HR001124S0002.pdf

Broad Agency Announcement

Intrinsic Cognitive Security (ICS)

INFORMATION INNOVATION OFFICE

HR001124S0002

October 16, 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: OVERVIEW INFORMATION

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

I. Funding Opportunity Description

A. Program Overview B. Program Structure C. Program Metrics D. Deliverables E. Intellectual Property

II. Award Information A. General Award Information B. Fundamental Research

III. Eligibility Information A. Eligible Applicants B. Organizational Conflicts of Interest C. Cost Sharing/Matching D. Other Eligibility Criteria

IV. Application and Submission Information A. Address to Request Application Package B. Content and Form of Application Submission

V. Application Review Information A. Evaluation Criteria B. Review of Proposals

VI. Award Administration Information A. Selection Notices and Notifications B. Administrative and National Policy Requirements C. Reporting D. Electronic Systems E. DARPA Embedded Entrepreneur Initiative (EEI)

VII. Agency Contacts VIII. Other Information

IX. APPENDIX 1 – PROPOSAL SUMMARY SLIDE

PART I: OVERVIEW INFORMATION

Federal Agency Name – Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Information Innovation Office (I2O) Funding Opportunity Title – Intrinsic Cognitive Security (ICS) Announcement Type – Initial Announcement Funding Opportunity Number – HR001124S0002 Assistance Listing Number – 12.910 Research and Technology Development Dates o Posting Date: October 16, 2023 o Proposers Day: October 20, 2023 o Abstract Due Date and Time: November 2, 2023 12:00 PM (ET) Eastern Time o Questions Due: November 20, 2023, 12:00PM (ET) o Proposal Due Date and Time: December 20, 2023, 12:00 PM

Anticipated individual awards – DARPA anticipates multiple awards in technical area (TA) 1 and one award in TA2.

Total Funding Available for Award - The anticipated award amount for a TA1 performer will range between $8M-$10M. The anticipated award amount for a TA2 performer will range from $3M-$5M.

Types of instruments that may be awarded – Procurement Contract, Cooperative Agreement or Other Transactions (OT).

Agency contact o Points of Contact

The BAA Coordinator for this effort can be reached at:

Email: ICS@darpa.mil

DARPA/I2O

ATTN: HR001124S0002

675 North Randolph Street Arlington, VA 22203-2114

PART II: FULL TEXT OF ANNOUNCEMENT

I. Funding Opportunity Description

This publication constitutes a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) as contemplated in Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.102(d)(2) and 35.016 and 2 C.F.R. § 200.203. Any resultant award negotiations will follow all pertinent laws and regulations, and any negotiations and/or awards for procurement contracts will use procedures under FAR 15.4, Contract Pricing, as specified in the BAA.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is soliciting innovative proposals in the following areas of interest: computational science to build tactical mixed reality systems that protect human users against cognitive attack. Proposed research should investigate innovative approaches that enable revolutionary advances in science, devices, or systems. Specifically excluded is research that primarily results in evolutionary improvements to the existing state of practice.

A. Program Overview

The Intrinsic Cognitive Security (ICS) program develops computational science to build tactical mixed reality systems that protect human users against cognitive attacks. The core technical hypothesis of the program is that formal methods can be extended with cognitive guarantees and models to protect mixed reality users from cognitive attacks. Mixed reality (MR) integrates virtual and real worlds in real-time and will be ubiquitous in future military missions, including missions involving dismounted soldiers. Users of MR systems will be vulnerable to a wide variety of adversary attacks that exploit the intimate connection between users and MR equipment, such as information flooding to increase equipment latency and induce physical illness, planting real-world objects to overwhelm displays, subverting a personal area network to sow confusion, injecting virtual data to distract personnel, using objects to overwhelm a user with confusing false alarms, assessing user status through an eye tracker, and other potential attacks.

Formal methods are rigorous, mathematics-based approaches to provide guarantees about computer-based systems. Formal methods used in the design of security-critical systems can guarantee the absence of exploitable system weaknesses. Cognitive models represent aspects of human perception, action, memory, and reasoning. The ICS program will extend formal methods by explicitly creating and analyzing cognitive and other models as part of MR system development to protect the warfighter from adversary attacks.

MR systems today are deployed on a few DoD missions in which better performance justifies high component and engineering costs. DoD missions will increasingly deploy highly capable and less expensive commercial components. One MR platform under U.S. Army development uses enhanced and ruggedized commercial components to improve soldier decision-making and target engagement. MR-enabled capabilities imagined or currently under development include soldier squad coordination, real-time low-light/infrared radiation/X-ray overlays, real-time mentoring, radio traffic visualization, weapon targeting, target selection and coordination, remote medical assistance, combat diving situational awareness, and navigation aids.

