ID08190054 RFI Attachment 1 PWS.pdf

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F-16 Secure Storage Facility Support
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ID08190054
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3/04/2020

Performance Work Statement

Control of Critical Items identified as part of the SN-D-QAW Case

1. BACKGROUND: Critical Items (CI)/components relating to new technology have been identified to be stored and safeguarded in a US secure storage facility (SSF). The critical items/components are required as a part of the Singapore F-16 Upgrade program. The critical items/components will be supporting the program during aircraft kit installation and sustainment spares. A SSF will be established at Tengah Air Base, Singapore and this PWS will address the handling and protection of the critical items located at Tengah Air Base as well as the mod site at Singapore Technologies Aerospace, ST Aero. St Aero is the companying that is modifying the aircraft off base at its location, approximately 15-20 minutes from Tengah Air Base.

2. PURPOSE: This PWS will provide guidance concerning the handling, shipping, usage limitations and storage of the following items: AN/APG-83 AESA (RADAR Antenna

Assembly, Receiver Exciter Processor Modules), Mission Modular Computer (MMC) Line

Replaceable Modules (LRMs).

3. UNDERSTANDING OF RESPONSIBILITIES: The following paragraphs and attachments explain responsibilities to all involved organizations.

4. LIST OF CRITICAL ITEMS/COMPONENTS:

4.1 AN/APG-83 AESA (Complete Array Assembly and all Receiver Exciter

Processor (REP) Modules

4.2 MMC LRM Components (4 types)

4.2.1 WM70A Processing Module

4.2.2 MB70A Processing Module

4.2.3 AD70A Processing Module

4.2.4 GPHS Processing Module

5 SSF MANAGER CRITERIA

5.1 SSF managers will be US Citizens with a valid US Secret Clearance.

These individuals cannot maintain a dual citizenship.

5.2 SSF managers will reside no further than 30 driving minutes away from

SSF location.

5.3 SSF will be staffed during regular working hours (Monday through

Friday, 0800 to 1700) by authorized persons.

5.4 During off-duty hours, SSF staff will be on-call for response to be provided in a one hour timeframe (unless there is an intrusion alert, then response time is 30 minutes). Example: Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) notifies

SSF manager at 7:00PM that a AESA REP needs to be changed out on a F-16.

The SSF Manager will report to the SSF Facility within an hour and trade out

AESA REPS and complete the appropriate paperwork. If an alternate work schedule is required to support the active aircraft schedule, then the planned schedule will be adjusted to support the needs of the aircraft. This alternate schedule will still be 9 hours. SSF managers might be working non-typical hours to accommodate availability during all modification shifts that take place.

5.5 SSF managers shall have a strong understanding and background in military fighter jet components.

5.6 SSF managers will complete training requirements of National Industrial

Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM) prior to starting their position as a SSF Manager. This training will be held at Wright Patterson Air Force Base

(WPAFB) and have a duration of one day.

5.7 SSF managers will complete annual security refresher training.

5.8 The Security Manager from SSF Managers Company will debriefed the

SSF manager upon termination of employment for any reason.

6 SSF GENERAL ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES:

6.1 Four SSF managers will man the facility to support operational and production requirements in support of the Singapore F-16 Upgrade Program.

6.2 SSF managers shall be onsite during normal working hours and will be

“on call” during non-working hours to respond to Intrusion Detection System

(IDS) alarms and other security concerns that may arise.

6.3 SSF managers will be responsible for inventories and inspections of all critical items received at respective Singapore locations (Changi International

Airport). This includes critical items/components in the secure storage, during the upgrade process, and installed on the aircraft.

6.4 SSF managers will use cellular phones (provided by this contractor) to monitor the SSF via electronic communications during off duty hours.

6.4.1 The cell phone must be capable of calls, texts and email. The camera on the cell phone will have to be disabled by rendering the lens permanently opaque.

6.4.1.1 No cameras are permitted including cameras on tablets and laptops.

6.4.2 The on-duty SSF manager for after hours will carry electronic communications (cell phones, tablets and laptops, all provided by the contractor) that will receive an automatic call in case of an alarm.

