HDTRA1-19-S-0002 ASD URA BAA Final Draft Feb2019.pdf

HDTRA1-19-S-0002 Page 1

DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

BROAD AGENCY ANNOUNCEMENT

HDTRA1-19-S-0002

DRAFT February 2019

Research and Development Directorate (RD)

Chief Scientist and Innovation Department (ST)

Adaptive Signature Discovery University Research Alliance

(ASD-URA)

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION NO. PAGE NO.

OVERVIEW INFORMATION

ADDITIONAL OVERVIEW INFORMATION

1. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

2. FEDERAL AWARD INFORMATION

3. ELIGIBILITY INFORMATION

4. APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INFORMATION

5. APPLICATION REVIEW INFORMATION

6. AWARD ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION

7. AGENCY CONTACTS

8. OTHER INFORMATION

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OVERVIEW INFORMATION

Agency Name:

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Research and Development (RD) Directorate Chief Scientist and Innovation Department (ST) 8725 John J. Kingman Road, MS 6201 Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6201 Funding Opportunity Title: DRAFT of the Adaptive Signature Discovery University Research Alliance (ASD-URA) Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) Announcement Type: This is a draft announcement of this funding opportunity.

Funding Opportunity Number: HDTRA1-19-S-0002 Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number: 12.351 Dates: This BAA is in effect from the final posting date through September 2019. Phase I pre-proposal submissions are due 60 days following the publishing date of the final BAA.

ADDITIONAL OVERVIEW INFORMATION

Purpose: DTRA is seeking to support research to investigate scientific means to better understand current and emerging Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats and threat networks, and discover better methods for seeking changing signatures of these networks and the pathways that lead to their development. Findings from this basic research are anticipated to help support future identification of proactive measures to counter WMD threats.

WMD threat detection cannot always be achieved optimally by individual physical means alone, such as a particular sensor modality. Thus, multiple types of sensors are often employed in harmony to contextualize information from collected data. Research involving scientific areas such as cultural anthropology, mathematical sociology, and physical science using tools like multimodal data fusion, game theory, and machine learning may provide new pathways to explore WMD threat predictions because the sum of physical observation and social interpretation may be stronger than either alone. No verified deterministic general theory of human behavior or social networks exists. For the purposes of this BAA, it is anticipated that an interdisciplinary effort, in which physical and social scientists work together in an integrated team, will yield insights into new measures to defeat WMD.

The overarching goal of the Adaptive Signature Discovery (ASD) University Research Alliance (URA), collectively known as ASD-URA, is to investigate the ability to deduce and be responsive to adversary capability and intent with WMDs using evolving data from multimodal sensors to extract actionable information from multimodal sensors (including imaging), physical networks, and social networks. The research performed by the URA must be an approach with active collaboration between the individual disciplines. The intent is to enable a team to model, predict, and discover emerging threats under a framework of broader sensor network theories, namely adaptive networks. Methods supported under this ASD effort should be useful in either

HDTRA1-19-S-0002 Page 4 strategic peer competitor threats or more vague/non-state threat landscape determination.1 A signature in this effort is a piece of information derived from data correlated to an event or object of interest. This is not a data gathering effort, nor is it solely data fusion. Instead, the project is exploring adaptive approaches to the fusion of information to extract knowledge about adversary capabilities and intents with WMDs.

DTRA anticipates that the predominance of work conducted by the ASD-URA will be fundamental research as defined in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information. Initially the research conducted by the ASD-URA will align under Budget Category 6.1 (Basic Research) funding. However, to provide the Government with the most flexibility, the cooperative agreement (CA) will also allow participation from other Government agencies and may result in additional Budget Category 6.1 funding as well as some Budget Category 6.2 funding (Applied Research funding; see discussion of Enhanced Program in Section 1.6). Thus, the research conducted for the ASD-URA will fall within the first four Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs).

DTRA envisions that the results of the ASD-URA research will be efficiently and rapidly transitioned to applied DTRA research and development programs.

Award Instrument and Structure: This Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) is expected to result in the award of a CA as defined at 31 United States Code (U.S.C.) 6305 for the execution of the program. The CA will be awarded to an Alliance of United States (U.S.)-based organizations that may include U.S. institutions of higher education, Department of Defense (DoD)-Degree Granting Colleges and Universities, DoD Service Labs, U.S. industrial partners, and/or U.S. non-profit organizations. At this time, performance under the CA is not limited to individuals designated as U.S. Persons; however, individual participation could be limited in the future based on DoD policy changes.

The Alliance must be led by a U.S. institution of higher education charged with spearheading the focused basic research program. This organization will be designated as the Lead Research Organization (LRO). Each Research Area (RA) will be led by a different U.S.-based institution of higher education that will be designated as the Lead Research Area Organization (LRAO).