Commercial MR systems today apply cognitive engineering principles during system development, but those principles are not used to ensure how MR systems operate when facing an adversary intent on interfering with a mission. Some potential user cognitive effects have been identified in virtual settings – such as manipulating emotion, inducing cybersickness, causing confusion, reducing trust in equipment, and assessing anxiety – but commercial MR systems designed to work in a benign and uncontested operating environment lack user protections. Traditional methods used in current DoD systems to address sensor and cybersecurity threats do not address user cognitive effects. As commercial MR technologies are increasingly adapted for diverse DoD missions, protection for users is needed.

Formal methods have not been widely used before to protect MR users, but the cognitive engineering field provides principles upon which models and guarantees can be formulated. The ICS program proves guarantees relevant to MR user attacks and protections based on models relevant to MR system use. Guarantees about adversary attacks and associated protections formalize needed system properties and are informed in part by the many ways in which MR systems have been known to fail. Modeling user behavior in the MR domain formalizes understanding of how people behave when using immersive systems. Models of human behavior relevant to mitigating MR system attacks can be built by adapting and formalizing the emerging understanding of human behavior in mixed reality and in related domains, and can involve both certainties and probabilities. For example, user physiology effects have been studied in the stimulation effects of virtual reality games and other health issues; user perception effects have been studied in night vision goggles and other products; user attention effects have been studied in the design of aircraft flight decks; user confidence effects have been studied in self-driving cars; and user status effects have been studied to provide commercial MR systems privacy.

Models of sufficient fidelity to make proofs of guarantees useful also must not be unnecessarily complex. For example, a model of physiology that estimates likelihood of nausea based on the user’s exposure to excessive display lag or dynamic visual content could be used to prove performance requirements for an MR system that protects most people against attacks causing cybersickness. However, models that explain the biological basis for cybersickness may not be applicable to mixed reality system design. A model of the key decision-making points of a particular mission could be useful for reasoning about user distraction while executing that mission. However, a detailed model of the human attention system is likely unnecessary to support needed guarantees. The development of implementable guarantees that address specific MR vulnerabilities and the appropriate models to efficiently support establishment of those guarantees are the focuses of the program.

Proposers to the ICS program will identify one or more example missions. A mission is a task that a mixed reality system helps a user to achieve. An ideal ICS program mission can be rapidly prototyped using readily-available hardware and software, has identified potential vulnerabilities, and can be related to a potential DoD use of mixed reality. Guarantees will be useful in the construction of mixed reality systems that achieve a mission because they will drive system requirements that protect mixed reality users. Guarantees in the ICS program will be proven using models and demonstrated to be implementable, meaning that the assumptions embedded in guarantees will be shown to be incorporable in prototypes.

The Government anticipates guarantees and associated models will address mixed reality user issues in five categories.

1. Physiology includes issues that cause acute or chronic health effects on users. Mixed reality equipment that leads to user nausea, dizziness, headaches, and long-term negative health impacts are examples in this category.

2. Perception includes issues that lead users to misapprehend information. Using virtual information to mask important real-world events, interfering with users accurately knowing their location, and causing users to mistakenly assess real-world occurrences are examples in this category.

3. Attention includes issues that degrade user mission performance through confusing or distracting information. Distracting a user at a key mission moment with unimportant alarms or highlighting irrelevant information are examples in this category.

4. Confidence includes issues that cause users to doubt virtual world or real-world information.

Presenting a user with inconsistent data or overwhelming with information that causes users to turn off equipment are examples in this category.

5. Status includes issues that allow an adversary to inappropriately leverage data that the user has shared with the system. Sharing sensitive data such as location or pupil width are examples in this category.

These categories involve diverse issues, and guarantees and associated models are anticipated to be largely unrelated to each other, particularly those from different categories. Guarantees and associated models in distinct categories are also anticipated to be expressed in distinct modeling languages, because the challenges are dissimilar and models will be specific to the guarantees to be established. For example, a guarantee in the physiology category that relates aspects of equipment performance with likelihood of cybersickness would need to be established using a model of the circumstances that trigger users to become nauseated. As another example, a guarantee in the status category that keeps user pupil diameter from being unnecessarily shared would be established using a model of a mixed reality system’s information flow. A guarantee in the attention category that limits distraction at key mission points requires a model of a mission that provides what those key mission points are. It is expected that proposers will apply a variety of languages and tools to address these diverse challenges. It is not anticipated that performers will relate models supporting different guarantees to one another.

