FINAL.ER.Solicitation.pdf

HSHQDC-14-R-B0011 BAA14-101

Exploratory Research in

Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism

Broad Agency Announcement No.

BAA14-101

for

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

(DNDO)

Transformational and Applied Research Directorate

(TAR)

Table of Contents 1 Introduction

1.1 Background

1.2 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

1.3 Strategic Approach

1.4 Scope and Funding

2 Exploratory Research Topics

2.1 RTA-01: Detector Materials Development for Active Interrogation Techniques

2.2 RTA-02: Shielding Anomaly Detection

2.3 RTA-03: Reduction in Cost of Existing and Near-Term Nuclear/Radiological Threat Detection Systems

2.4 RTA-04: Model-driven Analysis Tool Research and Development

3 Management Approach

3.1 Program Milestone Structure

3.2 Deliverables and Review Cycles

4 Procurement Overview

4.1 Eligible Offerors

4.2 Review and Evaluation Process

4.3 Award Instruments

4.4 Award Schedule

4.5 Period of Performance

5 Proposal Preparation and Content

5.1 White Paper Preparation: Format and Content

5.2 Full Proposal Preparation: Format and Content

6 Evaluation Criteria

6.1 Criterion I: Transformational Impact

6.2 Criterion II: Technical Approach

6.3 Criterion III: Capability and Experience

6.4 Criterion IV: Management Approach

6.5 Criterion V: Cost/Price Realism and Reasonableness

7 Instructions to Offerors

7.1 Submission of White Papers and Full Proposals

7.2 Questions

7.3 Central Contractor Registration:

7.4 Representations and Certifications

7.5 Safety Act

7.6 Security/Classified White Papers/Full Proposals

8 Attachments

8.1 White Paper/Full Proposal Cover Sheet

8.2 Quad Chart Template

1 INTRODUCTION

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Office of Procurement Operations (OPO) is soliciting proposals for the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) under this Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) for Exploratory Research (ER) that directly supports the DNDO mission. This BAA solicits first white papers and then full proposals in the area of Preventing Nuclear and Radiological Terrorism that may lead to a dramatic improvement in national capabilities in nuclear/radiological detection.

For this BAA, the Government encourages full proposals from the following types of organizations which could serve as the prime contractor: private industry, academic institutions, and non-profit organizations. Prohibited from serving as prime but encouraged to participate as sub-contractors for this BAA are National Laboratories, Federal Government Laboratories, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), Federal Government Activities, Federal Agencies, and Government-Sponsored University Affiliated Research Centers (UARCs).

This BAA is issued under paragraphs 6.102(d)(2) and 35.016 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), which provides for the competitive selection, as stated in Section 6, of basic and applied research and/or development not related to a specific system or hardware. Full proposals submitted in response to this BAA that are selected for award are considered to be the result of full and open competition and in compliance with the provision of Public Law 98-369, “The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984” and subsequent amendments.

The award schedule for this BAA is as follows:

DATE EVENT

9 JUNE 2014

MONDAY

Pre-solicitation Notice Posted

13 JUNE

2014 FRIDAY

BAA Solicitation Posted and Open for White Paper Submission

20 JUNE

2014 FRIDAY

Questions Submission Deadline for White Papers, 12:00 PM ET (Noon)

23 JUNE 2014

MONDAY DNDO: Responses Posted to Questions for White Papers

25 JULY 2014

FRIDAY White Papers Submission Deadline, 4:00 PM ET

11 SEPT 2014

THURSDAY

DNDO: Responses for White Papers Provided to Offerors and Open for Full Proposal Submission

23 SEPT 2014

TUESDAY

Questions Submission Deadline for Full Proposals, 12:00 PM (noon) ET

25 SEPT 2014

THURSDAY DNDO: Responses for Full Proposal Questions Provided to

1.1 Background

The Department of Homeland Security has been tasked to ensure that the United States remains safe from the illicit importation, development, or procurement of a nuclear or radiological device. In recognition of the catastrophic risk posed by the use of a nuclear weapon within the United States, DHS has integrated all nuclear detection research, development, testing, evaluation, acquisition, and operational support into a single office: the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. DNDO develops the global nuclear detection architecture; conducts research and development; and acquires and supports the deployment of domestic nuclear detection and forensics systems.

The Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) Directorate was established within DNDO to conduct, support, coordinate, and encourage an aggressive transformational program of Research and Development (R&D) that will dramatically improve national capabilities to detect and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device, Special Nuclear Material (SNM), or radiological materials outside of regulatory control. Priority is placed on R&D that has the greatest potential for addressing needs or weaknesses in the global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). TAR will undertake those efforts that dramatically improve performance and reduce technical, performance, and/or cost risks in achieving DNDO objectives by bringing innovative new concepts to a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) demonstration before transitioning them to an advanced technology demonstration program or supporting direct commercialization of the technology.

DNDO coordinates and consults with other Government agencies (intra-DHS, Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DoD), etc.) to reduce duplication of effort, leverage related R&D efforts, and encourage collaboration across the R&D community.

1.2 Global Nuclear Detection Architecture

The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) is a worldwide network of sensors, telecommunications, and personnel, with the supporting information exchanges, programs, and protocols that serve to detect, analyze, and report on nuclear and radiological materials that are out of regulatory control. The term “out of regulatory control” refers to materials that are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, developed, or used without authorization by the appropriate regulatory authority, either inadvertently or deliberately.

Furthermore, the GNDA:

• is global in that it includes both U.S. systems and those of other countries, as well as the sharing of information among those systems;

Offerors

31 OCT 2014

FRIDAY

Full Proposals Submission Deadline, 12:00 PM ET (Noon)

BY FEBRUARY

Anticipated Award Date

• targets illicit trafficking and unauthorized use of nuclear and radiological material to help protect against both nuclear and radiological terrorism;

• detects by way of passive and active detection equipment as well as by non-technical means, such as ongoing law-enforcement information or observations, public and other government departments and agencies’ observations, or reporting of suspicious behavior;

and

• represents the architecture or structure which reflects the fully coordinated approach to detect, analyze, and promptly report nuclear and radiological threats.

DNDO has identified a number of significant, long-term technical challenges in the deployment and operation of an effective architecture. Many of these challenges cannot be easily overcome with existing or near-term technology developments. They include:

• Cost effective equipment with sufficient technical performance to ensure widespread deployment;

• Enhanced wide area search capabilities in a variety of scenarios to include urban and highly cluttered environments;

• Capabilities that we can deploy along challenging GNDA pathways, to include scanning of general aviation and small maritime vessels, and searching for nuclear threats along our borders, between ports of entry; and finally,

• We must be able to detect nuclear threats, even when they are heavily shielded.

Technological solutions to these challenges and many others required to improve the GNDA will require sustained, long-term support to develop the fundamental scientific and technological foundation required to make such detection capabilities effective and affordable. Major advances in capabilities that support the GNDA can be achieved through focused research in areas ranging from the sensor materials, front-end-electronics, advanced algorithms, modeling, sensor fusion and other research supporting development of passive, active, and ancillary detection systems. Advances in one or more of these areas in-turn can provide new and improved capabilities for screening, scanning or searching for nuclear and radiological materials of concern, improved identification of these materials and reduced or simplified operations for end-users. The many challenges in developing the GNDA illustrate the need for a well-supported transformational and applied research program to fully explore the limits and potential of physics, engineering, mathematics and computation to counter the radiological and nuclear threat.

1.3 Strategic Approach

The DNDO approach to transformational and applied research is intended to stimulate the R&D community in academia, private industry, non-profit organizations, federally funded research and development centers (FFRDCs), university affiliated research centers (UARCs) and other Federally-funded Government activities. To this end, the overall TAR research and development program is organized into four primary initiatives: Exploratory Research, Advanced Technology Demonstrations, an Academic Research Initiative, and Small Business Innovation Research. A description of each of these follows:

• Exploratory Research (ER) – this BAA is intended to transform the basic building blocks of nuclear detection technology and supporting fields. Innovative concepts that successfully complete the exploratory R&D phases are typically brought to a Proof-of- Concept (PoC) demonstration – a minimal, but functional, realization of the technology for testing and demonstration, typically in a laboratory environment. DNDO anticipates releasing future Exploratory Research BAAs on an annual schedule.

The present BAA covers only Exploratory Research. However, the following initiatives may be announced as separate solicitation announcements. The following is for informational purposes only. Full proposals for Advanced Technology Demonstrations, the Academic Research Initiative and Small Business Innovation Research must await the issuance of their respective solicitation announcements. Solicitation announcements for the following initiatives are anticipated sometime in FY14 or FY15 if not already issued.

• Advanced Technology Demonstrations (ATDs) are the final stage of development and evaluation of proven (PoC) technology in the DNDO Transformational Research program. The purpose of an ATD is to develop a mature prototype capable of providing reliable performance measurements in a challenging and realistic, albeit simulated, operational environment, replicating the concept of operations and employment relevant to the technologies intended use. ATDs may also include a limited demonstration of the technology in an operational environment. Data generated during technology demonstration and characterization (TD&C) will be analyzed to formulate recommendations on technology maturity, support a cost-benefit analysis of the technology and aid in determining next-steps in development to include potential commercial system development and acquisition.

• The Academic Research Initiative (ARI) is intended to support a research community in nuclear detection and related sciences within academia that will conduct fundamental and early applied research in nuclear detection and related fields. The ARI is also intended to address the human capital crisis in scientists and engineers who can support the next generation of researchers in these fields. Research grants cover a wide breadth of research activities, emphasize collaborative and interdisciplinary approaches to research, and encourage robust student engagement at both the graduate and undergraduate levels.

Successful ARI research endeavors may support exploratory research efforts and small business research projects.

• Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) program supports technological innovation that can lead to rapid prototyping and commercialization of concepts by small businesses, to include socially and economically disadvantaged small business concerns.

1.4 Scope and Funding

DNDO anticipates making multiple awards under this BAA. DNDO reserves the right to fund all, parts, or none of the full proposals received and will fund awards by phases as options under this BAA. Total funding for this BAA in FY14 is anticipated to be $3.2M with additional funding potentially available in later years. The actual number and size of awards under this BAA will be at the discretion of DNDO, based on a review of submitted proposals against the criteria listed in Section 6, and the availability of funds.

2 EXPLORATORY RESEARCH TOPICS

DNDO is interested in technologies or methodologies that can dramatically improve the national capability to detect and report attempts to import or transport a nuclear device, SNM, or radiological material outside of regulatory control. For this BAA, the technologies and methodologies are divided into four Research Topic Areas (RTA) as follows:

• RTA-01: Detector Materials Development for Active Interrogation Techniques

• RTA-02: Shielding Anomaly Detection

• RTA-03: Reduction in Cost of Existing and Near-Term Nuclear/Radiological Threat Detection Systems

• RTA-04: Model-driven Analysis Tool Research and Development Each RTA description below contains a summary of the research area of interest with examples of intended research and overall performance objectives, as appropriate. Offerors must propose to a specific RTA. It is anticipated that the topics will change in future exploratory research solicitations, which are scheduled to be released on a yearly basis. Offerors must emphasize the extent to which their proposal provides transformational capability in support of the DNDO mission and compare to current solutions, as applicable.

DNDO prefers comprehensive programs that may include elements of scientific theory, modeling, simulation, experimental investigations, algorithm development, and other elements of applied research and development. All exploratory research efforts should lead to a formal proof-of-concept demonstration. Note that the intended scope of exploratory research excludes large scale, integrated systems development efforts that are the focus of advanced technology demonstrations and other developmental programs and projects.

Proposals should provide a phased technical approach (see Section 3.1), starting with a feasibility demonstration and evaluation in Phase I to address all critical technical issues; leading to a PoC prototype demonstration in Phase V. A program can enter into a phase later than feasibility if the proposal can show that feasibility has already been demonstrated. Supporting documentation, data, simulations, analytic calculations, and references need to be provided to support the proposed approach. For this BAA, DNDO is only considering offerings addressing solutions for areas described in the following Research Topic Areas (RTA):

2.1 RTA-01: Detector Materials Development for Active Interrogation Techniques

One of the gaps or weaknesses in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) is the difficulty of passive detection methods to find and identify rad/nuc material with either low gamma or neutron emission or material which is heavily shielded or masked. Active interrogation (AI) is one solution, using either gamma rays or neutron beams or other particle beams, to probe objects such as vehicles, containers, or aircraft, and detectors to sense the subsequent stimulated emission.

Up to now, the AI system designers and integrators have been driving the solutions to gamma and neutron detection. The AI application harbors special requirements for detectors of gammas and neutrons. These unique requirements include high efficiency, fast decay time, ruggedness, high stopping power, high gamma-neutron discrimination, low activation, low cost, safe operation (non-hazardous), good energy resolution for gammas and/or neutrons, and large scale detectors. For mobile units, there are additional requirements of compactness, low weight, and low power consumption.

This topic area is soliciting research proposals for the development of detector materials better suited for: Sub-Topic 1A) Transmission Radiography (single and/or multi-energy), and Sub- Topic 1B) Fission Detection. The proposal should include:

1) Description of presently employed materials in AI systems (state-of-the-art);

2) Description of the proposed material(s) including availability (e.g., raw materials), and the methods to be utilized in developing them;

3) A performance comparison between the proposed material and the current state-of-the-art detailing which metrics are not met, which are met, and which are exceeded;

4) Cost projections (per cubic centimeter and/or per gram) for current and future production;

5) Expected challenges in developing the proposed materials; and

6) Expected duration of the development effort needed to make the material available for testing

The proposal should state which of the following types of AI systems the proposed material(s) can be used for:

• Stationary / re-locatable system o Cargo containers, rail cars, air cargo, aircraft, personally owned vehicles (POV)

• Mobile system (but not human portable) o Urban environments, POV; moving or stationary

• Human portable system o Urban environments; vehicles; small container; maritime

Sub-Topic 1A: Transmission Radiography: This sub-topic is soliciting near term replacements for commonly used radiography detector materials such as cadmium tungstate, lead tungstate, and cesium iodide. The proposed detector materials should perform as well as the state-of-the-art but at lower cost or perform better than the state-of-the-art at similar or lower cost. Responses should emphasize materials approaches that can realize mature manufacturing readiness in a two to three year time frame. Materials that would utilize solid-state readouts are preferred over photomultiplier tubes. Other desired characteristics for all materials would include good spectroscopy performance, insensitivity to temperature, and mechanically robust.

Proposed materials that perform better than state-of-the-art at similar or lower cost must achieve or exceed all of the following performance metrics:

- Responsive to x-ray energy between 0.5-9 MeV

- High stopping power equivalent to or better than CdWO4

- If scintillator, greater than 10,000 photons /MeV

- Radiation hardness of 500 MRad or greater over a time period of 5 years

- Non-hygroscopic preferred unless encapsulation does not affect detector pitch

- Producible in moderate to large detector voxels (>10 mm x >10 mm x >25 mm = >2.5 cm3)

- Less than 1% afterglow @ 2 milliseconds

- Less than 100 microsecond rise time with < 1 millisecond fall time

For materials that perform as well as the state-of-the-art but at lower cost, some combination of the above performance metrics must be achieved.

Sub-Topic 1B: Fission detection: This sub-topic is soliciting detector materials for the detection of photon and/or neutron induced fission. The fission products can be in the form of neutrons or gammas. For example, current TAR developed systems typically utilize liquid scintillator based detectors for neutron detection. The proposed detector materials should perform as well as the state-of-the-art but at lower cost or perform better than the state-of-the-art at similar or lower cost. Non-liquid, non-gaseous, and non-hazardous based detector materials are desired. Other desired characteristics would include insensitivity to temperature and mechanically robust.

Proposed materials that perform better than state-of-the-art at similar or lower cost must achieve or exceed all of the following performance metrics for each detection type:

For delayed neutron detection:

- Greater than 10-5 neutron/gamma discrimination

- 30% or greater neutron stopping efficiency at ~1 MeV

- Producible in large surface area (1 m x1 m = 1 m2)

- Rise time of better than 100 nanoseconds and fall time of better than 1000 nanoseconds

For prompt neutron detection:

- Responsive to neutron energies of 0.5 MeV and higher

- Greater than 30% neutron stopped efficiency at ~1MeV

- High neutron/gamma discrimination (better than 10-9)

- Producible in large surface area (1 m x 1 m = 1 m2)

- If scintillator, low afterglow (<0.01% within 1 millisecond)

- Less than 1 nanosecond rise time

For delayed gamma detection:

- Responsive to gamma energies of 2.6-9 MeV

- 50% or greater gamma stopping efficiency

- Better than 30% energy resolution at 2.6 MeV

- No afterglow after 1 millisecond

- Producible in greater than or equal to 40 cm x 40 cm sizes

- Less than 1 nanosecond rise time

- 4 nanosecond fall time

For materials that perform as well as the state-of-the-art but at lower cost, some combination of the above performance metrics for each detection type must be achieved.

The proposal would be best informed from teams consisting of AI systems designers and integrators and materials developers.

The proposal should provide a phased technical approach (see Section 3.1.1): starting with a feasibility demonstration and evaluation in Phase I to address all critical technical issues; leading to a PoC prototype demonstration in Phase II. The program may begin in a phase later than feasibility if the proposal can show that feasibility has already been demonstrated.

2.2 RTA-02: Shielding Anomaly Detection

Radiation detectors are the primary tool used to detect radiological and nuclear (RN) materials that could be used in an act of terrorism. To avoid detection, adversaries may try to shield these materials inherent radiation signatures to the point where detection of the shielding material itself may be an effective complementary detection modality. Active interrogation techniques, including radiography, have been developed and deployed at our borders to help detect shielded threats. However, because these systems use ionizing radiation, it limits there mobility and there application where people might be present.

The goal of this topic area is to develop a capability to detect large, dense anomalous objects suggestive of a nuclear weapon or shielding in vehicles, cargo containers, boats, airplanes, or buildings. The technique need not be perfect, but it should greatly reduce the number of objects that require a more intensive interrogation technique such as close proximity radiation scan, secondary x-ray image scan, personnel interview, or manual inspection. Examples of technologies that might fill this niche include gravity sensors, electromagnetic field analysis, acoustics, weight sensors, and radar. The capability should not use external sources of ionizing radiation, be integratable with current radiation detection technologies, and it should be mobile in its final implementable form. The proposal should state the expected nuisance alarms for the proposed technology in the anticipated application if the detection requirement is an 8 kg high atomic number (Z>74) object, with a detection time comparable to existing scan times for current radiation sensing and radiographic scanning approaches.

The proposal must provide a phased technical approach (see Section 3.1.2): starting with a feasibility demonstration and evaluation in Phase I to address all critical technical issues; leading to a PoC prototype demonstration in Phase V. The program may begin in a phase later than feasibility if the proposal can show that feasibility has already been demonstrated.

