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ADVANCING REFORMS TO PROMOTE
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF
GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES
An Applied Political Economy Analysis (PEA)
May 2019
CONTRACT INFORMATION
This work is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development under contract number AID-OAA-I-14-00014/AID-OAA-TO-15- 00020 for the Biodiversity Results and Integrated Development Gains Enhanced (BRIDGE) Project.
BRIDGE is funded and managed by the USAID Bureau for Economic Growth, Education, and Environment, Office of Forestry and Biodiversity.
DISCLAIMER
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
RECOMMENDED CITATION
Stark, J., H.Z. Schuttenberg, M. Newton, S. Edminster, G. Asiedu. E. Ekekpi., and G.J. Torrens-Spence.
(2019). Advancing Reforms to Promote Sustainable Management of Ghana's Small Pelagic Fisheries.
Washington, D.C., USA: USAID. 57pp.
ON THE COVER
Ghanaian woman drying fish. Credit: Heidi Schuttenberg
USAID.GOV SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES | i
CONTENTS
ACRONYMS II
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1
BACKGROUND 1
KEY FINDINGS 3
KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 6
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 8
I. BACKGROUND 13
THE CRISIS OF GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES 13
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING BY INDUSTRIAL TRAWLERS 13
REVERSING THE DECLINE IN SMALL PELAGIC FISH STOCKS: REFORMING THE LEGAL
AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 17
UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE 18
II. METHODOLOGY 20
PROCESS AND ROLES 20
IDENTIFYING QUESTIONS 20
FIELD WORK 21
ANALYSIS 21
III. FINDINGS 22
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35
THE DYNAMICS OF REFORM 35
RECOMMENDATIONS 37
ANNEX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 43
ANNEX II: LITERATURE REVIEW 44
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55
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ACRONYMS
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
BRIDGE Biodiversity Results and Integrated Development Gains Enhanced
CDD Center for Democratic Development
CEWEFIA Central and Western Fishmongers Improvement Association
CLO Community Liaison Officer
CSO Civil Society Organization
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility
DAA Development Action Association
EU European Union
F2F Fisher-to-Fisher Consultative Dialogue
FDF Fisheries Development Fund
FPSO Floating Production Storage and Offloading Platform
GBV Gender-Based Violence
GIFA Ghana Inshore Fisheries Association
GITA Ghana Industrial Trawlers Association
GNCFC Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council
IGF Internally Generated Funds
IUU Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing
MCS Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance Division
MOFAD Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development
MMDA Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Assemblies
MMDCE Metropolitan, Municipal, and District Chief Executives
MP Member of Parliament
NAFPTA National Fish Processors and Traders Association
NDC National Democratic Congress
NFMP National Fisheries Management Plan
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
NPA National Petroleum Authority
NPP New Patriotic Party
NPS National Pre-mix Secretariat
PEA Political Economy Analysis
SFMP Sustainable Fisheries Management Project
STWG Scientific and Technical Working Group
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VSLA Village Savings and Loan Association
WARFP West Africa Regional Fisheries Program
USAID.GOV SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT OF GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES | 1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ghana is facing a crisis of sustainability in its small pelagic fisheries that threatens the food security and livelihoods of a large segment of the population. While the technical solutions to the problems in these fisheries have been known for some time, the necessary actions have not been implemented. To understand this persistent gap between the presence of solutions on paper and the absence of action in practice, USAID implemented this Applied Political Economy Analysis (PEA). The goal of the PEA is to provide a deeper understanding of the political, economic, and social factors driving the behavior of key actors in the fisheries sector to inform future USAID programming decisions.
BACKGROUND
GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERY—A VALUABLE RESOURCE AT RISK
In Ghana, fisheries are both a way of life and pillar of economic and food security. Fish provide around 60 percent of animal protein in the Ghanaian diet, making Ghana the country most reliant upon fish for nutrition in Africa. They also contribute, directly and indirectly, to livelihoods for nearly 3 million people, or around 10 percent of the nation’s population.
There are three main categories of fishing in Ghana—artisanal/small-scale, semi-industrial/inshore, and industrial trawlers. Over 80 percent of Ghana’s fishers are in the artisanal/small-scale canoe fleet, which targets small pelagic fish. Small pelagics are the sardinella, mackerel, and anchovies that inhabit the mid-water column and are the most important fishery for food security.
In principle, the artisanal fishery should not conflict with the industrial trawlers, which are largely owned and operated by Chinese companies, and licensed under shell companies run by Ghanaian owners.
Interviews and published reports indicate that these politically influential Ghanaian owners benefit financially from their sponsorship of the Chinese trawlers. Industrial trawlers are primarily licensed to target demersal fish, which live near the sea floor beyond the range of most artisanal canoes; however, growing evidence suggests that industrial trawlers are intentionally deploying their gear illegally and using illegal types of gear to target small pelagic fish. The catch is flash frozen and illegally transferred to specially designed canoes that bring the fish to shore for marketing. This illegal catch and transshipment, known as saiko, is perceived to be a significant threat to the artisanal fishery and is a symbol of unfair and unmanaged fishing practices that are driving an escalation in fishing effort—both legal and illegal—in a race to catch increasingly scarce fish.