One of the LRAOs could also be the LRO; however, the same entity cannot be the LRAO for more than one RA. Together the LRO and LRAOs make up the permanent Alliance members, who are responsible for shaping and steering the URA through collaboration with DTRA.

Collectively the URA members and DTRA make up the Consortium. Performance under the URA and resulting CA will likely also include organizations beyond the LRAOs as subawardees to the LRO. These subawardees are non-permanent members of the URA.

Alliances are encouraged to include Historically Black Colleges and Universities (as determined by the Secretary of Education to meet requirements of Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965 as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1061) and from Minority Institutions defined as institutions “whose enrollment of a single minority or a combination of minorities…exceeds 50 percent of

1 Anticipation of threat landscapes includes but is not limited in scope to current or future potential threats such as EMP (SREMP, HEMP, SGEMP), cyber vulnerability on NC3 and civilian systems, geophysical natural disasters triggered by red team actions, neocortical interface exploits, nanotechnology-based security threats, and 4th gen tailored nuclear weaponry. Technical Horizon Research Evolution Anticipation Tool (THREAT), Gallup Gov., June 2018.

HDTRA1-19-S-0002 Page 5 the total enrollment,” 20 U.S.C. § 1067k(3).

While DTRA anticipates that a single award may be made from this BAA, the Government reserves the right to fund all, some, or none of the proposals submitted; may elect to fund only part of any or all proposals; and may incrementally fund any or all awards under this BAA. The Government also reserves the right to request applicants make any changes necessary to documents submitted as part of an application package to increase the feasibility of making the proposal fundable. Applicants may decline to participate in any revisions to application packages requested by DTRA.

Proposal Submission: The BAA will be conducted in two phases. Phase I is for receipt and evaluation of pre-proposal submissions. Phase II is for receipt and evaluation of invited proposal packages. Invitation to submit a Phase II proposal will be based on the evaluation results of the Phase I pre-proposal submission.

All submissions must be made in accordance with the submission instructions in this BAA through www.grants.gov using the application packages linked with this BAA (under the “Package” tab) on www.grants.gov. Applicants are responsible for ensuring compliant and final submission of all applications. Any submission that does not conform to the requirements outlined in the BAA and in the invitation for Phase II submissions may not be reviewed or considered further at the discretion of DTRA.

Period of Performance: Efforts may be proposed for three years with two additional two year options. The total possible period of performance is seven years.

Funding: Estimated funding for the CA is anticipated to be $5M annually (total, including both direct and indirect costs) depending on the nature and the scope of work. This BAA is issued subject to the availability of funds. The funding levels provided are to allow applicants to prepare estimates only. Payments on CAs will be made in advance, subject to the conditions described in 2 Code Federal Regulations (CFR) 200.305.

Profit/Fee: In accordance with 32 CFR §22.205, profit/fee is not permitted under the CA.

Cost Sharing: Cost sharing is not required under this BAA; however, efforts that include cost sharing or in kind contributions are allowed.

Terms and Conditions of Awards: Any CA awarded under this announcement will be governed by the award terms and conditions, which conform to DoD's implementation of The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) circulars applicable to financial assistance. This includes DoD implementation of OMB guidance in 2 CFR part 200, "Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards."

http://www.grants.gov/

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1. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION

1.1. Introduction

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) safeguards America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and provides capabilities to reduce, eliminate, and counter the threat and effects from chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives. DTRA seeks to identify, adopt, and adapt emerging, existing and revolutionary sciences that may demonstrate high payoff potential to Counter-WMD (C-WMD) threats. As a combat support agency, DTRA provides both operational support and specialized capabilities in science and technology (S&T). The Agency is the premier Department of Defense (DoD) source of science-based WMD expertise and a sponsor of basic research focused exclusively on WMD threat reduction.

Overcoming the most difficult technical challenges for combatting WMD requires revolutionary advancements in S&T. Only strategic investment in basic research will lead to the scientific breakthroughs needed for future WMD threat reduction. The strategy for the basic research program is to target unique C-WMD challenges within DTRA’s mission space. The program’s goals are as follows:

• Train the next-generation workforce;

• Advance the fundamental knowledge and understanding in the sciences;

• Promote university research to support WMD threat reduction; and

• Facilitate transition of research that enables new capabilities for the warfighter.

The program avoids preconceptions about specific applications or solutions in order to preserve the integrity of basic research. However, to maintain the relevance of the program to the larger DTRA mission and to ensure focus on the strategic goal of transitioning the research to enable new capabilities for the warfighter, the applied research requirements across the Agency are used to inform our choices. This approach has successfully attracted outstanding research institutions and a new generation of scientists into the field of WMD threat reduction. It also provides a hedge against the uncertainty of future threats and technology surprise.

