FY'23 ARCTIC NOFO.pdf

DHS-23-ST-061-ARCTIC

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)

DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

Center of Excellence for Homeland Security in the Arctic

Table of Contents

A. Program Description

1. Issued By

2. Assistance Listings Number

3. Assistance Listings Title

4. Funding Opportunity Title

5. Funding Opportunity Number

6. Authorizing Authority for Program

7. Appropriation Authority for Program

8. Announcement Type

9. Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities

a. Program Overview and Objectives

b. Priorities and Expectations for a COE

c. Overarching Vision of the COE for Homeland Security in the Arctic

d. Geographic Focus of the Center

e. DHS Strategic Goals and Objectives

f. Research and Education Program

g. Research and Education Themes, Topics, and Questions

h. Application Project Narrative

10. Performance Measures

B. Federal Award Information

1. Available Funding for the NOFO: up to $4,600,000 in the first award year

2. Projected number of Awards:

3. Period of Performance:

4. Projected Period of Performance Start Date(s):

5. Projected Period of Performance End Date(s):

6. Funding Instrument Type: Cooperative Agreement

C. Eligibility Information

1. Eligible Applicants

2. Applicant Eligibility Criteria

3. Cost Share or Match

4. Key Dates and Times

5. Agreeing to Terms and Conditions of the Award

6. Address to Request Application Package

8. Steps Required to Submit an Application, Unique Entity Identifier, and

System for Award Management (SAM)

9. Electronic Delivery

10. How to Register to Apply Through Grants.gov

11. How to Submit an Application to DHS via Grants.gov

12. Timely Receipt Requirements and Proof of Timely Submission

13. Content and Form of Application Submission

14. Optional Forms

15. Other Submission Requirements

16. Funding Restrictions and Allowable Costs

17. Allowable Costs

D. Application Review Information

1. Application Evaluation Criteria

2. Review and Selection Process

E. Federal Award Administration Information

1. Notice of Award

2. Administrative and National Policy Requirements

3. Reporting

F. DHS Awarding Agency Contact Information

1. Grants Officer

2. Office of University Programs Mailing Address

G. Other Information

1. Period of Performance Extensions

2. FEMA Financial Assistance Programs for Infrastructure

3. Disclosure

APPENDIX A: COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT TERMS AND CONDITIONS

APPENDIX B: Acronyms

APPENDIX C: End-to-End Approach

APPENDIX D: References for Themes, Topics and Questions

APPENDIX E: Tips for Applicants

All entities wishing to do business with the federal government must have a unique entity identifier (UEI). The UEI number is issued by the SAM system. Requesting a UEI (Sam.gov information can be found at: https://sam.gov/content/entity-registration.

Grants.gov registration information can be found at:

https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html.

1. Planned UEI Updates in Grant Application Forms

On April 4, 2022, the Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) Number was replaced by a new, non-proprietary identifier requested in, and assigned by, the System for Award

Management (SAM.gov). This new identifier is the Unique Entity Identifier (UEI).

Additional Information can be found on Grants.gov:

https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/forms/planned-uei-updates.html

A. Program Description

1. Issued By

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

2. Assistance Listings Number

97.061

3. Assistance Listings Title

Centers for Homeland Security

4. Funding Opportunity Title

Center of Excellence for Homeland Security in the Arctic

5. Funding Opportunity Number

6. Authorizing Authority for Program

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 308, as amended, P.L. 107-296. Codified at 6 U.S.C.

7. Appropriation Authority for Program

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2022, Pub. Law No. 117-103, Division F, Title IV, Research Development, Training and Services, Science and Technology Directorate Research and Development (FY ’22)

8. Announcement Type

Initial

9. Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities

a. Program Overview and Objectives

The DHS S&T Office of University Programs (OUP) is requesting applications from accredited U.S. colleges and universities to lead a consortium of universities for a Center of Excellence for Homeland Security in the Arctic. The DHS COEs are university consortia that work closely with DHS Components and their partners to conduct research, develop, and transition mission-relevant science and technology, educate the next generation of homeland security technical experts, and train the current workforce in the latest scientific applications. Each COE is led by an accredited U.S. college or university and involves multiple partners that change over time. COE partners include other academic institutions; commercial industry; DHS Components; Department of Energy National Laboratories; Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs); other federal agencies that have homeland security-relevant missions; state, local, tribal, territorial (SLTT) governments; non-profits; and first responder organizations. DHS envisions the COEs as long-term trusted academic partners that provide an array of resources to help DHS achieve its missions and improve operations across the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE). The COEs that make up the COE network are listed at http://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence. The new Center will be a fully integrated component of the COE network and will take advantage of the network's resources to develop mission-critical research, education, and technology transition programs.

b. Priorities and Expectations for a COE

Establishing a COE is a major and expensive effort that involves numerous individuals and organizations. The COEs collaborate and build relationships over 10 years with DHS, and priorities will evolve during that period. It is critical for university applicants to understand the roles and requirements of being a COE lead institution before applying and to craft a proposal that meets all of the requirements of a DHS COE.