Landings of small pelagic stocks are currently estimated at just 14 percent of highest recorded levels and are dangerously close to the 10 percent threshold that is scientifically considered to signal a collapsed fishery. While the conflict between impoverished small-scale fishers and industrial trawlers is a current flashpoint in fisheries management, the decline in small pelagic fish stocks has its roots in larger structural problems. The number of small-scale fishing canoes has grown to an unsustainable level and proposed limits to the number of trawlers have not been implemented. Rather than implementing strategies that would ensure sustainable stocks for the long term, the government has favored policies that drive overfishing by subsidizing fuel and motors and extending tax-free treatment to imported fishing inputs such as nets, ropes, and cork floats. At the same time, illegal practices have become
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commonplace among all fishing sectors, with limited law enforcement efforts by either formal or traditional authorities.
SOLUTIONS KNOWN, BUT NOT IMPLEMENTED
The technical solutions for reducing fishing capacity and effort in Ghana are understood and broadly articulated in the National Fisheries Management Plan 2015-2019 and the proposed Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management. Little action, however, has been taken to implement the vision outlined in these policy documents. In the meantime, over-exploitation of Ghana’s small pelagic stocks has only worsened as the scientific evidence documenting this decline has continued to strengthen. This PEA examines the reasons for inaction and the political, economic, and social opportunities for engagement that could catalyze change.
Many of the obstacles to successful fishery reforms are a reflection of the constraints produced by the Ghanaian political system. Ghana’s two leading political parties—the New Patriotic Party (NPP) and the National Democratic Congress (NDC)—have followed similar patterns of political patronage for more than two decades, including the use of subsidies, discretionary regulatory enforcement, and privileged access to jobs. The coastal region of Ghana, sometimes referred to as the “Florida of Ghana” because of its closely contested electoral results, has significant populations of fisherfolk who benefit from these preferential policies. Politicians of both parties are reluctant to alienate these swing voters. The concentration of political power in the executive branch further reinforces this patronage system. All District Chief Executives (the equivalent of mayors) and one third of District Assembly members are appointed by the President. The behavior of elected representatives and government officials, including the decision-makers responsible for the management of Ghana’s fisheries, is strongly conditioned by these political realities.
METHODOLOGY
The PEA was recommended by a “pause and reflect” exercise with USAID’s ongoing Sustainable Fisheries Management Project (SFMP). This collaborative review of the program’s context and theory of change identified key questions about threats to Ghana’s artisanal fisheries and the social, political, and economic barriers to achieving needed reforms in fisheries management. With support from USAID’s BRIDGE program, an interdisciplinary team was assembled from USAID/Washington DC and USAID/Ghana and a literature review of the sector was prepared based on scholarly research, governmental and nongovernmental reports, and media sources, framed within USAID’s Applied PEA analytic categories. Over a three-month period, the team held regular teleconferences to focus the PEA, prioritize research questions, identify key stakeholders, and craft tailored sets of interview questions. In November 2018, team members split into two groups and conducted over 40 interviews and focus groups in Accra and Ghana’s four coastal regions. While in the field, the PEA team conducted a preliminary analysis of the interviews, distilling the key findings and initial recommendations for future programming. These initial conclusions were further refined through supplemental research and input from an expert PEA consultant and iterative review by key partners.
https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/Applied%20PEA%20Field%20Guide%20and%20Framework%20Working%20Document%20041516.pdf
KEY FINDINGS
1. BRIGHT SPOTS
The recently declared closed season for 2019 is a tangible first step recognizing the urgent need to address dwindling small pelagic stocks.
Across the coastal areas, good progress has been made in registering and embossing canoes. This advances the goal of registering the entire canoe fleet in order to cap their numbers and establish a moratorium on new entrants in the canoe fishery.
There are new possibilities for key stakeholder dialogue that converge with a critical window of opportunity to incorporate the input of fisher associations and resource users in the proposed Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management and amendments to the 2002 Fisheries Act.
In coastal communities, there is increasingly an appreciation that small pelagic fisheries have declined significantly and the situation must change. This understanding is bolstered by a practical synthesis of the science in the work of the Scientific and Technical Working Group (STWG) at the Fisheries Commission and university-based research, which provide an improved scientific basis for estimating current small pelagic stocks and explaining the benefits of different management measures, including implementing a closed season during the time that small pelagic species spawn.
Key informants from all four coastal regions agreed that—despite some remaining weaknesses—civil society organizations and associations of fishers and fish processors are becoming increasingly effective.
Many interviewees attested to the importance and effectiveness of USAID’s efforts to train, build capacity, and foster dialogue with women’s organizations, fisher associations, civil society, industry groups, and the Fisheries Commission.