2.3 RTA-03: Reduction in Cost of Existing and Near-Term

Nuclear/Radiological Threat Detection Systems

A range of radiation detection equipment and industrial radiographic imaging systems with improved capabilities for nuclear/radiological (N/R) materials detection or discrimination has risen in commercial availability over the last decade. However the purchase, operating and maintenance costs of these technologies are often very high and prohibitive to large scale acquisition and deployment. Furthermore, the utilization of these systems could be significantly improved by incorporating technologies that provide “smart” operations, minimizing the administrative and operational cost of conducting N/R detection missions. Enhancements that reduce costs and simplify use of these technologies are anticipated to result in overall increased mission effectiveness and capabilities of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Proposals are sought for methods, techniques, and processes to significantly reduce the procurement, operational, maintenance, and total lifecycle costs of existing or near-term N/R detection systems without compromising the performance of such systems. Examples could include research to substantially reduce the cost of component or sub-system technology employed in N/R detection systems; or operations research and research in human-machine interfaces to greatly reduce the operational costs of these systems. Proposed approaches should enable a goal of 50% or more total cost reduction with sufficient evidence to support the proposed reductions. The proposal should clearly state the class of equipment (e.g., x-ray imager, backpack detector) that the proposed research could effect and how the cost reduction would be implemented if the proposed research is successful. The proposal should also state how the proposed research is different from similar past research efforts.

The proposal must provide a phased technical approach (see Section 3.1.2): starting with a feasibility demonstration and evaluation in Phase I to address all critical technical issues; leading to a PoC prototype demonstration in Phase V. The program may begin in a phase later than feasibility if the proposal can show that feasibility has already been demonstrated.

2.4 RTA-04: Model-driven Analysis Tool Research and Development There continues to exist a need to for highly efficient (faster than real time), high fidelity computer modeling of tactical nodes that constitute the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA). Although considerable work has been accomplished in this area, the efforts to date have been predominantly ad-hoc and evolutionary. These tools provide only limited fidelity in modeling the wide array of detection and adjudication operations that constitute the GNDA and generally only support static conditions.

This topic area focusses on the need for a foundational modeling platform and enabling modules that provide new capabilities to accelerate the ability to develop, execute and analyze simulations of the encounter between detection assets and threats for a broad range of scenarios. Specific products of these models include Monte-Carlo informed operational cost assessments (as measured by time, personnel and dollars) to support a given concept of operations (CONOPS), and the likely success of that CONOPS in threat interdiction (as measured by receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves). The purpose of these encounter models is to enable comparative analyses between advanced or existing detection systems and assess how those systems are the optimally employed. Specifically, research in the following areas is desired:

• Detection Node Discrete Event Simulation Tool: Research in the development of an end-to-end process model that connects separate but related events for a defined interdiction CONOPS within a given GNDA node. Discrete events could include encounter, detection, localization, threat classification, and adjudication in a search operation or primary screening, secondary screening, and alarm adjudication in a screening operation. Each discrete event is itself dynamic (in time and space), with associated defining processes, variables, probabilities, and uncertainties. Research is necessary to 1) provide a flexible tool(s) that can be readily adapted to any GNDA node of interest in the maritime, aviation or land domains, 2) provide high fidelity representation of the outcomes of each dynamic event and conditional relationships between connected events, 3) be able to analyze the duration, manpower, and other operational costs within and between events as well as the overall cost of the implemented CONOP, and 4) assess the overall ROC curve performance of the implemented CONOP. The research should assess how such tools can be designed to facilitate integrated Monte-Carlo analysis of the GNDA node, and the effects of changing key variables and/or their probabilities on CONOP cost and performance. Implemented concepts should include a dashboard analysis concept that enables simple, robust and complete exploration of the modelled parameter space and effective communication of key simulation results.

• Radiation Transport and Detector Response Module: Since radiation detection and/or radiographic screening are key enabling aspects of GNDA node events, research is necessary on the optimal use of radiation transport theory, modeling and experimental data to support event simulations, with emphasis on faster-than-real-time simulation of dynamic conditions. Transported radiation then must be accurately responded to by whatever threat detection system(s) is employed in the given CONOP. Research is necessary on means to simplify introduction of detection system response functions into modelled vignettes, to include their response under dynamic conditions (source and detector moving relative to each other), and encompassing the algorithms and signal processing that occurs within the system. In the case of radiographic or active detection techniques, simplified approaches to model these systems performance in detecting threats are also required. The research could also explore for a given node how novel, serial or integrated threat detection techniques can be modeled, to include for example, video-enabled radiation detection systems, radiation imaging systems, advanced radiographic systems, and/or active interrogation approaches. Finally, research identifying key issues with supporting forward compatible capabilities to include both future CONOPS and future detection technology are also of interest.

• Background and Clutter Module: Threat detection based on radiation sensing is confounded by the presence of background radiation and clutter associated with naturally occurring radioactive materials. Similarly, radiographic and many active detection techniques are hindered by heterogeneous and dense cargo surrounding threat materials.

Research is necessary to develop more accurate estimates of the statistical background noise and clutter that would be experienced by radiation detection and/or radiographic inspection systems in modelled vignettes under dynamic conditions. Research should leverage current and emerging large spatial and temporal data sets of detailed background radiation data, such as the RadMAP dataset maintained by the University of California, Berkeley, and the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System technology characterization dataset maintained by DNDO. Offerors may request access to Government Furnished Information. The research would include organization of datasets to include parameterization to enable faster than real-time estimation of background under dynamic conditions for a specific class/type of detector employed in a given CONOP. The estimated background should include both required spectral and angular flux characteristics necessary to generate an accurate detector response. A method for validating the model, possibly through additional background measurements with a suite of benchmark detectors with different response functions, is also a requisite. It is recognized that aspects of this research will be tightly coupled to the above Radiation Transport and Detector Response Module, and subsequently should encompass flexible output strategies to support input into this module.

Wherever possible, the above effort(s) should leverage existing modeling capabilities to include but not limited to DNDO-sponsored software, to include SoftWare for Optimization of Radiation Detectors (SWORD), Monte-Carlo Neutral Particle (MCNP), and Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS), and DNDO-sponsored measurement campaigns. Note: any software developed under this effort will be modular and open source, and will be developed so as to support implementation in open system federations.

The proposal must provide a phased technical approach (see Section 3.1.2): starting with a feasibility demonstration and evaluation in Phase I to address all critical technical issues; leading to a PoC prototype demonstration in Phase V. The program may begin in a phase later than feasibility if the proposal can show that feasibility has already been demonstrated.

3 MANAGEMENT APPROACH

3.1 Program Milestone Structure

When responding to the topic descriptions, all Offerors should choose one of the two research and development approaches detailed below. These two approaches are: 1) General Research approach, or 2) Applied Development Leading to Proof-of-Concept Demonstration approach. If the Offeror chooses to propose a management plan that does not follow the phased approaches described herein, they must provide a justification for their own approach, including a discussion of the benefits to the Government of their approach.

Regardless of the approach chosen, all full proposals must be submitted with a detailed master plan and schedule describing the phases of execution to successfully achieve research objectives and must provide costing information for each phase corresponding to the proposed research structure. Selection for award constitutes commitment of funding for the initial phase, while funding for the subsequent phases will depend on the performance of the preceding phase and availability of funds. Be advised that although up to five phases may be proposed for each approach, previous experience indicates most selected efforts have an actual period of performance from one to three years.

The two approaches are as follows:

3.1.1 General Research:

Full proposals dealing with more basic research for which phased systems engineering approaches and detailed milestones are difficult to apply should propose the following phased approach:

• Phase I: Conduct research and development needed to demonstrate the proof-of-principle or feasibility of a hypothesis, theory or premise with focus on those aspects that involve the greatest scientific or technological risk. These efforts will lead to a Feasibility Evaluation Review (FER). Phase I efforts will generally be no longer than 6-9 months, and represent no more than one quarter of the full intended effort. Phase 1 efforts longer than 9 months require justification. Generally, funding for phase I efforts are limited, and should be less than $300K.

• Phase II – IV: Following a successful FER, succeeding phases will be negotiated based on research results of phase I, and a proposed master plan and schedule that describes specific accomplishments and milestones to be achieved by phase, with the ultimate goal to demonstrate a scalable solution to a given technical challenge or capability gap.

3.1.2 Applied Development Leading to Proof-of-Concept Demonstration:

Proposals that lead to a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) prototype demonstration with final testing and demonstration (T&D) shall follow the phased approach below. Projects that were previously funded by the Government or other funding source may enter at an advanced Phase provided that justification is included in the proposal.

• Phase I: Conduct necessary research and development focused on addressing all critical scientific and technical issues and risks, leading to a conceptual design and concluding in a Feasibility Evaluation Review (FER) and report. Phase I efforts will generally be no longer than 6 – 9 months, and represent no more than one quarter of the full intended effort. However, any duration longer than 9 months would require full justification.

Generally, funding for phase I efforts are limited, and should be less than $300K.

• Phase II: Following a successful FER, conduct the necessary research and development

(experiments, modeling, analysis, and trade studies) to validate the final PoC prototype design choice, culminating in a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) and report;

• Phase III: Following a successful PDR, conduct the necessary engineering and development to present a Critical Design Review (CDR) and report;

• Phase IV: Following a successful CDR, proceed to develop, fabricate, and assemble a prototype component, device, or algorithm, culminating in a Test Readiness Review (TRR) and report. Submit T&D plan for the PoC demonstration for DNDO approval;

and

• Phase V: With participation of DNDO, execute the T&D plan and generate a comprehensive final report for the entire effort.

3.2 Deliverables and Review Cycles

The number and types of reviews and deliverables will be specified in the award document, but is anticipated to include the reports and reviews described in this section. The reports shall be prepared and submitted in accordance with the award document and mutually agreed on before award. A Final Report that summarizes the project and tasks will be required at the conclusion of the performance period for the award. All reports, briefings, and other documents described below shall be electronically submitted to both the DNDO Program Manager (PM) and either the DHS Contracting Officer or Grants Officer, as appropriate.

The following reports are anticipated in managing funded efforts:

3.2.1 Project Plan, Milestones and Schedule

The project plan includes a task and event-driven plan that documents the significant activities and accomplishments necessary to complete each phase of the project, with greatest detail provided for the initial phase of the effort. The plan should include major milestones for each phase that can be used to assess research progress, and potentially as go/no-go criteria for latter phases of the effort. The plan also includes a detailed spend plan for all tasks necessary to complete the work. The project plan, milestones and schedule should be delivered during the kick-off activities following contract award and should be updated as necessary for each phase of the effort.

3.2.2 Quad Chart and Project White Papers or Summaries

Quad charts are one page documents that provide a very concise summary of the overall effort and are generally updated annually or when significant changes occur within an effort. The quad chart should include a picture, graphic or artist’s conception of the effort in the top left, a summary of technical approach and risks in the bottom left, a summary of relevance and goals on the top right, and a summary of schedule, budget and team in the bottom right. A template will be provided. The project summaries are one or two page narratives that are usually used to communicate the nature, scope and impact of a research effort to persons or audiences internal or external to DNDO. Specific templates will be provided for any required white paper or project summary.

3.2.3 Monthly Progress Report (MR)

Brief narrative reports shall be submitted within two weeks after the last day of each month.

These reports will include:

• A summary of the previous month’s activity,

• Progress achieved against planned goals and milestones,

• A summary of technical challenges and risks, and risk mitigation strategies (as necessary)

• Details of research planned for the next month,

• An account of all funds expended by task to date, and

• Any additional information required by the DNDO Program Manager.

Monthly reports generally should follow a standardized template format that will be provided by

DNDO.

3.2.4 Performance Reviews

Performance Reviews (PRs) will be held every three to six months or as needed depending on the project risk and duration. A kickoff meeting will take the place of the initial PR, and shall be held within the first three (3) months after contract or grant award. The PR briefing is due one week prior to the PR, for which a suggested presentation outline will be provided by DNDO. A PR briefing will be comprehensive in nature and must include, where appropriate:

• Review of the prior quarter’s activity,

• Review of the overall technical progress,

• A summary of technical challenges and risks, and risk mitigation strategies,

• A comprehensive account of all funds expended by task to date,

• Explicit plans for the next quarter including an updated Gantt chart for the current phase, and

• Any additional information required by the DNDO Program Manager.

Meeting minutes shall be generated within one week after the PR. The PR does not replace the monthly progress report, unless agreed upon in advance with the DNDO Program Manager.

3.2.5 End of Phase Performance Evaluation & Report

Each phase concludes with submission of an End of Phase Report, and may also include a performance evaluation in the case of research following the phased structure in 3.1.2. If a performance evaluation is required, the briefing material is due one week prior to the evaluation.

The performance evaluation will be the basis for determining continued funding for the follow-on phase. The End of Phase Report does not replace the monthly technical report. The evaluation must include, where appropriate:

• Technical progress achieved against phase goals,

• A summary of technical challenges and risks, and risk mitigation strategies,

• A comprehensive account of all funds by program, project, and tasks expended during the phase along with a comparison of these figures with projections from the start of the contract,

• If follow on work is proposed, updates as required to the project plan, milestones and schedule, statement of work (SOW) and cost breakdown for the next phase,

• Lessons learned and their impact on future R&D, and

• Any additional information required by the DNDO Program Manager.

The End of Phase Report and meeting minutes are due two weeks after the evaluation or end of phase, whichever is soonest, and it should address issues raised during the evaluation.

3.2.6 Final Report

A Final Report shall be due at the end of the final phase of the effort. The final report will be a cumulative, stand-alone document that describes the work of the entire program and project. The final report shall also include “lessons learned” from the effort, recommendations for future research in this area, and a comprehensive accounting of all funds expended. A final report will be due within 60 days of the end of the final phase's period of performance.

4 PROCUREMENT OVERVIEW

4.1 Eligible Offerors

Private industry, non-profit organizations, and academic institutions are invited to submit proposals to this BAA, and may team/subcontract with other companies, organizations, and institutions to include FFRDCs, UARCs and other Federally-funded Government activities, as appropriate, to best utilize their individual strengths.

Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU), Minority Institutions (MI), Small and Disadvantaged Businesses (SDB), women-owned businesses, and HUB-zone enterprises are encouraged to submit proposals, and to join others as team members/subcontractors in submitting proposals. However, no portion of the BAA will be set-aside for these special entities pursuant to FAR Part 19.502-2.

FFRDCs, UARCs and other Federally-funded Government activities may not propose directly as prime contractors to this BAA. However, they may collaborate with eligible Offerors by providing explicitly identified supporting capabilities. It is the responsibility of the providing laboratory (not DNDO) to identify which supporting capabilities are available. DNDO will neither encourage nor discourage eligible Offerors from utilizing FFRDCs, UARCs and other Federally-funded Government activities. This is at the sole discretion of eligible Offerors. All members of the proposed team may participate in proposal preparation and fully participate in the execution of the program. UARCs must include as part of a full proposal a statement of permission to participate from the Center's Federal sponsoring activity.

Foreign participants and/or individuals may participate to the extent that such participants comply with any necessary Non-Disclosure Agreements, Security Regulations, Export Laws, and other governing statutes applicable under the circumstances.

Note: Pursuant to FAR 25.701, except as authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) in the Department of the Treasury, no contracts shall be awarded as a result of this BAA if any proclamation, Executive Order, or statute administered by OFAC, or OFAC’s implementing regulations at 31 CFR Chapter V, would prohibit such a transaction. Except as authorized by OFAC, most transactions involving Cuba, Iran, and Sudan are prohibited, as are most imports from North Korea into the United States or its outlying areas. More information about these restrictions, as well as updates, is available in OFAC’s regulations at 31 CFR Chapter V and/or on OFAC’s website at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac.

Note: FAR 52.225-13, Restrictions on Certain Foreign Purchases, is applicable to this solicitation and will be included in any resulting contract.

Organizational Conflict of Interest issues will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis as outlined below. Offerors who have existing contract(s) to provide scientific, engineering, technical and/or administrative support directly to DHS DNDO will receive particular scrutiny.

http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac

Organizational Conflict of Interest:

(a) Disclosure. The Offeror must represent, as part of its proposal and to the best of its knowledge that: (1) It is not aware of any facts which create any actual or potential organizational conflicts of interest relating to the award of this contract; or (2) It has included information in its full proposal, providing all current information bearing on the existence of any actual or potential organizational conflicts of interest, and has included the mitigation plan in accordance with paragraph (d) of this provision.

(b) Determination. The Contracting Officer may determine that this effort may result in an actual or potential conflict of interest, or may provide one or more Offerors with the potential to attain an unfair competitive advantage based on the information provided or based on knowledge of the Contracting Officer.

(c) If any such conflict of interest is found to exist, the Contracting Officer may (1) disqualify the Offeror, or (2) determine that it is otherwise in the best interest of the United States to contract with the Offeror and include the appropriate provisions to mitigate or avoid such conflict in the contract awarded. After discussion with the Offeror, the Contracting Officer may determine that the actual conflict cannot be avoided, neutralized, mitigated, or otherwise resolved to the satisfaction of the Government, and the Offeror may be found ineligible for award.

(d) Mitigation/Waiver. If an Offeror with a potential or actual conflict of interest or unfair competitive advantage believes it can be mitigated, neutralized, or avoided, the Offeror may submit a mitigation plan to the Contracting Officer for review. Award of a contract where an actual or potential conflict of interest exists shall not occur before Government approval of the mitigation plan.

(e) Other Relevant Information. In addition to the mitigation plan, the Contracting Officer may require further relevant information from the Offeror. The Contracting Officer will use all information submitted by the Offeror, and any other relevant information known to DHS, to determine whether an award to the Offeror may take place, and whether the mitigation plan adequately neutralizes or mitigates the conflict.

(f) Corporation Change. The successful Offeror shall inform the Contracting Officer within thirty (30) calendar days of the effective date of any corporate mergers, acquisitions, and/or divestures that may affect this provision.

(g) Flow-down. The contractor shall insert the substance of this clause in each first tier subcontract that exceeds the simplified acquisition threshold.

4.2 Review and Evaluation Process

It is the policy of DHS/DNDO to ensure an impartial, equitable, and comprehensive evaluation of all full proposals and to select the source (or combination of sources) whose offer is most advantageous to the Government. Evaluation criteria are stated in Section 6 and include the potential for transformational impact, technical approach, team capability and experience, management approach, and cost/price realism and reasonableness. See Section 6 for evaluation criteria and full proposal evaluation details.

A review panel drawn from Government and non-Government experts including system engineering and technical assistant (SETA) support contractors, who have signed appropriate non-disclosure agreements, will support DNDO in performing technical evaluations of the white papers and full proposals. National Laboratory personnel on detail to DNDO will be considered Government personnel for purposes of the technical evaluation of full proposals and will participate in the evaluation subject to conflict of interest considerations.

The Contracting Officer will notify all unsuccessful Offerors in writing at the time of award.

Post-award debriefs may be conducted and specifics regarding debriefs will be included in the notice of award letters and letters to unsuccessful Offerors.

4.3 Award Instruments

The Government anticipates multiple awards resulting from this BAA. Although multiple awards are anticipated, they are not guaranteed.