Exhibit A.pdf

Mount Rushmore (MORU) Fireworks &

Pyrotechnics Code & Best Practices Evaluation

Charles P Weeth

Weeth & Associates, LLC www.pyro-pages.com

Updated by NPS to remove sensitive data: 1/30/2020 http://www.pyro-pages.com/

Mount Rushmore (MORU) Fireworks & Pyrotechnics Code & Best Practices Evaluation

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Author’s Note

This report was prepared on behalf of, and for the National Park Service (NPS).

November 2019

Author’s Note: This report is not a Formal Interpretation issued pursuant to National Fire

Protection Association (NFPA) Regulations. Any opinion expressed is the personal opinion of the author and does not necessarily represent the official position of the NFPA or its Technical

Committees.

Photo 1 A 2003 photo from below with 6” and larger color shells bursting above the carvings. [Photo credit:

Cleveland.com]

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Abstract

This Report is a professional evaluation of the proposed discharge sites for a fireworks display and/or proximate pyrotechnics Show at Mount Rushmore (MORU)

National Memorial. These discharge sites have been evaluated for compliance with the relevant National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards as well as best practices. The Report will be used to as part of the National Environmental Protection Act

(NEPA) evaluation and decision process and inform the NPS and other authorities having jurisdiction (AHJs) in to approve and issue permits for a Show at MORU.

This Report is NOT an evaluation of the entertainment value, the logistical feasibility, the public service availability, or the economic viability of a Show at MORU. It will be up to the

Sponsor(s) and the Operator1 to determine the viewshed of the spectators in the Amphitheater to the MORU carvings together with the performance heights and dimensions of the fireworks and/or pyrotechnics in the sky from the proposed discharge sites, along with the mortar/tube angles in combination with the sizes, types and styles of fireworks and/or pyrotechnics to be fired from those discharge sites.

1 NFPA 1123 3.3.39 Operator: The person with overall responsibility for the operation and safety of a fireworks display.

Photo 2 A still photo of multicolor comets fired from angle cakes from the Tops of Carvings. Regular comets do not burst while splitting comets (Crossettes) burst. [Photo credit: South Dakota Tourism]

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Introduction

The Mount Rushmore (MORU) National Memorial in the Black Hills of South Dakota is one of the most iconic national memorials administered by the National Park Service (NPS). It is the state’s most popular attraction with about 3,000,000 annual visitors from around the world.

The carvings of MORU (Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln and T. Roosevelt) were blasted out of the smooth, fine grain granite by some 400 workers between 1927 and 1941.

Each carving is about 60 feet tall on southeast side of the mountain, which is 5,725 feet above sea level and some 500 feet above the Amphitheater.

MORU consists of 1,278.45 acres of rocky hills covered with ponderosa pine forest and was designated a National Memorial in 1933. It is surrounded by the Black Hills National Forest, which consists of over 1.25 million acres and is managed by the U.S. Forest Service.

The original Visitor Center Complex completed in 1957 consisted of the Amphitheater, Grandview Terrace, and Avenue of Flags together with a gift shop, restaurant, information center and surface parking lot. There have been numerous improvements over the years with additional amenities such as a parking ramp, the Presidential Trail and the Lincoln Borglum Museum.

The Avenue of Flags and Grandview Terrace are currently being renovated and should be completed later in 2020. The Avenue of Flags, Grandview Terrace and Amphitheater are closed to the public during these renovations.

A new Administrative Building replaced the old building in the late 1990s and the original Maintenance Facilities have been updated over the years. There is also a Water

Treatment Facility and Employee Dormitory.

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Executive Summary

• From 1998 to 2001 and 2003 to 2009 a non-profit organization (NPO) that partners with the NPS at MORU sponsored a fireworks display on July 3rd.

• The fireworks displays were fired by a professional fireworks display company and consisted of thousands of aerial fireworks up to 12”2 fired electrically from high density polyethylene (HDPE) mortars in above ground wood frame racks, as well as multiple tube devices (cakes) from the Hall of Records.

• In February 2009, NPS staff completed an internal report that addressed concerns with the feasibility of the location of the discharge site, to the manner in which fireworks display was set up and conducted, to the challenges with a fireworks display in a forest on steep slopes, to the safety and security of the spectators, to the compliance with national fire codes, as well as Federal and state laws.

• The 2010 fireworks display was cancelled based on the concerns raised in the

2009 NPS report and recent forest conditions that increased the fuel load

• On May 6, 2019, the Department of the Interior and the State of South Dakota signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) “to work to return fireworks to

Mount Rushmore National Memorial in a safe and responsible manner on July 3, July 4, or July 5, beginning in the year 2020”.