There are three major aspects of operating a COE that the application will have to address. The detailed expectations and requirements for each of these aspects is outlined in the following sections of this funding opportunity:

Section B.b.2 Research Program

Section B.b.3 Education and Workforce Development Program

Section B.4 Management and Administration

Applicants should read this entire funding opportunity prior to applying, paying close attention to these sections and other pertinent sections, such as D.10. Content and Form of Application Submission, D.12. Other Submission Requirements, E.1. Application Evaluation Criteria, E.2. Review and Selection Process, and Appendix A: Cooperative Agreement Terms and Conditions.

The DHS COEs are different from many other federally funded university centers.

Each COE lead institution must build a nation-wide or world-wide network of academic and other SMEs in order to be able to access the best experts for each problem in short order. This includes developing strong partnerships with Minority Serving Institutions

(MSIs) and committing resources to support building a diverse, highly capable, technical workforce for DHS and the broader HSE. The HSE (Homeland Security Enterprise) is defined as the collective effort and shared responsibility to maintain critical homeland security capabilities, and includes federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial governments;

non-governmental, private-sector, and international partners; and individuals, families, and communities.1 HSE partners in the Arctic include domestic and international public-and private-sector organizations.

The COE team must also demonstrate their commitment to develop a long-term, trust-based partnership between universities, DHS components, and organizations across the broader HSE to provide targeted capabilities and education resources. DHS COEs operate using a unique research management approach where researchers work alongside operational and decision-making personnel to find opportunities to use science and technology to enhance homeland security capabilities. For example, university faculty may spend time working with customers in the field to better understand their needs and how their results may be applied to operations, policy, and processes. As such, DHS looks to COE leadership to maintain situational awareness of cutting-edge research to inform DHS and the HSE of research futures, and to identify potential threats arising from, or to be mitigated by, novel technology.

DHS expects the work of the COEs to make a difference and to produce implementable results. Proposals for re-branded off-the-shelf research or pet projects will not survive DHS’s rigorous review processes. DHS needs use-inspired, results-focused research that generates customized and innovative solutions.

The DHS mission requires that its operational Components [e.g., United States Coast Guard (USCG), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), United States Customs and Border Protection (U.S. CBP) etc.] be responsive to a wide range of constantly evolving homeland security challenges and threats, both natural and manmade. As a result, DHS priorities and operational challenges may change over the course of a COE’s performance period.

Therefore, COE research programs should be flexible enough to adapt to new homeland security challenges and priorities, while at the same time maintaining focus on their core research areas.

It is also important to understand that the skill sets required to make a COE successful are more extensive than research expertise alone. COEs need to have the ability and commitment to communicate frequently with a variety of actors, from federal staff, to attorneys, to university administrators, to the private sector. In addition to a multidisciplinary research team, COEs should include experts in finance, project management, education, training, outreach and marketing, intellectual property management, technology development, and technology transfer. Applicants should demonstrate an understanding of how to translate research to practice, including aspects

1 DHS Lexicon: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhs-lexicon such as technology and business market assessment, protection of intellectual property rights, licensing, and federal financial assistance and federal acquisition.

DHS funds the COEs through cooperative agreements, which support research for public purposes and enable substantial federal agency involvement in COE activities and research. OUP facilitates interactions between researchers, DHS SMEs, and customers from the public and private sectors (e.g., homeland security practitioners). The goal of this hands-on management is to develop a trusting, sustained relationship between universities, DHS Components, and their public- and private-sector stakeholders across the broader HSE.

OUP will work with COE management to formulate each COE’s research and education projects, and to develop communication and transition strategies. Interactions commonly include COE-sponsored workshops that bring together diverse SMEs, industry representatives, and federal managers. DHS believes this frequent interaction is the most effective way to get the federal government’s research investments into operational use by security, intelligence, and emergency response personnel. Only academic institutions that can embrace this type of close working relationship should apply for this funding opportunity. For more information about cooperative agreements and substantial federal agency involvement, please see Section B.

c. Overarching Vision of the COE for Homeland Security in the Arctic

The Center of Excellence (COE) for Homeland Security in the Arctic will conduct research and education to support homeland security mission goals in the Arctic, including those described in the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region,2 which seeks an Arctic region that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative, the 2021

DHS Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security,3 which provides a strategic alignment and vision to protect the homeland and secure prosperity in the region, and the