6.5 SSF manager will record all movement of CI/components into and out of a SSF. The record will be monitored and audited against kit installation schedule at the modification site and maintenance records at the Tengah AFB.

Discrepancies will be reported immediately.

6.6 In the event of a natural disaster or war, SSF manager will work with

RSAF and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) to develop contingency plans. These contingency plans must be sent to United States

Government (USG), F-16 Security Office for approval.

6.7 SSF manager must understand and follow the Singapore Transportation

Shipping and Handling (TRASH) Plan as well as the LOA Security Instruction

(LSI).

6.7.1 A copy of the TRASH Plan and LSI is currently stored and locked in the SSF.

6.7.1.1 The TRASH Plan cannot be shared with Foreign

Nationals.

6.8 SSF managers may be required to make changes to the existing Standard

Operating Procedures (SOP). Any changes must meet the requirements of the

LSI, the TRASH plan, and on the job experience that will be approved by USG F-

16 Security Office. This SOP is stored in the SSF.

6.9 In the event of an IDS failure, SSF managers shall man and guard the facility 24 hours a day/7 days a week until IDS is activated and re-alarmed.

6.10 SSF managers are responsible for participating in all dry-run exercises, Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA) certification, and actively communicate with RSAF Security personnel and ST Aero Security personnel to ensure upon completion of dry-run, if dry-run is necessary and initiated by USG.

6.10.1 Dry run exercises simulate a break in at the SSF with an appropriate military response from RSAF.

6.10.2 Dry run exercises simulate a break in at the ST Aero Mod Line with an appropriate armed response from Singapore Police.

6.10.3 The SSF Manager will be trained to respond to alarm conditions and coordination with Military and police.

6.10.4 DTSA is the USG approving agency for SSFs.

6.11 SSF Managers shall perform exercises with RSAF to simulate alarm responses of the Intrusion Detection System (IDS) if deemed necessary.

6.12 SSF managers shall also perform monthly self-evaluation of security procedures to ensure all SSF managers understand requirement for alarm protocols.

6.13 SSF managers will work with RSAF to review the existing check-out procedures of CI from SSF.

7 DAILY INVENTORY CHECKS:

7.1 At the beginning and end of each day, a daily inventory must be performed at the ST Aero Mod Line and at the Tengah AFB SSF.

7.2 On a daily basis the SSF manager will check for evidence of disturbed anti-tamper indicators and take appropriate reporting action of any disturbed indicators.

7.2.1 SSF Manager will receive one day training at WPAFB on daily inventories, ant tamper indicators and appropriate reporting actions.

7.2.2 SSF Manager will receive on the job training from the existing

SSF Manager for a period of no less than two weeks.

7.2.3 Standard Operating Procedures for inventorying and reporting is contained in the TRASH Plan and LSI located in the SSF.

7.3 SSF manager will document, on a daily log, the location of all aircraft installed anti-tamper indicators and take necessary actions to formally report any incident of attempted access.

7.4 SSF managers will use handheld remote monitoring devices to monitor the

SSF to record and account for all CI within the SSF and on the modification line.

7.5 Any instance where a CI/component cannot be located, or its location is not reflected in SSF inventory, and the component cannot be located within 24 hours, the incident must be immediately reported to the USG Singapore Security

Assistance Program Manager, (SAPM) US Embassy Singapore Office of Defense

Cooperation (ODC) and F-16 Security WPAFB. This reporting will kick-off a security investigation.

7.6 At the end of the shift, any CI not installed after checkout must be returned by SSF/RSAF cleared personnel to the SSF for overnight storage.

7.7 At the end of the shift, the SSF manager shall perform a daily facility check to ensure there has been no unauthorized access/conditions of facility that could impact security.

8 END OF DAY SECURITY CHECK AT SSF

8.1 SSF manager will ensure SSF containers within the SSF are inspected at the end of day by the on duty SSF manager annotating the appropriate SF 701

Activity Security Checklist (include time, date, and items checked and then initial) found in Appendix D. An entry is not required on SF 701 on non-duty days such as Saturdays, Sundays, or holidays.