• In July 2019, staff from MORU and Regional NPS offices as well as from the

South Dakota State Fire Marshal (SD SFM) and the Rapid City Fire Department

2 1123 4.1.1 Aerial shells, comets and mines are classified and described in terms of the inside diameter (ID) of the mortar from which they are fired (not their circumference)

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(RC FD) surveyed potential discharge sites at MORU for a fireworks display in early July 2020. The group determined there were six potential discharge sites.

• On September 6, 2019 the NPS retained the Author to conduct a survey and evaluation of the potential discharge sites to comply with national fire codes and best practices, as well as Federal and state laws.

• The NPS provided the Author with the information available to date and the

Author researched additional public information.

• The Author surveyed MORU and met with NPS staff as well as the SD SFM the week of October 7, 2019.

• The Author identified five additional potential discharge sites and divided one potential discharge site (Hall of Records) into five distinct portions

• The Author also consulted with NPS staff over the month of October and early

November 2019, and researched additional information (See References)

• Based on the information available at this time, the Author has concluded that a fireworks display and/or pyrotechnic Show can be safely conducted at MORU and in compliance with national fire codes and best practices, as well as Federal and state laws, subject to the limitations and recommendations in this Report.

• Any such Show will be different from the previous fireworks displays, which were not in compliance with national fire codes and best practices, as well as

Federal and state laws.

• It will be up to the Operator and Sponsor(s) to determine the entertainment value, the logistical feasibility, the public service availability, and the economic viability of a show at MORU.

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Photo 3 Green grass and vegetation will burn easily if it receives sufficient heat or direct flame, especially if conditions are hot and dry. This is an example of a small grass fire that occurred during a battlefield reenactment using pyrotechnic and flammable gas special effects.

The fuel load was low, and winds were light, so the grass fire was slow moving. Firefighters with brush trucks and a ready source of water were on station, so it was not deemed a hazardous situation.

The reenactment continued for about an hour and after it concluded, the grass fire was extinguished.

Fireworks Displays at MORU 1998 - 2009

In 1998, a non-profit organization (NPO) that partners with the NPS at MORU sponsored a fireworks display from the Hall of Records canyon and on top of and behind the carvings. The

NPO contracted with a professional fireworks company to perform the display on July 3rd.

The proposed display was deemed manageable by the NPS and other officials.

Comprehensive operational and law enforcement plans to address issues with traffic control, fire protection, security and other issues were developed by the various Federal, state and local agencies in anticipation of the fireworks display.

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The 1998 fireworks display was deemed a success by the NPO and tourism officials, so it was decided to continue it as an annual event. The July 3rd fireworks display continued until 2002 when it was cancelled due to drought conditions.

The July 3rd fireworks display picked up again in 2003 and the Federal, state and local officials continued to improve on their plans. At some point, NPS staff began to insist on changes to the display, such as reducing the sizes of the aerial shells from a maximum of 12” to 6” due to falling debris starting small fires in the forest below.

The last fireworks display was performed in the fog in 2009. The 2010 fireworks display was cancelled based on the concerns raised in the 2009 NPS Reconsideration of the

Independence Day in Light of Updated Research and a recent pine beetle infestation that killed many ponderosa pines that increased the fuel load.

2009 NPS Reconsideration of the Independence Day in Light of Updated Research

In February of 2009, NPS staff at MORU issued an internal report that reviewed past experience with the fireworks displays and national fire codes and standards, Federal and state laws, as well as NPS policies. The NPS report concluded that many of the past practices were not in compliance national fire codes and standards, Federal and state laws, as well as NPS policies.

Photo 4 The actual Hall or Records was used by the crew to operate the firing control panel. Note there is no Means of Egress, Exit or Means of Escape. [Photo credit: NPS]

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The 2009 NPS report concerns included:

• separation distances to spectator viewing areas from an elevated discharge site, especially with wind

• risks of aerial shells firing at steep angles, especially from an elevated discharge site

• potential for wildland fires and the limited fire prevention and fire protection resources

• difficulties with locating duds in a rocky forest fallout area

• hazards of aerial shells bouncing off of overhanging canyon walls

• safety of the crew firing from within the actual Hall of Records

• risks with chain fusing and rapid firing

• inability of mortar racks to withstand a catastrophic aerial shell malfunction in a mortar

• damage to the Memorial from burning cakes and fireworks malfunctions

The NPS Reconsideration concerns regarding the NPS policies, included:

• endangerment to property and critical utility infrastructure

• possible chemical hazards

• safe capacity and egress of the Visitor Center Complex for spectators

• perils to archaeological and natural resources

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Photo 5 An example of a catastrophic aerial shell malfunction in a mortar. An 8” aerial shell functioned prematurely in an American made fiberglass mortar with a wood plug screwed into the bottom. The mortars were mounted in above ground wood frame racks.