The Government anticipates that the ICS program will adapt existing languages and tools rather than invent entirely new techniques. The term “formal methods” in the ICS program (defined above) is broad; modeling, specification, and reasoning approaches need to be mathematically rigorous and meet the specification and proof needs of the program and will be chosen by the performers. Some guarantees will involve probabilities rather than certainties. For example, a user may become distracted regardless of a mixed reality system’s operation, so it is not possible to build a mixed reality system that absolutely ensures that a mixed reality user remains on task.

Performers may use models that are known to work in most cases, or provide guarantees that explicitly involve probabilities, so long as they advance the overall goal of reducing mixed reality vulnerabilities in the context of the overall ICS approach.

Establishment of protection guarantees based on models provides a rigorous basis from which to build protected MR systems. Adversary exploitation of security vulnerabilities associated with widespread MR use is a potential technological surprise. Methods for developing protected MR systems will be developed by the ICS program before MR systems lacking protections are pervasive and essential. This program will show how to protect personnel and enable MR adoption in the DoD.

Technical Areas:

The program has two technical areas (TAs):

TA1: Mixed Reality Cognition TA2: Evaluation

There are multiple points of essential collaboration in the program, and the Government expects all performers to collaborate effectively. Proposers should read the descriptions of both TAs and the Program Structure and Metrics sections to ensure a full understanding of the program context, structure, and anticipated relationships required among performers. To facilitate the open exchange of information, all program performers will have Associate Contractor Agreement (ACA) language included in their award. See Section VIII for further information.

No organization will be awarded both a TA1 and TA2 contract as either a prime contractor or as a subcontractor.

TA1: Mixed reality cognition

TA1 teams must address both TA1.1 and TA1.2.

TA1.1: Cognitive guarantees - The goal of TA1.1 is to create cognitive guarantees that secure users of mixed reality systems and overcome several current challenges: 1) current lack of guarantees that address mixed reality vulnerabilities; 2) need to express guarantees in languages suitable for proofs from models; and 3) need for guarantees to be implementable on mixed reality systems.

Example approaches to these challenges include:

Applying cognitive engineering principles to identify negative attack effects and mitigations;

Formulating guarantees that relate operation of mixed reality equipment to attack effects using existing formal methods languages;

Formalizing guarantees using specification languages supportable by cognitive models;

and

Demonstrating in prototypes that guarantees can drive system requirements.

TA1.2: Cognitive models - The goal of TA1.2 is to build cognitive models for reasoning about users of mixed reality systems overcoming several challenges: 1) current lack of cognitive models relevant to mixed reality system vulnerabilities; 2) need to create models with sufficient fidelity with human behaviors; and 3) need for analyzable mathematical models that support automated reasoning about guarantees.

Example approaches to these challenges include:

Constructing models that support establishing specific guarantees using engineering-relevant elements of the cognitive stack;

Using languages that enable existing formal methods reasoning tools and developing reasoning frameworks that enable mixed reality guarantee proofs; and Validating models against existing cognitive engineering principles and performing experiments as needed to complete them.

These challenges are important and illustrative, but are not exhaustive, so proposals should clearly articulate other challenges considered in the proposal and the methods to address them.

Proposers should not limit themselves to the example approaches and should propose novel approaches for addressing the program challenges. The proposals should explain, presenting any preliminary results as evidence, how the proposed approaches are likely to be successful in terms of the ability to meet the program metrics.

A strong TA1 proposal will describe the following:

One or more missions that can be rapidly prototyped using readily-available hardware and software, have identified potential vulnerabilities that will be mitigated consistent with program guarantees, and are suggestive of potential DoD use of mixed reality.

Guarantees that will be formalized to address mixed reality vulnerabilities, are drawn from all or nearly all mixed reality issue categories, and have an associated innovative technical plan that identifies the language or other method that will be adapted for expressing them.

Models that help establish the guarantees, an innovative technical plan for how the models will be represented and used to establish associated guarantees, and a plan for assuring the fidelity of the models using existing literature or experimentation.

Any required human subject experiments and a plan for writing required human subjects documentation and securing local institutional review board (IRB) and DoD Human Research Protection Office (HRPO) approval.

Prototype or prototypes that will be used to establish that the guarantees are realizable in a functioning system and the commercially available platform or platforms and software infrastructure to be used.

Execution team that has the diverse skills needed to perform effectively as a TA1 team.

The extent to which the proposed work advances the program-wide metrics and the overall program goal.

A plan for interacting with a TA2 performer to enable effective evaluations.