8.2 The SSF manager shall properly lock and alarm facility and the inspecting individual will enter time of inspection and initial ‘checked By” column of SF

702 Security Container Check Sheet found in Appendix D.

8.3 In addition to SF 701 and SF 702, ensure the following documents are posted inside of the SSF as indicated below:

8.3.1 SF 700 is maintained inside the SSF

8.3.2 SF 701

8.3.3 SF 702

8.3.4 One copy of Authorized Signature list (Appendix B)

8.3.5 One copy of Asset serial number tracking log for each unit

(Appendix A)

9 ALERT RESPONSE PROCESS:

9.1 In the event of an alarm, SSF managers must respond day and night.

9.2 SSF manager must report within thirty (30) minutes in case of alarm when

SSF managers are not present at the facility.

9.3 SSF manager will access the SSF and allow security forces to enter and clear the facility before entering. Once facility is cleared SSF manager(s) will escort responding security forces at all times when granted access to the facility.

9.4 Upon securing the area, SSF manager will inventory all CI within the SSF to ensure full accountability.

10 ARRIVAL OF CRITICAL ITEMS

SSF managers are responsible for all CI once items arrive in country. All CI will arrive at

Changi International Airport.

10.1 3 days prior to scheduled CI arrival in country, SSF manager will confirm with RSAF that a truck will be available for the day.

10.2 SSF manager upon receipt of the Notice of Availability (NOA) shall confirm with Singapore Air Lines (SAL) the flight schedule, flight number, and arrival time of flight to verify NOA information.

10.3 Day of delivery the SSF manager will arrive one hour prior to aircraft arrival and meet at the Singapore Air Terminal Services (SATS) Facility, the SSF managers will coordinate with SAL/ SATS Customs Liaison for escort to aircraft unload area.

10.3.1 Observe the off load and transfer to teardown location and perform initial inventory and visual inspection.

10.3.2 Upon off load procedures the SSF manager will accomplish required inventories and take positive control of the cargo. Cargo can be transported directly to the loading dock to await transport. If transportation is still in transit to the loading dock the SSF manager shall ensure positive control of the cargo at all times.

10.3.2.1 NOTE: Upon offloading the SSF manager shall

determine inventory process for both scenarios to ensure positive control of cargo. It may be necessary to accomplish multiple movements. The SSF manger may require another individual (Another SSFF Manager or

RSAF or approved ST Aero person) at the drop off point (Secure room or dock). The additional individual would then re-inventory and at the end of the process both the individuals (person A teardown location and person B at the receiving location) would compare inventory sheets to ensure no item is misplaced. If the inventory process reveals a missing or tampered item the SSF Manager will make the proper notifications as listed in section 13 of the Trash Plan and TRASH Plan, appendix P, Attachment – Evidence of Tampering

Checklist.

10.3.3 Work with SATS to ensure customs paperwork is finalized prior to departure of SATS Terminal Facility.

10.3.3.1 NOTE: Movement of cargo cannot proceed without

customs approval.

10.3.3.2 If customs is required to open the classified cargo

containers, the SSF manager needs to be present to monitor the customs agent’s actions.

10.3.4 If the truck is delayed with arriving for any reasons the SSF manager is responsible to stay with the CI until the truck arrives at the facility.

10.3.5 Positive control during loading procedures from the loading dock to the vehicle shall be maintained by either visual means or re-establishing inventory.

11 EN-ROUTE TRAVEL TO Tengah AFB

11.1 Prior to departure: SSF manager is responsible for coordinating the route and estimated time of delivery which shall be agreed upon by both RSAF and SSF managers.

11.1.1 SSF manager shall:

11.1.1.1 Verify names and ID’s along with vehicle number

11.1.1.2 Exchange phone numbers and ensure positive check

of phones are operational

11.1.1.3 Contact a designated SSF manager at Tengah AFB

or ST Aero at the destination and provide information of departure time, that the movement is underway and estimated time of arrival.

11.1.2 RSAF driver will report directly to SSF located at Tengah AFB with the SSF manager following behind at all times.

11.1.3 SSF manager will direct the RSAF unloading the cargo into the

SSF and take 100% accountability of shipment and inspect for damage.

