy the immediate requirement without an unacceptable transition period. The Government has a future plan to reduce barriers and pursue competition after transition to a new technical baseline.