2019 U.S. Coast Guard Arctic Strategic Outlook,4 which reaffirms United States Coast

Guard’s (USCG) commitment to leadership in the Arctic region. The DHS Strategic

Approach summarizes the challenges and opportunities for homeland security in the

Arctic:

The U.S. Arctic is dynamic; evolving environmentally, operationally, and strategically. A challenging landscape and seascape, combined with the sheer vastness of distance from the mainland United States, austere communications, and limited infrastructure, exacerbate the harshness of Arctic operations. This new operating environment will not only require additional maritime security presence

2 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/National- Strategy-for-the-Arctic-Region.pdf 3 2021 DHS Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/strategic-approach-arctic-homeland-security 4 2019 USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook: https://www.uscg.mil/arctic/ but will also necessitate new operational capabilities and additional resources to perform cyber and infrastructure security missions, trade and travel facilitation, and natural disaster response in the near term; and inevitably, additional mission sets. 5

For example, as changing conditions such as receding sea ice increase access to waters and land across the region, the homeland security mission in the Arctic is expanding.6

This includes furthering collaborative efforts to strengthen security and resilience with federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial entities; private and non-profit industry; and communities and individuals. This will also involve efforts to ensure the resilience of the

Arctic infrastructure necessary for basic and surge operations as well as lifeline functions against a range of natural and man-made threats; the advancement of situational awareness in the Arctic; the ability to respond to and recover from adverse events;

identification of best practices, actions, technologies and policies that could prevent or help plan and prepare for adverse events; and fostering collaborative efforts via interagency and international fora to address areas of mutual interest.

The COE for Homeland Security in the Arctic will conduct interdisciplinary basic and applied research, education, and technology transition to inform those efforts and support

DHS components having an operational presence in the Arctic, including the USCG, FEMA, CBP, CISA and other HSE entities in coordination with partner agencies, such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of State

(DoS), and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).

DHS anticipates the Center’s research will produce tangible research and education results for use by DHS, other government agencies, communities, non-profit organizations, industry, and other relevant entities across the HSE. The Center’s research results will include tools, technologies, and knowledge products (e.g., best practices, resource guides, case studies) for use in improving homeland security operations, decision-making, and policy at all levels of government. The Center’s education and workforce development programs will include innovative initiatives that: embed students with homeland security practitioners to conduct research; foster opportunities for students to gain practical experience in homeland security-related professions; integrate homeland security studies into existing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) graduate and undergraduate degree programs; and provide technical education and training programs for homeland security professionals.

5 2021 DHS Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/strategic-approach-arctic-homeland-security 6 2021 DHS Strategic Framework for Addressing Climate Change:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_strategic_framework_10.20.21_final_508.pdf

d. Geographic Focus of the Center

There are numerous definitions of the Arctic with differing descriptions of the geographic areas (land and sea) encompassed by the term.7

Section 112 of the Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984 (codified in 15 U.S.C.

4111), as amended, defines the U.S. Arctic as:

“…all United States and foreign territory north of the Arctic Circle and all

United States territory north and west of the boundary formed by the

Porcupine, Yukon, and Kuskokwim Rivers; all contiguous seas, including the Arctic Ocean and the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi Seas; and the

Aleutian chain.” 8

This definition “includes certain parts of Alaska below the Arctic Circle, including the Aleutian Islands and portions of central and western mainland

Alaska, such as the Seward Peninsula and the Yukon Delta.” 9

This COE will be looking at the Arctic as defined in ARPA in addition to certain other areas pertinent to DHS strategic objectives, including but not limited to the entire State of Alaska. This expanded geographic focus better incorporates DHS’s operational role in the region, and better positions the Center to conduct research and education relevant to homeland security mission sets, as outlined in the 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 21

(PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience,10 which aims to advance

“national unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure,” and 2011 PPD-8, National Preparedness,11 which aims to strengthen “the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the nation.” There are numerous international agreements that describe operational areas for different functions that are relevant to homeland security. These include the 2013 Agreement on

Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic

(MOSPA),12 the 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search

7 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress:

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/144 8 Arctic Research and Policy Act (ARPA) of 1984: https://www.nsf.gov/geo/opp/arctic/iarpc/arc_res_pol_act.jsp 9 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress:

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/144 10 2012 Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21), Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience:

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-and-resil 11 2011 PPD-8, National Preparedness: https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-8-national-preparedness 12 2013 Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic (MOSPA):

https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/529 and Rescue in the Arctic,13 the 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic

Scientific Cooperation,14 among others. Applicants should align the geographic focus of proposed research and education to accomplish the proposal’s objectives.

