AFMAN 10-2503.pdf

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY

OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE MANUAL 10-2503

14 MAY 2019

Operations

OPERATIONS IN A CHEMICAL,

BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL, AND

NUCLEAR (CBRN) ENVIRONMENT

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at www.e-Publishing.af.mil for downloading or ordering

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication

OPR: AF/A4

Supersedes: AFMAN10-2503, 8 May 2019

Certified by: AF/A4CX

(Col Michael J. Zuhlsdorf)

Pages: 132

This publication implements AFPD 10-25, Air Force Emergency Management Program, and supports the integration of AFPD 10-26, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Enterprise, and AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Management Program. This manual supports the integration of actions into a single installation CBRN Defense Program by establishing essential

Ability to Survive and Operate (ATSO) standards and CBRN defense training and exercise competencies. It includes current Air Force (AF) doctrine, operational concepts, tactics, techniques, and procedures to enable both survival and the conduct and sustainment of operations in CBRN environments. It also provides commanders with operational standards to use when developing individual, unit, installation, and theater plans, training, and exercises. Within the context of this document, preventative actions are taken throughout the preparedness phase of attack management to protect the warfighter (force survivability) to enable mission continuation through the use of intelligence, inspections, evaluations, the integrated risk management process

(IRMP), and improved security methods to prevent or lessen the effects of attacks/incidents. It applies to Total Force units worldwide. Consult the cited instructions, manuals and their supplements for specific policies, procedures and requirements. This publication may be supplemented at any level, but all supplements must be routed to the office of primary responsibility (OPR) listed above for coordination prior to certification and approval.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary

Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route

AF Forms 847 from the field through appropriate functional’ s chain of command. Ensure that all http://www.e-publishing.af.mil/

2 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System, and Records Disposition Schedule. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier (“T-

0, T-1, T-2, and T-3”) number following the compliance statement. See AFI 33-360, Publications and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers.

Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the publication OPR for non-tiered compliance items.

Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary

Responsibility (OPR) using the AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route

AF Forms 847 from the field through appropriate functional’ s chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System, and Records Disposition Schedule at https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm recommended changes to AF EM

Division, 1260 Air Force Pentagon (4C1057), Washington, District of Columbia 20330-1260 or usaf.pentagon.af-a4.mbx.a4cx-workflow@mail.mil.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. The recent changes to this publication includes integrating the ability to survive and operate (ATSO) enabling standards, which includes Air Force (AF)-unique guidance for conducting operations in highly contested CBRN environments, and introduces new considerations for pre, trans, and post-attack actions. It also incorporates analytical data specific to CBRN defense operations and provides

Commanders with courses of action to consider when preparing for, responding to, and recovering from CBRN attacks/incidents.

Chapter 1— OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS 7

1.1. Introduction:

1.2. Doctrine, Policy, and Guidance:

1.3. Mission

1.4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment:

1.5. Operational Areas of Concern:

Table 1.1. Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies

Table 1.2. Disconnects Between AF and MTTPs

1.6. Standards

1.7. Operational Assumptions:

https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm mailto:usaf.pentagon.af-a4.mbx.a4cx-workflow@mail.mil

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 3

1.8. Leadership Challenges and Responsibilities:

1.9. Organization:

1.10. Host Nation Support:

1.11. Noncombatant Protection:

1.12. CBRN Defense Force Structure:

1.13. Training and Exercises:

1.14. CBRN Defense:

1.15. Theater Basing Options:

1.16. Medical Operations:

Chapter 2— INSTALLATION CBRN THREATS 32

Section 2A— Threat Assessment 32

2.1. Background:

2.2. Operational Environment

Table 2.1. Elements of AF CWMD Operations

Figure 2.1. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile Systems

2.3. Installation Threat Assessments:

Section 2B— CBRN Weapons Effects and Employment Strategies 36

2.4. Installation Attacks:

2.5. Theater Ballistic Missile (TBM) Systems

Figure 2.2. Typical Theater Ballistic Missile - Major Components

Figure 2.3. Estimated VX Liquid Agent Deposition Time Following a SCUD Airburst

Warhead Detonation 250 Meters (820 feet) Above Ground Level

Table 2.2. Potential SCUD Missile Impacts by Raid Size (Notional Estimate)

Table 2.3. TBM Warning Time Assessments for Installation Attacks

2.6. Aircraft Threats

Table 2.4. Example of Aircraft Warning Time Assessment for Installation Attack

2.7. Cruise Missiles and UAS Threats:

Figure 2.4. Typical Land Attack Cruise Missile Systems

4 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Chapter 3— COUNTER-WEAPONS of MASS DESTRUCTION (C-WMD) PASSIVE

DEFENSE PROGRAM 45

3.1. CWMD Operations and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear

(CBRN) Defense:

3.2. Contamination Avoidance:

3.3. Protection:

3.4. Contamination Control

Chapter 4— CBRN COMMAND, CONTROL AND ATTACK WARNING 50

Section 4A— Command and Control 50

4.1. Installation Command and Control (C2) Organization

4.2. CAT and EOC Operations:

Table 4.1. CAT, EOC, and UCC Enabling Tasks

4.3. CBRN Control Center:

4.4. Continuity of Operations

Figure 4.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid – USAF Attack Warning Signals

4.5. Alarm Conditions

Table 4.2. Report Enemy Activity

4.6. Warning Time Assessment

Table 4.3. Main Operating Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times (Seconds from Declaration)

Table 4.4. Collocated or Bare Base (Notional Example) Alarm Notification Times

(Seconds from Declaration)

Table 4.5. Tactical Ballistic Missile (TBM, SCUD Variant) – Threat Warning Times

(Notional Example) (Seconds from Launch)

4.7. Installation Sectors or Zones:

Figure 4.2. Installation Sector or Zone Identification (Notional Example)

Figure 4.3. Historical Wind Direction for Osan AB, Korea

Figure 4.4. Sample Split-MOPP Declaration after Initial Attack

Figure 4.5. Sample Split-MOPP Adjustment Due to Wing Shift

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 5

Chapter 5— CBRN PROTECTION 66

Section 5A— Individual Protection 66

5.1. Introduction:

5.2. Individual Protective Equipment (IPE):

5.3. Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP):

Figure 5.1. AF “Be Ready” Training Aid, Mission Oriented Protective Postures (MOPP)

5.4. Task Qualification in MOPP

5.5. Forced Hydration

5.6. Work-Rest Cycles

5.7. MOPP Analysis and Management:

Section 5B— Collective Protection 69

5.8. Collective CBRN Protection

Table 5.1. Classes of Collective Protection

Table 5.2. Collective Protection Operations - General Actions

5.9. Collective Protection Planning Factors (COLPRO)

Table 5.3. Collective and Non-Collective Protection Shelter Operations – General Actions.. 74

Section 5C— Hardening. 75

5.10. Introduction:

5.11. Hardened

5.12. Special Hardening Considerations for CBRN Threats:

Attachment 1— GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 78

Attachment 2— PRE-CONFLICT, ATTACK RESPONSE, AND POST-CONFLICT

OPERATIONS 100

Section A2A— Pre-Conflict 100

Section A2B— Attack 103

Attachment 3— CBRN POST-ATTACK RECONNAISSANCE 106

Attachment 4— CBRN TRAINING AND EXERCISES 112

Attachment 5— CHEMICALLY CONTAMINATED OBJECT RULE (CCOR) 118

6 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Attachment 6— ANALYTICAL DATA TO SUPPORT CBRN PASSIVE DEFENSE

OPERATIONS 124

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 7

Chapter 1

OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS AND STANDARDS

1.1. Introduction:

1.1.1. Top-level National, Department, and Air Force (AF) strategies drive revision to AF

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) defense operations. References include the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Department of Defense (DoD) strategy of Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

This manual provides revised guidance for conducting and sustaining operations in CBRN environments. It also provides expanded procedures to enable total force Airmen to gain an operational advantage in non-permissive environments. The operational concepts and actions within this manual are tools intended to inform AF tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

Use these tools to complete the individual, mission essential, and collective tasks that enable mission accomplishment in contested and CBRN environments.

1.1.2. The foundation of this manual is AF intent to continue operations in contested environments (e.g. anti-access, area denial). Successful implementation is contingent upon adopting a risk management approach to operate independently for an unknown duration.

Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from across the installation assist commanders to develop and implement courses of action. Key SMEs reside in Emergency Management (EM), Intelligence, Bioenvironmental Engineering (BE), Security Forces (SFs), Explosive Ordnance Disposal

(EOD), and Fire and Emergency Services. All functional communities play a role in ensuring

Airmen have the Ability to Survive and Operate in non-permissive environments. It is the

Installation Emergency Manager's responsibility to brief commanders at their location on guidance provided in this manual.

1.1.3. Commanders, supervisors, specialized teams, and Airmen use this manual to implement courses of action based on a current threat analysis and their mission. Users must be proficient within their AF specialty and understand basic CBRN defense concepts of operations. A comprehensive installation CBRN defense training and exercise program will provide the basis for CBRN defense knowledge and task training.

1.1.4. Procedures in this manual are fully executable in today's AF structure with existing

CBRN defense response equipment and material. The existing resources and equipment are to be re-aligned within the commander’s areas of responsibility. Commanders will commit all levels of resources to include manpower for specialized team support, Emergency Operation

Center (EOC)/Unit Control Center (UCC) representatives, specialized supplies and equipment to execute the revised CBRN concepts of operations. (T-3).

1.2. Doctrine, Policy, and Guidance:

1.2.1. This manual implements guidance for organizing and employing Aerospace Forces at the tactical level across a full range of military operations. It connects joint service and AF doctrine requirements for CBRN defense. Commanders will use this guidance to execute assigned missions as part of an air component of a joint or multinational force. Commanders, supervisors, specialized teams, and Disaster Response Force elements will use this manual to develop deliberate plans and conduct operations in what may be highly contested, non-permissive CBRN environments.

