FA8505-16-D-0004_JA_Redacted.pdf
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- FA8501-15-R-95016
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Justification and Approval (J&A) for Other Than Full and Open Competition
I. Contracting Activity.
This superseding Justification and Approval (J&A) to request authority for Other Than Full and Open Competition supports requirements generated for the Department of the Air Force. The contracting activity for this requirement is AFLCMC/WWQK. The organizational activity for this requirement is AFLCMC/ WWQAC. The purchase request number supporting this contracting action is FD2060-15-95016. This J&A supersedes the J&A of the same purchase request number approved 12 May 2015 by
USAF, Program Executive Officer, Fighters & Bombers, and is necessary due to the circumstances described in section II below.
II. Nature and/or description of the action being processed.
Due to the circumstances described herein, the activity requests authority to acquire the services listed in this document using Other Than Full and Open Competition (OTF&OC) as prescribed by FAR 6.302-1, Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements. This action will result in the award of a new IDIQ contract, which will be a cost plus fixed fee with one firm fixed price CLIN contract with a one year basic plus four one year options. This sole source requirement will be purchased from the following company:
The Boeing Company (Cage Code: 76301) 6200 JS McDonnell Blvd.
Saint Louis, MO 63134-1939 Large Business
This is a superseding J&A as the dollar value of the contractor's proposal exceeds the original J&A approval authority. The proposal includes maximum quantities for all possible options of testing and repairs as well as pricing for option CLINs annually (5X) that can only be exercised once.
The reason for the change is due to the structure of the proposal including maximum quantities for all possible options of testing and repairs. Specifically the proposal includes up to 40,000 Spectrum Flight Hours (SFH) of testing on each of the test articles. While it is highly unlikely that either test article will withstand that many hours of cycling, having the maximum allowance for testing included in the J&A ceiling is preferred as the overall goal of the Full Scale Fatigue Test (FSFT) is to determine the actual economical service life of the F-15 fleet. The desired service life of the F-15 fleet was previously extended from 2025 to 2045 and could likely be extended further. Being able to cycle the test articles to the maximum quantities will preclude the need for future testing.
III. Description of supplies/services required to meet agency needs.
The purpose of the F-15 Sustaining Engineering Services - FSFT effort is to continue full scale fatigue testing of an F-15C test article (designated FTA7) and an F-15E test article (designated FTE10). This effort requires testing and analysis performed by Boeing to assess the ramifications of flying F-15 aircraft beyond the design service life. This test is a large scale highly specialized effort requiring extensive engineering knowledge and expertise in the fields of aerodynamic loads, distribution of loads through the structure, and operational usage specific to the F-15. The service is split into three services sections: testing (cycling)/repairing, limited teardown of the test articles, and limited fatigue analysis of prioritized cracked locations found during testing. The FSFT is being performed on two existing fleet aircraft. The minimum goal of this logical follow-on contract is to test FTA7 to an additional 30,000 Equivalent Flight Hours (EFH) and FTE10 to an additional 16,500 EFH. The test spectra are based on actual fleet usage and will be the same as that used for the initial FTA7 and FTE10 testing. Teardown and analysis tasks associated with this effort include partial disassembly, inspection, and fractographic analysis of selected parts experiencing cracking during the course of the testing.
The overall goal of the FSFT is to determine the actual economical service life as well as identify any fatigue problems that need to be addressed in order to continue flying the F-15 beyond the design service life to meet future operational requirements. The F-15C/D and F-15E fleet are currently certified to 9,000 equivalent flight hours (EFH) and 8,000 EFH respectively. In comparison, 65% of the F-15C/D fleet and 80% of the F-15E fleet have exceeded the current certification and would be operating at an elevated risk without ongoing FSFT efforts. Based on the achieved testing to date, the F-15C/D and F-15E fleets have achieved a test demonstrated certified life of 13,065 EFH (26,131Total EFH) and 25,086 EFH (50,172 Total EFH) respectively. In comparison to these test demonstrated lives, the risk has been mitigated for all but 7 F-15C/D aircraft (3% of the fleet). As the F-15 fleet continues to operate at a high operational tempo, it is imperative to continue the FSFT to remain ahead of the fleet to mitigate operational risks. The certified service life is not expected to be extended until the test hour goal established for the FSFT is reached, determined unreachable, or exceeded. Based on current plans to fly the F-15 until 2045 (revised since the expiring FSFT efforts awarded) the minimum goal for the FSFT is to reach 55,432 Total EFH (27,716 EFH certified life) on the F-15C and 66,476 Total EFH (33,238 EFH certified life) on the F-15E.
In anticipation of possible future revisions to fly the F-15 beyond 2045 the test articles, if possible, will be cycled beyond the current goals.
Period of Performance (POP) for this effort will be 60 months.
FY17
funding allocations for Weapon System Sustainment (WSS) will occur Jun-Jul 2016.
FY16(Basic) FY17 (Opt1) FY18 (Opt2) FY19 (Opt3) FY20 (Opt 4) Total
FY18 - FY20 requirements shown above are not yet included in Program Objective Memorandum (POM) but will be added during the next POM cycle in November 2016. The Centralized Asset Management (CAM) unfunded process will be used for any unfunded requirements. Final funding spread will reallocate any excess to other Weapon System Sustainment (WSS).