To continue and expand on the program’s success to date, DTRA is evolving the investment strategy for basic research. DTRA intends to establish a new collaborative venture that seeks to investigate Adaptive Signature Discovery (ASD) in the context of future WMD-relevant operations through a new University Research Alliance (URA) that will consist of United States (U.S.) university researchers working to solve complex problems. The overall objective is to develop a fundamental understanding of the adaptive nature of information correlation with images, sensory data, social networks, and physical networks. Research specialties can involve cultural anthropology, detection sciences, mathematical sociology, machine learning and other artificial intelligence, multimodal data fusion, network analysis, and other techniques in order to build predictive models of an adversary’s adapting capability and intent to acquire, proliferate, or use WMDs.

DTRA strongly believes that a joint collaborative approach by a multidisciplinary team of researchers is required to make fundamental advances towards meeting the Adaptive Signature Discovery University Research Alliance (ASD-URA) goal to develop a fundamental understanding of adaptive signature discovery. DTRA has identified three interrelated Research

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Areas (RAs) that when jointly studied will advance the theoretical foundations of ASD in the context of future operations. Those three areas are as follows:

• RA1—Image correlation with context enhanced data fusion,

• RA2—Physical network response, and

• RA3—Social networks.

In addition to these three RAs, predictive modeling of adaptive behavior is a Cross-Cutting Research Initiative (CCRI) that is inherent in each of the RAs. This modeling must cover feedback loops and control (i.e., observability/data collection, controllability/actuation, and stability/convergence of response and counter-response) as framed within a game theoretic scenario. This predictive modeling involves both adversary and friendly forces.

The ASD-URA is intended to create a collaborative environment that enables the Alliance to advance the state-of-the-art and to take advantage of the diverse scientific capabilities and viewpoints of both the academic sector and government personnel. The ASD-URA will work collaboratively with DTRA Technical Points of Contact (TPOCs) to develop research programs and identify areas where joint, multidisciplinary, collaborative research is advantageous.

Continuous collaboration through technical exchanges, site visits, student development, outreach, etc. opportunities will strengthen and improve the ASD-URA research and its DoD relevance.

As part of the URA, DTRA Program Managers (PMs)/scientists/engineers may have substantial involvement, including engaging in deep and meaningful collaborative research across the URA team.

1.2. Programmatic Strategy

The Cooperative Agreement (CA) will be awarded to an Alliance of organizations that may include U.S. institutions of higher education, DoD-Degree Granting Colleges and Universities, and DoD Service Labs.

The Alliance will work in collaboration with DTRA TPOCs to advance the state-of-the-art in ASD to meet the challenges of future military operations. DTRA and the URA selected for award will establish the Consortium that will work collaboratively to conduct basic research addressing key scientific gaps and barriers critical to ASD. Additionally, other government agencies may participate in the ASD-URA and contribute their technical expertise, personnel, and facilities. This intellectual synergy is also expected to include sharing equipment, personnel, and facilities to promote efficiency and enhance collaboration.

It is anticipated that the predominance of work conducted by the ASD-URA will be fundamental research as defined in National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 189, National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and Engineering Information. Fundamental research is basic and applied research in science and engineering, the results of which ordinarily are published and shared broadly within the scientific community as distinguished from proprietary research and from industrial development, design, production, and product utilization, the results of which ordinarily are restricted for proprietary or national security reasons. Contracted fundamental research includes research performed in the CA that is (a) funded by Budget Category 6.1 (Basic Research), whether performed by universities or industry or (b) funded by Budget Category 6.2

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(Applied Research) performed on-campus at a university2. Fundamental research provides for S&T research and early applied development. It seeks to lower performance risk to a manageable level and facilitate transition and funding to capability end-state programs.

Initially the research conducted by the ASD-URA will align under Budget Category 6.1 (Basic Research) funding. However, to provide the Government with the most flexibility, the CA will also allow participation from other Government agencies and may result in additional Budget Category 6.1 funding as well as some Budget Category 6.2 funding (Applied Research funding;

see discussion of Enhanced Program below). Thus, the research conducted under the ASD-URA CA will fall within the first four Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs). TRLs provide a systematic metric/measurement system that supports assessments of the maturity of a particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity between different types of technology.

The research strategy developed by the applicant should adopt a systematic approach to fundamental research focused on understanding how adaptive signatures from image correlation, physical networks, and social networks can be used to uncover evolving adversary capabilities and intents with WMDs. This research should lead to an elucidation of fundamental laws, theories, and theoretically grounded and empirically validated models that enable design of dynamic, adaptive, and goal-driven techniques to predict and discover adversary adaptive intents and capabilities with WMDs. An adaptive adversary is one that responds to their perception of our forces, sensor deployment and tactics, actions and potential courses of action in countering their use or threat to use WMD. Their capabilities include any: (1) WMD weapons and forces, and (2) general purpose forces specifically supporting their use of WMD. Intent and capabilities are considered adaptive when an adversary responds to their situational awareness, for example by a step-up of their postures for use of WMD forces.