8 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.2.2. AF and joint doctrine requires commanders to prepare their forces for employment across the full range of military operations. This doctrine outlines AF operations in support of a joint service task force or coalition operations. Joint doctrine publications include Joint

Publication 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, Joint Publication 3-11, Operations in

Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments, and Joint Publication 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction, Joint Publication 3-27, Strategy for Homeland

Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities, February 2013; Joint Publication 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 31 July 2013; and Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response, 21 June 2012.

1.2.3. This manual applies to the entire total force military Airmen and civilian personnel. AF detached, forward operating area units and personnel assigned to duties outside of AF jurisdiction will also comply with CBRN defense policies, plans, and orders of the host or the supported organization.

1.2.4. Major Commands (MAJCOMs) and units will develop supplemental guidance to integrate theater, MAJCOM, and host-nation procedures. (T-2). Supplemental guidance must be as restrictive as possible, and not contradict, higher headquarters publications. Commanders of forces operating in a joint command will follow the directives and procedures of the unified commander. Commanders of forces in a multinational alliance or coalition should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders evaluate and then follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures only after careful consideration of operational risks involved.

1.3. Mission. The AF will fly, fight, and win in air, space and cyberspace with forces prepared to operate in CBRN environments. To maximize military projection of airpower during and after a CBRN attack, operations balance force survivability with mission continuation. Commanders protect forces throughout all phases of operations. Organize, train, and equip all Airmen to execute the mission. CBRN defense exercise competencies are provided in Table 1.1 and expanded upon in Attachment 4.

1.4. Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operating Environment:

1.4.1. The AF and joint forces should be prepared to conduct prompt, sustained, and decisive military operations in CBRN environments. An enemy’s use of WMD or CBRN weapons or any intentional or unintentional release of CBRN hazardous material can create effects that disrupt or delay operations to achieve US and multinational objectives. The planning, preparation and sustainment of operations in a CBRN environment are outlined in Joint

Publication (JP) 3-11 and adopted by Joint and AF planners during the Joint Intelligence

Preparation of the Operational Environment.

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 9

1.4.1.1. Commanders and staffs will consider potential adversary CBRN capabilities when developing strategy, plans, policy, operations, and doctrine. Understanding the CBRN environment includes an analysis of the operational environment as outlined in JP 3-11.

Once the operational environment is analyzed, it is important to determine the type and amount of resources needed to support capabilities for CBRN response activities as outlined in DODI 6055.17, DoD Emergency Management Program and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response. This can include factors such as priority, level of response capability, and the hazards, threats, and vulnerabilities identified during risk management activities. (T-1).

1.4.1.2. Any analysis of the operational environment that is factored into strategy, plans, policy, operations, and doctrine shall also be incorporated into all risk assessments including the criticality assessment, all-hazards threat assessment; and vulnerability assessment. Information should include specific potential state and non-state actor capabilities (conventional and CBRN capabilities), units and equipment (order of battle), CBRN materials, delivery systems, asymmetric capabilities (special operations forces);

potential effects, vulnerabilities; and adversarial intent. (T-1). Commanders will also identify intelligence priorities and informational gaps presenting those collection requirements to the intelligence staff in order to gain a better understanding to mitigate threats and hazards. (T-1).

1.4.1.3. All installations and theaters will be postured to respond to all-hazards (see

Attachment 1 for definition); however for nuclear-specific missions or threats, installations and personnel must be able to effectively respond to, detect, deploy countermeasures, mitigate, and operationally recover from nuclear incidents or attacks from an adversary.

1.4.2. At the operational level, the analysis of the Operating Environment includes issues such as sociocultural factors, the location of adversary’s political and economic support structures, military support units, force generation capabilities, potential third-nation or third-party involvement, logistic and economic infrastructure, political treaties, press coverage, adversary information activities, and the potential to affect the information environment. Typically the

Combatant Command J2 function publishes the evaluation of adversary CBRN capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses to other service component headquarters (i.e., HQ PACAF, HQ

USAFE, etc.). The intelligence estimate is normally used for sharing this type of evaluation.

However, intelligence products from other official governmental agencies (Defense

Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency) may provide relevant threat information to assist with preparing the operational environment and can be requested through the installation intelligence organization. Air Operations Centers (AOC) and AFFOR staffs use the Combatant Command J2 intelligence estimate to assist with the development of air component requirements within an operational plan.

10 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

1.4.3. Tactical level intelligence elements will provide initial threat assessments and information on the enemy order of battle and military doctrine. They will also analyze attack reports from other locations to identify enemy behaviors and predict future actions against the installation. The installation All-Hazards Threat Assessment (AHTA) provides the installation a mechanism for identifying relevant CBRN threat information. Installations will follow the procedures outlined in DoDI 6055.17, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP)

3-2.46, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTPs) for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Passive Defense, when developing the AHTA, Criticality

Assessment, and Vulnerability Assessments. (T-1).