e. DHS Strategic Goals and Objectives

The missions of the Department are broad and complex: counter terrorism and homeland security threats, secure U.S. borders and approaches, safeguard cyberspace and critical infrastructure, preserve and uphold the Nation’s prosperity and economic security, strengthen preparedness and resilience, and champion the DHS workforce and strengthen the Department. Accordingly, DHS engages with the academic community to conduct strategic and innovative research and education in support of these missions. Proposals should aim to aid DHS overall and the operational components in support the

Department’s strategic goals and objectives. Objectives 1.4, 2.1, 2.2, 3.2, 4.2, 4.3, 5.1, 5.2, 6.2, and 6.3 of the 2020-2024 DHS Strategic Plan15 should be referenced when articulating anticipated impacts, showcasing how research by university-led consortia can support relevant operational needs of the Department. Figure 1 below provides a crosswalk of DHS Goals and Objectives and operational component responsibilities. See below Figure 1: DHS Goals and Objectives Crosswalk from the DHS Strategic Plan FY

2020-2024.

13 2011 Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic:

https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/531 14 2017 Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation: https://www.arctic.gov/agreement-on-enhancing-international-arctic-scientific-cooperation/ 15 DHS Strategic Plan FY2020 – 2024: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/department-homeland-securitys-strategic-plan-fiscal-years-2020-2024

Figure 1: DHS Goals and Objectives Crosswalk from the DHS Strategic Plan FY 2020-2024

f. Research and Education Program

Applicants must propose a research program to address each of the research and education themes and a selection of topics outlined below. Each theme is organized into major topics that are related to the mission areas of DHS. Within each topic is a list of research questions. Successful proposals must address all themes; however, DHS does not expect proposals to address every topic within a theme or every question within a topic. Applicants should select topics and questions within a theme area, explain why they selected these topics or questions, and propose methods, metrics, and outcomes to answer the relevant questions. Include at least one research project for each research theme in this NOFO for which the Center will have a high level of expertise and capability.

Because COEs are interdisciplinary by nature and design, DHS expects COEs to engage researchers from a variety of disciplines to tackle complex problems. Applicants should present interdisciplinary, comprehensive, problem-based approaches to research and education in each of the major theme areas that include faculty, students, and Center leadership. DHS welcomes applicants to suggest a range of innovative approaches to generate excellent and relevant research, while exposing students and faculty to real world challenges.

The Research Program should consist of: (a) an overview of the research program, and

(b) specific project proposals.

g. Research and Education Themes, Topics, and Questions

Themes Topics

1. Advance All-Domain

Situational Awareness

1A. Impacts of Emerging Technology on

Operations

1B. Technology Suitability and

Adaptability for the Operational

Environment

1C. Trend Analysis of Dynamic Human and Non-Human Systems in a Changing

Environment

2. Improve Understanding of

Risks and Potential Impacts

2A. Foundational Risk Assessment and

Analysis for Operations

2B. Risk Management for Crisis

Response

3. Enable Adaptation for

Resilience

3A. Operational Adaptation for Security

3B. Planning and Analysis for Future

Conditions

3C. Advanced Technologies and Tools for Remote and Harsh Operating

Conditions

3D. Building Capacity to Adjust to

Future Conditions

4. Expand Collaboration and

Cooperation across the

Homeland Security Enterprise

4A. Training, Education, and Workforce

Development

4B. Outreach and Engagement

4C. Collaboration with Local

Communities

Table 1 - Center of Excellence for Homeland Security in the Arctic

Research and Education Themes and Topics

Theme Area One: Advance All-Domain Situational Awareness

The Arctic presents unique challenges for maintaining situational awareness for operations, such as difficulty in maintaining effective awareness across vast and remote spaces. In addition, there are a number of changing conditions in the Arctic such as permafrost thaw, coastal erosion, and extreme variability in sea ice coverage. 16 Understanding the changing physical, operational, and geostrategic environments is and will be essential in advancing all-domain awareness, to include persistent awareness across land, sea, air, cyberspace, and space, and proactively addressing homeland security across the Arctic.

DHS Components need to understand how the Arctic’s physical environment is changing in order to anticipate how those changes will impact DHS operations. There is a lack of data on the Arctic environment and information sharing capability among Arctic operators in comparison to other environments in which DHS and the HSE operate, yet the Arctic is changing more rapidly than these other environments. DHS seeks forward-looking methods and approaches to (1) better understand what conditions are changing in Arctic regions, where they are changing, and how they are changing over time, and (2) enable situational awareness of current and future changing conditions and their impacts across the HSE, with an emphasis on all-domain situational awareness for homeland security operations, including: Maritime Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience, Disaster Response and Recovery, Hazard Mitigation, Border Security, and Protection of Trade and Travel.

Below are representative research questions of interest to DHS by topic (questions not listed in priority order):

Topic 1A. Impacts of Emerging Technology on Operations

What emerging technologies are likely to have the biggest impacts on homeland security missions in the Arctic? Will these technologies increase or decrease vulnerabilities with respect to homeland security missions?