The display site was in a park by a lake and fairly level. The mortar racks were located on a paved parking lot and nailed to each other for mutual support with 2” x 4”x 8’ stringers. The show was computer fired and after the catastrophic aerial shell malfunction in the mortar, other 8” aerial shells continued to fire for many seconds before the show was stopped. Some shells flew down range well over 800 feet away into a grove of trees by some houses.

Note the remnant of mortar in the disintegrated rack in the center and the rack to the right that is missing all five of its mortars. The stringers supporting the group of mortars have been knocked off the racks. Not pictured is how this malfunction telegraphed down the line of mortar racks to the right, knocking other mortars loose and racks over as the computer continued to fire 8” shells.

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Author Identified Concerns

In addition to the concerns identified in the 2009 NPS Reconsideration, the Author identified other issues, including:

• no record of any permit applications to the NPS or local fire officials by either the

NPO or the professional fireworks company with diagrams of the discharge site, the fallout area and the spectator viewing areas for any years of the fireworks displays3

• no record of any permits issued by any Authority Having Jurisdiction (AHJ) to either the NPO or the professional fireworks company for any years of the fireworks displays4

• no information regarding the storage of the display fireworks in an approved

Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) magazine for the days and weeks prior to the loading of the fireworks at the discharge site5

• no information regarding the storage or attendance by the Operator or any

Assistants of the display fireworks loaded into the mortars and placed at the discharge site for the days prior to firing the display6

• the use of above ground wood frame mortar racks for 8” and larger aerial shells7

• no indication there were any Spotters around the Display Site watching the

Fallout Area for normal or hazardous debris, duds, and blind stars or effects8

3 1123 10.3 4 1123 10.3 5 1124 Chapter 5 and 27 CFR, Part 555, Subpart K Storage 6 27 CFR, Part 555, Subpart K Storage 7 1123 4.5.1* and 4.5.3 8 1123 8.1.4.3

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• no indication the Operator and/or Shooter was able to communicate with any of the Spotters or the AHJs, or vice versa9

• nothing to address the use of the Hall of Records as a limited egress discharge site and how the crew would be protected10

U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) Soil & Water Survey

In 2016, the U. S. Geological Survey (USGS) published the results of their soil and water survey conducted between 2011 and 2015 at MORU. These surveys began two years after the last fireworks display in 2009 and found fireworks debris on the ground.

The USGS determined that the past fireworks displays were the probable cause of elevated concentrations of perchlorate in groundwater and surface water. The concentrations are such that any further monitoring is advisable if there are fireworks displays in the future.

Fireworks compositions generally consist of a fuel, an oxidizer and a binder. Fireworks compositions create the bright colors and loud sounds due to the high heat and energy output of the fuel burning rapidly because of the higher levels of oxygen provided by the oxidizer (as opposed to combustible or flammable fuels that rely on the oxygen in the atmosphere to burn)

Potassium perchlorate (KClO4) is the most common oxidizer used in display fireworks. It is more stable than potassium chlorate (KClO3), which increases the sensitivity of fireworks compositions to ignition from impact or friction.

When fireworks stars and effects burn in the sky, the majority of the fuels and the oxidizers are consumed when heat and light are released, however any minute particles of

9 1123 8.1.4.3.2 10 1123 Chapter 7

Page 14 of 162 November 2019 compositions that are not burned will fall back down to the ground. The cardboard casings of aerial shells that burst apart in the sky and was in contact with the fireworks compositions will also fall back down to the ground with residual composition. Any duds or blind stars that failed to ignite in the sky will also fall down to the ground.

Over time, the remaining fuels and oxidizers that have come down to the ground in whatever form will eventually breakdown, thus resulting in potential contamination.

The level of contamination is based on the volume of unburned fireworks compositions that may come down over time, the type of soil and the volume of precipitation, and other factors.

Department of the Interior and South Dakota Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

On May 6, 2019, the Department of the Interior and the State of South Dakota signed a

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). The MOA among other things called for the parties “to exercise their full authorities under State and Federal law to work to return fireworks to Mount

Rushmore National Memorial in a safe and responsible manner on July 311, July 4, or July 5, beginning in the year 2020”.