1.4.4. Commanders must review each tasked operational and/or contingency plan to assess and evaluate likely courses of action regarding an adversary’s CBRN capability and intent to use. Commanders will organize, train, and equip Airmen to survive and operate in a CBRN environment based on the evaluation of the CBRN threats identified in each operational and or contingency plan and developing subsequent OT&E requirements. (T-1).

1.5. Operational Areas of Concern: The AF conducts operations in both mature theaters of operation and austere regions. Installation CBRN defense TTPs must be flexible and adaptable to varied basing realities. Forces located in or deployed to mature theaters primarily operating from existing main or assembled operating bases. Main operating bases normally have an established support, manpower, and facility infrastructure. Collocated or forward operating bases may have an established support and facility infrastructure, but do not normally have assigned manpower.

Forces deployed to austere regions or to recently re-occupied areas may find installations without pre-existing support and facility infrastructure. In addition, hostile action or civil unrest may damage or destroy the installation infrastructure before the arrival of United States forces. See

Table 1.1 for the Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies.

Table 1.1. Overview of CBRN Exercise Competencies.

Countering WMD Line of Effort Associated Major Competency

Proliferation Prevention. Actions taken to prevent or limit the spread of WMD.

Understanding the AF’s role in interdiction operations.

Counterforce. The ability to defeat the full suite of CBRN capabilities before they can be used.

Understanding the risk assessment and management processes for CBRN targets.

Active Defense. Attempts to intercept CBRN weapons enroute to their targets.

Understand the levels of command and control for operational warning and reporting.

Passive Defense. Measures to maximize the ability to survive and operate in CBRN environments.

Understand issues, constraints, and guidance for installation operations in a

CBRN environment.

CBRN Response. Activities to reduce the impact from a CBRN incident.

Understand and demonstrate how to protect the force from CBRN effects.

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 11

1.5.1. Units assigned to locations where CBRN threats exist will develop contingency plans and conduct training and exercises for both the home station and deployment location (if applicable) threat and mission. All other units will plan, train, and conduct exercises for contingency operations at their deployment location(s). Develop plans, training, contingency response checklists, and exercises based upon a realistic threat and assessment of resources that will be available in a contingency. Deliberate plans that rely upon in-place resources, such as the Installation Notification and Warning System (INWS) or fixed-site collective protection facilities, may not be executable at austere locations. Commanders will train and exercise forces to develop alternate methods or work-around procedures should critical resources be destroyed or if host-nation or mutual-aid resources are unavailable. (T-2).

1.5.2. All units should prepare and plan for operations in highly contested, non-permissive, CBRN contaminated environments. (T-2). Existing manpower and equipment force modules must be reviewed to determine their adaptability for flexible operations in austere locations.

For guidance on conducting CBRN planning and execution refer to the list of references in the back of this publication.

1.5.3. While MTTPs greatly aid in standardization, the publications are not prescriptive. The following examples in Table 1.2. highlights some of the key areas where the AF has consciously decided to take a different path than what is outlined in the respective MTTPs. Air

Force personnel will follow the guidance contained within this Manual where there are discrepancies from MTTPs. Note: The examples provided in Table 1.2 originated from ATP

3-11.32, MTTPs for CBRN Passive Defense. Additional disconnects exist in ATP 3-11.32 and other MTTPs. See Table 1.2 for some examples of disconnects with AF policy and MTTPs.

12 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

Table 1.2. Disconnects Between AF and MTTPs.

Subject Language in MTTP AF Position

General

Statement on

Use of Contaminated

Equipment and

Personnel

“Contamination avoidance practices should include strict enforcement of checkpoints to prevent contaminated personnel or equipment from entering uncontaminated zones unless it is necessary for life-saving medical evacuation.”

While it is desirable to keep contaminated personnel and equipment out of uncontaminated areas, this is not always possible during Major

Combat Operations (MCO) activities. Recognizing this need, the Air Force developed and uses the chemically contaminated object rule (See

Attachment 5) for handling contaminated equipment.

Contaminated personnel may accompany the equipment as part of the mission operation, or contaminated personnel may have to traverse an uncontaminated zone in order to get to their rest and relief area – be it in a collective protection facility or at an open-air toxic-free area (TFA).

Airborne

Aircraft

Contamination

“If the height of the top of any inversion layer is lower than 800 meters, this should be indicated in the CBRN Chemical Downwind

Report by the letter A appearing in the coded significant weather phenomena. If the height of the top is lower than 400 meters, letter B is used, if lower than 200 meters, letter C. These letters signify the lowest safe altitudes for aircraft to avoid airborne contamination.”

Operationally relevant chemical warfare (CW) contamination does not reach hundreds of meters in height above AF installations attacked with missiles except in very rare cases. Those unusual scenarios primarily affect “open door” helicopters as opposed to fixed wing aircraft. Further, aircrew members wear the appropriate

Individual Protective Equipment

(IPE) when CW hazards exist on the installation. As a result, the

AF does not issue CBRN flight warnings to aircrew members with the intent of having the aircrew modify their existing flight profiles.

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 13

Radioactive

Decay

“For nuclear fallout after a nuclear detonation (many different radionuclides, each with different half- lives), the seven-ten rule applies.”

AF EM and Bioenvironmental

Engineering can provide precise estimates of radiation exposure due to nuclear detonation and fallout using the actual decay rate.

One tool for estimating exposures is the 7:10 Rule, which means for every 7- fold increase in time after detonation, there is a 10- fold decrease in the exposure rate. In other words, when the amount of time is multiplied by 7, the exposure rate is divided by 10. For example, let's say that 3 hours after detonation the exposure rate is 500 R/hr. After 21 hours, the exposure rate will be 1/10 as much, or 50 R/hr.

Decontamination

“Detailed equipment decontamination (DED), detailed troop decontamination (DTD) and detailed aircraft decontamination

(DAD) are conducted as part of a reconstitution effort during breaks in combat operations…..The DED, DTD, and DAD restore items so that they can be used without protective equipment.”

“When a CBRN incident occurs, the joint force quickly responds to and initially mitigates the effects of contamination. The joint force performs only those actions required to allow continuation of the mission and to save lives. To recover, the commander decides whether decontamination is required to restore combat power and, if so, what level of decontamination is required (the levels of decontamination are immediate, operational, In an MCO environment the AF does not support CW decontamination of areas, vehicles, equipment, and aircraft other than spot decontamination.”

Historical and technical test reports show that Mission

Oriented Protective Posture

(MOPP) reduction cannot take place; militarily-significant CW vapors continue to off- gas from contaminated surfaces after decontamination activities have been completed.

The AF does not have area/facility, vehicle, aircraft, or munitions decontamination teams for chemically-contaminated items in MCO environments.

Users accomplish spot

14 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

thorough, and clearance).” decontamination as necessary through the use of M295 kits in order to decontaminate areas of vehicles, equipment, and aircraft that will be continually touched.

Note: Specific areas below exemplify the variations of decontamination types and the degree of deviations the AF has from sister services in these areas.

Vehicle Wash

Down

“Vehicle wash down should be performed within one hour of contamination for equipment that is not painted with Chemical Agent

Resistant Coating (CARC); within six hours of contamination for

CARC painted equipment; and when the mission does not permit a thorough decontamination.

“The vehicle wash-down crew may use power driven decontamination equipment to spray 100 to 150 gallons of hot, soapy water on each vehicle to wash off the gross contamination.”

Testing has shown the specified decontamination technique is not effective in regard to AF goals and objectives. See paragraph

3.4.2 for more information on the Air Force approach to resource decontamination.

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 15

Operational Aircraft

Decontamination

“Commanders conduct Operational decontamination to minimize contact hazards, accelerate the weathering process, and limit cross contamination of mission-critical resources. Performing aircraft wash down within 1 to 6 hours of contamination speeds the weathering process and may allow the aircraft to be operated and maintained in reduced aircrew IPE or MOPP levels. Aircraft operational decontamination is accomplished by decontaminating surfaces (exterior and interior) that must be touched during aircraft servicing and operations.”

“The site should have sufficient fresh water to wet the entire exterior of the aircraft. For planning purposes, the following recommendations are provided: F-

18, 300 gallons; and C-130, 800 gallons.”

Testing has shown the specified decontamination technique is not effective in regard to Air Force goals and objectives. See paragraph 3.4.2 for more information on the Air Force approach to resource decontamination.

Area

Decontamination

“Even though a particular part of a building is not intended for occupation, it may still need to be decontaminated to prevent the contamination from spreading.”

“Streets and sidewalks also absorb liquid agents and then give off toxic vapors when heated by the sun.

These surfaces may need decontaminating several times to reduce hazards.” “If possible, the contaminated area should be marked and evacuated until cleared.”

Testing has shown the specified decontamination technique is not effective in regard to Air Force goals and objectives. See paragraph 3.4.2 for more information on the Air Force approach to resource decontamination.

Chemical De-masking Procedures

MTTP outlines “Selective De-masking technique that requires selected individuals to go through cycles of removing their mask, donning their mask after specific

The selective de-masking process does not fall within the

Air Force’s range of acceptable risk.

16 AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019

time periods, and then being monitored for agent symptoms.

Entire population de-masks if selected personnel did not exhibit symptoms during the process.

Contaminated Waste

“Separate waste by type (solid versus combustible versus noncombustible).”

Air Force does not generate liquid contaminated waste (e.g., runoff from decontamination operations) as part of CW-related MCO activities. As such, the Air Force consolidates all

Chemical Warfare contaminated waste in its contaminated waste collection points and centralized

Chemical

Warfare waste disposal area.

Replacement of

Vapor

Exposed Joint

Service

Lightweight

Integrated Suit

Technology

(JSLIST)

Ensembles

“Use a chemical detector, if available, to ensure that vapor levels in the area are below detector threshold sensitivity levels.

However, if a reading of zero cannot be obtained, report to one of the installation’s CCAs or MOPP gear exchange points for suit exchange prior to reducing MOPP level 4.”

The MTTP technique of basing

JSLIST replacement on whether or not a detector reading of zero can be obtained is not valid.

Testing has shown that the relevant factor is how much agent the ensemble has been exposed to. See the “re-use of vapor exposed JSLIST ensembles” segment of this guide.

Use of Burning as a

Decontamination or

Contaminated Waste

Disposal Technique

“Fuel may be used to burn grass or short undergrowth. Burning also works on dirt surfaces. Soak the area with diesel fuel, kerosene, or fuel oil and ignite remotely. Do not use gasoline; it burns too quickly.

Burning causes vapor hazards downwind, and protective measures have to be used by downwind units.

Area commanders should warn these units of the vapor hazards.”

Neither the Air Force nor DoD have a method for determining how far downwind the vapor hazards from a burning operation will extend. As a result, adequate warning to friendly forces and non-combatants cannot be provided – especially with the historical “wind shifts” that occur over time. Consequently, the Air Force does not use burning as a contaminated waste disposal technique.

Donning Masks

Upon Indication of

Biological Warfare

Attack

“In the preparation phase, a biological trigger event has occurred which caused the unit to assume protection. These trigger events range from an intelligence warning based on adversary

Air Force procedures do not automatically direct the donning of protective masks because an intelligence warning of an impending attack has occurred, as there is no way of knowing

AFMAN10-2503 14 MAY 2019 17

capabilities and activity; a warning from a biological detector; or other environmental indications of a biological hazard (for example, personnel exhibiting symptoms, dead animals with no apparent trauma, and so forth).”

how long this posture would have to be maintained (and the

Air Force biological detection protocols will provide the requisite protection). The Air

Force does not automatically direct the donning of protective masks after indications of an attack are seen (dead animals, people exhibiting symptoms, etc.). This is because the incubation period of Biological

Warfare (BW) agents means that the hazard has likely already dissipated.

1.6. Standards. The AF standards for mission sustainment and mission capability restoration following chemical or biological attacks are summarized below. Although specific standards are not established for mission restoration following conventional weapons attacks, commanders should use CBRN defense standards as a guide to restore the mission. AFI 10-2501 outlines the peacetime response enabling standards and proficiency requirements. It includes response to terrorist attacks with weapons of mass destruction.

1.6.1. Any assigned, attached, or geographically separated Air Force unit conducting combat operations or in direct or indirect support of combat operations, must be able to:

1.6.1.1. Resume their primary mission as soon as possible after the end of a chemical or biological attack or the discovery that a covert attack has occurred.

1.6.1.2. Support operational sustainment, in accordance with Installation Emergency

Management Plan (IEMP) 10-2, for up to 96 hours.

1.6.1.3. Support operational sustainment by reducing contamination-related casualties to the lowest possible level.

1.6.2. Any AF unit conducting force projection operations in support of expeditionary forces must be able to resume their primary mission capability within 6 hours after a chemical or biological attack or the discovery that a covert attack has occurred.

1.7. Operational Assumptions:

1.7.1. There are many decisions Commanders and senior leaders will have to make during

Major Combat Operations activities involving CBRN materials. Most of these decisions are hazard specific e.g., the item applies to Chemical Warfare but is not applicable to Biological

Warfare or Radiological Warfare scenarios.

1.7.1.1. Timing the release of people from shelters after enemy missile attacks.

1.7.1.2. Utilization of Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) options.

1.7.1.3. Implementation of Split-MOPP.

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1.7.1.4. Use of “simplified” versus “advanced” version of the Chemically Contaminated

Object Rule.

1.7.1.5. Determination of aircraft CW contamination status.

1.7.1.6. Accomplishment of area, vehicle, and aircraft decontamination.

1.7.1.7. Re-use of protective ensembles.

1.7.1.6. Timing of de-masking decisions.

1.7.2. Mission priorities may require commanders to make decisions on protective postures and recovery actions based on incomplete information. A high priority mission may require acceptance of an increased casualty risk for some, or all, of the installation population.

Commanders should consult with their staff SMEs and consider both friendly and hostile force capabilities. Factors to consider include the commander’s confidence in the intelligence assessment and the importance of the mission to the current and overall operational or contingency plan. Also, consider attack-warning timelines, alarm signals, force training, equipment levels, collective protection, and the ability to communicate desired actions to all installation forces. For hostile forces, consider their intent, probable order of battle, attrition (if any) due to counterforce operations, theater situation, and past behaviors.

1.7.3. CBRN threats require the use of protective measures that could degrade the mission.

Commanders must balance mission-degrading defensive measures against sortie generation, airlift throughput, and mission continuation. The threat of CBRN attack drives the determination of the appropriate alarm condition and MOPP level (see paragraph 5.3.).

1.7.4. For nuclear operations, installations will function at different points on the operational spectrum (e.g. once nuclear weapons are used and fallout arrives). Commanders will adjust the

“acceptable risk” for radiological doses based on mission requirements.

1.7.5. Additional funding, by itself, does not enhance AF capabilities to fly, fight, and win in

CBRN environments. The Air Force must have broad operational concepts to effectively use the resources and manpower available. Commanders will tailor their response protocols in the

IEMP 10-2 to counter the CBRN threats for their specific installation and to meet specific unit missions or objectives. (T-1).

1.7.6. The currently fielded chemical and biological agent detectors do not detect every potential agent in all forms (solid, liquid, or gaseous state) at expected concentrations. These detectors will detect field concentration of likely chemical warfare agents under most conditions. If the agent concentration is below the detector's threshold level (lower limit of the detector sensitivity), the detector will not indicate the agent present. Consequently, detector operators can only determine that, if present, the agent concentration is below the instruments level of detection sensitivity. Installation EM and Bioenvironmental specialists can provide specific information on CBRN detector capabilities, limitations, and risk assessment.

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1.7.7. Civil aircraft that are under DoD contract and the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) may conduct flights into CBRN areas assessed as “Low” threat as determined by the Air Mobility

Command Threat Working Group with input from the FAA. They will not conduct operations on installations or airbases that are under attack or contaminated at the time of flight arrival.

Depending upon the type of agent and scope of exposure, the crew may require medical evaluations, treatment, or prophylaxis prior to departure. Air Mobility Command provides

CRAF and contract airlift crews with CBRN defense training and issues a ground crew chemical ensemble before entry into these areas. If a CRAF aircraft or contract crew is caught on the ground during a CBRN or WMD attack, the crew will be evacuated by first available means and their aircraft grounded.

1.7.8. The airlift cargo owner is tasked to decontaminate cargo before and after on-loading or off-loading. This is especially important for cargo movements from forward operating bases.

1.7.9. For airlift operations, only critical retrograde cargo will be moved from a contaminated to an uncontaminated installation. Critical requirements are pre-designated in theater operational plans.

1.7.10. The DoD must coordinate with applicable civilian authorities, and will only issue guidance on contaminated aircraft movement after obtaining approval from the President of the United States and United States Secretary of Defense. Carriers are issued War-Risk-

Insurance and any claims for hull loss and/or damage to include contamination will be processed through United States Transportation Command and the Federal Aviation

Administration.

1.8. Leadership Challenges and Responsibilities:

1.8.1. Challenges. Leadership at all levels remains an essential element to effectively conduct and sustain operations in a highly contested, non-permissive environment. Probably the greatest challenge faced by leaders and supervisors is continuing mission operations, despite the short and long-term impact of wartime operations upon themselves and their subordinates. The physical and psychological effects of CBRN weapons upon personnel and unit operations will range from limited to severe.

1.8.2. A leader's knowledge of an airman's abilities has always been a key component of successful leadership and becomes even more important under CBRN conditions. Leaders must anticipate that some people will have difficulty performing operations, such as operating in protective equipment. The cause may be a lack of training (i.e. failure to complete task qualification training), fatigue, poor health, or poor adjustment to the local climate. Stress and physical conditions will magnify existing problems for some individuals and create new ones for others. Operationally stressful training situations will provide an opportunity to both identify and correct individual problems and to train leaders to recognize and resolve common problems. Leaders and co-workers must watch for problems, take action to correct the situation within their ability, or notify the Unit Control Center (UCC), unit commander, or medical staff immediately.

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1.8.2.1. If personnel within a unit become CBRN casualties, other unit members may experience significant stress-related problems. Some, even though they were not exposed, may believe they have CBRN agent symptoms too. Leaders must be aware of this potential problem and request assistance from the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) or medical personnel, if this situation occurs.

1.8.2.2. Several techniques are available to extend Airman, team, and unit performance under CBRN conditions. Develop standard operating procedures and training leaders and workers to perform tasks and missions under different alarm conditions (paragraph 4.7.)

and MOPP levels. Train all personnel on the procedures for day and night operations. Units will train supervisors to use crew rotations, work and rest cycles, sleep discipline, and to enforce hydration standards. (T-2). Align Crisis Action Team (CAT), EOC, and UCC activities to support contamination footprint identification and isolation. In addition, focus

CAT, EOC, and UCC activities on management of forces under different protective postures throughout the installation, climatic conditions, and threat scenarios.

1.8.3. Responsibilities. See AFI 10-2501, Air Force Emergency Program, for specific Air

Staff, MAJCOM, installation, and functional area responsibilities for CBRN defense.

1.8.3.1. CBRN Task Qualification Training (TQT). TQT prepares individuals and teams to perform mission essential tasks in CBRN threat environments. Unit supervisors and trainers will conduct CBRN task qualification training for the target audiences IAW each functional Air Force Specialty (AFS) Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP).

(T-1). Common core tasks are contained in AFTTP 3-2.42, Multi-service Doctrine for

CBRN Operations, this manual, and provided in the CBRN Defense training course.

1.8.3.1.1. AF Career Field Managers (CFM) and Functional Area Managers (FAM).

Each CFM, through the MAJCOM FAMs (e.g. Air Force Installation and Mission

Support Center (AFIMSC) and retained MAJCOM Program Managers (e.g. C-

MAJCOMs)) will provide expert guidance for their AFS. They are the critical link responsible for integrating CBRN defense operational concepts into AF and MAJCOM functional area programs. The FAMs will use the concepts and TTPs within this manual to further develop their functional area-specific CBRN guidance and TTPs. The FAMs will also include CBRN guidance and TTPs into the next revision of their functional publications, CFETPs, job guides, and formal schools. MAJCOM FAMs will identify critical tasks that must be performed in CBRN environments in CFETPs. This guidance must be in sufficient detail to enable supervisors to identify the minimum individual and unit training tasks required to conduct operations in CBRN environments. (T-1).

1.8.3.1.2. Installation Functional SMEs. Installation functional SMEs will incorporate

AF and MAJCOM guidance into unit-level publications, training or job guides, checklists, and standard operating procedures. Functional SMEs assist first-line supervisors to tailor unit specific CBRN defense TQT requirements based on core TQT standards established by CFMs for their respective Air Force specialty and also assist commanders to develop standard unit response and recovery procedures for likely

CBRN attack scenarios.

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1.8.3.2. Installation Area of Responsibility:

1.8.3.2.1. The Joint Rear Area Coordinator (JRAC) is responsible for coordinating security for all rear area forces including air bases. The JRAC may assign the in-place or deployed Air Force commander an area of responsibility that extends beyond the boundaries of the installation perimeter boundary. The installation commander normally will delegate responsibility for security within the base area of responsibility to the Defense Forces Commander. Responsibility for CBRN detection and marking in the area outside of the base perimeter may or may not be the responsibility of the installation. Specific requirements are determined by host-nation support agreements, local sensitivities, the capability of other services, and coordination with the JRAC.

1.8.3.2.2. Security Forces patrols that operate outside the installation perimeter and within the installation area of responsibility must have the ability to detect and report

CBRN contamination. This may require additional training on specialized CBRN detection instruments. Another method is for specialists from EM to accompany

Security Forces patrols to detect and mark CBRN contamination and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the area of responsibility. Conversely, Security Forces patrols may need to escort EM teams tasked to evaluate the extent of contamination within unsecured areas of the installation perimeter or outside the installation boundaries.

Security Forces patrols outside the installation perimeter should assist in maintaining the security of automatic and manual chemical and biological agent detectors. Security

Forces may not be able to immediately dedicate patrols specifically to these secondary tasks, especially if actively engaged in their primary tasks for installation defense. EM specialists tasked to provide CBRN defense support for Security Forces operations will be postured for immediate response, armed, equipped with personal body armor, and trained to perform their assigned tasks. The Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC), the Communications Squadron, and EOC must closely coordinate operational planning and communications requirements. Installations will identify requirements and TTPs for off-base CBRN reconnaissance operations within the IEMP 10-2 and the Base

Support Plan, Part II, Chapter 11. (T-2).

1.9. Organization:

1.9.1. The CBRN defense operational concept is to use the existing MAJCOM, Component-

Numbered Air Force (C-NAF), and installation command and control relationships and structures to execute CBRN defense operations. This structure provides a natural mix of forces that includes senior leaders, functional area specialists, and augmentation. It maintains control of a wide range of installation activities and enables the commander to respond effectively to all threats and maintain mission focus. Adjustments may be necessary to support joint, theater, and host-nation missions, but should not require the creation of a new or separate organization or structure.

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1.9.2. Commanders will organize their forces and develop a command and control structure

IAW the Air Force Incident Management System (AFIMS) to meet operational requirements under the most likely threat conditions. (T-1). Note: Consider how Command and Control (C2) relationships and structures may be degraded when operating in a multi-domain C2 environment. Joint and Combined Operations. Most future conflicts will include Air Force participation in a Joint or coalition campaign. Units operating from overseas bases are also subject to host-nation agreements and requirements. Joint doctrine requires Air Force units to integrate operational and support activities within the framework of the Joint organizations and host-nation agreements.

1.10. Host Nation Support:

1.10.1. The availability of host-nation support may enable Air Force units to reduce support and transportation requirements by securing agreements with host-nations. These agreements may include forces, civilian manpower, supplies, equipment, and facilities designated for installation use. MAJCOM, NAF, and installation planners should develop support agreements to complement Air Force CBRN capabilities and reduce the need for pre-positioned or mobility material. Any new agreements must fulfill existing regulatory requirements. Contact the Wing

Judge Advocate for further guidance on new agreements and for interpretation of any existing agreement, including but not limited to, any Status of Forces Agreement or Defense Contract

Agency agreement.

1.10.2. Host-nation agreements should include all of the CBRN support Air Force units receive from or provide to host-nation forces. Examples include exclusive or shared use of

CBRN attack warning and reporting systems, medical treatment, CBRN detection, decontamination, and access to facility hardening equipment and supplies.

1.10.3. The Joint Forces Commander (JFC) normally establishes a single office to serve as the executive agent to manage and coordinate host-nation support. Installation or Air Component

Command representatives use this office, according to JFC directions and guidelines, to resolve conflicts…