What resilient technologies and methods are available or can be developed to monitor and manage vessel traffic, with a focus on providing safe vessel routing, collision avoidance, ice navigation, casualty response, and maritime domain awareness?

Maritime operations require accurate and timely awareness as well as future forecasting of activities within the domain to support responses. Maritime awareness in the Arctic is currently restricted due to limited surveillance, monitoring, modeling, and information system capabilities.

o How are technological advances and their intersection with changing environmental conditions in the Arctic likely to impact these capabilities?

As internet infrastructure continues to emerge within the U.S. and Canadian Arctic areas, gaining an understanding of the opportunities and impacts for remote villages related to commercial and economic growth, and community resilience is essential.

16 2021 DHS Strategic Approach for Arctic Homeland Security: https://www.dhs.gov/publication/strategic-approach-arctic-homeland-security o How will technological advances, such as modern high-speed internet and broadband cellular network coverage as it becomes available throughout the U.S. and Canadian Arctic, impact commercial and economic growth, and community resilience?

Topic 1B. Technology Suitability and Adaptability for the Operational Environment

Are there existing tools, technologies or methods used for homeland security operations in the Continental United States (CONUS) that could be adapted for use within the Arctic operational environment?

Will maritime object detection models developed in non-Arctic regions work in the Arctic?

What type of sensors are necessary and are able to function in the Arctic? This includes persistent sensors (potentially with no solar power during much of the year) and asset-mounted sensors (that will still face conditions beyond normal operating parameters of common sensors).

Ice ridges are a challenge to icebreakers. What measures and technologies are available or can be developed to improve navigation in or near ice-infested waters (e.g., for ice ridging detection and ice thickness measurements)?

Global Positioning Signal (GPS) jamming can have a critical impact on safe navigation in the Arctic. An increasing number of satellites are populating the Low Earth Orbit (LEO) – most of which are related to communications, Earth observation, and radar. In addition to these targeted applications, there is yet-to-be-harnessed potential for LEO and positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) systems known as LEO-PNT.

o Can commercial LEO satellites be used PNT? What does a LEO-PNT system entail?

What technology is involved and what are the potential challenges?

What navigation and marine safety information do mariners need for safe navigation in the Arctic? With new promising marine connectivity/internet services becoming available, what communications methods/channels/solutions/services will mariners use?

What is a model to support persistent and effective monitoring of the northern U.S. maritime and terrestrial border in the Arctic without physical human presence?

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing is a pervasive global maritime security threat. By undermining international agreements and fisheries conservation measures, IUU fishing jeopardizes food security and economic security, with pronounced destabilizing effects on vulnerable coastal states.

o What emerging technologies and methods exist that could be applied to the protection of Living Marine Resources and economic security?

o When and where might fisheries across the Arctic evolve and necessitate DHS enforcement and protection of fishing fleets and resources?

Topic 1C. Trend Analysis of Dynamic Human and Non-Human Systems in a Changing

Environment

How do the dynamic changes in the Arctic environment (environment includes: physical, commercial activity, wildlife migration, strategic / geopolitical, etc.) impact operations, planning, policy, and other national security risks?

How will climate related changes impact resilience and reliability of critical infrastructure?

How will national security infrastructure (ports and oil pipelines) be impacted by sea-level rise and permafrost thaw and coastal erosion over the next 50-100 years?

At what rate are conditions such as coastal erosion or thawing permafrost threatening existing Arctic communities? How are they being impacted, and how are those impacts being addressed locally and nationally?

How do we forecast trends of maritime activities (e.g., maritime shipping, fishing, tourism, natural resource exploration/exploitation) in the Arctic? How can this be modeled? What will the trends look like 20 years from now? 50 years from now?

Conditions in the Arctic are changing, including geo-political shifts and strategies. For example, the current Ten-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S. Arctic Region, 2020-

203017 is a reference for Arctic activity, often applied to Arctic Marine Spatial Planning.

However, major factors underlying this document’s conclusions have shifted, including an unprecedented demand for Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) due to the Russian-Ukraine territorial war. These geo-political influences may alter the projections documented by the U.S.

Committee on the Maritime Transportation System and are worthy of re-examination.

o Given the geo-political changes in the Arctic region, as well as changes in costs and demand of marine fuels and LNG, what are the projected trends in Arctic marine traffic from 2024 through 2034? How will these changes impact homeland security mission risk and execution?

Is human migration take place in the Arctic? What is the potential for it to take place in the future? What are the factors that influence human migration, and what tools can be developed to identify and predict migratory patterns? What tools or capabilities would be needed for DHS and the broader HSE to respond to mass migration in or through the Arctic?