11.1.4 SSF manager will log inventory on log sheet.

11.1.5 SSF manager will formally document any damage or indication of tampering to the cargo.

11.1.6 SSF manager will send email to stakeholders that shipment was received with/without issue and include the arrival time at Changi

Airport, Departure time at SATS Terminal, and arrival time at

SSF.

12 CRITICAL ITEM INDUCTION TO SSF

12.1 Upon delivery the SSF manager shall immediately perform an arrival inventory and unload the assets into the SSF (The same inventory list used at customs shall be used).

12.2 Once all packages are inside the SSF, a detailed inspection shall take place

(SSF managers should be only personnel inside facility during this inspection).

12.2.1 Each item shall be visually inspected for damage or evidence of tampering and reported accordingly.

12.3 Once an item is inspected it will be immediately logged into the facility log including physical location within the facility.

12.4 Report delivery to appropriate agency POC listed in the USG Trash plan associated with the Singapore Upgrade Program.

12.5 Transport of CI for repair and return must follow same procedure as induction.

13 TRANSFER OF ASSETS TO THE ST AERO MODIFICATION LINE

13.1 SSF manager shall coordinate the transfer of SSF maintained assets.

13.2 SSF manager shall coordinate with RSAF asset transfer schedule.

13.3 SSF manager shall release CI in a first in, first out method.

13.4 SSF managers shall track the release of assets:

13.4.1 SSF manager shall use Asset Serial Number Tracking Log

(Appendix A) and ensure enough install time remains for installation of equipment

13.4.2 Only authorized SSF and RSAF representatives can sign for and transport of SSF critical items at this time.

13.4.3 SSF Manager and authorized RSAF representative will compare

Asset Serial Number Tracking Log sheet to requested equipment.

SSF Manager will annotate on the inventory sheet time out and designated Aircraft Tail number and bay location. SSF manager and RSAF representative will sign log and transport the equipment immediately to ST Aero Mod line.

13.4.4 SSF Manager and/or RSAF representative shall transport directly to receiving Aircraft.

13.4.5 If an approved RSAF personnel is unavailable then the SSF manager will apply serialized security tamper seals to all critical component installation locations and panels immediately after critical component installation on an aircraft, and annotate on aircraft tracking forms

13.4.5.1 NOTE: SSF manager is responsible for keeping log

of all serialized security tamper seals relating to which part and what aircraft tail the seals are located on.

14 REPAIR AND RETURN OF CI

14.1 In the event, an asset is needed to be returned to the SSF due to inoperability or issue with the asset, SSF manager will need to issue a new asset following same procedures as initial check-out.

14.1.1 The SSF manager must check-in the broken item for repair and return.

14.1.2 The SSF manager must notify the USG of part and part number that is broken.

14.2 The SSF manager will maintain possession of the defective CI and observe the preparation for shipment in an appropriate shipping container, as well as the accompanying shipping/transportation paperwork.

14.3 The SSF manager will work with the classified freight forwarder to determine the next scheduled classified shipment to arrange for shipping to the appropriate US facility for depot level repair.

14.3.1 NOTE: The shipping method must be prior approved by the

Singapore F-16 USG SAPM.

15 INTERNAL MOVEMENT OF SSF CRITICAL ITEMS AT ST AERO MODIFICATION

LINE

15.1 The need may arise to move equipment during production line operations:

15.1.1 RSAF or qualified ST Aero employee shall notify the SSF

Manager prior to any movement of assets

15.1.2 SSF manager will approve the request and annotate on the Asset

Serial Number Tracking Log the new designated Aircraft and bay location, and the RSAF representative or qualified ST Aero employee will sign the appropriate box.

16 ACCESS TO SSF

16.1 SSF manager will escort all U.S. and Non-U.S. personnel requiring access to the SSFs, at all times.

16.2 SSF Manager will maintain authorized entry list for all approved RSAF personnel authorized to enter.

16.3 SSF Manager will work with RSAF security officer to maintain list of approved ST Aero personnel authorized to handle CI outside SSF.

16.3.1 Access list must include a color photograph of each approved person on the list with a description of how SSF manager can verify identification, and access approvals documented on the person’s identification badge.