2. REGULATORY CAPTURE AND SAIKO
According to multiple key informants, front companies for Chinese-operated industrial trawlers are owned by politically influential, yet unnamed, Ghanaians, whose interventions with legal and regulatory authorities allow industrial trawlers to engage in transshipment of saiko and other forms of IUU fishing.
These instances of political interference reflect situations in which MOFAD and the Fisheries Commission are vulnerable to regulatory capture.
While Ghanaian companies are the owners of these vessels on paper, Chinese companies are the de facto “beneficial owners.” The behavior of Chinese trawler operators indicates they are not concerned about the potential collapse of Ghana’s fisheries. The economic gains realized by industrial trawlers in Ghana accrue overwhelmingly to the Chinese beneficial owners and to the small number of Ghanaian owners who file for the licenses, with few benefits to the general Ghanaian population or the majority of fishers.
Reports of absent law enforcement and the appearance of regulatory capture have damaged the credibility of MOFAD and the Fisheries Commission, often undermining public confidence. Perceptions of injustice among artisanal fisherfolk in relation to both the illegal practices of Chinese trawlers and the
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failure of the government to respond to them with legal sanctions create a flashpoint that hampers efforts to reach broader agreements on key fisheries management issues.
3. THE ARTISANAL SECTOR IN DECLINE
Artisanal fishing communities are experiencing livelihood insecurity and dysfunction in the relationships among formal and informal authorities with responsibilities for fisheries management. Fisherfolk at many of the landing beaches visited said that it has become much harder to catch fish, incomes are down, and operating expenses cause some fishers to go into debt. Illegal fishing practices are driven both by declining small pelagic fish stocks and a belief that the government’s enforcement of laws against IUU fishing is unjust and selective, especially in view of the non-enforcement of the ban on saiko.
The Marine Police note they have very limited resources to enforce the laws relative to the more than 300 landing beaches along the coast, making it difficult to apply the fisheries regulations in a way that is visible, uniform, and even-handed. Chief fishermen also encounter resistance and resentment when they try to apprehend artisanal fishers in violation of the law.
In most communities, the paramount chief and traditional authorities are respected figures with the potential to play a stronger role in fisheries management, but interviews found them to have generally weak engagement. In some communities, there was conflict between the chief fisherman and the chiefs.
Chief fishermen also are sometimes viewed by discontented fishers as complicit if they work with government and law enforcement officials and, in some cases, chief fishermen have been implicated themselves in illegal fishing.
Despite the formal expectation that district assemblies should enact by-laws to support sound fisheries management, there is little evidence of local government engagement in securing the fishing livelihoods of their constituents. District assembly members are often unengaged unless they perceive a tangible benefit. For example, in some communities, fisherfolk said the profits from subsidized pre-mix fuel was placed under the control of the district assembly chief executive.
While these problems of local governance vary among the fishing communities, what they have in common is a demonstrated need for strengthened fisheries co-management arrangements based on greater transparency and accountability, with arrangements that are tailored to regional differences.
4. WOMEN’S VOICES AND FAMILY RESILIENCE
Women are at the heart of fishery value chains and fishing communities, but despite this central role in the sector, their voice and organizational representation is only just beginning to realize its potential.
Effectively engaging women in fishery management is essential for achieving successful reforms and necessary to guard against negative impacts on fishing families and increases in gender-based violence
(GBV).
In Ghana, women play key roles in processing and trading small pelagics and they are sometimes financiers of men’s fishing trips. Women also directly harvest oysters, as in the Densu estuary where they have demonstrated best practices in fisheries co-management as part of SFMP. Both the long-term health of fisheries and proposed fishery reforms will directly affect the livelihoods of women working in fisheries, with ripple effects on families since women’s income often supports school fees and health expenses. Interviews suggested that the current declines in fish catch result in rising tensions and GBV in some families.
Given that the health and management of small pelagic fisheries directly affect the lives of women in fishing villages, women have clear interests that warrant a key role in fishery management discussions.
Currently, their influence appears to vary across communities. Interviews indicated that the interests of women are often weakly represented at the community level in landing beach committees and local government. However, relatively new organizations have been created to address the needs of women fish processors and traders and have provided gradually improving, but uneven, representation of women’s interests. With their relative strengths and weaknesses, the Central and Western Fishmongers Improvement Association (CEWEFIA), the Development Action Association (DAA), and the National Fish Processors and Traders Association (NAFPTA) need to work in complementary fashion if women’s interests are to gain greater visibility and produce concrete results. Increasing the collective participation of women would produce a strong multiplier effect on coalition-building in support of fisheries reforms.
Increasing women’s participation would also enable another lever for catalyzing changes in fishing behavior—the influence of purchasing power and market leverage to create incentives for making legal and sustainable catches the preferred standard for seafood products.
5. MINISTRY OF FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE DEVELOPMENT (MOFAD)
The MOFAD annual budget, currently $11.85 million, is low in relation to the sector’s contributions to employment and food security as well as its regulatory and law enforcement obligations. Ghana’s small-scale fisheries contribute an estimated $340 million in annual revenues or around 3 percent of GDP.