Applicants must carefully choose research topics to ensure a critical mass of researchers addressing the challenges proposed. Applicants are expected to apply relatively equal resources to each of the three RAs: image correlation, physical networks, and social networks. Research in each RA must be interdisciplinary in order to inform and be informed by the developments in the other two RAs given the strong inter-dependencies between the three RAs. Furthermore, the research dedicated to each area must address the CCRI. The CCRI resources are an integral part of the RA efforts.

This BAA aims to solicit the most creative, innovative, and flexible approaches to the ultimate goal of generating and exploiting research to solve pressing research gaps and issues impacting both the military and commercial sectors. This BAA seeks Phase I pre-proposal submissions and invited Phase II submissions; this BAA may result in the award of a single CA. In response to the BAA, applicants will be required to:

• Define the strategy for implementing an approach which synergistically integrates the three RAs and the CCRI and outline the metrics by which success of the program is expected to be measured.

• Scope and define the research, appropriate to the overall funding of the URA, ensuring all elements of the proposed research are tightly integrated in a way that results of research in

2 Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Memorandum, SUBJECT: Contracted Fundamental Research, dated 26 Jun 2008.

HDTRA1-19-S-0002 Page 9 one area support and enhance the results in other areas. Applicants should identify the most critical research issues and describe how the set of research efforts meets the goals of this program. Sufficient resources should be allocated to ensure enough critical mass to make fundamental progress.

• Formulate a basic research program which clearly demonstrates innovative, detailed and substantive scientific plans to address each of the three RAs and the CCRI. The proposal should clearly articulate the applicant’s vision for the area and the applicant’s research goals for the program (the base period and for each additional option).

• Present the experience, qualifications and availability of the scientific staff and the quality and relevance of research facilities.

• Identify approaches to build collaborations within the Alliance and with DTRA, which are essential to the success of the ASD-URA.

• Identify the overall management (business plan) and programmatic and administrative team with the expertise to achieve the stated research goals and to oversee and manage finances, reporting, data, meetings, reviews and intellectual property.

1.3. Research Strategy

Definitions, Scope, and Rationale. For the purposes of this BAA, the following definitions of adaptive, signature, and discovery are used:

• Adaptive: ability to change, understand and respond to changes in an adversary’s physical or social network structures

• Signature: a piece of information derived from data correlated to an event or object of interest.

• Discovery: extraction of a WMD adversary’s capabilities and intent from correlated signatures.

New pathways should be explored to extract information about WMD capability and intent using evolving data from multimodal sensors and other data sources combined with information about adapting physical and social networks to improve WMD threat and consequence/risk predictions.

The findings of this research have DoD relevance. Image correlation and pattern recognition of people, materials, infrastructure or objects associated with WMD threats or activities moving in space and time may provide an adaptive signature that elucidates adversary intent and behavior.

Similarly, adapting physical or social networks may help identify an adversary’s intent with WMDs or ability to reconstitute during a dynamic tempo of hostile actions. Social networks can contribute to the discovery of covert networks and identify attempts to assemble military networks or exploit critical war-supporting infrastructure. The warfighter needs to recognize enemy obfuscation and intent in order to respond with appropriate proactive and preventative actions. This would result in adaptive defensive strategies. Methods to identify critical infrastructure based on adaptive signatures from correlated images, physical network detection, and social network studies would contribute to C-WMD threat capabilities.

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Figure 1 below illustrates the general structure of the URA and the underlying RAs (RA1-RA3).

ASD-URA LRO

RA 1—LRAO 1

Image Correlation with Context Enhanced Data

Fusion

RA 2—LRAO 2

Physical Network

Response

RA 3—LRAO 3

Social Networks

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Subawardee

Adaptive Signature Discovery (ASD) -

UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ALLIANCE (URA)

Permanent Alliance

Members

Cross Cutting Research Initiative—Understand Adaptive Threat Responses and Counter-Threat Responses

Figure 1: General structure of the ASD-URA.

Overview of Research Areas (RAs) and Cross Cutting Research Initiative (CCRI).

Research findings from this BAA will help anticipate and understand future WMD threats and the networks and pathways that lead to their development. Future transition of the basic research will support the identification of proactive measures to counter the threats. The three RAs and the CCRI are:

• RA1—Image Correlation with Context Enhanced Data Fusion: Correlation of images with additional sensor information using physical variables, human behavior, and context to support determination of adversarial intent.

• RA2—Physical Network Response: Understand network transient reactive responses in data sparse environments for detection of infrastructure that may be missing from the sensor data, and experiment with physical networks for purposes of detection/actuation3

3 Adaptive Cooperative Systems – Martin Beckerman, John Wiley and Sons, 1997.

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• RA3—Social Signature: Detection of signatures4 associated with human behavior under duress and use of statistical and deterministic group dynamics to create simple rules describing emergent signatures associated with WMD intent and threat capability.