TA2. Evaluation – The goal of this TA is to evaluate the efficacy of models, proofs, and guarantees. This TA will:

Validate that TA1-provided models are high-fidelity by comparing against new and existing studies used in their development;

Validate TA1-provided guarantee proofs by using automated reasoning tools; and Validate TA1-provided prototype implementations are consistent with the assumptions of proven guarantees.

TA2 will also refine the proposed program metrics (listed in Section C), identify baselines, and evaluate the program-developed technologies to support the proposed metrics.

A strong TA2 proposal will describe the following:

Methods for conducting evaluations for alignment of prototypes with guarantee assumptions.

Technical approach, including proposed criteria, by which diverse models can be judged to possess sufficient fidelity.

Personnel with computing expertise to curate and maintain proofs developed using diverse methods and tools.

Personnel with ability to assess justification of models based on literature and experimentation.

A plan for interacting with TA1 performers to enable effective evaluations.

B. Program Structure

Figure 1. Program design

The ICS program has two phases, as indicated in Figure 1.

The primary focus of Phase 1 is the development of proved guarantees and supporting models.

Guarantees are developed to describe desirable properties of mixed reality systems. Models are developed to enable proofs of the guarantees, and many models are anticipated to be cognitive models. Technical approaches should leverage existing languages and proof systems as much as possible. Models are developed based on existing studies and as-needed new studies.

Phase 2 continues the work of Phase 1 with the development of guarantees and models, but the primary focus of Phase 2 is to validate the usefulness of the guarantees in mixed reality systems.

Performers will develop prototypes to demonstrate how guarantees are used to lessen vulnerabilities in working systems. The ICS program’s systems are expected to be low-maturity demonstration prototypes built using commercially available hardware and software and are intended to demonstrate how guarantees can be incorporated into system implementations.

The program is a 36‐month effort divided into two phases, as shown in Figure 2. Phase 1 and Phase 2 are each 18 months. Pre-authorization of performers before award finalization is anticipated to speed documentation and approval of IRB/HSR protocols, as indicated in the program schedule. Phase 1 and Phase 2 will end with an assessment and demonstration meeting, which will provide an opportunity to evaluate the progress made against the program objectives listed in Table 1. Proposers should submit a detailed schedule of logically sequenced tasks and subtasks that in sum constitute a constructive plan for achieving the proposed technical objectives while appropriately managing risk. Schedules will be synchronized across performers, as required, and monitored and reviewed throughout the ICS program’s period of performance.

For budgeting purposes, use July 1, 2024, as a Phase 1 kick-off date for both TAs.

Figure 2. Schedule

The Government will specify the locations for Principal Investigator (PI) meetings during program performance. There will be two PI meetings during each phase. Each phase will end with an assessment and demonstration meeting. PI meeting locations are likely to be spread across performer locations, and the proposers should plan to host at least one PI meeting over the duration of the program. The goals of the PI meetings will be to present new research findings and accomplishments, review plans for the next period, discuss implementation milestones, and resolve any programmatic, budgeting, or logistics issues.

In addition to these program-wide events, the Government team will conduct site visits and will hold monthly teleconference meetings with each PI to enhance communications with the

Government team.

For travel planning and costing, assume seven (7) trips during the entire two (2) phases (2024- 2027) per the program schedule shown above, alternating between Washington, DC and San Diego, CA, with each trip requiring 3 days and 2 nights.

C. Program Metrics

In order for the Government to evaluate the effectiveness of a proposed solution in achieving the stated program objectives, proposers should note the following program metrics that will serve as the basis for determining whether satisfactory progress is being made to warrant continued funding of the program. Although the following program metrics are specified, proposers should note that the Government has identified these goals with the intention of bounding the scope of effort, while affording the maximum flexibility, creativity, and innovation in proposing solutions to the stated problem.

Proposals should cite the quantitative and qualitative success criteria that the proposed effort will achieve by the time of each Phase’s program metric measurement. Success is measured in both phases by the number of provable guarantees and validated models. Phase 2 will additionally measure the extent to which the protections guaranteed through analysis of models can be implemented in operating prototypes. The detailed metrics for the entire program (i.e., not for each performer) are provided in Table 1. “Category” in Table 1 refers to types of cognitive guarantees and models: physiology, perception, attention, confidence, and status.