This Evaluation is a part of this process.

11 NPS Staff advised the Author that July 3rd was the only date supporting law enforcement, fire protection and other critical resources were available for a show at MORU

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Photo 6 An example of an ideal display site. This display site is in an open, grassy field with no overhead obstructions. It is accessible by motor vehicles so the equipment and fireworks can be delivered to the discharge site.

The discharge site within the display site is 400 feet wide and 100 feet deep and it is in an area closed to the public and under 24-hour video surveillance with security patrols. The main spectator viewing area is in the grandstand another 150 feet behind the photographer.

The fireworks display consists of limited sizes, types and styles of aerial fireworks to minimize normal and hazardous debris, concussive effects, etc. All mortar racks are individually staked to the ground or supported by heavy duty steel frames.

There are fire hydrants as well as sprinklers near the discharge site for ready access to water if needed.

Display Sites, Discharge Sites, Fallot Areas and Spectator Viewing and Parking Areas

In order to understand this evaluation, it is helpful to first discuss the basic terms, code standards and best practices for Display Sites, Discharge Sites, Fallot Areas and Spectator

Viewing and Parking Areas.12

Typically, a fireworks display has a single display site, discharge site and fallout area but many spectator viewing and parking areas. Some fireworks displays may have more than one display site, discharge site and fallout area as well.

A perfect display site for absolute safety would be fired remotely in a desert by robots with nobody and nothing around it that could be harmed or damaged in the event of a failure or

12 See the definitions in Appendix A -Definitions and Standards

Page 16 of 162 November 2019 malfunction. Every other display site always has a number of compromises to absolute safety, starting with the fireworks crew that will handle, set up and operate the fireworks display to the supporting personnel and the spectators, to the property in and around the display site.

Display Sites

Ideally, a display site is a large open area that is relatively flat, and either in or near a public park, or some other facility such as a fairground, ball field, golf course, racetrack or the like where spectators can gather to watch the fireworks. Anything less than this ideal requires additional attention to detail by the Operator, Sponsor(s) and AHJ(s) to provide the safest fireworks display possible.

The design of the fireworks display will be based on the many variables of the display site, available resources, anticipated weather conditions and other factors. The design is critical to the safe conduct of the display because what is decided or not decided regarding the fireworks and the firing equipment before the fireworks display will determine the possible outcome in the event of a failure or malfunction during the fireworks display.

Essentially with a fireworks display, one is inviting thousands of people to attend an outdoor event, in the dark, which in and of itself presents many challenges. The spectators are as

Page 17 of 162 November 2019 close as permitted to see large projectiles fired into the sky, where they will explode with solid chemicals burning at 800-

1,000° C while spreading out high in the sky.

This normal functioning of a fireworks display involves fireballs and firebrand near the ground where the fireworks are fired from, followed by burning pieces of paper and cardboard falling back to the ground over many thousands of square feet. And this is what happens when there are no equipment failures or fireworks malfunctions.

The entire area around the exploding projectiles in the sky must be kept clear of unauthorized personnel. All public paths and roads must be closed and any bulk storage areas of materials that have a flammable, explosive or toxic hazard, and occupied dwelling buildings and structures must be accounted for as well, both during and after the display until this area can be cleared of any duds, and blind stars or effects.

This entire area also must have any potential combustible fuels, such as grass, trees and shrubs either be in a stage and condition that a wildland fire is not likely, or mitigation measures have been taken to reduce the chances of a wildland fire, or if possible, removed.

Photo 7 One of the factors to both the operation and the cost of a fireworks display is the amount of transportation and labor that is required to deliver the firing equipment and the fireworks to the display site, and then remove it all after the fireworks display. Larger, more complex shows at challenging venues require more resources, especially when working outside around the weather.

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Discharge Sites

Selecting the appropriate discharge site is one of the most important facets to a safe fireworks display. Ideally it is reasonably flat and readily accessible with no or limited combustible vegetation and overhead objects. Also, of importance is a clear line of site of the portion of the sky the fireworks will burst above the discharge site to the main spectator viewing area (otherwise there is no point to shoot the fireworks display).

The location of the discharge site in relationship to the main spectator viewing area will determine in part what fireworks can and should be used. Ideally the designer will choose the sizes, types and styles of fireworks that provide for the safest fireworks display possible, followed by what fireworks are most visible and entertaining to the spectators using the well understood design principles of scale, proportion, rhythm and pace.

