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NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY, IN

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ESTIMATED COST $13,181.25

Section C - Descriptions and Specifications

STATEMENT OF WORK

Identifying the Fundamental Assumptions and Logic of Minimum Deterrence, and Examining Them Against Empirical Evidence

1. BACKGROUND

Proposals for a Minimum Deterrence policy have a long history in the United States. The common theme in such proposals is that given the great lethality of nuclear weapons, few are needed to ensure the reliable, predictable functioning of deterrence. These proposals typically conclude that a relatively small number of survivable US nuclear weapons and their launchers, measured in single digits to hundreds, is and will be adequate for all pertinent US deterrence missions, including extended deterrence. These weapons are intended to hold at risk a small number of an opponent’s soft and non-military targets. Minimum Deterrence proposals call for the United States to reduce its arsenal of nuclear weapons to such levels unilaterally or as part of an arms control process.

US nuclear deterrence strategies have never fully adopted notions of Minimum Deterrence.

Indeed, a consistent theme in US policy for four decades has been the explicit rejection of Minimum Deterrence. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s 1960s declaratory policies regarding a US deterrence strategy based on “Assured Destruction” included some elements of Minimum Deterrence. He identified the US threat to destroy specified percentages of the Soviet population and industry, i.e., “Assured Destruction,” as an adequate measure for strategic nuclear forces for deterrence and extended deterrence. McNamara argued publicly that this capability could be met with 400 “equivalent megatons,” and that additional US offensive or defensive capabilities would be of little value (or, in fact, would be harmful to deterrence “stability” and efforts to slow the nuclear “arms race”).

This Assured Destruction metric, according to McNamara, did not actually describe how the US approached the question of nuclear weapon employment, but its high visibility as declaratory policy led much of the interested public to conclude that Assured Destruction, and subsequently, Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) reflected the fundamental reality of US nuclear doctrine.

Consequently, when subsequent US nuclear policy developments such as NSDM-242 (the 1974 “Schlesinger Doctrine”) and PD-59 (the Carter Administration’s 1980 “Countervailing Strategy”) moved away from Assured Destruction-type language and force measures, there was considerable public outcry that the US was moving altogether away from the goal of deterrence and instead adopting nuclear “war-fighting” strategies. These critiques typically were based on the Minimum Deterrence proposition that a relatively small number of US nuclear weapons is adequate for US deterrence goals and reflects the proper force-sizing measure for the US nuclear arsenal.

Although Minimum Deterrence has never been the overarching US nuclear policy guide, various interested individuals and organizations have promoted a Minimum Deterrence policy direction since the 1950s. The following quotes are a small sampling coming from relatively recent Minimum Deterrence proposals:

o “The capability in peacetime or crisis circumstances to deliver many hundreds of nuclear warheads to targets in any prospective aggressor country in retaliation to a nuclear attack satisfy reasonable requirements of nuclear deterrence even under worst-case Cold War-like conditions.”

o “A total stockpile on the order of 500 warheads would satisfy the principal objectives of strategic nuclear deterrence in ‘rational’ scenarios where strategic deterrence is a useful concept.”

o “Deterring Russia, as well as China and other states that have acquired nuclear weapons remains a justifiable function of US nuclear weapons policy. But several thousand US nuclear warheads are not needed to discharge that mission; a few hundred would suffice.”

o “The United States needs relatively few warheads to deter China. A limited and highly accurate US attack on China’s 20 long-range ballistic missiles would result in as many as 11 million casualties.”

o “A few hundred warheads, are more than adequate to serve as a deterrent against anyone unwise enough to attack the United States with nuclear weapons.”

o “We estimate that a US strategic force of some 500 operationally deployed warheads would be more than adequate for deterrence.”

o “Deterrence would remain robust with far smaller arsenals on far lower levels of alert.

The United States and Russia should aim to cut the numbers of their nuclear weapons to the low hundreds.”

o “No sane adversary would believe that any political or military advantage would be worth a significant risk of the destruction of his own society…Thus ten to one hundred survivable warheads should be more than enough to deter any rational leader from ordering an attack on the cities of the United States or its allies.”

o “Having 100 nuclear warheads…will deter others from using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or from even engaging in conventional attacks.”

o “From a practical perspective, several second-strike nuclear weapons are more than enough to keep the most aggressive adversary at bay.”

o “‘Extended deterrence’ does not have to mean ‘extended nuclear deterrence.’ United States conventional capability, when combined with that of each of the allies in question, constitutes a deterrent to any conceivable aggressor at least as credible as that posed by its nuclear weapons.”

As noted, there is a long history of Minimum Deterrence advocacy in the United States. Most recently, some serving US military officers have adopted implicitly or explicitly the basic recommendations of a Minimum Deterrence policy and its underlying rationale. In addition, the Obama administration has embraced the long-term goal of “nuclear zero,” and a near-term goal of further nuclear force reductions below the deployed warhead and launcher ceilings set by the 2010 New START Treaty, i.e., 1550 and 700, respectively.

In short, proposals for Minimum Deterrence have recently taken on greater policy significance either as the appropriate US deterrence strategy framework for the post-Cold War era, or as a milestone en route to nuclear zero. The dominant trend in the nuclear policy debate clearly is in the direction of Minimum Deterrence.

2. SCOPE OF WORK

Despite the many proposals for Minimum Deterrence, there is no available study, contemporary or past, that systematically examines its basic elements for internal logic and consistency with empirical evidence. Given the increased policy salience of Minimum Deterrence and its potential to shape pertinent US policy decisions, this study proposes to identify the fundamental assumptions, logic and related conclusions associated with contemporary proposals for Minimum Deterrence, and to examine their internal logic and consistency with available empirical evidence. The goal of this examination is to contribute to an objective understanding of its potential role as a basis for US nuclear force planning, posture and policy.

Contemporary presentations of Minimum Deterrence tend to suggest that it is a new way of thinking most suitable for the dramatically different conditions of the post-Cold War period.

However, there has been considerable consistency over decades in the assumptions, logic and related conclusions of Minimum Deterrence. These include the following nine basic points and their respective extrapolations and implications:

1. There is a positive correlation between reducing the number of nuclear weapons and strengthening US security, i.e., more nuclear weapons means less security; fewer nuclear weapons means reduced dangers.

2. Russia and China are not now and are unlikely to again become serious security threats.

a. Cold War deterrence considerations pertinent to a peer nuclear power are no longer salient in US security planning.

3. Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the most pressing US security threat, i.e., terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

4. Deterrence, now and in the future, can be expected to function reliably and predictably against virtually any state actors at low or very low US nuclear force levels.

a. Greater deterrent effect comes from US conventional capabilities, because these are credible while nuclear threats are not for all important, likely contingencies.

b. There is no need to take into account the nuclear force requirements for defeating Russian or Chinese active and passive defenses.

c. Threats against urban-industrial centers will constitute a credible US deterrence threat.

i. There should be little emphasis on holding enemy military/counterforce target sets at risk.

d. Given the reliable, predictable functioning of deterrence, there is very limited need for national missile defense.

5. US allies will increasingly be assured adequately by US and allied conventional power projection forces and missile defenses.

a. Thus allies will remain non-nuclear in the context of further US nuclear reductions.

6. US strategic force-sizing can be determined via deterrence considerations alone;

a. Assurance of allies imposes no unique nuclear requirements.

b. Defense, if deterrence fails, poses no unique nuclear requirements.

7. Ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) will remain invulnerable for 40-70 years and are adequate for deterrence, thus other legs of the nuclear triad may be helpful but are unnecessary for deterrence or assurance.

a. A small triad or even an SSBN-based monad will be sufficient because force requirements for deterrence are easily met and SSBNs are, and will remain, survivable.

8. Declaring nuclear weapons to be of very limited continuing salience and correspondingly establishing a low or very low ceiling for US nuclear requirements facilitates the momentum and success of arms control by providing a positive example regarding the devaluing of nuclear weapons and by assuring opponents of the absence of US interest in “arms racing.”

a. US force developments are the dynamic behind force developments by prospective opponents. Thus US initiatives to limit the roles and numbers of nuclear weapons will help lead to greater global support for the same (“lead by example,” “isolate” rogues, establish norms, etc.).

i. The reduction of US nuclear forces will strengthen US non-proliferation efforts, which is the top US security priority; non-proliferation success depends on continuing reductions in US nuclear capabilities.

9. The reduction of US nuclear forces will save many billions of scarce US defense dollars.

Each of these propositions will be examined for their logic and consistency with available empirical evidence in separate chapters of an integrated report. The assumptions and reasoning behind each will be analyzed and checked against relevant evidence, including historical examples. Each chapter will be 25-50 pages in length, with a concluding tenth chapter that will build upon the preceding nine chapters and provide an overall assessment of Minimum Deterrence and its internal consistency. In addition, National Institute will produce briefings for each individual chapter as part of this study, and a comprehensive summary briefing corresponding to the final chapter.

3. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

This contract will consist of one 12-month base period and one 5-month option period.

4. DESCRIPTIONS OF TASKS AND DELIVERABLES

Not all proposals for Minimum Deterrence over the decades have included each of the above nine elements. Several of the elements identified above are of more recent vintage. But, a systematic examination of contemporary Minimum Deterrence expositions reveals that all of these elements are now included, implicitly or explicitly.

This study will examine each of these nine elements of the Minimum Deterrence position for its internal logic and consistency with available empirical evidence, particularly including directly pertinent historical evidence. The study will include as deliverables separate 25-50 page chapters on each of these nine elements, and a concluding tenth chapter and briefing that summarizes and synthesizes the study’s findings, and examines the overall internal consistency of Minimum Deterrence. Each of the elements and its part in the Minimum Deterrence narrative is described concisely below, along with the proposed method for examining its consistency with available evidence.

Task Descriptions

Base Year (October 1, 2013-September 30, 2014)

• Initial research/writing of the first set of draft chapters by authors

• Submission of draft chapters to senior review board

• Initial review of draft chapters by senior review board

• Revision/re-write of draft chapters by authors following review

• Submission of revised draft chapters to senior review board

• Final revision/re-write of individual draft chapters by authors

• Submission of completed chapters to ONA

Option Year (October 1, 2014-February 28, 2015)

• Initial research/writing of remaining individual draft chapters by authors

• Submission of draft chapters to senior review board

• Initial review of draft chapters by senior review board

• Revision/re-write of draft chapters by authors following review

• Submission of revised draft chapters to senior review board

• Final revision/re-write of individual draft chapters by authors

• Submission of completed chapters to ONA

• Integration of chapters to create a single text

• Writing of a final chapter that summarizes work and provides conclusions

• Submission and briefing of completed text to ONA and other offices as approved by

ONA

• Publication and release of completed and integrated report if approved by ONA

Chapter Descriptions

Chapter 1. There is a positive correlation between reducing the number of nuclear weapons and strengthening US security.

Proposals for a Minimum Deterrence force typically emphasize a recommended number of nuclear weapons (missile warheads and air-delivered bombs) rather than the characteristics of those weapons (yield, accuracy, reliability, effects) or their means of delivery (ICBMs, SLBMs, cruise missiles, bombers and strike aircraft). The number of nuclear weapons specified—100, 200, 500, etc.—often is linked to the quantity deemed necessary to hold at risk one or more types of targets, typically industries, infrastructure, or population. This focus on weapon numbers in part reflects the view that the enormous destructive power of nuclear weapons means that deterrence effect does not depend on the details of the force beyond some minimum number, and that there is little value in planning for what would happen if deterrence were to fail. But it also reflects the notion that the higher the number of nuclear weapons beyond that minimum necessary for deterrence, the greater the danger their existence poses to the United States and the world.

An assumption underlying this proposition is that numbers beyond the minimum necessary for deterrence increase the risks of nuclear war, theft, and accidents. Conversely, weapon reductions, especially to a Minimum Deterrence level, will lessen these risks. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, an organization that favors deep reductions on the path toward a nuclear-free world, “the continued presence of large stockpiles makes the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons a persistent risk.” In advocating significant cuts in the

“bloated” nuclear forces of the United States and Russia, an analyst at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation similarly warns, “The more nuclear weapons and material there is around the world, the greater the chances weapons or material could be stolen by terrorists and the greater the risks of the unauthorized, miscalculated, or accidental use of nuclear weapons.”

This asserted direct relationship between nuclear numbers and nuclear risks should not, and need not, be accepted uncritically. One way to test the validity of this proposition is to match available data on the numbers of weapons in the US and Soviet/Russian nuclear arsenals from the late 1940s to the present against a timeline for the same period that shows serious crises between the two sides (a crude index of the risk of war), known accidents involving their respective nuclear weapons, reported cases in which accidental or unauthorized nuclear use appeared possible, and recorded instances of attempted nuclear theft. If such an exercise does not reveal a correlation between numbers of weapons and numbers of dangerous events, an explanation could be sought by examining the political, military, and security factors that bear on the likelihood of such confrontations, accidents, and thefts. Depending on the information available, the effects of weapon numbers in the Indian-Pakistani nuclear rivalry also might be examined in a similar manner.

Chapter 2. Russia and China are not serious security threats; deterrence considerations pertinent to a peer nuclear competitor no longer are salient in US security planning.

Minimum Deterrence proposals almost always argue that in the post-Cold War period Russia and China do not constitute a threat to the United States. The Global Zero report, for example, states that, “Russia and China are not enemies of the United States,” “regarding Russia and China, large-scale conflict with the United States is implausible,” and, “The risk of nuclear confrontation between the United States and either Russia or China belongs to the past, not the future…”. The Global Zero report includes the assertion that the US can dramatically cut nuclear forces because “several hundred experts” surveyed by the Council of Foreign Relations do not believe that Russia threatens the United States.

This claimed absence of a serious security threat from Russia or China is a basis for the Minimum Deterrence recommendations for large and possibly unilateral cuts in US nuclear forces: because there is no likely need to deter Russia or China, we need not worry about the consequences for deterrence of deep nuclear force cuts. For example, Jeff Richard in his 2009 article supporting Minimum Deterrence argues “that reducing [US] force levels in the manner described above [500 warheads, adoption of a dyad] would provide the United States with the opportunity to lead by example, while not significantly sacrificing national security.”

This Minimum Deterrence proposition that Russia and China do not constitute a threat to the US can be tested against available evidence. There is inherent uncertainty in any prediction about the character of future threats. However, the potential for threats from Russia and China may be examined with some confidence, including Russian and Chinese statements and actions regarding their aspirations that conflict with US and allied interests, the nature of their respective nuclear force modernization programs, and the types of military exercises they stage. These things can provide evidence of external designs that could spark crises, and the perceptions of Moscow and Beijing regarding potential enemies. In particular, it is possible to identify Russian and Chinese nuclear systems intended for intercontinental threat or strike.

The asserted absence of a threat from Russia can be tested by reviewing Russian nuclear modernization programs, exercises, and doctrinal literature, including the new (2010) military doctrine, which discusses external threats. There is a very extensive Russian literature, much of it by civilian officials and military leaders, which discusses their nuclear doctrine, their threat perceptions, and their nuclear programs, including both delivery systems and nuclear warhead development.

With regard to China, testing this Minimum Deterrence proposition is more difficult because the Chinese are far more secretive with regard to the specifics of their military programs than is Russia. In addition, there are propaganda aspects of Chinese nuclear doctrine that have to be subjected to analysis. According to the Pentagon’s report on Chinese military power, “From Beijing’s perspective, strategic ambiguity—including strategic denial and deception—is a mechanism to influence the policies of foreign governments and the opinions of the general public and elites in other countries.” Nevertheless, the main thrust of Chinese objectives and programs can be examined based on open sources and the claims concerning the absence of a Chinese threat tested.

Chapter 3. Nuclear weapons are irrelevant to today’s most pressing security threat— WMD terrorism—therefore, few nuclear weapons are needed.

Minimum Deterrence proposals often echo statements from the George W. Bush administration and the Obama administration that nuclear terrorism poses the greatest threat to the United States and its allies. Minimum Deterrence presentations typically cite this point as an initial proposition from which to argue that nuclear weapons are of little value in deterring terrorist leaders, and thus less important to US security. This conclusion follows from the widely held view that terrorists cannot be deterred, either because they have “no return address” or because they are irrational fanatics—or both.

Thus the Global Zero Commission claims: “9-11 exposed the lack of efficacy—indeed, the irrelevance—of nuclear forces in dealing with 21st century threats.”

Similarly, the 2009 International Commission on Non-proliferation and Disarmament argued, “Whether or not terrorism can be deterred, or only prevented and defeated, and whether or not terrorist actors are themselves threatening or using nuclear weapons or explosive devices, nuclear weapons are manifestly neither strategically, tactically nor politically necessary or useful for this purpose.”

Using this same line of reasoning, a Federation of American Scientists report advocating Minimum Deterrence states that, “The missions assigned to nuclear weapons during the Cold War might or might not have made sense during the Cold War but there is no reason to think they would have any relevance at all to the radically different conditions of today.” Minimum Deterrence proposals then typically conclude that few US nuclear weapons are needed now or in the future.

In contemporary Minimum Deterrence presentations, there is little or no expectation that states might again become embroiled in a conflict involving nuclear threats or nuclear use. For example, the Global Zero report states that the matter is irrelevant because, “There is no conceivable situation in the contemporary world in which it would be in either country’s national security interest to initiate a nuclear attack against the other side.” Similarly, the Evans- Kawaguchi commission report asks rhetorically, “What is the real-world likelihood, present and future, of the nuclear powers—the US, China, Russia, France, UK, Israel, or even India and Pakistan—actually committing or threatening such major aggression against each other on a scale such as to even begin to justify breaching the nuclear weapons taboo?”

To test this element of the Minimum Deterrence narrative, two propositions need to be examined: 1) US nuclear weapons have no role in deterring nuclear or other WMD terrorism;

and 2) given this assertion, the US can reduce its nuclear forces to very low numbers.

To test the proposition that US nuclear weapons are irrelevant to WMD terrorism, National Institute will examine case studies of conflicts between states and terrorist organizations, including previous research done for OSD Net Assessment on this topic. The goal of this examination will be to use available history and other empirical evidence to determine: 1) the degree to which terrorist organizations behave rationally with regard to their goals (connect ends with means), and thus, in principle, are susceptible to US deterrence strategies; 2) the degree to which severe threats have served a useful role in influencing the decisions of terrorist organizations and their supporters and patrons; and 3) the possible link between US nuclear capabilities and the deterrence of terrorist organization via their state sponsors (“indirect deterrence”). Evidence of critical partnerships between terrorist organizations and WMD-armed states that may be susceptible to US nuclear deterrence strategies will be relevant to a determination concerning the role (or lack thereof) for nuclear weapons in deterring WMD terrorism.

In addition, the proposition that nuclear weapons are of limited value to US security because they are irrelevant to WMD terrorism presumes that there are no other priority threats that may be susceptible to US nuclear deterrence. This presumption can be tested against evidence of contemporary threat developments beyond those involving terrorist organizations to determine the salience of such threat developments and the potential utility of US nuclear forces in deterring those threats. This examination will be informed, in part, by the findings regarding the second proposition (Russia and China are not serious security threats).

Chapter 4. Deterrence will function reliably and predictably at low US nuclear force numbers.

As noted above, the fundamental policy prescription consistently following from the Minimum Deterrence approach to deterrence and force sizing is that the United States can prudently move to a deployed nuclear force level that ranges from a few weapons to hundreds of weapons. This fundamental prescription is predicated on the belief that deterrence will function predictably and reliably at low force levels to prevent severe provocations. Deterrence will be effective because even a small number of nuclear weapons represent an unbeatable retaliatory threat of “catastrophic” consequences for all rational state leaderships, and thus all leaderships will be deterred from severe provocation by such a threat of nuclear retaliation. The underlying hypothesis is that the unavoidable lethality of nuclear weapons against civilian targets essentially ensures the functioning of deterrence against all rational opponents, even at very low US nuclear force levels. Consequently, proponents of Minimum Deterrence claim that low nuclear force levels need not cause any degradation in US deterrence strategies vis-à-vis severe state-based provocations.

US deterrence capabilities that focus on an opponents’ nuclear forces (“counterforce” target sets), are not considered necessary to the functioning of US deterrence strategies and typically are excluded from Minimum Deterrence retaliatory threats and force requirements. Rather, US counterforce capabilities generally are regarded as potentially “destabilizing” of a mutual deterrence balance because they could undermine an opponent’s confidence in the survivability of its deterrent, and thus move the opponent to consider a preemptive strike in a crisis. In addition, the number of nuclear and other military targets could be quite large, especially for peer adversaries, which could lead to the need for a US nuclear arsenal much larger than those associated with Minimum Deterrence. Consequently, proposals for Minimum Deterrence typically shun counterforce targeting as unnecessary for deterrence and as potentially destabilizing. Instead, civilian targets that are relatively few in number and unprotected are identified as the preferred basis for deterrence, and correspondingly, place modest demands on US force numbers.

A related part of the Minimum Deterrence narrative is that US national ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other forms of active and passive defense are both unnecessary and potentially destabilizing for the same reasons that US counterforce capabilities are shunned: defenses are unnecessary to meet the modest offensive force requirements for deterrence and could undermine an opponent’s confidence in its deterrence capabilities and thereby inspire an opponent’s interest in preemption in a crisis. As a result, Minimum Deterrence proposals typically argue against any US movement toward thick area defensive capabilities.

A relatively recent addition to this Minimum Deterrence narrative is the proposition that US nuclear capabilities are of declining value for US deterrence and extended deterrence goals because US advanced conventional forces and limited regional missile defenses can provide more credible deterrent effect. The Global Zero report states that “strong conventional forces and missile defenses may offer a far superior option for deterring and defeating a regional aggressor….Precision-guided conventional munitions hold at risk nearly the entire spectrum of potential targets, and they are useable.” Consequently, the US can prudently continue to reduce its reliance on and the number of its nuclear forces without jeopardizing the functioning of deterrence.

Numerous specific expectations regarding opponent decision-making and behavior are inherent, but rarely made explicit, in these related Minimum Deterrence propositions. These expectations about opponent behavior are that:

• opponents will reliably and predictably be deterred from severe provocation by US nuclear threats limited to a relatively small number of its soft targets; and,

• in opponent calculations, US advanced conventional forces can substitute for larger US nuclear capabilities to provide more credible deterrent effect.

These expectations presume very specific opponent calculations and behavior in response to US deterrence threats, and that essentially all rational, state leaderships will follow the same presumed specific decision making and behavioral norms. In the absence of these presumptions, Minimum Deterrence can offer no basis for expecting the predictable functioning of deterrence at low force levels.

To test these Minimum Deterrence propositions, a fundamental analytic goal of this chapter is to examine whether history supports the proposition that opponents reliably and predictably exhibit the decision-making and behavioral norms presumed in Minimum Deterrence. It is impossible to “prove” via empirical evidence that a specific future opponent certainly will or will not follow these specific decision-making and behavioral norms and thus will be deterred reliably at very low force levels. It is possible, however, to test the reasonableness of the Minimum Deterrence presumption that opponents reliably and predictably will follow these specific decision-making and behavioral norms against actual historical experience of leadership decision making and behavior in the context of severe threats.

Chapter 5. Minimum Deterrence capabilities are adequate for the assurance of allies and increasingly can be replaced for this purpose by US conventional forces and missile defenses.

Assuring allies of their security positions is a traditional US national goal. For example, the United States provides an extended deterrence commitment, including the “nuclear umbrella,” to NATO allies, Japan, South Korea and Australia. This US assurance provided to allies via their confidence in credible US extended deterrence is key in some cases to those allies seeking membership in NATO and continuing to remain non-nuclear themselves. Consequently, a key element of the contemporary Minimum Deterrence narrative is the assertion that the requirements for assuring US allies can be met with very low numbers of US nuclear weapons— particularly because US conventional forces and missile defense can provide comparable or superior assurance effect. This approach is evident in the following statement from the Global Zero Commission report: “Non-nuclear forces are also far more credible instruments for providing 21th century reassurance to allies whose comfort zone in the 20th century resided under the US nuclear umbrella.”

The claim on behalf of Minimum Deterrence that very low US nuclear force numbers are adequate for allied assurance, especially because US conventional forces can provide assurance, removes any unique US nuclear requirements for assurance that might otherwise push US requirements beyond those of Minimum Deterrence.

It is possible to test this important Minimum Deterrence claim against empirical evidence. There is considerable evidence available in this regard in past and contemporary allied reactions to US nuclear force reductions (and withdrawal), and in allied statements concerning the assurance value they attach to US nuclear forces and the characteristics of US nuclear forces they perceive as important for their assurance. It similarly is possible to test the claim that non-nuclear forces will provide comparable assurance effect in allied calculations of the requirements for their assurance. In this case, the allies cannot be correct or incorrect about the value they attach to the number and types of US nuclear forces for the purpose of their assurance—they are the sole judges of that effect and many express their views in this regard. That pertinent evidence is readily available to test this part of the Minimum Deterrence narrative.

Chapter 6. Deterrence considerations alone can determine the size and composition of the nuclear force.

Minimum Deterrence proposals base nuclear force sizing requirements on a relatively small number of weapons deemed to be adequate for deterrence. Once the relatively simple calculations for Minimum Deterrence requirements are concluded, no further goals shape the recommended size of the US nuclear force.

For example, the Global Zero Commission concluded, “An arsenal of 500-900 total weapons on each side would easily meet reasonable requirements of deterrence and would set the stage to initiate multilateral nuclear arms reductions involving all countries with nuclear weapons.”

According to this approach, no unique requirements for assuring allies or pursuing other national objectives if deterrence fails affect US nuclear force-sizing calculations.

In Minimum Deterrence proposals, the strategic goal of assuring allies is typically assumed to be a derived benefit from meeting these minimal deterrence requirements. Similarly, Minimum Deterrence proposals typically do not include any unique nuclear requirements to support US goals in the event pre-war deterrence fails. For example: “A true minimal deterrence mission has no need for a capability to attack enemy nuclear forces, hardened facilities, or underground structures, and certainly not to do it promptly.” In fact, some Minimum Deterrence presentations explicitly reject as undesirable and destabilizing any nuclear weapons for defense in the event deterrence fails (i.e., for damage limitation through strikes against enemy nuclear forces or through strategies intended to control escalation).

Not including a defense/damage-limiting objective as a US nuclear force-sizing metric allows Minimum Deterrence to base its recommended force size on its concept of pre-war deterrence requirements alone. It removes any need for pertinent US defensive capabilities such as maintaining prompt-response capabilities because they are unnecessary for deterrence.

Consistent with this approach, the Global Zero Commission recommends, “land-based ICBMs would no longer be poised for full-scale launches on a moment’s notice. Instead, they would be “pinned and safed” in their silos, an existing safety measure (the reversal of which requires maintenance crews to re-enter the silos and remove the pins), thus precluding their launch during normal peacetime conditions and requiring many hours to reverse.” The assertion that “dealerted” nuclear forces pose no serious risk to the functioning of deterrence enables the Global Zero Commission to remove half of its recommended 900-warhead force from alert or modified alert status.

These Minimum Deterrence propositions can be tested by examining the following questions: 1) to what degree are the assurance of allies, escalation control and defense (in the event of deterrence failure) recognized as priority national goals?; and, 2) if assurance, escalation control, and defense are priority national goals, should they be included independently as considerations in US force sizing because they create unique and separate nuclear requirements?

An examination of the history and character of these diverse national goals—deterrence, assurance, escalation control, and defense (in the event deterrence fails)—will provide insight regarding the degree to which US force-sizing calculations in the past have included each, and the degree to which they have unique force-sizing requirements independent of pre-war Minimum Deterrence calculations. The goal of this investigation is to identify the nature of these objectives and how the United States has in the past approached the appropriate measures of merit and adequacy for each, and to determine if US policy has been consistent in this regard, and if so, for what reasons.

Chapter 7. Because ballistic missile submarines are invulnerable, a small SSBN fleet can provide most of the nuclear capability needed for a future US deterrence needs.

According to most Minimum Deterrence presentations, US nuclear deterrence requirements can be met with a relatively small number of deployed forces based entirely or almost entirely on SSBN/SLBMs. Minimum Deterrence proposals rely heavily on the assumption that SSBNs are invulnerable and will remain so for decades. This assumption allows Minimum Deterrence proposals to recommend that the majority or all of US deployable nuclear warheads be based on a reduced number of survivable SSBNs, and that the two other legs of the nuclear triad be reduced or eliminated.

For example, the Global Zero Commission relies on the assumption of continued SSBN invulnerability to reduce the number of SSBN and make deep cuts in US nuclear force modernization plans, including elimination of the US ICBM force. In early 2010, Air Force analysts wrote, “Today the United States can adopt a minimum deterrence strategy and draw down its nuclear arsenal to a relatively small number of survivable, reliable weapons.” A more recent Minimum Deterrence proposal includes the recommendation of reducing the number of SSBN to eight.

The heavy emphasis on a reduced number of SSBNs clearly is based on the expectation of their survivability: “The submarine force would offer a high degree of survivability for many decades—no peer competitor currently has any effective anti-submarine warfare capability against US SSBNs at sea and technological breakthroughs that could threaten this survivability are several decades away.”

This Minimum Deterrence proposition and logic can be examined in a three-step process. The first step will be to research and summarize reputable sources that discuss, in general, the future of SSBN survivability. Certainly, if the US deployed nuclear force consists primarily of a small number of submarines at sea, the ability to locate and track those submarines would be a high-priority goal for future adversaries. If an adversary could track, and then neutralize, a small number of US SSBNs at sea, that adversary would have tremendous leverage over the United States under a Minimum Deterrence force structure. The detailed technical information on this subject is highly classified. Therefore, a review of the work of military and technical experts who discuss the issue of submarine survivability would have to suffice here.

Step two would involve addressing the security implications if the Minimum Deterrence presumption of continued SSBN invulnerability is demonstrated to be questionable, particularly including the US actions required with regard to maintaining a prudent measure of overall nuclear force survivability. National Institute will compare and contrast an adversary’s task of neutralizing a Minimum Deterrent force relying heavily or exclusively on a small number of SSBNs with the same task for a more diverse nuclear force.

Step three is to examine the US options and capabilities that would be absent with a deterrent force based largely or exclusively on SSBNs, and identify the potential implications of their absence for US deterrence goals and the assurance of allies.

Chapter 8. Nuclear force reductions provide essential support for arms control and nonproliferation efforts.

Minimum Deterrence proponents believe that by adopting very low nuclear force levels and by lowering reliance on, and the profile of, nuclear weapons in US defense policies, the United States would be well positioned for significant strides in nuclear arms control with peer or near-peer competitors Russia and China. In their view, Moscow and Beijing no longer would have to worry about the danger of an “arms race” with the United States and this US example would encourage both to make deep reductions in their own nuclear forces. The United States correspondingly would have greater confidence and flexibility in cutting its forces, either unilaterally or through negotiations.

Minimum Deterrence proposals further contend that adoption of such a posture would provide a clear demonstration of the US commitment to a nuclear-free world, giving Washington strengthened political and moral standing to lead international efforts to stop or roll back the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran. By adopting Minimum Deterrence and related nuclear force standards, the United States would have the high ground to spearhead renewed cooperative international campaigns aimed at convincing—or coercing—nuclear reversals by Pyongyang and Tehran.

These beliefs regarding the arms control and nonproliferation benefits of Minimum Deterrence assume that US nuclear force reductions and limitations are a critical determinant of what other states do with regard to acquiring nuclear weapons. This assumption can be subjected to careful analysis. While some nuclear-armed states appear to take US nuclear weapon plans, programs, and forces into account in their own nuclear-related activities, National Institute will examine whether there is evidence for a strong action-reaction dynamic, and also other factors that affect acquisition decisions regarding nuclear forces. In some cases, for example, the need to offset superior US conventional capabilities may be important to the nuclear weapon programs of others. In general, regional dangers, desire for prestige, domestic and bureaucratic politics, scientific-technical capacity, and economic wherewithal may be key factors affecting the nuclear weapon developments of states. Similarly, the political, military, diplomatic, and even economic bases for the arms control and non-proliferation stances taken by various countries are much more complex than simply whether the United States is setting a “good example” via its nuclear arsenal. The proposed study will examine the empirical record with regard to these various factors to determine if US adoption of Minimum Deterrence would be likely to bring about the arms control and non-proliferation benefits claimed by Minimum Deterrence.

Chapter 9. A small number of nuclear weapons is adequate for deterrence, thus US defense spending can be reduced considerably by reducing nuclear forces.

Minimum Deterrence proposals claim that a small number of US nuclear weapons is adequate for US deterrence goals and thus deterrence can be maintained without the cost of a large, diverse nuclear arsenal. Consequently, most presentations of Minimum Deterrence include the claim of large savings in defense spending. The Global Zero report claims that absent its recommended reductions, the US will spend $200 billion on needless nuclear modernization programs. In short, a theme of Minimum Deterrence proposals is the promise of substantially reduced defense spending.

In addition, as noted, Minimum Deterrence presentations typically argue that any possible degradation in deterrence resulting from these nuclear reductions can be mitigated with US conventional forces and missile defense.

The Minimum Deterrence claims of cost savings can be examined empirically. Historically, the United States and NATO moved toward reliance on nuclear deterrence because this was considered a much cheaper and more effective option than reliance on conventional weapons.

This history can be examined for its possible contemporary lessons.

In addition, the costs associated with measures to compensate for the reduction of US nuclear capability via conventional and missile defense capabilities typically are not taken into account.

The savings from deep nuclear reductions envisaged by Minimum Deterrence can be compared with the likely costs of attempting to provide additional or improved US non-nuclear forces intended to buttress US deterrence strategies.