Table 1. Program Metrics

D. Deliverables

All performers will be required to provide the following deliverables:

Technical papers covering work funded by the ICS program;

Source code, build scripts, and any toolchains required to compile, interpret, or execute code; algorithm and interface description documents; user guides; any data developed on the program or necessary to replicate results; and documentation, assumptions, and limitations for all software developed under this program, to include guarantees, models, proofs, and prototypes;

Slide Presentations. Annotated slide presentations shall be submitted within one month after the program kick-off meeting and after each program event (program reviews, PI meetings, and technical interchange meetings);

Quarterly Progress Reports. A quarterly progress report describing technical progress made, resources expended, major risks, planned activities, trip summaries, changes to key personnel, and any potential issues or problem areas that require the attention of the Government team shall be provided within 15 days after the end of each quarter;

Monthly Progress Reports. A monthly progress report in the form of a PowerPoint document describing technical progress, planned activities for the next month, and any technical, financial, and programmatic issues shall be provided and presented in a videoconference with DARPA;

Monthly financial status reports;

A Phase 1 Final Report that concisely summarizes the effort conducted within that phase;

and A Final Technical Report that concisely summarizes the effort of the program.

E. Intellectual Property

The program will emphasize creating and leveraging open-source technology and architecture.

Intellectual property rights asserted by proposers are strongly encouraged to be aligned with open-source regimes.

A key goal of the program is to facilitate rapid innovation by providing a base for future users or developers of program technologies and deliverables. Therefore, it is desired that all noncommercial software (including source code), software documentation, hardware designs and documentation, and technical data generated by the program be provided as deliverables to the Government with unlimited rights, as lesser rights may adversely impact the lifecycle costs of affected items, components, or processes.

II. Award Information

A. General Award Information

Multiple awards are anticipated. The resources made available under this BAA will depend on the quality of the proposals received and the availability of funds.

The Government reserves the right to select for negotiation all, some, one, or none of the proposals received in response to this solicitation and to make awards without discussions with proposers. The Government also reserves the right to conduct discussions if it is later determined to be necessary. If warranted, portions of resulting awards may be segregated into pre-priced options. Additionally, DARPA reserves the right to accept proposals in their entirety or to select only portions of proposals for award. In the event that DARPA desires to award only portions of a proposal, negotiations may be opened with that proposer. The Government reserves the right to fund proposals in phases with options for continued work, as applicable.

The Government reserves the right to request any additional, necessary documentation once it makes the award instrument determination. Such additional information may include but is not limited to Representations and Certifications (see Section IV.B.3.d.., “Representations and Certifications”). The Government reserves the right to remove proposers from award consideration should the parties fail to reach agreement on award terms, conditions, and/or cost/price within a reasonable time, and the proposer fails to timely provide requested additional information. Proposals identified for negotiation may result in a procurement contract, cooperative agreement, or other transaction, depending upon the nature of the work proposed, the required degree of interaction between parties, whether or not the research is classified as Fundamental Research, and other factors.

Proposers looking for innovative, commercial-like contractual arrangements are encouraged to consider requesting Other Transactions. To understand the flexibility and options associated with Other Transactions, consult http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions.

In accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 4022(f), the Government may award a follow-on production contract or Other Transaction (OT) for any OT awarded under this solicitation if: (1) that participant in the OT, or a recognized successor in interest to the OT, successfully completed the entire prototype project provided for in the OT, as modified; and (2) the OT provides for the award of a follow-on production contract or OT to the participant, or a recognized successor in interest to the OT.

In all cases, the Government contracting officer shall have sole discretion to select award instrument type, regardless of instrument type proposed, and to negotiate all instrument terms and conditions with selectees. DARPA will apply publication or other restrictions, as necessary, if it determines that the research resulting from the proposed effort will present a high likelihood of disclosing performance characteristics of military systems or manufacturing technologies that are unique and critical to defense. Any award resulting from such a determination will include a requirement for DARPA permission before publishing any information or results on the program. For more information on publication restrictions, see the section below on Fundamental Research

B. Fundamental Research

It is DoD policy that the publication of products of fundamental research will remain unrestricted to the maximum extent possible. National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189 defines fundamental research as follows:

‘Fundamental research’ means basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community, as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons.

http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/contract-management#OtherTransactions

As of the date of publication of this solicitation, the Government expects that program goals as described herein may be met by proposers intending to perform fundamental research and does not anticipate applying publication restrictions of any kind to individual awards for fundamental research that may result from this solicitation. Notwithstanding this statement of expectation, the Government is not prohibited from considering and selecting research proposals that, while perhaps not qualifying as fundamental research under the foregoing definition, still meet the solicitation criteria for submissions. If proposals are selected for award that offer other than a fundamental research solution, the Government will either work with the proposer to modify the proposed statement of work to bring the research back into line with fundamental research or else the proposer will agree to restrictions in order to receive an award.