• CCRI—Understand Adaptive2 Threat Responses and Counter-Threat Responses: During the investigation of the research areas above, the science of complex adaptive systems is explored for three discrete research areas. Each area needs to be studied with continuous awareness of developments as they occur in the other areas. This creates an iterative process in which each of the three research areas contributes to the developments within a coordinated framework for ASD. The body of mathematics and design of experiments associated with adaptive science is the cross cutting focus.

Research in each of these areas is discussed next. Each RA has its own unique theme, but these must not be conducted as stand-alone research projects. It is expected that the participants will be actively engaged with team members from the other RAs throughout the research.

Communication and responsive, iterative research will yield a better integrated result. The RAs will be aided in this by on-going consideration of the CCRI and by management from the URA

LRO.

RA1—Image Correlation with Context Enhanced Data Fusion. There is no shortage of sensor data or images, but there is room to extract more valuable information from these images that leads to actionable information for WMD discovery using contextualized data or multisensor data fusion. Additionally, methods that can handle data gaps or large volumes of data from multiple sensor types to build a WMD threat picture should be investigated. Investigations into pattern recognition in an adapting environment are encouraged and should be investigated as well. Extraction of information about static or immobile objects should be included in the discovery process. Similarly, information about dynamic or mobile objects should be collected and analyzed in order to interpret adversary intent.

The following questions are examples of research issues that may help frame the scope of subareas. Other questions that are relevant to this area may also be proposed by the PIs.

• Can imaging be used to predict or identify enemy obfuscation?

• Can image correlation be used to create preventative and proactive measures?

• Given that images alone are less valuable than the coupling of images to other sparsely collected measurements, how can multiple types of separate measurements be coupled (i.e., fused) to discover adversary capability, potential, or intent?

• Is it necessary to effectively couple physical observations with individual human behavior and group intent or potential for action; what are the significant sets of multimodality detections that best provide opportunity for C-WMD?

• Given that physical, social, and image information frequently needs to be considered and understood together with an emphasis on multimodal sensor analysis, what information techniques can be used to fuse data from different sensors for quick analysis and

4 Social, Cultural, Behavioral Modeling – 11th Int. Conference Proc., SBP Brims, July 10-13, 2018.

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• How can evolving classification/clustering approaches or other methods facilitate adaptive pattern recognition?

RA2—Physical Network Response. Physical networks provide a dual opportunity to discover adaptive signatures. Physical networks can be used to understand adversary military capability. Study of the adaptive game for physical networks can also provide solutions for improving our network capabilities. For example, examining transient reactive response can help to recognize changes in infrastructure and identify missing components. Data sparse methods and experimentation with physical networks should be studied as potential techniques to control, identify, or counter adversary WMD capabilities.

The following questions are examples of research issues that may help frame the scope of subareas. Other questions that are relevant to this area may also be proposed by the PIs.

• What techniques can help with transient/harmonic analysis of nonlinear dynamic systems?

• Can strong perturbative approaches be created for characterization of transients in potential WMD-threat data?

• How can the limits of data sparse environments be quantified and categorized, and how do these environments resolve as new modalities are introduced?

• What experiments and control variables within physical networks lead to detection/actuation effects for control of individual and group (social) response?

• Can we anticipate intent by identification of new infrastructure components during the construction phase?

RA3—Social Signature. Social networks should be investigated and used to develop methods to detect and understand signatures associated with adaptive human behavior under duress.4 Statistical and deterministic emergent group dynamics should be investigated to learn about adversary capability and intent with WMDs. Social networks should be leveraged to provide information about civilian or military physical infrastructure and determine when further actuations are valuable (e.g. theft of plans). Social networks should be used to discover covert networks and identify attempts to move toward assembly of military networks. Social network information from image processing can be built using case studies as WMD analogues.

Adaptive social network intelligence can be used to guide wide area search for WMD. Another very important subarea for this research is to recognize development pathways that are leading to distinctly novel forms of WMD threat capability.

The following questions are examples of research issues that may help frame the scope of subareas. Other questions that are relevant to this area may also be proposed by the PIs.

• How can signatures associated with adaptive human behavior under conditions that may be applicable to WMD social networks be identified?

• What patterns of activity are strong dynamic signatures for adversary WMD activity (e.g.

production, transportation, preparation for launch, etc.)? Can the signatures of adapting social networks be used to determine if an adversary is preparing to attack?

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• What statistical or deterministic methods can be used to identify emergent group dynamics of interest for discovery of threats?

• Are there discernible “simple rules” that explain emergent, apparently-complex behavior and corresponding signatures associated with WMD intent and threat capability?

• Can social information be combined with imaging to recognize what is physically happening, with an emphasis on visual aspects augmented with other sensor modalities to “see” the activity?