Theme Area Two: Improve Understanding of Risks and Potential Impacts

The Arctic region presents unique strategic and operational risks for the HSE. This includes climate-related impacts to lifeline infrastructure,18 adversaries’ ability to impact strategic trade routes, impacts to local food supply, increased pollution, and difficulty in maintaining safety for maritime operations due to increasing operational and commercial traffic.19,20 These risks are compounded by a changing geographic environment, which both elevates the risk of more frequent and severe environmental impacts, but also may open previously inaccessible/partially accessible resources and trade routes.

Without innovative strategies, approaches, and tools, increased activity across the Arctic could outpace DHS’s ability to detect, deter, prevent, and respond to these changes and mitigate the growing risks.

17 2019 U.S. Committee on the Maritime Transportation System, A Ten-Year Projection of Maritime Activity in the U.S.

Arctic Region, 2020 – 2030:

https://www.cmts.gov/assets/uploads/documents/CMTS_2019_Arctic_Vessel_Projection_Report.pdf 18 FEMA Community Lifelines: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/practitioners/lifelines 19 2019 USCG Arctic Strategic Outlook: https://www.uscg.mil/arctic/ 20 2019 Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for Congress:

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R41153/144

The Arctic region is changing faster than other regions in which the HSE operates.21 As conditions in the Arctic evolve, many systems within the region – including critical infrastructure – will experience changes in operating and resilience requirements. Arctic infrastructure is critical for sustaining communities and maintaining operational capability in the Arctic region. Seventy percent of all Arctic infrastructure lies atop near-surface permafrost that is at risk.22 These changes do not happen in isolation – changes among (and risks to) the Arctic’s natural and human systems can have cascading and compounding impacts due the dynamic and interconnected nature of these systems, to include changes observed among physical, biological, and socioeconomic systems.23 Understanding these interactions is important to understanding how the Arctic operational environment is changing and how those changes impact HSE operations. DHS must understand the lifeline infrastructure systems that support homeland security operations in the Arctic, the interdependencies between them, and work with infrastructure service providers24 to improve resilience against constraints and challenges associated with operating in the Arctic. DHS seeks to better understand Arctic systems, how they interact with and impact each other, and how to better enable them to be resilient and recover from disruptions.

DHS responsibilities in the Arctic include enhancing critical infrastructure security, , responding to and recovering from disasters, law enforcement operations (protection of trade and travel), search and rescue, pollution prevention and response, protection of fisheries, and enhancing the security and safety of the Maritime Transportation System (MTS). To support Arctic risk management, hazard mitigation, emergency preparedness, and overall homeland security in the Arctic, DHS needs research that “promotes an understanding of disaster risk exposure, sensitivity to hazard, and adaptive capacity.”25

The ability to assess risks and understand potential impacts from disruptions is key to maintaining operational capability in the Arctic region. The ability to manage risk requires a well-informed understanding of environmental conditions and their projected changes over time. DHS seeks innovative mechanisms to assess the homeland security risks and opportunities as well as potential impacts to Arctic communities, critical infrastructure (including the maritime transportation system), and trade and travel routes from changing environmental conditions (i.e., permafrost thaw, sea level rise, ice flows, stronger storms).

Below are representative research questions of interest to DHS by topic (questions not listed in

21 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the national Science and Technology Council Arctic Research Plan 2022 – 2026: https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/index.html 22 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research 2019 – 2020:

https://www.arctic.gov/goals-and-objectives/ 23 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the national Science and Technology Council Arctic Research Plan 2022 – 2026: https://www.iarpccollaborations.org/plan/index.html 24 CISA Critical Infrastructure Sectors: https://www.cisa.gov/critical-infrastructure-sectors 25 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the national Science and Technology Council Arctic Research Plan

Topic 2A: Foundational Risk Assessment and Analysis for Operations

DHS has numerous risk assessment tools, such as CISA’s National Risk Management,26 FEMA’s Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA),27 and FEMA’s National Risk Index.28 Changing conditions in the Arctic require new foundational baselines and approaches for risk assessment and analysis.

How do we categorize and measure homeland security risks in the Arctic pertaining to the following?

o Increasing access and trade and travel o Communities and disaster resilience o Increasing vessel traffic and the maritime transportation system

Alaskan Area Committees are comprised of federal, state, local, and tribal representatives as well as other stakeholders. As required, each Area Committee incorporates Worse Case Pollution discharge planning factors into its Area Contingency Plan.

o What analytical approaches could be applied to determine if current pollution response capabilities and logistical considerations are adequate?

o What analytical approaches could be applied to assess potential solutions to improve efficacies?

Topic 2B: Risk Management for Crisis Response

Intentional wellhead ignitions are a tactic that may be used to combat a wellhead blowout (e.g., uncontrolled release of crude oil from a wellhead at the surface or subsea).

o What are the environmental implications for using this tactic in the Arctic should it be recommended?

o What are the environmental trade-offs for a wellhead ignition?

o What are the risks involved and implications for using intentional oil wellhead ignition as an operational tool for a Federal On-Scene Coordinator's Representative (FOSCR) during a worst-case scenario?

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has recommended to the USCG and EPA to conduct assessments or ecological risk assessments, examining the potential effects of subsurface use of dispersants on ocean ecosystems in regions where this is a viable response option.29 Use of dispersants is considered a viable response option for the north slope of the Arctic, and in other areas located near oil infrastructure. An ecological risk assessment and modeling of subsurface use of dispersants in the Arctic needs to be completed to advance oil spill response preparedness efforts.

o What are the ecological risks and potential effects of subsurface use of dispersants on Arctic marine ecosystems?

26 CISA National Risk Management: https://www.cisa.gov/national-risk-management 27 FEMA National Risk and Capability Assessment: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/risk-management/risk-capability-assessment 28 FEMA National Risk Index: https://hazards.fema.gov/nri/ 29 GAO-22-104152, Offshore Oil Spills: Additional Information is Needed to Better Understand the Environmental Tradeoffs of Using Chemical Dispersants: https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-22-104153 o Is this a viable response option for the north slope of the Arctic, and in other areas located near oil infrastructure?

o How can the use of subsurface dispersants and their risks be modeled?

There is no baseline data on the reliability of lifeline infrastructure systems30 in the Arctic.

o What is the status of reliability of Arctic infrastructure?

o What infrastructure dependencies and interdependencies exist?

o What lifeline infrastructure failures have there been in the past?

o What failures are most likely in the future?

o What planning and decision-making procedures may enable more effective prioritization of infrastructure investments to improve resilience?

Telecommunication systems are often heavily reliant on energy systems at critical infrastructure nodes.

o Should a loss of power occur, what are the impacts, and how can DHS better secure and build redundancy to prevent the direst impacts?

o What interdependencies exist within the Arctic telecommunication infrastructure that, if impacted, would have a negative impact to telecommunications in the Arctic?

The Arctic environment is rapidly changing, with the consequences most acutely being felt by the Indigenous and local communities of the region. Any investigation into how to make the Arctic domain more resilient and secure must take into consideration the ecological and geophysical impacts of a changing climate on Indigenous and local communities and consider their approaches to sustainability.

o What are the social and ecological interdependencies in the Artic region, and what are the areas where the capacity to adapt and change can occur?

o Where do critical gaps to sustainability exist and pose a threat to the homeland security of the region?

Theme Area Three: Enable Adaptation for Resilience

The capacity to adapt to changing conditions is a key component of resilience for the HSE. This includes adjustment to actual or expected conditions, strengthening capacity to mitigate impacts, and enhancing reliability, availability, and recoverability of human and natural systems. Resilience refers to the ability to adapt to changing conditions and withstand and rapidly recover from disruption.31 Climate resilience includes the “ability to anticipate, prepare for, and adapt to changing conditions and withstand, respond to, and recover rapidly from climate related disruptions, challenges, and risks through adaptability, innovation, and preparedness.”32 While the Department leverages the work of scientific agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), DHS needs the science and engineering capacity to translate that science into impacts and solutions that support DHS components.33 Decision-

30 FEMA Community Lifelines: https://www.fema.gov/emergency-managers/practitioners/lifelines 31 2018 DHS Resilience Framework:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_resilience_framework_july_2018_508.pdf 32 2016 DHS Directive 023-03, Climate Resilience:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/mgmt/environmental-management/mgmt-dir_023-03-climate-resilience.pdf 33 2018 DHS Resilience Framework:

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhs_resilience_framework_july_2018_508.pdf makers across DHS need to understand the impacts of climatic trends on their mission space, including Maritime Security, Critical Infrastructure Protection and Resilience, Disaster Response and Recovery, Hazard Mitigation, Border Security, and Protection of Trade and Travel.

Developing the information and resource capacity to achieve these priorities is key in enhancing the resilience of DHS operations, critical infrastructure, industry, and communities in the Arctic.

Infrastructure systems, including those used to supply electricity, heat, water, and communications, and to enable transportation, must be resilient to changing conditions to sustain and improve the quality of life of Arctic communities and meet federal, state, local, and tribal needs.34 Enabling resilient infrastructure systems in the Arctic will require capacity to conduct monitoring and maintenance to meet current demand, and research to inform adaptation to future environmental, demographic, and geopolitical shifts.35 Resilience to man-made and natural events is often dependent on reliable, interoperable communications and associated infrastructure so that different communities can talk to one another and offer mutual aid. There are significant differences in communications infrastructure such as broadband access in the Arctic and its Indigenous and remote communities compared to the continental United States. DHS seeks new planning and analysis methods and tools to enable and adapt homeland security capabilities and infrastructure to address the risks and potential impacts from changing conditions in the Arctic.

Below are representative research questions of interest to DHS by topic (questions not listed in

Topic 3A: Operational Adaptation for Security (multiple problem statements)

How do we adapt capabilities across the HSE to address the likely impacts from changing conditions in the Arctic?

The timeframe and location of activity as well as the demand signal for various DHS missions in the Arctic continues to evolve at unprecedented rates. Building permanent infrastructure or permanently establishing bases may inadvertently position these elements in the wrong locations within a short period of time. Yet, in some cases the Arctic also lacks the necessary infrastructure to enable the USCG to quickly surge where and when needed for sustained operations.

o To increase mission effectiveness, what are unique ways or practices that would enable the USCG, FEMA, CISA, CBP, or other DHS components to quickly surge into and across the Arctic when and where needed? For example, would it be practicable and efficient to build basic elements such as building pads and water/electrical connections where USCG and other DHS components could quickly deploy?

This would include the ability to rapidly deploy shelters for USCG crews and other DHS responders as well as people from a mass rescue event or temporary shelters in communities impacted by natural disasters. The upper end of the

34 U.S. Arctic Research Commission, Report on the Goals and Objectives for Arctic Research 2023 – 2024:

https://www.arctic.gov/goals-and-objectives/ 35 Interagency Arctic Research Policy Committee of the National Science and Technology Council, Arctic Research Plan spectrum could include the ability to deploy portable or temporary hangars for fixed wing or rotary wing assets and crews.

Increased open water in the Arctic means increased risk of icing for ships. This has already been a challenge for USCG cutters and will be challenging for other ships as well. Active (i.e., electrically conductive) anti-icing paints exist, and “ice-shedding” paints also exist, but are not compliant with USCG ship paint requirements.

o Are there emerging technologies / materials available, or that can be developed to mitigate and prevent ice buildup on vessels, cutters, buildings, towers, and other infrastructure that comply with USCG requirements?

How can we adapt homeland security disaster response and recovery capabilities to address changing conditions in the Arctic? What approaches are working well in the Arctic and how can those successes be replicated and scaled to accelerate disaster resilience?

Topic 3B: Planning and Analysis for Future Conditions

How do we need to adjust DHS risk and operational planning and models so that they are valid for the Arctic region? What types of coordination frameworks would best enable adaptive planning across the HSE?

How do commercial vessel carriage requirements need to evolve as the Arctic environment continues to evolve?

How can we better anticipate and plan for changing trade and travel patterns?

How can we bolster and invest in Arctic communities, including remote and Indigenous populations, to enable whole-community resilience and adaptation to the impacts of climate trends?

What international best practices and lessons learn can we apply to DHS operations, equipment, sensors, deployments, and maintenance in harsher environments?

Topic 3C: Advanced Technologies and Tools for Remote and Harsh Operating Conditions

There are very few resources/infrastructures to support oil spill response operations in the Arctic. This includes options for temporary storage and transport of recovered oil/waste.

Decanting and burning of waste are two solutions that are often controversial. This is a common issue across the international community. Temporary storage is often insufficient to support a large spill in remote areas. What emerging technologies or solutions exist to eliminate the need for extensive temporary storage of oily waste in the Arctic?

What fixed and deployable power solutions are available to power remote operations and/or equipment in the harsh Arctic environment?

Changing conditions, such as sea level rise, permafrost loss, and extreme weather events, may increase risk to regulated bulk oil facilities in the Arctic.

o What mechanisms are available or can be created to help identify and visualize potential risks?

o What technology solutions are available or can be developed to reduce potential risks to these facilities?

Topic 3D: Building Capacity to Adjust to Future Conditions

How can day-to-day resilience contribute to disaster resilience?

Solar storms are a common phenomenon that occur with little time to prepare. As the region grows its telecommunications infrastructure, the impacts of a prolonged or severe solar storm may be significant. What current measures are in place to address the resiliency of the telecommunications network in the Arctic during these events, where do critical gaps exist, and what can be done ensure telecommunications are sustained during the worst-case scenarios? What measures can DHS take to build resiliency and maintain continuity of telecommunications in the Arctic during a prolonged meteorological event (i.e., solar storm)?

Given the remoteness of many locations in the Arctic, the response to any manmade or natural event will often be reliant on multiple communities or entities offering mutual aid. However, given the overall lack of the broadband infrastructure outside the major population centers in the region, the ability to communicate in real-time is problematic and poses security risks.