This low funding level appears to reflect a lower prioritization of fisheries compared with other sectors and ministries. It also seems to result from an inability within the Ministry to adequately itemize and explain its budget, weakening parliamentary support for its budget requests and activities. Within MOFAD, despite the critical need for improved enforcement, the current budget allocation for the Monitoring, Control, and Surveillance (MCS) Division is just 5 percent of MOFAD’s annual budget.
These budgetary inadequacies can be viewed in juxtaposition to the budget allocation for the pre-mix fuel subsidy, which is nearly four times MOFAD’s budget, demonstrating the government’s disproportionate investment in fishery inputs over sustainable fisheries management.
Beyond the inadequacies and inefficiencies in MOFAD’s budget, a number of interviewees also said that the current culture at the Ministry and Fisheries Commission discourages ethical behavior and initiative and limits open discussion with staff. The failure to benefit from the contributions of qualified professional staff undermines the ability of the Fisheries Commission to fulfill its mission.
The Fisheries Commission has poor relationships with many local communities, a problem acknowledged by leadership at the Fisheries Commission itself. Dealings with artisanal fisher groups are considered to be sometimes prickly and difficult, and both sides acknowledge that in many areas there is little public trust in the Fisheries Commission’s capacity to reliably carry out its mandate. On some issues, the Fisheries Commission has worked well locally with civil society organizations, but the Fisheries Commission needs a stronger regional and local presence, especially as it pertains to the Fisheries Enforcement Unit.
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6. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT
The management of Ghana’s fisheries is subject to the effects of the country’s party politics and patronage. The most frequent example, mentioned by many interviewees, is the case of pre-mix funds, which are said to be party-controlled resources used by both parties for political patronage and personal profit.
Fishing licensing fees and fines are placed in the Fisheries Development Fund (FDF), but fines are far below the amounts prescribed by law because of the non-transparent nature of the Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) used to expedite court cases involving heavy fines against trawler companies. These cases are commonly subject to political interference, followed by the reduction (or ultimate non-payment) of fines. The amounts and use of the Fisheries Development Fund itself are opaque.
The Fisheries Commission Board is an interagency body representing all sectors, with two seats on the board reserved for the fishing industry, one for industrial interests and one for artisanal fisherfolk.
Leaders from the artisanal sector said, however, that without consultation MOFAD appointed a person unknown to them as the representative of the artisanal sector.
7. CONFLICT BETWEEN FISHERIES AND OIL AND GAS
Fishers are of the view that developments in the oil and gas sector have resulted in the depletion of fish stocks and note the many oil supply vessels in the area of Sekondi. The areas around oil rigs are subject to 500-meter exclusion zones, but the lights of oil rigs attract fish, which the fishermen sometimes follow into the exclusion zones.
Oil spills have raised community concerns over impacts on water, health, infrastructure, and fish populations. The chiefs of the Western Region have advocated that 10 percent of oil revenues be allocated for the development of infrastructure and livelihood opportunities in the region.
Oil and gas companies have tried to set up offices with Community Liaison Officers in the six coastal districts of the Western Region, but according to nongovernmental researchers it is still difficult for the public to access information. Oil and gas companies have started to engage communities directly in consultations on the implementation of corporate social responsibility projects. However, some projects are implemented without any consultative process, and communities often lack the funds or expertise to engage in the consultation processes.
Local authorities are not powerful enough to resolve oil and gas conflicts, and the central government is often not inclined to engage on them. Fisher associations are relatively well organized and often have informal means of engaging in direct negotiations with the oil and gas companies. Interviewees said, however, that both public sector and private sector engagement on conflicts between artisanal fishers and the oil and gas sector have been relatively ineffective and require clearer and better-defined mandates.
KEY CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The reforms needed to reverse the decline in Ghana’s small pelagic fisheries are contingent on the interactions of a diverse array of forces and stakeholders. Fundamental problems of flawed institutional performance, limited financial resources, non-transparency in decision-making, weak law enforcement, constraints on the administration of justice, and a lack of accountability militate against the reform agenda, even as diverse actors in the fisheries value chain accelerate stock declines in pursuit of their livelihoods.
The potential costs of a collapse of the artisanal fishing industry are considerable. In addition to the loss of direct employment for more than 200,000 men and women, the knock-on effects on hundreds of thousands of other jobs in the fisheries value chain could result in a sharp drop in purchasing power and worsen food insecurity, with a strong likelihood of higher crime rates. Political instability could also result. Three of the four coastal regions are well known for their swing votes in Ghana’s closely contested presidential elections. Health risks would likely increase, especially for vulnerable populations such the elderly and children. The potential could also increase for conflict with neighboring countries over shared marine resources as well as maritime piracy, already a growing threat in the Gulf of Guinea.