University or non-profit research institution performance under this solicitation will include effort categorized as fundamental research. In addition to Government support for free and open scientific exchanges and dissemination of research results in a broad and unrestricted manner, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient, regardless of tier, acknowledges that such research may have implications that are important to U.S. national interests and must be protected against foreign influence and exploitation. As such, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient agrees to comply with the following requirements:

(a) The University or non-profit research institution performer or recipient must establish and maintain an internal process or procedure to address foreign talent programs, conflicts of commitment, conflicts of interest, and research integrity. The academic or non-profit research performer or recipient must also utilize due diligence to identify Foreign Components or participation by Senior/Key Personnel in Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs and agree to share such information with the Government upon request.

i. The above described information will be provided to the Government as part of the proposal response to the solicitation and will be reviewed and assessed prior to award. Generally, this information will be included in the Research and Related Senior/Key Personnel Profile (Expanded) form (SF-424) required as part the proposer’s submission through Grants.gov.

1. Instructions regarding how to fill out the SF-424 and its biographical sketch can be found through Grants.gov.

ii. In accordance with USD(R&E) direction to mitigate undue foreign influence in DoD-funded science and technology, DARPA will assess all Senior/Key Personnel proposed to support DARPA grants and cooperative agreements for potential undue foreign influence risk factors relating to professional and financial activities. This will be done by evaluating information provided via the SF-424, and any accompanying or referenced documents, in order to identify and assess any associations or affiliations the Senior/Key Personnel may have with foreign strategic competitors or countries that have a history of intellectual property theft, research misconduct, or history of targeting U.S. technology for unauthorized transfer. DARPA’s evaluation takes into consideration the entirety of the Senior/Key Personnel’s SF-424, current and pending support, and biographical sketch, placing the most weight on the Senior/Key Person’s professional and financial activities over the last 4 years. The majority of foreign entities lists used to make these determinations are publicly available. The DARPA Countering Foreign Influence Program (CFIP) “Senior/Key Personnel Foreign Influence Risk Rubric” details the various risk ratings and factors. The rubric can be seen at the following link:

https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/092021DARPACFIPRubric.pdf

iii. Examples of lists that DARPA leverages to assess potential undue foreign influence factors include, but are not limited to:

1. Executive Order 13959 “Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Communist Chinese Military Companies”:

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf

2. The U.S. Department of Education’s College Foreign Gift and Contract Report: College Foreign Gift Reporting (ed.gov)

3. The U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, List of Parties of Concern: https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern

4. Georgetown University’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology (CSET) Chinese Talent Program Tracker:

https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech

5. Director of National Intelligence (DNI) “World Wide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community”: 2021 Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (dni.gov)

6. Various Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) products regarding targeting of US technologies, adversary targeting of academia, and the exploitation of academic experts: https://www.dcsa.mil/

(b) DARPA’s analysis and assessment of affiliations and associations of Senior/Key Personnel is compliant with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Information regarding race, color, or national origin is not collected and does not have bearing in DARPA’s assessment.

(c) University or non-profit research institutions with proposals selected for negotiation that have been assessed as having high or very high undue foreign influence risk, will be given an opportunity during the negotiation process to mitigate the risk. DARPA reserves the right to request any follow-up information needed to assess risk or mitigation strategies.

i. Upon conclusion of the negotiations, if DARPA determines, despite any proposed mitigation terms (e.g. mitigation plan, alternative research personnel), the participation of any Senior/Key Research Personnel still represents high risk to the program, or proposed mitigation affects the Government’s confidence in proposer’s capability to successfully complete the research (e.g., less qualified Senior/Key Research Personnel) the Government may determine not to award the proposed effort. Any decision not to award will be predicated upon reasonable https://www.darpa.mil/attachments/092021DARPACFIPRubric.pdf https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-11-17/pdf/2020-25459.pdf https://sites.ed.gov/foreigngifts/ https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern https://chinatalenttracker.cset.tech/ https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community https://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/reports-publications/reports-publications-2021/item/2204-2021-annual-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community https://www.dcsa.mil/ disclosure of the pertinent facts and reasonable discussion of any possible alternatives while balancing program award timeline requirements.

(d) Failure of the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient to reasonably exercise due diligence to discover or ensure that neither it nor any of its Senior/Key Research Personnel involved in the subject award are participating in a Foreign Government Talent Program or have a Foreign Component with an a strategic competitor or country with a history of targeting U.S. technology for unauthorized transfer may result in the Government exercising remedies in accordance with federal law and regulation.

i. If, at any time, during performance of this research award, the academic or non-profit research performer or recipient should learn that it, its Senior/Key Research Personnel, or applicable team members or subtier performers on this award are or are believed to be participants in a Foreign Government Talent Program or have Foreign Components with a strategic competitor or country with a history of targeting U.S. technology for unauthorized transfer , the performer or recipient will notify the Government Contracting Officer or Agreements Officer within 5 business days.