17 AIRCRAFT TRANSFERS TO GAINING BASES

17.1 RSAF will notify the SSF Manager when the Aircraft is due to transfer locations. SSF Manager will track aircraft upon notification.

17.2 The SSF manager will accomplish an inspection and verify all CI are accounted for prior to the aircraft moving to another operational base.

17.3 The SSF Manager will prepare the associated Asset Serial Number

Tracking Log which will be held at SSF at Tengah AFB.

18 ASSET MONTHLY INSPECTION

18.1 SSF managers shall perform random monthly inspections (once a month at a random time) of assets at ST Aero modification line to ensure assets are properly accounted for.

18.2 SSF managers shall perform random monthly inspection of assets assigned to operational aircraft or located in other facilities for authorized operational use.

18.2.1 Other facilities may include different maintenance areas or facilities within Tengah AFB or Changi AFB.

18.3 SSF manager shall perform random inspections of end item usage and report findings to the F-16 Security Office and USG SAPM. SSF managers shall coordinate with RSAF maintenance for which aircraft will be inspected. This coordination will reduce flying downtime. SSF manager should establish a good working relationship with base officials and do their best to support both the mod line and operations. SSF managers shall assist USG with random unannounced facility and asset end item inspections.

18.4 A log of items inspected and any discrepancies noted shall be kept by the

SSF manager and be provided every 3 months (quarterly) to the USG Security

POC.

18.5 Noted discrepancies shall be assigned a corrective action, champion, and completion date. RSAF assigned actions shall be provided to Base Leadership for review and feedback of actions taken.

19 SSF MANAGER LOGS

The SSF Manager shall maintain Log books and electronic databases to track the following:

1. Asset Serial Number Tracking Log (Appendix A)

2. Authorized Signature List (Appendix B)

3. Visitor Log AF1109 (Appendix C)

4. SF 700 series forms (Appendix D)

NOTE: The following appendices are examples and shall be kept as a hard copy and maintained electronically. Electronic Signatures can be used when available.

NOTE: SF 700 Series form found at: https://www.gsa.gov/forms-library/

19.1 Biannual Testing- The SSF managers will conduct this testing every six months and record results, and file/forward accordingly.

20 SUPPLIES

20.1 Any office supplies or materials must be provided by contractor. This includes laptops, tablets and cell phones.

https://www.gsa.gov/forms-library/

Appendix A: Asset Serial Number Tracking Log

This Log should be used to track location of each asset and be maintained within the SSF.

Date/Time In Date/Time Out Nomenclature Part # Serial #

Aircraft Tail or

Loaction

Changi AFB or

ST Aero

Signature in

(Print & Sign)

Signature Out

(Print & Sign)

43717 43759 Part A 123 456 A/C 631 ST Aero

43723 Part B 789 5678 Changi

Appendix B: Authorized Signature list (other than SSF Manager)

RSAF and ST Aero shall provide names of individuals that can take possession of SSF critical items from the SSF Manager. RSAF and St Aero Individuals shall possess equivalent security clearances and be approved by local Base or Service Security Offices. A signed letter from the

RSAF Security Office will be provided to the SSF Manger and USG Security Office. For USG and US Contractors, proof of security clearances shall be provided to the SSF Manager but controlled by the USG owning Security Office.

Note: When individuals retire, change locations or are removed from a security clearance formal notification to the SSF Manager is critical.

Name (last, First, Middle I) Print/Sign

Base or

Company Badge

Number

Effective Date Expiration

Date

Approval

Authority Base

Unit

Phone Number

Access

Approval letter on file (y/n)

SSF Mgr

Initial

Appendix C: Visitor Log AF1109 or Local Equivalent

Name

Last, First, Middle initial

Print /

Sign

Base or

Company

Badge

Number

Date /

Time

In

Date /

Time

Out

Organization Phone

Number

Escort

Name

Print and

Sign

This log will be maintained for all personnel entering the facility that require shoulder to shoulder escort.

Appendix D: SF 700

SF 701: Activity Security Checklist

SF 702 Security Container Checklist:

File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .