WF3_QandA_3_5 Feb 21.xlsx
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- Attached to
- Workforce 3. 0 - Managed Solution, Defense Healthcare Management Systems (WF3) Federal contract opportunity
- Solicitation number
- HT003821R0001B
- Issued by
- Defense Health Agency
About this file
This document outlines requirements for the Workforce 3.0 Managed Solution opportunity issued by the Defense Health Agency. Key details include the solicitation seeks proposals to transform middle and back office functions through adoption of commercial best practices and outcomes-based contracting. Offerors will propose approaches across multiple task orders, including a design-to-outcome order, core order, and incubator orders. Evaluation will include gates assessing past performance in digital transformation, product management capabilities, and talent management metrics. Pricing will utilize firm-fixed-price, incentive, and gamechanger profit models. Awardees will own outcomes for identified product lines while excluding direct product work. The agency aims to issue three awards under Lot 1 and up to five under the small business set-aside of Lot 2.
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Sheet1
| ID | Question | Industry Comment/Suggestion | Answer |
| 1 | Please explain how program personnel could self-identity as customers and how would "%↑ Program personnel that self-identity as customers" metric be assessed? | This metric was identified as a notional metric. These will not be evaluated during the source selection process. The Government will hold detailed, bi-lateral discussions with the awardees during Design-To-Outcome task orders. | |
| 2 | Can the government define what it means by "Core" and "non-core" work? | Core refers to the core task order cycle defined on Slide 22. | |
| 3 | Will the government pre-define the incentive model for each task order or does the government intend to negotiate each incentive (base profit, incentive base profit, game changer) for each task order? | The Government intends to evaluate using the metholodgy defined in the SF-1449, but final negotiations for incentive models will occur during Design-to-Outcome or Accelerator task orders as applicable. | |
| 4 | What pricing models is the government considering to operationalize for the "three trenches of incentives"? | See Draft RFP 2, the Government has developed a model to utilize firm-fixed price payments for its incentive payments and award payments. | |
| 5 | Slide 16 states, "Our operational model is inspired by commercial success stories...". Can the government please elaborate on the "commercial success stories" and which products and companies they are referencing? | There are no specific instances; the Government performs market research on a continuous basis to ensure it has the most up to date understanding of best practices in the technology industry. | |
| 6 | How will the government structure the payment of the incentive and gamechanger profit? | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 7 | Can the government provide more details related to the "Core Task Order" it intends to release under this IDIQ? This information would be helpful in addressing the government's question on Slide 19 . | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 8 | What does the government mean by "Bi-Lateral "and "Unilateral" ordering? | In the case of unilateral orders, the Government will issue them unilaterally based on pricing incorporated by reference in accordance with the Ordering Guide. Bi-lateral orders will be negotiated prior to issuance. | |
| 9 | For TO1 what is meant by "Transition Operations"? | Transition would include typical activities when on-boarding to a Government space such as scaling up staffing, obtaining CAC cards and accounts, in taking information necessary to design the first year of work, etc. | |
| 10 | Can the government provide details related to what it envisions for "Design to Outcome TO"? | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 11 | Can the government provide details related to what it envisions for "Accelerator TO"? | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 12 | To facilitate the feedback interest parties have on whether or not the task-order structure is appropriate can the government please define what kind of contract type they are looking for (e.g., a type that requires a completed deliverable or something that allows best-efforts)? | The Government intends to use outcome-driven Firm-Fixed Price task orders. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 13 | What specific contract type is DHA considering for the core task order? | PEO DHMS anticipates awarding Firm-Fixed Price contracts for the Core Task Orders (and all others). See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 14 | How will the Core TO vendor incorporate and deliver outcomes produced in Incubation TOs and how will that information be relayed to Core TO vendor? Does the government plan to exercise optional CLINS for the Core awardee to perform and deliver on efforts identified through the Incubation Task Orders? | The Core Task Order and Incubator efforts are independent of one another. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 15 | Will the Core Task Order holder be permitted to submit a response/rebuttal to the Performance Evaluation & Logical Follow-on or Fair Opportunity Determination and be provided the opportunity to improve on performance after assessment? | The Government expects that the Performance Evaluation Process will be conducted with face-to-face exchanges between both parties, and specifics about the process will be solution dependent and finalized during the Design To Outcome task order. | |
| 16 | Can the government please provide its plan for the frequency of award/incentive payments? | The requested details are provided in the Ordering Guide. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 17 | Can the three successful awardees of the IDIQ compete on all task orders to be released under the Workforce 3.0 vehicle? Can the government please explain how the competition at the Task order would work upon award of the vehicle? For example; After the award of Task Order #1 could all the awardees compete for the Incubation, Accelerator and follow-on task orders? Would the Incubation or Accelerator Task orders create any OCI's for future task orders to be released under this vehicle? | Lot 1 awardees cannot compete on Lot 2 task orders, and vice versa. Please see Draft RFP 2 for an explanation of task orders linked by the logical follow-on fair opportunity exemption. | |
| 18 | Does the government envision IDIQ award winners to be responsible for developing and pushing code to production? | No. This is anticipated to fall in either the DevMAC or Program/Project-specific prime mission product contracts. | |
| 19 | Will the government provide additional details for its evaluation approach, particularly for written portions of the response? There is a clear intent to seek change in how solutions are presented. Would the government provide clarification of what its expectations are in how vendors should change their approach to formulating responses? | See Draft RFP 2 for proposal development instructions. | |
| 20 | Can the government provide an explanation related to the thresholds identified on slide 26? Where were they derived from? | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 21 | Would the government consider alternate metrics tied to business outcomes for the "Disruptive Outcomes" gate? examples to consider can be for example: cost savings from replatfoming tech. architecture; % of DevOps automation; % of data made searchable or findable via APIs; other. | The intent of the "Disruptive Outcomes" gate is to align with Offerors' capability to drive holistic digital transformation across the enterprise. As such, the metrics are designed to measure strategic business outcomes rather than tactical technology-centric outcomes. The provided examples do not indicate whether the organization successfully achieved a digital transformation with lasting business impact. | |
| 22 | Can the government define what it means by "Customer Retention rate"? | Please provide the specific location for the referenced quote. | |
| 23 | Can the government define what it means by "Significant Product"? | WF3 must execute commercial best practices for end-to-end product management. Product management includes incubation, development, and commercialization of a successful significant new technology product for a client. The term “significant new technology product” means that the company intends for the product to differ significantly in its characteristics or intended uses from those previously produced or create a new market for itself. By contrast, a new feature aims only to create a greater market share in the company’s existing product area. By definition, a successfully commercialized new product will create a new revenue stream that leads to increased profitability within a planned time frame. | |
| 24 | Can the government please describe what is driving the use of compensation and bonus as a performance metric? Industry uses various benefits aside from monetary awards to attract and retain talent. Would recommend that the government require offerors to detail the programs and incentives they have to attract and retain talent (company contributions for continuing education/certifications, 401K plans and matching contributions, Health and wellness plans, What COVID-19 contingencies did companies employee to retain and attract staff?, etc..) | Given the difficulty of disrupting the status quo in the Government, it is vital that WF3 awardee teams have successful experience employing incentives as motivators for their employees. A report by the Society for Human Resource Management (SSHRM) (based on 2017 data) found that top quartile bonus awards to be 5% and 10% for non-executive and executive employees respectively (https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/trends-and-forecasting/research-and-surveys/Documents/2017-Human-Capital-Benchmarking.pdf). A report by Charles Aris (based 2018 data) focused on Consultant Industry compensation found average annual bonuses to be in the range of 10-25% based on education, tenure, and seniority (https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/4432423/2019%20Charles%20Aris%20Strategy%20Consulting%20Compensation%20Study.pdf). Based on these findings, and feedback from industry interaction during WF3 solicitation, sub-factor 1.3 requires that Offeror Primes provide at least 9% of total compensation for their personnel as incentive-based bonuses or additional financial incentives such as equity or awards. | |
| 25 | Can the government provide examples of commercial service models consulted that inspired this acquisition strategy? | There are no specific instances; the Government performs market research on a continuous basis to ensure it has the most up to date understanding of best practices in the technology industry. | |
| 26 | Can the government define what it means by "middle and back-office functions" in the context of DHMS PEO, BULLET #4? | The Government requires any mid- and back-office functions required to successfully deliver the proposed approach. The Government expects offerors to define these functions as they align to the offeror's specific approach. | |
| 27 | Can the government please define what it means by "non-traditional" firms? | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 28 | How does the PEO evaluate "team chemistry"? Consider removing this highly subjective criterion. | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 29 | Has the government considered for the scenario of the evaluation, to require potential offerors to identify barriers that may impact the success of managed solutions. If you removed all rules of government acquisitions, what would it take to bring all the innovation and new capabilities through endless partners to solve problems? Have offeror’s present what the vision would look like, then introduce known barriers such as policies, regulations, directives, processes, etc. that exist within DHA and have the offeror demonstrate how they would work with the Government to mitigate/remove barriers in an effort to achieve success. | The Government intends to allow flexibility for offerors to propose using methodologies that align to its proposed solution, rather than specifying a specific approach. | |
| 30 | For the Workshare plan on slide 32 recommend that the government consider applying a goal of 30% Small Business participation of total subcontracted dollars for the IDIQ. | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 31 | Can the government please clarify the responsibilities of the Workforce 3.0 with the DevMac? Will the Workforce 3.0 awardee be providing project/program oversight only, or will it be responsible for defining design thinking? To what extent will the PMO act as a systems integrator? | Workforce 3.0 is intended to help the Government transform how it uses particular models, such as design thinking, whereas the DevMAC contractors will be the ones performing the design work for a specific new product. Notionally, where it makes sense to standardize a design thinking model across the portfolio, the WF3 contractor would help the Government adopt that model after identifying the need for a standard and obtaining buy in from the Government. A DevMAC contractor would then use that model to deliver their products. |
Organizational design elements such as the extent a PMO acts as a systems integrator will depend on the products and program.
| 32 | Will the incumbent IDIQ awardee (core TO) be eligible to compete for its follow-on work, should the government open the core work to competition? Will the core vendor be eligible to compete for non-core work? | All Lot 1 awardees will be eligible to compete for each Lot 1 cycle, but will not be eligible to compete for Lot 2 work. | ||
| 33 | How will the performance thresholds to determine if the core task will be recompeted be determined? | These will be finalized during the Design-to-Outcome task order. | ||
| 34 | Can the government please provide an expected date for when they plan to release a draft of Section L & M for industry review and comment? | See HIVE for updated schedule. | ||
| 35 | How will those potential IDIQ awardees who are designated as being on the "back burner" get the opportunity to bid on task orders? | All Lot 1 awardees will be eligible to compete for each Lot 1 cycle. | ||
| 36 | Please define thresholds that the government would consider as "Game Changers?" | See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 37 | Does the government intend to require offerors to submit a draft Performance Management Plan as part of the response? This would allow the government to evaluate the performance metrics proposed. | The Government does not intend to specify the methodology for responding to a particular factor. Offerors must determine what information is most responsive to the criteria dependent on their individual approach. | ||
| 38 | When will the performance metrics be defined? Will these occur at the IDIQ and/or at the Task Order level? | Performance metrics will be agreed upon during Design-to-Outcome or Accelerator task orders. | ||
| 39 | In reference to question #63 from the Q&A and “inside the wire” companies as it pertains to Workforce 3.0, are potential offerors allowed to engage at all with these firms? | These firms are covered by non-disclosure agreements for activities specific to Workforce 3.0, but open engagement is encouraged on the HIVE. The Government does not control interactions between private companies, but "inside the wire" contractors are bound against disclosing any non-public information. | ||
| 40 | Is the government intending to release awardable Task Orders with the release of the IDIQ? If yes, does the government plan to release and require a response for each of the Task Orders to include Task Order 1, Incubation Task Order and Accelerator Task Order? | See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 41 | Will the Government allow prime contractors to make changes to their teams over the course of the contract in order to continually advance performance? This includes addition of new innovators that have emerged in the Health IT space and removal of subcontractors that are demonstrating subpar performance. | Yes | ||
| 42 | In order to achieve industry’s most innovative, yet feasible approaches to the challenge scenarios, will the Government consider no less than 2-3 weeks advance notification for teams to prepare their responses to the challenges scenarios? | Lines 658-to-710 in the WF3 SF1449 Draft #1.75 describe the current structure for Challenge Scenario instructions. Notably, the Government intends to notify qualified Offerors of the high-level capability area to be covered in the challenge scenarios (e.g., "Cybersecurity") through an Initial Notice. This Notice will not include the specific details necessary for sufficient solutioning. Such details will be provided at the start of the challenge scenario period. The intent of the challenge scenarios are to evaluate Offerors' ability to develop a solution in a live, time-constrained setting including the ability to pivot team members and exercise reachback. It is the Offerors' responsibility to assign challenge scenario personnel based on the Initial Notice and then marshal a team during the response period to achieve a successful presentation. The advance period for Initial Notices is still pending finalization based on schedule updates but the Government will provide sufficient time for teams to prepare. | ||
| 43 | Does the Government intend to create a notional small business commitment where the measure of small business participation is based on the percent of work subcontracted rather than percent of overall contract revenue? | In order prevent limiting the array of approaches industry could devise and offer, recommend that if a small business target is set, it bet indexed as a percent of work subcontracted overall. Given the anticipated size of contract, there will be considerable opportunity for small business participation with a pct of total subcontracted dollars approach. A large small business target set against total contract value could deter potential offerors from submitting prime contract bids. | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 44 | In order for the Government to evaluate offerors’ ability to interact with the DHMS Government team in real-time, will the Government consider foregoing the upload of offerors' solutions and instead conduct live interactions? | Lines 1143-to-1185 in the WF3 SF1449 Draft #1.75 describe the current structure for Challenge Scenario evaluations. Notably, the Challenge Scenarios are intended to evaluate Offerors' ability to interact within and amongst the team. Given the digital nature of work in the current environment, the Government has decided to record and allow uploads for Offeror solutioning including web-enabled methodologies. Conducting live interactions in lieu of recorded uploads would: 1) limit the Government's ability to evaluate virtual collaboration, and 2) introduce opportunities for inconsistent facilitation of challenge scenarios. As such, the Government will maintain the current live-recorded Challenge Scenario model. | ||
| 45 | The PEO could consider requiring past performance examples of appropriate size and scale to that of the DHMS environment in the commercial sector. Models that provide transformational impact in a microcosm may not translate effectively to enterprise product and program management environments, and teams should bring demonstrated commercial past performance in digital transformation / product delivery | See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 46 | The PEO could also consider the creation of a “balanced scorecard” around process improvement, features delivery, outcomes delivery, organizational working model, e.g., with prime teams, that would hold its workforce accountable to delivering across multiple categories of effort. | Noted. Thank you. | ||
| 47 | Many industry partners are stalled in determining positioning and teaming (prime or sub) or not being able to bid WF3 at all due to potential OCI outcomes/determinations currently under review by PEO DHMS. This is inhibiting the ability to move forward in solidifying partnerships and solutioning for the proposal. Given the short acquisition timeline and desire to give thoughtful and well articulated proposals, can the OCI determinations be accelerated or can the acquisition timeline be adjusted to provide ample time for PEO DHMS to respond and industry to move forward with finalizing teaming arrangements? | Provide estimated timeline for completing OCI pre-screen reviews and determinations. Build in OCI pre-screen timeframe into acquisition timeline and adjust as needed to enable thoughtful and well articulated responses, as well as greater ability of industry partners to position to meet PEO DHMS' needs for WF3. | Noted. Thank you. | |
| 48 | In the Gate overview on page 1 of Attachment 2, Subfactor 1.3 - Talent, 'Prime & Sub' is indicated, however, page 8 indicates ‘Prime Offeror'. Additionally, page 8 indicates pass criteria for this gate for the ‘Prime Offeror’, however, 4) indicates Offeror Team Member’s. Please confirm the pass criteria is for the Prime & Sub, and/or that 4), specifically, is for Prime & Sub? | Based on industry feedback and the viability of forming balanced teams to deliver the full depth and breadth of WF3 capabilities, the Government has recalibrated its strategy for Gate 3: Talent Management. The requirements shall be modified to only apply to the Prime Offeror. See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 49 | With respect to the goal of incentivizing the WF3 workforce, how will the prime's distribution of the incentives to its workforce and that of its subcontractors be ascertained and evaluated by the government? | The Government does not intend to specify the methodology for responding to a particular factor. Offerors must determine what information is most responsive to the criteria dependent on their individual approach. | ||
| 50 | Cash flow can be challenging for organizations in a risk/reward type contract especially should the incentives be paid on either variable or infrequent cycles. What is the government's payment approach for evaluating performance, and incentives? Monthly? Quarterly? Other? | Lines 1513-to-1537 in the WF3 SF1449 Draft #1.75 describe the current structure for periodic administration of Incentive Profits. Specifically, "At the beginning of the sixth and end of the eleventh months of the "Core Task Order" the Contractor shall provide the results calculated against the metrics and the agreed upon supporting materials" and "Once this determination is made, the Contracting Officer will unilaterally modify the task order to reflect the earned Incentive Profit unit quantity, and de-obligate any surplus funds, as necessary. Once this modification is executed, the Contracting Officer will provide written permission for the Contractor to invoice this line item, and the Government will accept a properly submitted invoice for payment of the Incentive Profit in accordance with the invoicing and payment terms of the contract." In summary, the Government's payment for Incentive Pools shall follow evaluation of metrics occurring on the 6th and 11th month of each 11-month Task Order cycle. | ||
| 51 | The government has suggested bidders will provide a baseline profit % within submissions upon which the incentive model will be based. However, as most of the tasks are shown as Firm Fixed Price (FFP), will prime contractors retain other additional profits from efficiency gains in their delivery while they also own the risk of cost overruns? | The incentive and gamechanger profit pools are separate from the line items where the work is conducted. Baseline work efficiency is also an opportunity for awardees to realize additional profit. | ||
| 52 | How often will the proposed baseline profit and 10x incentives be evaluated and adjusted? One time for the initial proposal or reset for each task thereafter? | For source selection evaluation purposes, the SF-1449 contains the evaluation model. Final incentive models will be negotiated in the Design-to-Outcome or Accelerator task orders. | ||
| 53 | In several of the government's Q&A responses, it has been stated WF3 as a procurement is not a recompete of any contracts currently in place in the DHA environment. Can it be therefore inferred that existing PEO DHMS IT service contracts will continue in parallel to the WF3 contract with an appropriate level of cross-program collaboration, as required? | The PEO 3.0 construct describes the contracts currently planned to be awarded going forward, but is subject to change as requirements and strategies are refined. | ||
| 54 | How will the government determine the separation of scope of work between WF3 and the existing EHR product contracts and hold the WF3 primes accountable for such measurements as UI/UX and others? Will the WF3 primes have oversight of Government procured COTS solutions? | The WF3 contractor will not have oversight, but will likely support the Programs in their oversight of their products. Specifics about metrics and measurements will be determined during Design-to-Outcome or Accelerator orders. | ||
| 55 | Will Lot 1 be awarded prior to Lot 2, allowing unsuccessful Lot 1 Offerors to compete for Lot 2? | To ensure efficiency of the source selection process, the cut-off for receipt of proposals for both Lots is the same, to give the Government the flexibility to conduct evaluations and provide feedback as rapidly as possible, given the limitations on resources available to conduct the evaluation. | ||
| 56 | Draft RFP 1.75 PowerPoint slides 34 and 25 indicate that for both Disruptive Outcomes and Product Prowess, “gate qualification checks whether the Offeror team has at least one member that has contributed significantly to an organization’s significant improvement in market position.” However, the graphics on the respective slides show “Prime” for Disruptive Outcomes and “Prime or Sub” for Product Prowess. Additionally, page 2 of Attachment 2 – Lot 1 Gates, indicate “The Government expects that competitive teams will have at least one member with readily available case studies and/or management artifacts that document successful digital business transformation". Please confirm that Gate 1 – Disruptive Outcomes is for 'Prime or Sub'. | Gate 1, Disruptive Outcomes, will only evaluate the Prime. See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 57 | The NAICS code on Beta. Sam indicates a “Size Standard: $16.5 million annual receipts”, however, WF3 procurement is listed as a Full and Open/Unrestricted opportunity. Please clarify the size standard for Lot 1 and Lot 2. | The NAICS for each Lot is the same. Lot 1 is unrestricted, and Lot 2 is set-aside for small businesses under the standard for that NAICS. | ||
| 58 | Solicitation document HT003821R0001_Draft RFP 1.75, Factor 4: Price Proposal (Lot 1) (rows 471 – 473), Pg. 26 of 68, the Government states that “Offerors shall include the same level of substantiation for all proposed Prime and subcontractor elements of cost. The burden of proof as to credibility rests with the Offeror.” Does the Government expect that all subcontractor contract types must match that of the prime contract type (i.e. Firm Fixed Price with Incentive Profit and Gamechanger Profit pools), or may subcontractor proposals be based on more traditional contract structures such as Labor Hour or Time & Materials contract types, at the Offeror’s discretion. | Arrangements between the prime and sub-contractor will not be specified, but the contract type between the Government and the prime will be Firm-Fixed Price. The Government seeks viable and innovative approaches to achieve program outcomes. In addition to the Price Proposal, Behavior Model proposals allow for Offerors to describe their strategy for managing subcontractor and/or teaming members. The Government does not expect Offerors to use a specified approach for subcontractor contract types. Instead, such factors will be weighed amongst others to establish the overall feasibility and ratings for Offeror proposals. | ||
| 59 | When will the PWS for the Workforce 3.0 initiative be released? | The Government does not intend to provide a PWS. Offeror proposed PWS' will be delivered with their proposals and will be specific to their approach. | ||
| 60 | By setting Lot 2 aside for small business, will this unintentionally restrict medium and large size vendors (tech vendors and SI's) that are not awarded one of the 3 Lot 1 Task Orders but that still can offer targeted capabilities to the government from competing for the Accelerator and Ad-Hoc Task Orders? | Lot 2 is set-aside for small businesses, but the Government does not intend to restrict teaming participation other than as specified in regulations or the SF-1449. | ||
| 61 | How does a company bid for a Lot 2 Award? | See Draft RFP 2 for proposal submission instructions. | ||
| 62 | How does the government intend to determine the size and number of personnel required for the Lot 1 Design-to-Outcome Task Order(s)? | Offerors will propose a level of effort appropriate for their specific approach and the Government will evaluate IAW the RFP. | ||
| 63 | Where is the PEO DHMS Organizational Design (2020 Assessment) Published? | https://hivegov.mobilize.io/main/groups/43575/lounge/resources?path=%2F(2020.11.02)%20Back-up%20Data | ||
| 64 | How does the government intend to determine the size and number of personnel required for each of the various Task Orders to be included in the Pricing Model?? | Offerors will propose a level of effort appropriate for their specific approach and the Government will evaluate IAW the RFP. | ||
| 65 | Can the government provide more detailed definitions of the notional engagement teams (Management Centric, Technology-Centric, Administrative Centric, Free Pick) identified on slide 42 and how the government expects each of those teams to be used in the BAsis of Estimate? | The Government will provide updated and detailed pricing instructions. In the interim, Offerors can expect to propose the notional teams identified on slide 42 as part of the Core Task Order Basis of Estimate. The intent of this model is to provide realistic bounds for constructing the BoE while acknowledging that the actual detailed build-up of contractor Core Task Order workforces shall occur during the Design-To-Outcome task order. The Lot 1 Price Worksheet, Price Eval Table provides further details for which CLINs require BoE. See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 66 | Why are offerers prohibited from submitting offers in both lots? | Offerors can propose as a Prime for either Lot 1 or Lot 2, however not both. Primes may not be a subcontractor on other teams. Subcontractors can propose as part of multiple teams. This design is to ensure that there is independence in the long-term depth of support being provided by Lot 1 and the fast-moving breadth of services being provided by Lot 2. See Draft RFP 2. | ||
| 67 | Why are offerers prohibited from submitting mulitple offers in a Lot which implies that a technology vendor (or others) cannot particiate in multiple teams? | See question 66. | ||
| 68 | Workforce 3 Draft RFP 1.75, Slide 19: Can the government carify whether it is seeking to establish a set of metrics appropriate for the life of the IDIQ, or intends to develop metrics on a task order-by-task order basis? | A simple clarification should suffice, and may be a good topic for discussion in 1:1 office calls. As a best practice in acquisiiton, it would be recommended to establish a small number of broad metrics for the base IDIQ, but a more specific set for each task order tailored to the scope of work. The Design-to-Order Task Order (DTO) could include the development of metrics as a deliverable, to be incorporated in the Core-Task-Order (CTO). | Performance metrics will be agreed upon during Design-to-Outcome or Accelerator task orders and applied to the relevant linked order. | |
| 69 | Workforce 3 Draft RFP 1.75, Slide 22: Can the government provide an estimate on the number of Lot 1 DTO task orders projected in the first year of the IDIQ? | With a target profit base of 2% as stated on slide 18, it is difficult for offerors to project whether the cost to develop an initial proposal or task order proposals could be recouped by an award. The government might consider providing an estimated number of opportunities which will be released for competition in each lot during the first year, or commiting to a minimum award amount for each successful bidder. | The Government anticipates that there will be one Lot 1 task order cycle per year. | |
| 70 | Workforce 3 Draft RFP 1.75, Slide 36: Can the government clarify whether the Gate Element 3 qualifications refer to the entire Offeror Team, or only the Prime? There appears to be a conflict between the slide which reads "Prime & Sub", and Attachment 2_Lot 1 Gate Form which requires responses for the Prime only. | A correction to either the slide or the attachment clarifying intent should suffice. | See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 71 | Attachment 2_Lot 1 Gate Form, pg. 8, Subfactor 1.3: Talent Management, element (1): Would the government reconsider its measurement of Retention Capability? | The Gate Form (pg. 9) lists the Retention Capability gate metric as, "Percent of Employees with >2 Years Tenure." Measuring the percentage of a company's current employees who have been with the company for 2+ years, penalizes successful companies that have grown quickly and recently, leading to many new hires. The government might consider a two-year retention metric (the percent of employees who were with the company two years ago who are still with the company today), as opposed to a two-year tenure metric. | Based on industry feedback and the identification of fringe scenarios that may prevent otherwise qualified Offerors from passing the Gate, the Government has recalibrated its formula and measurements for Retention Capability. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 72 | Attachment 2_Lot 1 Gate Form, pg. 8, Subfactor 1.3: Talent Management, element (3): Would the government reconsider its measurement of Career Development? | The WorldatWork Annual Promotion Survey shows the average promotion rate for most companies is about 8%-9%. As organizations seek to increase their ability to deliver innovation and increase agility, many are flattening their reporting chains and focusing on role mobility as opposed to only titled promotion. Focusing on high promotion rates, then, may be counter-productive to DHA's objectives. The government might consider lowering the acceptable rate, or utilizing other metrics such as annual expenditures per employee on career development; availability and coverage of career paths and mentorship programs; percentage of open positions filled internally; etc. | Based on industry feedback and to account for non-traditional career mobility models, the Government has recalibrated its strategy for Gate 3: Talent Management, Promotion Rate. The requirements shall be modified to demonstrate either Promotion Rate OR Annual Employee Compensation Increase. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 73 | Attachment 2_Lot 1 Gate Form, pg. 8, Subfactor 1.3, element (4): Talent Management: Would the government consider specifying that no more than 5% of the Offeror Team Member operating division that will execute this requirement, shall come from MHS contracts? | DHA is looking for non-traditional companies, technologies, new ideas and solutions from industry. With a 5% general revenue threshold, DHA may still favor contractors who engage in large amounts of work with the MHS today, but whose total revenues across the corporate entity are large enough to outweigh this. The government might consider setting a 5% revenue threshold at the level of the operating division that will execute this requirement, or setting a dollar threshold as opposed to a percentage threshold. | Based on industry feedback and the viability of forming balanced teams to deliver the full depth and breadth of WF3 capabilities, the Government has recalibrated its strategy for Gate 3: Talent Management. The requirements shall be modified to only apply to the Prime Offeror. See Draft RFP 2. | |
| 74 | Can a company be a subcontractor on one proposal and a prime (or CTA/JV) on another proposal? If yes, are there circumstances where this would not be allowed: (a) different business types on the same RFP and (b) different RFPs in the family (DEVMAC, XaaS, Workplace (i.e. 8(a) and OTSB)? | See Draft RFP 2. Other than OCI issues that are specific to each offeror's circumstances, the Government does not intend to definitively limit participation between the PEO 3.0 contracts. | ||
| 75 | Can a company propose firm, fixed price (development), and CFPP elements in the same proposal in order to support scaling and sustainability of products and services delivered? For instance web resource requirements may increase over time (storage, RAM, etc.). Can those types of variable costs be proposed as CFPP, or is FFP the only option? | The contracts will be firm fixed price. | ||
| 76 | (*) While you mention outcomes-based measures which are typically project-based for system modernization efforts (i.e. cost, schedule, and performance), are you tieing outcomes to health outcomes? Is there an overarching goal or strategy of the MHS that awardees should also acknowledge when proposing and during the assessment, design, and delivery of solutions (for instance, improve patient outcomes, measured by in-patient bed days, mortality, reduced readmissions, infection rates, rehabilitation days, reduced pain medication, improved patient experience, or other pain points or quality improvement objectives?) Do proposers need to suggest/declare industry best practices and quality measures in their response or are we to propose outcomes that tend to address scope to project measures such as cost, schedule, performance to be competitive? | Workforce 3.0 is intended to modernize the PEO's organization. While the Government intends for this to improve the technology it delivers and that that technology will improve health outcomes, there is no intent to directly measure MHS outcomes within the WF3 contract. | ||
| 77 | Related to (*) above, and focused on patient health outcomes, does modernization of the PEO DHMS methods, processes, tools and mid/back-office also encompass modernizing clinical infrastructure to deliver improved data and medical operations efficiencies? Can offerors propose clinical infrastructure enhancements/tools that lead to improved medical business operations? | The PEO is not responsible for clinical infrastructure or MHS processes/operations. | ||
| 78 | Can a company propose across one or more of the other solicitation opportunities including XAAS, DEVMAC, and Workplace 3.0, in addition to Workforce 3.0? Or does that then create COIs and is discouraged. | See Draft RFP 2. Other than OCI issues that are specific to each offeror's circumstances, the Government does not intend to definitively limit participation between the PEO 3.0 contracts. The Government intends to post additional OCI guidance shortly. | ||
| 79 | How many operational business units should be covered in the proposal for Lot 1? (Note periodic table) | Lines 1005-to-1027 in the WF3 SF1449 Draft #1.75 describe the requirements for the Knowledge Check in the proposal Notably, "while these activities include but are not limited to the capabilities outlined in the WF3 Periodic Table incorporated in the Workforce 3.0 Draft RFP 1.75 slide deck, only restating the capabilities of the WF3 Periodic Table does not the satisfy the minimal requirements for an acceptable response." The Government does not intend to specify a set number of operational business units to be covered in the proposal. Offerors will be expected to design and submit an operating model that best suits the intended outcomes of Workforce 3.0. | ||
| 80 | Slide 25-27 of the latest deck and the corresponding content indicates that there will be three Lot 1 awardees with one of them being awarded DTO1 and CTO1, covering a period of about 14 months. While understanding that there will be performance checks/mid-term assessment (exceed or fail) along the way during CTO1, it looks like the other two Lot 1 awardees will not get any task orders until month 8, and these will be 2 month incubator tasks. If the first contractor exceeds, it looks like it could be even longer. Considering the effort involved in proposing for and standing up an organization for this important work and slide 31 that states, “We want you to be excited about this solicitation!” Can you please clarify if that is the case? | If this is the PEO's intent, suggest that the PEO regroup and develop some semi-parallel DTs and CTs to the other two awardees, or compress the timeline for the first awardee. If this is not the PEO's intent (to only issue incubator tasks well into the first period of performance, while the awardees wait for the outcome of CTO1), then request clarification. | Yes, awardees not selected during the initial fair opportunity (conducted concurrently with the IDIQ source selection) will only receive the incubator task orders during the first cycle. If the awardee that receives the DTO1 and CTO1 does not meet the metrics and is not awarded a logical follow-on for the next cycle, a fair opportunity will be conducted and all awardees will receive a chance to bid for the next cycle of task orders. | |
| 81 | What current DHMS contracts are considered for consolidation to support WF3 requirements? | The Government developed this new requirement based on the substantial evolution of DHMS and FEHRM's mission. No previous contracts were germane to this effort. | ||
| 82 | For Lot 1, initial sequence task order, what gating criteria (assessments) are used across the three awardees during the 90 day assessment, planning and transition to finalize the awardee?. Are these assessments public or private to assess the solution offering capabilities? The other two awardees will be provided incubator TO and brought in to preform these TO for two months (month 8 & 9) ? | Awardees not selected during the initial fair opportunity (conducted concurrently with the IDIQ source selection) will only receive the incubator task orders during the first cycle. If the awardee that receives the DTO1 and CTO1 does not meet the metrics and is not awarded a logical follow-on for the next cycle, a fair opportunity will be conducted and all awardees will receive a chance to bid for the next cycle of task orders, but only the initial fair opportunity winner will receive the initial DTO task order. | ||
| 83 | Slide 25 states the 90 day assessment is provided to the initial awardee... | |||
| while slide 22 states the best of three awardee will be issued a 90 day assessment. Can you please provide clarity in reference to the initial awardee and the statement in slide 22? | See Question 83 | |||
| 84 | Both WF3 and WP3 have the same acquisition timeline, but Industry has not seen any documents related to WP3 opportunity. Industry is trying to make decisions as to Prime or subcontract these two critical requirements and understand the linkage between the two. When will the government provide the requirements/docs (DRFP) for WorkPlace 3.0? | The Government anticipates releasing documents related to Workplace 3.0 in this quarter. | ||
| 85 | Acquisition Tempo: Right now my potential partners and competitors are still deciding if/how to proceed (we hear variations of Mr. Svabek’s postings a lot). Building the right partner set, one that is focused on risk sharing and delivering outcomes, will take time. On the current acquisition schedule, the government is likely to get glossed-up versions of standard proposals from the usual mix of existing DHA consultancies. Also note that industry’s default (and likely incorrect) interpretation of a short timeline is that it is wired. | Recommendation 1: Extend the acquisition timeline by a few months so the right types of teams have time to form, better understand the requirement, and define strong outcome-focused responses. | The Government will consider your comment/suggestion. | |
| 86 | Evaluate Who Gets Incentives: We believe that the government has correctly identified the need to change the incentives. The shift to a new outcomes based incentive model will help in this direction; however, changing how the companies are incentivized is not enough. The positive disruptive change that DHMS seeks will only occur if meaningful and timely incentives flow down to the employees that actually generate and implement new approaches. Workforce 3.0 needs to encourage companies to change how they engage, incentivize, and share profits and risk with their employees by moving away from “federal consulting” models and towards other employee incentive and engagement models. Greater than 9% cited in Gate Element 1.3 is too low a floor to incentivize and fails to track where the bonuses are allocated. | Recommendation 2: Develop evaluation criteria that ensure that the bidders are able to attract and retain innovative and creative team members that shepherd products to market more effectively. The evaluation factors should: |
• Ensure that incentive payments motivate future action by the Workforce 3.0 staff and are NOT just absorbed by the corporate management structure or simply become retained earnings;
• Determine if the vendor’s compensation plan shares incentives (and risks) with employees in a manner that attracts the right type of talent. DHMS PEO 3.0 requires a different mindset than is the risk-adverse and “don’t rock the boat” norm for federal contracting;
• Contain a mechanism to track and hold the vendor to this plan so that creative ideas are rewarded and that the rewards reach the actual innovators.
| The Behavior Model factors indirectly touch on these conceptually and a team could incorporate these into their response to that section. We recommend the evaluators specifically rate employee incentives as a separate item using the above three points. It would also make sense to have separate evaluation of “motivating” employees/teammates from influencing positive behaviors from Government personnel. | The Government intends to allow offerors the flexibility to address these motivational linkages in the Behavior factor and will further define applicable metrics during the Design-to-Outcome task order. | |||
| 87 | Strengthen the Incentives: Using an incentive based contract to drive a shift to an outcomes based acquisition approach is the correct course of action. The model on Slide 18 works conceptually but is not scaled or tuned correctly to drive change. A “2-and-20” model with a profit floor (2%) and an incentive pool or ceiling (20%) is pretty normal for federal contracting and is very conservative by commercial standards. 20% margin is not enough to motivate behavior change or to drive meaningful and sustained effort. Average contribution margins on federal consulting contracts are between 20% and 30% (net profit appears lower because it is absorbed by corporate/partners/execs). The incentive structure/pool should be significantly larger and designed to aggressively award meeting targets and punish (perhaps the wrong word) missing thresholds. Note it is also important to provide the vendor space to “fail fast and forward”. | Recommendation 3a: Change the risk equation! The “2 and 20” puts no risk on the vendor. Lower the profit floor, if the vendor fails to deliver (enough) desired outcomes/thresholds, there should be zero profit or even a loss. Balance this by having a real upside for meeting (enough) targets. At least 50% feels right, if all targets are met. This risk/reward feedback loop should be reflected in the employee’s compensation to ensure that both the government, vendor and their employees share the same objective. | ||
| Recommendation 3b: We also recommend that the highest ceiling-level profits should NOT be immediately attainable. Rather the incentive ceiling and the thresholds to achieve them should increase in the out years. This encourages continual improvement and recognizes that improvement in later years is harder because the “easier” changes have already been made. | The Government will not specify the base profit, contractors are free to balance their proposal from a business perspective by determining the appropriate mix of reward versus competitiveness in pricing. The Government will specify that incentive rewards significantly outweigh the base rewards (see Draft RFP 2). | |||
| 88 | Clarification of Pools: The “Gamechanger” pool is designed to reward strategic (as opposed to incremental) improvements. Incentives needed to be clear and believable to be effective. However, the mechanism to identify and potential award funding for these “changes” needs to be better defined. As currently described, receiving these awards, even when driving change, seem very unlikely from our perspective. Moreover, the limited detail about “Nomination” seems rife for abuse in both directions. | Recommendation 4: Potential annual or quarterly “Gamechanger” targets should be negotiated in advance (during previous year or quarter perhaps) and have clearly defined triggers. Payment should be automatic once the target has been met; however, this payment could require an extended “proof period” to ensure that impact is real. This may mean that the payment could potentially occur after the POP. This approach extends the vendor’s time horizon beyond their POP and would encourage investments and actions with longer payback periods. It may also help break the short term thinking endemic in consulting. | The intent of the Gamechanger pool is to act as a separate and distinct channel from the Incentive pool. As stated in a recent HIVE video, the Incentive pool is negotiated while the Gamechanger is discretionary. Recommendation 4 aligns to the intent of the Incentive pool with payment details negotiated during the DTO. However, the Gamechangers are designed to allow PEO DHMS to reward unanticipated yet impactful behavior through the course of performance. Governance regarding the Gamechanger awards is designed to mitigate risk of abuse from both directions. | |
| 89 | Gate Element 1.3: Metrics will make the gate criteria easier to evaluate and reduce evaluator bias. However, the metrics for Gate Elements 1-3 in Draft RFP 1.75 do not match well to an outcome orientated work scope because these metrics focus on evaluating inputs (Gate 1.3 - employee retention, percent of revenue). Evaluating inputs is tied to traditional consulting contract evaluation models and experience is only loosely correlated with driving innovation. | Recommendation 5: Do not evaluate inputs in the Gate Elements. Rather focus the evaluation factors on how the employees are incentivized to deliver desirable outcomes. The “right” incentive plan will attract and retain employees with the “correct” mindset, skills, and expertise. Note the “performance incentive” factor is good; however, the threshold is too low to motivate change (see section above). | The Government will consider your comment/suggestion. | |
| 90 | There is a very quick turn between the final RFP and proposal due date, limiting industry's ability to provide thoughtful and thorough proposed solutions and responses. Since this is a new, complex, and innovative approach and to decrease risk to the government and industry, will the government consider allowing more time for proposal development? | Recommend extending the proposal development timeframe from date of Final RFP release (recommend 45-60 days to allow adequate time for proposal development). | The Government will consider your comment/suggestion. |
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