1. This disclosure must include specific information as to the personnel involved and the nature of the situation and relationship. The Government will have 30 business days to review this information and conduct any necessary fact-finding or discussion with the performer or recipient.

2. The Government’s timely determination and response to this disclosure may range anywhere from acceptance, to mitigation, to termination of this award at the Government’s discretion.

3. If the University receives no response from the Government to its disclosure within 30 business days, it may presume that the Government has determined the disclosure does not represent a threat.

ii. The performer or recipient must flow down this provision to any subtier contracts or agreements involving direct participation in the performance of the research.

(e) Definitions

i. Senior/Key Research Personnel

1. This definition would include the Principal Investigator or Program/Project Director and other individuals who contribute to the scientific development or execution of a project in a substantive, measurable way, whether or not they receive salaries or compensation under the award. These include individuals whose absence from the project would be expected to impact the approved scope of the project.

2. Most often, these individuals will have a doctorate or other professional degrees, although other individuals may be included within this definition on occasion.

ii. Foreign Associations/Affiliations

1. Association is defined as collaboration, coordination or interrelation, professionally or personally, with a foreign government-connected entity where no direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

2. Affiliation is defined as collaboration, coordination, or interrelation, professionally or personally, with a foreign government-connected entity where direct monetary or non-monetary reward is involved.

iii. Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs

1. In general, these programs will include any foreign-state-sponsored attempt to acquire U.S. scientific-funded research or technology through foreign government-run or funded recruitment programs that target scientists, engineers, academics, researchers, and entrepreneurs of all nationalities working and educated in the U.S.

2. Distinguishing features of a Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Program may include:

a. Compensation, either monetary or in-kind, provided by the foreign state to the targeted individual in exchange for the individual transferring their knowledge and expertise to the foreign country.

b. In-kind compensation may include honorific titles, career advancement opportunities, promised future compensation or other types of remuneration or compensation.

c. Recruitment, in this context, refers to the foreign-state-sponsor’s active engagement in attracting the targeted individual to join the foreign-sponsored program and transfer their knowledge and expertise to the foreign state. The targeted individual may be employed and located in the U.S. or in the foreign state.

d. Contracts for participation in some programs that create conflicts of commitment and/or conflicts of interest for researchers. These contracts include, but are not limited to, requirements to attribute awards, patents, and projects to the foreign institution, even if conducted under U.S. funding, to recruit or train other talent recruitment plan members, circumventing merit-based processes, and to replicate or transfer U.S.-funded work in another country.

e. Many, but not all, of these programs aim to incentivize the targeted individual to physically relocate to the foreign state. Of particular concern are those programs that allow for continued employment at U.S. research facilities or receipt of U.S. Government research funding while concurrently receiving compensation from the foreign state.

3. Foreign Government Talent Recruitment Programs DO NOT include:

a. Research agreements between the University and a foreign entity, unless that agreement includes provisions that create situations of concern addressed elsewhere in this section,

b. Agreements for the provision of goods or services by commercial vendors, or

c. Invitations to attend or present at conferences.

iv. Conflict of Interest

1. A situation in which an individual, or the individual’s spouse or dependent children, has a financial interest or financial relationship that could directly and significantly affect the design, conduct, reporting, or funding of research.

v. Conflict of Commitment

1. A situation in which an individual accepts or incurs conflicting obligations between or among multiple employers or other entities.

2. Common conflicts of commitment involve conflicting commitments of time and effort, including obligations to dedicate time in excess of institutional or funding agency policies or commitments. Other types of conflicting obligations, including obligations to improperly share information with, or withhold information from, an employer or funding agency, can also threaten research security and integrity and are an element of a broader concept of conflicts of commitment.

vi. Foreign Component

1. Performance of any significant scientific element or segment of a program or project outside of the U.S., either by the University or by a researcher employed by a foreign organization, whether or not U.S. government funds are expended.

2. Activities that would meet this definition include, but are not limited to:

a. Involvement of human subjects or animals;

b. Extensive foreign travel by University research program or project staff for the purpose of data collection, surveying, sampling, and similar activities;

c. Collaborations with investigators at a foreign site anticipated to result in co-authorship;

d. Use of facilities or instrumentation at a foreign site;

e. Receipt of financial support or resources from a foreign entity; or

f. Any activity of the University that may have an impact on U.S.

foreign policy through involvement in the affairs or environment of a foreign country.

3. Foreign travel is not considered a Foreign Component.

vii. Strategic Competitor

1. A nation, or nation-state, that engages in diplomatic, economic or technological rivalry with the United States where the fundamental strategic interests of the U.S are under threat.