These possibilities are counterbalanced, however, by the influence of numerous stakeholders who are becoming better organized and more vocal in favor of fisheries sector reforms. This includes the GNCFC and NAFPTA, the largest fisher and fish processors organizations, supported by CSOs and allies among traditional authorities, academic researchers, and the media. USAID’s development partners have expressed their willingness to work on collaborative strategies to address problems in the fisheries sector. If these groups are able to coalesce in support of reforms, the technical solutions to reverse the decline in Ghana’s artisanal fisheries are available for implementation. The timing for advancing reforms is also propitious, as the closed season, the Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management, and the amendments to the 2002 Fisheries Act are all on the table to be enacted and put into practice in 2019.
Table A below shows the dynamics of the forces and stakeholders working against or in favor of reforms. This is followed by a summary version of the report recommendations and two infographics.
Infographic A presents the main challenges in the artisanal fishing sector and summarizes the report’s overarching recommendations. Infographic B identifies the main issues impeding reforms and details responses and recommendations. A full version of the report’s recommendations appears on page 35.
TABLE A: DYNAMICS OF FORCES/STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST OR IN SUPPORT OF REFORM
FORCES/STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST REFORM FORCES/STAKEHOLDERS IN SUPPORT OF
REFORM
Regulatory capture: The industrial trawl sector, heavily dominated by Chinese companies, is poorly regulated, with alleged linkages to Ghanaian political interests
Fisher associations, including women’s groups, are a growing force for advocacy and reform. These are bolstered by diverse elements of civil society such as traditional authorities, universities, think tanks, and the media
Poverty, weak law enforcement, and the appearance of selective enforcement results in low public confidence and widespread noncompliance with fisheries management laws
Legislative agenda for reform: Two major legal and regulatory measures are scheduled for 2019: 1) Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management and 2) Amendments to the Fisheries Act of 2002
MOFAD and Fisheries Commission weaknesses:
Inadequate budget (especially Monitor, Control and Surveillance Division) and dysfunctional organizational culture undermine effective management, proper oversight, and staff morale
The 2019 Closed Season has now been agreed by all major stakeholder organizations
Patronage, partisan politics, and lack of accountability erodes fisheries management, enforcement, and legitimacy of governance in the sector
The Fisheries Commission has committed professional staff and good potential for meaningfully increasing internally generated funds
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FORCES/STAKEHOLDERS AGAINST REFORM FORCES/STAKEHOLDERS IN SUPPORT OF
REFORM
Collective action dilemma: Why should poor fishermen obey fishing laws that foreign companies flout and government officials fail to enforce?
Potential international collaboration with development partners on mechanisms to leverage better fisheries management (e.g., EU yellow card and subsequent ongoing dialogue on IUU)
Supply-side accountability mechanisms such as the Ghana Audit Service
Growing popular awareness and agreement that small pelagic fisheries are near collapse and the problem must be addressed
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS
1. USAID should continue supporting strategies that aim to increase the voice of fisherfolk, including women, and bring greater transparency, effectiveness, fairness, and accountability to fisheries management.
2. USAID should continue to support more participatory and representative fisher associations, more frequent government consultations with stakeholders, and legal reforms that prevent arbitrary decision-making and promote collaborative management.
3. USAID should broaden the range of strategies used to produce the organizational change and increased accountability that is needed at MOFAD and the Fisheries Commission, with expanded engagement with other potential proponents of fisheries reforms elsewhere in the government.
4. USAID should leverage its influence and convening power to strengthen donor coordination and diplomatic strategies that increase incentives for government and industry stakeholders to agree on needed reforms.
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS
1. USAID should extend SFMP for one more year to:
• Encourage and support MOFAD’s efforts to prepare for and successfully implement the artisanal and industrial closed seasons in 2019.
• Encourage and support MOFAD in making the closed season an annual practice that is collaboratively managed to rebuild small pelagic stocks.
• Work through F2F, engagement with women’s organizations, and other forums to help broker a comprehensive agreement between government, industry, and civil society around annual closed seasons and linked issues of IUU enforcement, beginning with the issue of saiko.
• Work with MOFAD and other stakeholders to help finalize the approval of the Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management and help draft and finalize the Amendments to the Fisheries Act of 2002.
• Work with the Fisheries Commission to complete registration of all canoes in coastal marine areas and issue smart-cards for each canoe.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS TO ADDRESS KEY ISSUES
Increasing the Voice of Fisherfolk in Fisheries Management:
1. Continue building the capacity of artisanal industry groups (GNCFC, NAFPTA, CEWEFIA), civil society organizations, and researchers to strengthen their voice and influence in discussions with government decision makers to be commensurate with their large membership.
2. Continue and expand efforts to strengthen the participation, representation, and influence of women in fisheries management and businesses. Particular attention should be paid to the impact of fisheries reforms on women and family resilience.
Transparency and Accountability of the Operations of Industrial Trawlers:
3. Future USAID investments should focus on reducing or eliminating saiko transshipment by industrial trawlers. Potential interventions include:
• Supporting awareness and advocacy regarding saiko, including media coverage of the costs and consequences of illegal fishing by industrial trawlers.
• Encouraging the Government of Ghana, MOFAD, and the Fisheries Commission to engage with and adopt the principles of the Fisheries Transparency Initiative (FTI), the Open Governance Partnership (OGP), and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
• Supporting improvements in enforcement capacities and technologies, for example, VMS analysis and electronic observers.
Building Capacity for Enforcement, Improved Transparency, and Accountability at the Fisheries Commission:
4. Support increased Fisheries Commission budgets with: 1) technical training; 2) advocacy from potential proponents of fisheries reforms from within the government; and 3) external advocacy from sector actors with a stake in successful reforms, including industry associations, CSOs, other donors, and resource users.
5. Explore opportunities to support the Fisheries Commission in efforts to increase internally generated funds.
6. Encourage the Fisheries Commission to request an independent audit and make public the licensing fees, fines and penalties, and total amounts collected and utilized by the Fisheries Development Fund.
7. Encourage the Fisheries Commission to make fishing license information available to the public, including beneficial ownership data; foster mechanisms to improve harvest and catch reporting;
and make catch data available to the public.
8. Work with the Fisheries Commission to implement deconcentrated fisheries management that includes resource users (particularly women), traditional authorities, and local government.
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9. Work with the Fisheries Commission to ensure that enforcement is visible, responsive, and non-selective, based on cost-effective methods and minimized political interference in prosecution.
10. Work with the Fisheries Commission to help develop cost-effective, collaborative monitoring structures in the context of co-management to extend the capacity of the MCS Division’s enforcement efforts.
11. Support the Fisheries Commission in strengthening prosecution of fisheries crime by reforming the use of the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanism to require final settlement conditions to be returned to the court to ensure they comply with judicial guidelines.
12. Support an organizational change process in the Fisheries Commission focused on building the culture, structures, and leadership practices needed to empower staff to implement key management measures and engage in open dialogue.
Collaboration with the DRG Office to Respond to Lack of Transparency and Accountability:
13. Explore mechanisms for engaging the Ghana Audit Service (GAS) to conduct financial and/or performance audits of the Fisheries Development Fund and explore the promotion of strategies such as town hall meetings to support smart policies for the accountable distribution and sale of pre-mix fuel.
14. Explore possibilities for increasing public knowledge about threats to the sustainability of the artisanal fisheries sector, including industrial and artisanal IUU fishing practices.
15. Explore linkages with the local government work USAID has done through the Ghana Strengthening Accountability Mechanisms (GSAM) project, USAID’s Accountable Democratic Institutions and Systems Strengthening (ADISS) project, and USAID’s support for MMDAs on Internally Generated Funds (IGF). Linkages might include: 1) locally focused anticorruption efforts and 2) fostering greater local and parliamentary accountability on fisheries issues.
16. Consider developing a focus on fisheries reforms and management as an important national issue for public attention in the 2020 elections and beyond, providing fisher associations, civil society organizations, and media outlets a platform for advocacy and awareness raising.
Partnerships with the Oil and Gas Industry:
17. Explore the potential for partnerships with the oil and gas industry. The regeneration of small pelagic fish stocks would benefit both artisanal fishers and decrease conflicts between oil and gas operations and fishers over shared marine space.
Building on and Sustaining PEA Work and Thinking and Working Politically (TWP):
18. Continue the PEA/TWP approach, integrating it into procurement and implementation in order to provide ongoing collaborating, learning, and adapting for the development of strategy and tactics that align fisheries reform efforts with the evolving context.
INFOGRAPHIC A: CHALLENGES AND OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS
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INFOGRAPHIC B: ISSUES PREVENTING REFORMS AND DETAILED RECOMMENDATIONS
I. BACKGROUND
THE CRISIS OF GHANA’S SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES
Ghana is facing a crisis of sustainability in its small pelagic fisheries that threatens the food security and livelihoods of a large segment of the population. The World Bank estimated in 2011 that more than 370,000 fishers, fish processors, traders, and boat builders are directly employed by the sector. Indirect economic linkages expand the sector’s contribution to employment to nearly three million people or around 10 percent of Ghana’s population. Fish provide around 60 percent of animal protein in the Ghanaian diet, making Ghana the country most reliant upon fish for nutrition in Africa.
In the coastal areas of Ghana, the fishing industry has deep cultural roots, encompassing a way of life and a network of social relationships in addition to its central role as a source of income. In general, men do the fishing and women handle processing and marketing. Processing is done by smoking, salting and drying, frying, and canning. Women also sometimes play a central role as financiers by funding fishing trips, which ensures their access to the catch.
There are three main categories of fishing in Ghana—artisanal/small-scale, semi-industrial/inshore, and industrial. Over 80 percent of Ghana’s fishers are in the artisanal/small-scale canoe fleet, which targets small pelagic fish. Small pelagics are the sardinella, mackerel, and anchovies that inhabit the mid-water column and are the most important fishery for food security. However, there has been a sharp decline in small pelagic landings over the past two decades, from about 140,000 metric tons (mt) in the mid- 1990s to around 20,000 mt in 2016, reflecting significant overfishing (Nunoo 2018). A collapse of fish stocks is possible if these trends are not reversed.