Estimated POP, including all options (a basic, plus 4 one year options), is 6 Jan 2016 to 5 Jan 2021. The appropriation for this contract will be 3400.
IV. Statutory authority permitting Other than Full and Open Competition.
10 USC 2304(c)(1), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1, Only One or a Limited Number of Responsible Sources, and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.
V. Demonstration that the contractor's unique qualifications or nature of the acquisition requires the use of the authority cited above (applicability of authority).
Sole source orders to Boeing were awarded against the Eagle Talon contract F33657-01-D-0026 to perform the FSFT on the F-15C 7 Aug 2009 and on the F-15E 24 Sep 2010; 3400 funding limited the POP to five years. The testing goals of these efforts have not yet been reached due to test articles requiring unanticipated major repairs. The existing Eagle Talon orders expire 6 Jan 2016 for C/D and E.
Previous/current contract summary:
Previous C FSFT: F33657-01-D-0026 RJ46, awarded to The Boeing Company, NAICS: 541330, PSC:
R414, Qty: N/A, $69,115,733.13, POP: 7 Aug 2009 - 11 Dec 2014.
Previous C FSFT: F33657-01-D-0026 RJ81, awarded to The Boeing Company, NAICS: 541330, PSC:
R414, Qty: N/A, $4,717,582.47, POP: 11 Dec 2014 - 27 Aug 2015.
Current E FSFT: F33657-01-D-0026 RJ58, awarded to The Boeing Company, NAICS: 541330, PSC:
R414, Qty: N/A, $74,840,838.96, POP: 24 Sep 2010 - 6 Jan 2016.
Current C FSFT: F33657-01-D-0026 RJ83, awarded to The Boeing Company, NAICS: 541330, PSC:
R414, Qty: N/A, $2,904,152.20, POP: 9 Sep 2015 - 6 Jan 2016.
Under these previous orders, Boeing has developed fleet usage based spectrum, fatigue loads and finite element models, and test spectrum. They performed test set-up including equipping the test article with numerous pads and gauges and installing the test article in the test fixture. Boeing has cycled (tested) the test article along with performing numerous inspections and over 150 repairs. This test is a highly specialized large scale effort requiring extensive engineering knowledge and expertise in the fields of aerodynamic loads, distribution of loads through the structure, and operational usage specific to the F-15.
Therefore, this logical follow-on acquisition is for continued performance of a highly specialized service to continue testing the F-15C and F-15E test articles in an effort to reach the goals needed to certify the service life of the F-15 fleet.
Boeing designed and developed the F-15 Weapon System. As the sole source producer and prime integrator of this system, Boeing is the only contractor in possession of the technical data, documentation, proprietary spectrum, and detailed knowledge of the F-15 Weapon System (i.e., operations, design, facilities and tooling, configuration, manufacturing processes, integration of the aircraft avionics and maintenance support procedures) to successfully perform these activities. Reverse engineering is not feasible as it will require substantial delays in schedule. These delays are estimated to be at least 2 years based on the time required to initially design and stand up the beginning of the FSFT in 2010. Further, while reverse engineering is technically feasible, the duplication in setup and analysis costs (estimated at $70.8M
– discussed below) is not expected to be realized through competition.
The cost of buying the proprietary data has been discussed several times over the past few years, most recently in 2015. At that time Boeing asked us to submit a Request for Proposal (RFP), and subsequently pay proposal prep fees, in order to get a quote. This is not feasible for this follow-on effort due to the criticality of determining the service life of the F-15 as soon as possible and there being no chance to recoup the investment. Even if we obtained all of the data, it would not be of benefit to the Government without the expertise and knowledge base at Boeing of aerodynamics, mass properties, loads, spectrum, fatigue and fracture, etc. necessary to apply the data to the F-15.
A new award to a different contractor would require set-up and shipping costs to transfer the test articles to a new facility. In addition, Boeing would have to verify the work of any new contractor in order to correlate the two methods used to check the fatigue life of the F-15 fleet.
Due to the nature of this effort, the significant duplication of cost that would be incurred is not possible to be recovered through competition. Along with the duplication of cost would be a duplication of effort that would result in unacceptable delays to the program. The test set-up portion of the initial 5 year effort was 2 years. To duplicate the set-up at another source would cause at least a 2 year delay in cycling hours on the test articles. The initial full scale fatigue test effort has already identified seven C/D aircraft flying at risk. With the F-15 fleet continuing to approach the existing test demonstrated life, a 2 year delay in cycling hours on the test article is an unacceptable delay. Cycling hours on the test articles is critical to mitigate the serious risk level at which the F-15 is currently operating and to meet future F-15 mission requirements. Accordingly, Boeing is the only firm capable of providing the services described in Section III above without the U.S. Air Force experiencing substantial duplication of cost that could not be expected to be recovered through competition and unacceptable delays in fulfilling its requirements.