Proposers should indicate in their proposal whether they believe the scope of the research included in their proposal is fundamental or not. While proposers should clearly explain the intended results of their research, the Government shall have sole discretion to determine whether the proposed research shall be considered fundamental and to select the award instrument type. Appropriate language will be included in resultant awards for non-fundamental research to prescribe publication requirements and other restrictions, as appropriate. This language can be found at http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/additional-baa.

For certain research projects, it may be possible that although the research to be performed by a potential awardee is non-fundamental research, its proposed subawardee’s effort may be fundamental research. It is also possible that the research performed by a potential awardee is fundamental research while its proposed subawardee’s effort may be non-fundamental research.

In all cases, it is the potential awardee’s responsibility to explain in its proposal which proposed efforts are fundamental research and why the proposed efforts should be considered fundamental research.

III. Eligibility Information

A. Eligible Applicants

All responsible sources capable of satisfying the Government's needs may submit a proposal that shall be considered by DARPA.

1. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and Government Entities

a) FFRDCs FFRDCs are subject to applicable direct competition limitations and cannot propose to this solicitation in any capacity unless they meet the following conditions. (1) FFRDCs must clearly demonstrate that the proposed work is not otherwise available from the private sector. (2) FFRDCs must provide a letter, on official letterhead from their sponsoring organization, that (a) cites the specific authority establishing their eligibility to propose to Government solicitations and compete with industry, and (b) certifies the FFRDC’s compliance with the associated FFRDC sponsor agreement’s terms and conditions. These conditions are a requirement for FFRDCs proposing to be awardees or subawardees.

b) Government Entities Government Entities (e.g., Government/National laboratories, military educational institutions, etc.) are subject to applicable direct competition limitations. Government Entities must clearly demonstrate that the work is not otherwise available from the private sector and provide written documentation citing the specific statutory authority and contractual authority, if relevant, http://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/additional-baa establishing their ability to propose to Government solicitations and compete with industry. This information is required for Government Entities proposing to be awardees or subawardees.

c) Authority and Eligibility At the present time, DARPA does not consider 15 U.S.C. § 3710a to be sufficient legal authority to show eligibility. While 10 U.S.C.§ 4892 may be the appropriate statutory starting point for some entities, specific supporting regulatory guidance, together with evidence of agency approval, will still be required to fully establish eligibility. DARPA will consider FFRDC and Government Entity eligibility submissions on a case-by-case basis; however, the burden to prove eligibility for all team members rests solely with the proposer.

2. Other Applicants Non-U.S. organizations and/or individuals may participate to the extent that such participants comply with any necessary nondisclosure agreements, security regulations, export control laws, and other governing statutes applicable under the circumstances.

B. Organizational Conflicts of Interest

FAR 9.5 Requirements

In accordance with FAR 9.5, proposers are required to identify and disclose all facts relevant to potential OCIs involving the proposer’s organization and any proposed team member (subawardee, consultant). Under this Section, the proposer is responsible for providing this disclosure with each proposal submitted to the solicitation. The disclosure must include the proposer’s, and as applicable, proposed team member’s OCI mitigation plan. The OCI mitigation plan must include a description of the actions the proposer has taken, or intends to take, to prevent the existence of conflicting roles that might bias the proposer’s judgment and to prevent the proposer from having unfair competitive advantage. The OCI mitigation plan will specifically discuss the disclosed OCI in the context of each of the OCI limitations outlined in FAR 9.505-1 through FAR 9.505-4.

Agency Supplemental OCI Policy

In addition, DARPA has a supplemental OCI policy that prohibits contractors/performers from concurrently providing Scientific Engineering Technical Assistance (SETA), Advisory and Assistance Services (A&AS) or similar support services and being a technical performer.

Therefore, as part of the FAR 9.5 disclosure requirement above, a proposer must affirm whether the proposer or any proposed team member (subawardee, consultant) is providing SETA, A&AS, or similar support to any DARPA office(s) under: (a) a current award or subaward; or (b) a past award or subaward that ended within one calendar year prior to the proposal’s submission date.

If SETA, A&AS, or similar support is being or was provided to any DARPA office(s), the proposal must include:

The name of the DARPA office receiving the support;

The prime contract number;

Identification of proposed team member (subawardee, consultant) providing the support; and

An OCI mitigation plan in accordance with FAR 9.5.

Government Procedures

In accordance with FAR 9.503, 9.504 and 9.506, the Government will evaluate OCI mitigation plans to avoid, neutralize or mitigate potential OCI issues before award and to determine whether it is in the Government’s interest to grant a waiver.