• How does one discover if an adversary is using fundamental science and/or technology surprise to create completely new types of WMDs? What are the corresponding signatures?

CCRI—Understand Adaptive Threat Responses and Counter-Threat Responses. The novel approach underlying this URA is the adaptive game of discovering signatures in a rapidly changing environment and being able to flexibly adapt our sensing strategies, for both physical and human behavior variables, to compensate for changes in the adversary’s game. The research framework leans on the mathematics associated with uncertain programming and emergence that occurs from non-synchrony and non-cooperative systems. Most of what has been studied has been alignment from cooperating systems, such as the Ising model in multiple dimensions, for example. When we impose non-cooperation, cloaking, hidden information, and adaptive red teams we expect emergence of insights for real-time adaptation of our sensor network of networks. We seek to explore this adaptive phenomena.3

1.4. Structure and Management

It is critical that the ASD-URA be structured and managed to create and foster an open, collaborative research environment. This section describes a framework for the organization of the ASD-URA. The lightweight framework is flexible to minimize overhead, yet ensure research relevance and proper oversight. Applicants can suggest additional management tools and mechanisms as part of the proposal, but in doing so they must also justify and demonstrate the benefit and cost effectiveness of these additional management activities.

DTRA and the ASD-URA will collectively be referred to as the ASD-Consortium. Other Government agencies may be invited to join the ASD-Consortium and to contribute, as appropriate, their technical expertise, personnel, access to research facilities, and funding. Given that the research program may be enhanced during the lifetime of the CA, applicants should suggest a procedure for how the enhanced program may be considered and incorporated by the

ASD-URA.

The ASD-URA will strive for a focused, yet flexible research environment. The ASD-URA will be led by a single U.S. institution of higher education that will be designated as the Lead Research Organization (LRO). The LRO will be charged with spearheading the focused basic research program and must have the ability to integrate the broad palette of research required to realize the goals of the ASD-URA. Each RA will be led by a different Lead Research Area Organization (LRAO); each LRAO will be a U.S. institution of higher education. One of the LRAOs could also be the LRO; however, the same entity cannot be the LRAO for more than one RA. Together the LRO and LRAOs make up the permanent members of the ASD-URA, who together are responsible for shaping and steering the Alliance through collaboration with DTRA.

Collectively, the URA members and DTRA make up the ASD-Consortium.

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Performance under the CA may also include additional organizations (over and above the LRO and LRAOs) as subawardees to round out the technical expertise and research tasks in a given RA. Any such organizations are expected to be subawardees to the LRO and will be considered as non-permanent members of the ASD-URA. The non-permanent members of the URA may consist of U.S. institutions of higher education, DoD Service Laboratories, and DoD Degree- Granting Colleges and Universities possessing the required expertise. Given the likelihood that the non-permanent members will change over the lifetime of the CA, applicants may suggest potential subawardees as part of their proposed team; however, full details on subawardees are not required in the full proposal. Applicants should also suggest a process for consideration and incorporation of new organizations into the research program.

Alliances are encouraged to include Historically Black Colleges and Universities (as determined by the Secretary of Education to meet requirements of Title III of the Higher Education Act of 1965 as amended, 20 U.S.C. § 1061) and from Minority Institutions defined as institutions “whose enrollment of a single minority or a combination of minorities…exceeds 50 percent of the total enrollment,” 20 U.S.C. § 1067k(3).

Technical Guidance and Oversight. The following framework is required for the management and oversight of the ASD-Consortium. Applicants may propose additional plans or mechanisms for management; however, applicants are cautioned to ensure that any such plans or mechanisms are: (1) not duplicative of the requirements and (2) not overly burdensome to the Alliance. A description of each component of the ASD-Consortium management follows:

• Cooperative Agreement Manager (CAM). The integrated scientific management and fiscal responsibility for the URA will reside with the DTRA Basic Research Manager, who will be designated the CAM for the ASD-URA under the CA. The Grants Officer will receive recommendations from the CAM and will be the ultimate legal authority empowered to make formal modifications to the CA.

• Technical Points of Contact (TPOCs). The TPOCs are the government subject matter experts (SMEs) that are charged with the scientific stewardship of the RAs and CCRI.

Each RA will have a DTRA TPOC. The TPOCs will work collaboratively to lead the CCRI efforts. The TPOCs will be heavily involved in the scientific management and review of the ASD-Consortium. The TPOCs will have significant responsibilities in the development of the Initial and Biennial Program Plans (IPP/BPP), fostering deep and persistent multidisciplinary research across the RAs, and performing day-to-day administrative duties associated with the RAs. The TPOCs will be the advisors to the

CAM.

• Lead Research Organization (LRO). The LRO provides the overall research leadership for the Consortium. This responsibility includes the day-to-day management of the ASD- URA; oversight of the development of the IPP/BPP; participation in the research;

promoting collaboration and technology transition; distributing Government funding to permanent and non-permanent members of the Alliance; and maintaining proper research invoicing. The LRO will designate an ASD-URA Program Manager (PM) from their organization who will be the Alliance’s scientific and programmatic representative charged with providing management and guidance of the CA.

• Program Manager (PM). The ASD-URA PM is the LRO's scientific representative charged with the Alliance’s overall responsibility for management and guidance of the

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CA. The PM is required to be an eminent scholar and have the stature, experience, and leadership skills to successfully execute the ASD-URA. It is also recognized that the PM may require staff support to manage and execute the CA, and this staff support should be included in the proposal submission.

• Lead Research Area Organizations (LRAOs). The LRAOs provide research leadership for a specific Research Area (RA). This responsibility includes supporting the PM in the development of the IPP/BPP, creating and fostering deep and persistent multidisciplinary research across the RA, performing day-to-day administrative duties associated with the RA, and conducting fundamental research in support of the ASD-URA. Each LRAO will identify a specific Principal Investigator to represent the LRAO, as a Research Area Lead (RAL), in Consortium planning and execution and to serve as a member in support of the PM and CAM during TMG meetings. If the LRO is also a LRAO, the PM and the RAL must be different individuals.

• Technical Management Group (TMG). The TMG is chaired by the CAM and consists of the PM, the three RALs, the corresponding RA Government TPOCs, and the DTRA Chief Scientist. The TMG will collaboratively lead the Consortium and assist the CAM and the PM in carrying out their duties concerning the ASD-URA. The RALs and their respective Government RA leads will collaboratively lead the RAs through the TMG.

The TMG will be responsible for the management and integration of the Alliance’s efforts including programmatic, technical, reporting, financial, and administrative matters. In matters where a consensus cannot be reached amongst the TMG, the CAM will have final decision-making authority. The TMG makes recommendations that concern the membership of the Alliance, the definition of the tasks and goals of the participants, and the relative distribution of funding to the members and subawardees.

Quarterly meetings will be conducted by the TMG.

• Research Management Board (RMB). The RMB will be established by the CAM to identify and develop collaborative opportunities, advise and assist the CAM in setting research goals by providing advice into the BPP planning process, provide recommendations to the CAM for the option year execution, and facilitate transition of URA research to basic and applied research programs. The RMB will be chaired by the CAM and may include the DTRA Chief Scientist, the TPOCs, and other representatives from DTRA. Other service organizations and other Government agencies with interest and expertise in the technologies related to the ASD-URA may also be included at the discretion of the CAM. The RMB will be invited to the Technical Review and appropriate workshops. The RMB will also be invited to review the IPP and BPP.

Articles of Collaboration (AoC). The AoC define the operational structure and governance within the Alliance including:

• Membership and management

• Changes to Consortium membership

• Financial, personnel, facilities, and reporting requirements

• Intellectual property

• Information exchange guidelines

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• Modifications to the AoC Applicants invited to submit a proposal will be provided a model AoC with their invitation to submit a proposal. The model AoC represents appropriate and necessary terms and conditions that the Government finds acceptable for operation of the ASD-URA. Applicants must submit the AoC with the proposal signed by a duly authorized representative for each proposed member of the Alliance. The model AoC can be executed by the proposed members of the Alliance “as is” or changes can be proposed. If changes are proposed, applicants are hereby informed that justification of any changes should be included with the proposal and such changes must be acceptable to the Government for the applicant to be eligible for award.

Initial Program Plan (IPP). Within 90 days after award, the PM will prepare an IPP through the TMG to cover the following 9-12 months of performance. The IPP will be based substantially on the draft IPP submitted as part of the proposal from the Alliance. The IPP should provide a detailed description of well-coordinated research activities. The IPP will include a detailed description of the projects proposed to be undertaken by any subawardees.

The IPP will contain the Data Management Plan as an appendix.

The IPP should be accompanied by a seven-year roadmap that describes the overarching goals and objectives to be accomplished by the Alliance within the Consortium structure. This roadmap should provide the vision for goals to be addressed during the first three years of the Alliance and similar for the two additional two year option periods. It should provide approximate timelines for research activities to facilitate potential future basic research transitions.

The IPP and the roadmap will be submitted to the CAM for review and approval. The final, approved IPP will be submitted to the Grants Officer for incorporation into the CA.

Biennial Program Plan (BPP). Nine to 12 months after award, the PM will prepare a proposed BPP through the TMG for the next two fiscal years. The BPP will enable integration and execution of multidisciplinary, collaborative research that strives to achieve URA objectives.

The BPP will provide a detailed plan of research activities (including research goals, key personnel, collaboration opportunities, staff and student development opportunities, facilities, experiments and budget) that commits the Alliance to use their best efforts to meet specific research objectives. The BPP will also describe the collaborative efforts with the Government.

The BPP will include a detailed description of the projects proposed to be undertaken by any subawardees, including new subawardees. The BPP will contain the Data Management Plan as an appendix.

The BPP will be submitted to the CAM for review and approval. The final, approved BPP will be submitted to the Grants Officer for incorporation into the CA. This process will continue through the life of the CA. Each BPP will cover a two-year timeframe, but may be altered, with the approval of the CAM and the Grants Officer, if research work requirements change.

During the course of performance, if it appears that research goals will not be met, the TMG will provide a proposed adjustment to the BPP for approval by the CAM. In addition, the CAM may from time to time request that additional research be added to the BPP within the scope of the CA. The Alliance, as an entity, will not solicit or accept funding from outside sources other than DTRA without the approval of the CAM and the Grants Officer.

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During the course of performance, the Grants Officer, in coordination with the CAM, will have approval authority for certain specific changes to the IPP/BPP including but not limited to:

• Changes in the scope or the objective of the program, IPP/BPP, or research milestones;

• Change in the key personnel specified in the IPP/BPP;

• The absence for more than three months, or a 25% reduction in time devoted to the project, by the PM;

• The need for additional Federal funding; and

• Any subaward, transfer, or contracting out of substantive program performance under an award, unless described in the IPP/BPP.

Annual Technical Review Meeting. Each year, the ASD-URA must conduct a Technical Review that is open to the scientific community at-large where the research portfolio is presented by the PIs. Such a review is intended to allow the Alliance researchers to engage in face-to-face technical discussions as well as garner input on the technical achievements of the Alliance from the broader community. One goal of this meeting is to foster interactions and collaborations among researchers and allow Consortium research leadership to assess research progress. The emphasis for the review is on collaborations (especially multi-disciplinary, cross-RA collaborations), experimentation/validation plans, and possible transition opportunities.

Planning for the annual Technical Review Meeting will be conducted by the TMG. The annual Technical Review Meeting will be executed by the Alliance. A hosting will be agreed upon among the permanent Alliance members in the Washington, D.C. area.

DTRA strongly encourages student and post-doctoral fellow participation in the annual technical review meetings. It is, however, recognized that such participation must be balanced with the associated costs. Thus, DTRA anticipates that a significant number of the students and post-doctoral fellows will participate in each review. DTRA also anticipates the inclusion of more advanced research in selection of student and post-doctoral fellows for review participation. To ensure development of student and post-doctoral fellows the review must include targeted avenues for them to explore collaboration and networking opportunities and share their research, e.g., through poster presentations or oral sessions.

Applicants should suggest how they can aid in the planning of a technical review in the Washington, D.C. area, including a model with an associated cost for the conduct of annual reviews of the research program that meet the intent of what is described herein.

Additional Information. It is anticipated that the Alliance will participate in other DTRA program reviews. The ASD-URA, as an entity, will not solicit or accept funding from outside sources without the approval of the CAM and the Grants Officer.

The CAM, in coordination with the RMB and DTRA leadership, will be responsible for integrating the IPP/BPP into the overall Government research and technology programs. During the course of performance, the Grants Officer, in coordination with the CAM, will have approval authority for certain specific changes to the CA including, but not limited to:

• Changes to the AoC if such changes substantially alter the relationship of the parties as originally agreed upon;

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• Solicitation or acceptance of funding under the agreement from sources other than DTRA; and

• Changes in non-permanent Alliance membership, if not documented in the IPP/BPP.

1.5. Collaboration and Workforce Development

A close collaborative relationship between DTRA and the Alliance will be necessary to accomplish the research for the ASD-URA. Persistent collaboration across the ASD-URA will enhance innovation and have a high return on investment. It is DTRA's strong belief that work conducted under the ASD-URA cannot be successful either in whole or in part without collaboration. DTRA intends for the collaboration to provide avenues to promote growth and development of staff across the ASD-Consortium, including Government personnel. Particularly of interest to DTRA is training the “next-generation” of SMEs. DTRA also views the collaboration as a means to foster a community with both high-value technical expertise and insight into DTRA challenges. Therefore, collaboration between the Alliance and the Government is integral to the execution and success of the ASD-URA. Creation of an environment that is conducive to collaboration is a critical element in establishing the Alliance.

In the proposal, applicants should outline the range of opportunities foreseen for collaboration and the mechanisms that will be put into place to foster the collaborative activities.

General Activities. The URA is encouraged to hold regularly-scheduled scientific lectures, conduct short courses, convene RA-focused technical meetings, and technical workshops on mutually agreed upon topics throughout the period of performance. Additionally, the ASD-URA is expected to hold regular, periodic research reviews that will permit and encourage the free exchange of ideas and research results, especially those impacting any crosscutting research themes.