The main reason for the decline in small pelagic stocks is overfishing, including the use of illegal fishing practices. Over the past decade, the number of artisanal fisher canoes has increased from 10,000 to nearly 14,000. The Government of Ghana subsidizes fishing in various ways. For the small-scale sector, pre-mix fuel is heavily subsidized; imported fishing inputs such as nets, ropes, and cork floats receive tax-free treatment; and outboard motors are distributed at subsidized prices (Tobey et al., 2016). As stocks have declined, many canoe fishers have turned to illegal fishing techniques, including light fishing, fine mesh nets, dynamite, and the use of chemicals. Additionally, there is a conflict between artisanal canoes and industrial trawlers over the small pelagic stocks.
ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED (IUU) FISHING BY INDUSTRIAL TRAWLERS
The overwhelming majority of industrial trawlers are owned and operated by Chinese companies licensed under shell companies run by Ghanaian owners. According to multiple informants and published reports, these politically influential owners are widely believed to benefit financially from their sponsorship of the Chinese trawlers (Akapalu, Eriksen & Vondolia, 2018; Environmental Justice Foundation 2018). In principal, the artisanal fishery should not conflict with the industrial trawlers, which are licensed to catch demersal species like groupers, snappers, octopus, and cuttlefish. Industrial trawlers, however, use equipment and nets to illegally target small pelagic fish such as sardinella and mackerel. This places them in direct competition with artisanal fishers for the shrinking small pelagic fish stocks. The catch is flash frozen in slabs and transshipped to shore by canoes that have no fishing equipment of their own but are capable of handling heavy cargo.
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This illegal catch and transshipment, known as saiko, is perceived by fisherfolk to be a significant threat to the artisanal fishery and is a symbol of unfair and unmanaged fishing practices that are driving an escalation in fishing effort—both legal and illegal. By one estimate, an average saiko canoe can carry up to 26 tons of fish, the equivalent of 400 artisanal fishing trips (Environmental Justice Foundation, 2018).
The estimates of the total size and impact of the illegal take of small pelagics by saiko vary considerably.
It is estimated that up to 40 percent of the overall trawler take is “by-catch,” but there is considerable variation in the content of individual frozen slabs of saiko catches. Juvenile demersal fish (also illegal) are caught with small pelagics and the relative proportion of each varies from slab to slab. Moreover, it is unclear what percentage of the small pelagics is comprised of the four target species that make up 80 percent of artisanal small pelagic landings. These empirical uncertainties, however, stand in contrast to the strong belief of artisanal fishing communities that saiko is a serious threat to the sustainability of Ghana’s artisanal fisheries.
These two problems—illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing and overfishing among all fishing sectors—are the main threats to Ghana’s fisheries. Small pelagic stocks are currently estimated at only 14 percent of highest recorded landings and are dangerously close to the 10 percent threshold that researchers consider indicative of a collapsed stock (Froese et al., 2012).1 The Scientific and Technical Working Group (STWG) of the Fisheries Commission estimated in 2017 that small pelagic stocks could collapse in three to seven years.
Reversing the Decline in Small Pelagic Fish Stocks: A Closed Season In an effort to try to reverse these alarming trends, the Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development (MOFAD) announced as a top priority in July 2018 plans for a closed fishing season to take place in August 2018. This would coincide with the time of year when small pelagics spawn, thus offering the best possibilities for a significant regeneration of fish stocks. The closed season was not
1 In a recent technical paper on “Rebuilding of Marine Fisheries,” the Food and Agriculture Organization notes in its discussion of the literature on the concept of collapse that, “Perhaps more important than the reference level [maximum landings] is the rate and length of the decline of the resource, biomass or catch…” It also notes that complementary research indicates the importance of changes in reproductive diversity and social behavior in the resilience of fish populations (Garcia et al., 2018).
Small pelagic stocks occupy an important ecological position. Lazar et al. (2017) note that, “the collapse of the pelagic stocks [would] have a domino effect on both higher and lower trophic species.”
Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing
Global fisheries face an existential threat in the decades ahead as a result of IUU fishing:
• IUU fishing harms legitimate fishing activities and livelihoods, jeopardizes food and economic security, benefits transnational crime, and undermines ongoing efforts to implement sustainable fisheries policies.
• IUU fishing poses risks to both biodiversity and the rule of law.
• IUU fishers reduce expected government revenues through lost fees and taxes.
U.S. National Intelligence Council, “Global Implications of Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing,” 2016 viewed as the sole solution to the artisanal fishery’s decline but a major step that could have a measurable impact and set an important precedent in fisheries management. If implemented on an annual basis, in combination with other measures for the proper management of the sector, MOFAD projected that the closed season could restore the small pelagics fisheries to 90,000 mt by 2030. Figure 1 shows the importance of a closed season as a cornerstone for reversing the decline of the artisanal fishery, while identifying the suite of additional reforms that are needed for it to be fully effective. In Figure 2, the black line shows the precipitous decline of the small pelagic fisheries in the past 20 years and the blue bars track MOFAD’s projections of the increase in these stocks by 2030, if key reforms are implemented in the sector.