In addition, if another source were pursued, the inconsistencies in test setup involving load application, load pad application, whiffle tree design, and cycling actuators would prohibit the ability to draw consistent continuous comparisons to the already accomplished efforts. Buying the proprietary data necessary to perform this large scale, highly specialized test, as well as the inherent knowledge that Boeing possesses, is not feasible due to the remaining life of the FSFT program which is not expected to exceed 5 years. The plan for this FSFT effort is to cycle the test articles until they can no longer be tested or it is uneconomical to repair the test articles to continue testing. Therefore, the duplication in costs and efforts described herein would not be recouped.
VI. Description of efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable.
As this is a superseding J&A, the solicitation has already been issued as well as the pre-award synopsis required by FAR 5.201(b) in advance of issuance of the solicitation. This requirement was synopsized 10 July 2015 on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) web page citing conditions which preclude Full & Open Competition. No sources expressed an interest as a result of the synopsis. A Sources Sought Synopsis (SSS) or Request For Information (RFI) synopsis was not issued for this superseding J&A as (1) it would be late to need, and (2) there is no expectation it would reveal any additional sources that could meet the Government requirement. SCCO signature/coordination of this J&A constitutes waiver of the requirement to conduct RFI/SSS (ref DFARS PGI 206.302-1(d)).
VII. Determination by the Contracting Officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable.
The proposal will contain cost or pricing data; the resultant contract will consist of cost plus fixed fee CLINs and one firm fixed price CLIN. In accordance with FAR 15.403-4, the contractor will be required to provide a TINA compliant proposal to be used in supporting the Government's evaluation of the proposed cost. The PCO will request a technical evaluation of the proposed skill mix of labor, labor hours, types and quantities of material, other direct costs, and direct and indirect rates. Negotiations will be conducted by the Government based on recommendations from the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) or Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) and expert technical personnel supporting the program. The contract price will be negotiated in accordance with the procedures in FAR Part 15 ensuring the ultimate cost is fair and reasonable.
VIII. Description of the market research conducted and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted.
Market research for this logical follow-on test was conducted on 1 Dec 2014. The focus of the market research was to locate additional sources that might be able to provide the services listed for this large scale highly specialized effort as Key Performance Requirements (KPRs): 1) F-15 Full Scale Fatigue Testing 2) F-15 Repairs 3) F-15 Limited Teardown and 4) F-15 Limited Analysis. Specific market research methods utilized were: internet searches using Google.com, System for Award Management (SAM), company websites, review of SSS results from prior requirements related to this program, and discussion with subject matter expert Government personnel with extensive knowledge of industry developed by reading publications, attending conferences, attending contractor capability briefings and through professional contacts maintained within industry. As mentioned in section VI above, an RFI or sources sought was not issued during the Market Research and at this point would not provide any additional useful information.
Also mentioned in section VI above, this requirement was synopsized 10 July 2015 on the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) web page citing conditions which preclude Full & Open Competition. No sources expressed an interest as a result of the synopsis.
Market research included a vendor survey of 7 sources. Although there are other engineering research firms who are generally capable of providing some F-15 support none other than Boeing have sufficient capabilities in performing any of the Key Performance Requirements (KPRs) or access to the F-15 technical data or F-15 Structural Integrity Program. Boeing possesses the experience and resources necessary to meet all four KPRs and all of the requirements of the FSFT PWS.
A technical review of this effort determined there are no other sources of engineering expertise available to meet the Government's needs. The effort to achieve this knowledge within a new firm, even one with significant knowledge of existing weapons system, would involve significant risks in time, costs, and performance. The Air Force does not have adequate funding or scheduling allowances to develop this level of expertise with another contracting source.
IX. Any other facts supporting the use of Other Than Full and Open Competition.
None.
X. List of sources, if any, that expressed interest in the acquisition.
See Section VI above.
XI. A statement of the actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before making subsequent acquisitions for the supplies or services required.
Although no future FSFT (i.e., identical requirement) is expected there is a future requirement for teardown of the test articles. As such, F-15 Engineering is refining the requirements for the teardown and recommends competition for the teardown efforts that will be required after testing is completed. While the timeline for the teardown effort depends on the completion of the FSFT, estimated to be sometime in FY19-FY21, the planning actions (Performance Work Specification, RFI, SSS, Market Research) for the effort will begin in 2016. The teardown effort was included in the approved Acquisition Strategy for the FSFT program.
Also, the multi-functional FSFT team, including Boeing and USAF, successfully worked with our USAF Engineering Data group in 2015 to resolve format issues with the repair data being provided as a deliverable on the FSFT contract. This data will allow competition for parts and repairs required on the fleet as a result of the findings of the FSFT.
XII. Certification by the Contracting Officer.
The contracting officer's signature on the Coordination and Approval Document evidences that he/she has determined this document to be both accurate and complete to the best of his/her knowledge and belief (FAR 6.303-2(b)(12)).
XIII. Certification by the technical/requirements personnel.
As evidenced by their signatures on the Coordination and Approval Document, the technical and/or requirements personnel have certified that any supporting data contained herein, which is their responsibility, is both accurate and complete (FAR 6.303-2(c)).
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