The announcement of the closed season was made with little advance preparation or notice, evoking an unexpectedly strong protest from fisherfolk and fisher associations, most notably the Ghana National Canoe Fishermen Council (GNCFC). As a consequence of this political resistance, Ghana’s Cabinet withdrew the fishing ban for 2018, but MOFAD’s Minister declared her commitment to implementing the closed season in 2019.
FIGURE 1: SUITE OF STEPS TO REBUILD GHANA’S MARINE FISHERIES
Source: SFMP
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FIGURE 2: REVERSAL OF THE DECLINE IN SMALL PELAGIC FISHERIES BY 2030 BASED ON PROPOSED REFORMS
Source: F. K. E. Nunoo, Ministry of Fisheries and Aquaculture Development, 2018
The failure to implement the closed season further focused awareness on the potential costs of a collapse of the artisanal fishing industry. In addition to the loss of direct employment for more than 200,000 men and women, the knock-on effects on hundreds of thousands of other jobs in the fisheries value chain could result in a sharp drop in purchasing power and worsen food insecurity, with a strong likelihood of higher crime rates. Health risks would likely increase, especially for vulnerable populations such the elderly and children. The potential could also increase for conflict with neighboring countries over shared marine resources as well as maritime piracy, already a growing threat in the Gulf of Guinea (ICC International Maritime Bureau, 2018).
Political instability could also result from the fallout of an artisanal fishery collapse. Three of the four coastal regions (Western, Central and Greater Accra) are well known for their swing votes in Ghana’s closely contested presidential elections and are sometimes referred to as “the Florida of Ghana.” In 2016, all three were won by President Nana Akufo-Addo’s New Patriotic Party, with just over 50 percent of the vote. While the closed season debate highlighted the electoral risks of hastily announced fisheries reforms, a collapse of the artisanal fisheries might carry larger political implications.
Most artisanal fisherfolk groups did not object, in principle, to the idea of a closed season. Instead, they said they felt insufficiently prepared to deal with its economic consequences and timing, which coincided with the August bumper season, annual festivals, and the payment of school fees. But the capacity that small-scale fisherfolk and NGOs demonstrated for organization and mobilization against the closed season was new and noteworthy. Their demonstration of political clout indicated that there may be new possibilities for stakeholders to hammer out a consensus on fisheries sector reforms and mechanisms for effective co-management of the fishing industry.
REVERSING THE DECLINE IN SMALL PELAGIC FISH STOCKS: REFORMING THE LEGAL AND
POLICY FRAMEWORK
Working with USAID’s Sustainable Fisheries Management Project (SFMP) and key fisher associations and institutions, MOFAD has drafted a “Policy Framework on Fisheries Co-Management” to provide a roadmap for moving forward on a new model of collaborative management for the sector. Other reforms that are being discussed among stakeholders include new fishing gear requirements, the elimination of illegal nets, cessation of destructive fishing practices (light fishing, chemicals, dynamite), the registration program for artisanal and small-scale canoes, and ending saiko transshipment.
In fact, the main elements of the necessary technical reforms in the fisheries sector have been known and widely discussed for at least a decade. In 2012, a special committee formed by the Fisheries Commission noted the urgent need to address the negative effects of saiko catches by industrial trawlers, but the situation has worsened since that time. In November 2013, the European Commission (EC) issued a “yellow card” sanction on Ghana for IUU fishing activities by Ghana flagged vessels. This involved “fishery products (mainly tuna species) illegally caught or transshipped.” Faced with the prospect of significant export losses, the government of Ghana responded with legislative measures in the Fisheries (Amendment) Regulations of 2015 (L.I. 2217) and the Fisheries Management Plan (2015- 2019). The government also established a Fisheries Enforcement Unit (FEU). The Fisheries Management Plan, however, has been weakly implemented since the election year of 2016 and the subsequent change in ruling parties. The FEU has limited resources that are insufficient to cover Ghana’s 540-kilometer coastline.
It is this persistent gap between solutions on paper and the resolution of problems in practice that provides the underlying rationale for this Applied Political Economy Assessment (PEA). The failures to address the sustainability challenges in Ghana’s artisanal fisheries are not scientific or technical but are primarily grounded in the political, economic, and institutional context and characteristics of the sector.
Hence, this PEA is directed toward providing a deeper understanding of the way these factors influence the behavior of key actors in the fisheries sector to inform future USAID programming decisions.
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UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL FRAME OF REFERENCE
Since 1992, Ghana’s political system has revolved around competition between its two main political parties, the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP). The NDC has roots in the revolutionary populist politics of the 1980s, but by the 1990s it already had turned toward party brokers, along with allied business associations and unions, and became reliant upon…
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