Fallout Areas

The fallout areas are where the normal debris from a fireworks display is expected to land. It is also where any hazardous debris, duds, blind stars and effects are expected to land, provided the designer selected the right sizes, types and styles of fireworks for the display site and the anticipated weather conditions.

The fallout area is also where any aerial shells, comets or mines are likely to fire in the event of an equipment failure or fireworks malfunction, however this will depend in large part on sizes, types and styles of fireworks selected as well as the types of mortars and mortar racks, placement and securement methods, and fusing and firing methods.

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It is possible that an errant fireworks can be fired at such an angle, especially from an elevated discharge site, that it can travel well outside the display site and then explode.

Spectator Viewing and Parking Areas

Essentially any place that spectators can view a fireworks display and park their cars while there to watch the show are spectator viewing and parking areas. However, from the perspective of the fire codes, the concern is primarily on spectator viewing and parking areas that are immediately adjacent to the display site. It is not uncommon that a fireworks display held for the benefit of a private audience at an outdoor venue may have an even larger audience outside of that venue.

Ideally, spectator viewing and parking areas are located in public parks, or some other facility such as a fairground, ball field, golf course, racetrack or the like that has the basic infrastructure to serve a large crowd at an outdoor event. Grandstand seating and/or open grassy areas are preferred for warm weather shows. A park or facility with permanent or temporary restrooms, food and beverage services and other amenities are often desired.

Separation Distances

In evaluating a potential display site, it is common that the first and sometimes the only consideration is the required minimum separation distances13 between the aerial shells to be fired in a proposed discharge site, and the proposed main spectator viewing and parking area. If noted, 13 1123 5.1.3.1

Page 20 of 162 November 2019 but sometimes overlooked when evaluating a potential display site are bulk storage areas of materials that have a flammable, explosive or toxic hazard, and dwelling buildings and structures.

The distance will be measured and a determination often made that it will be

“safe” to fire the largest aerial shells possible that meet the prescribed minimum separation distance.

The reality is there are a host of other critical variables that can and should be taken into account before deciding on what sizes, much less what types and styles of fireworks can safely be fired at a particular display site. Many of these other critical variables are conditional and evaluating each in relationship to the others requires a thorough and thoughtful process.

Other Critical Variables

The Operator, Sponsor(s) and AHJ(s) must also evaluate and assess a number of other critical variables above and beyond just the separation distances. All of these variables must be considered along with the separation distances in order to develop a comprehensive show plan that provides for the safest possible fireworks display. These variables include:

• Aerial shell types and styles (Single break, multiple break, salutes, reports, inserts, comets, mines, splitting effects, bursting effects, falling or trailing effects, Roman candles, cakes, etc.)

Photo 8 An example of a computer firing control panel.

These panels can fire thousands of cues in increments as fast a 1/10th of a second. They are proprietary and together with the design software, testers, junctions, firing modules and cables needed to make the entire system work, can cost tens of thousands of dollars

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• Display fireworks vs articles pyrotechnic

• Quality, reliability and consistency of the display fireworks and/or article pyrotechnic

• Quality, reliability and consistency of the mortars and mortar racks14

• Quality, reliability and consistency of the methods to secure mortars and mortar racks and securement (Steel or lightweight mortar materials15, buried in the ground, troughs or drums16, methods of bracing and securing above ground mortar racks17,

• Method(s) of ignition (manual, electrical or computer)

• Fusing type (Single shot vs. chain fused18)

• Pace of the show (slow, moderate or rapid fire)

• Combustible fuel types and loads (Grass, weeds, deciduous vs non- deciduous shrubs and trees, quantity of leaves and needles on the ground, etc.)

• Weather conditions prior to as well as potentially during the fireworks display

(hot, dry, windy vs. cold, wet and calm) 19

• Fire prevention (What needs to be done beforehand to mitigate potential for wildland fires vs. what can be done with the resources and time available)20

14 1123 4.5.4, 4.5.7* and 4.61* 15 1123 4.3.8* and 4.3.10* 16 1123 4.4 17 1123 4.5 18 1123 4.6.2 and 5.1.3.3.2 19 1123 8.1.4.1 and 8.1.4.2* 20 1123 8.1.1*

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• Fire protection (What needs to be done during and after to mitigate potential for wildland fires vs. what can be done with the resources and time available)21

• Ability of the Spotters to watch for normal or hazardous debris, duds, and blind stars or effects22

• Ability of the Monitors to secure the display site23

• Ability of the Spotters to communicate directly with the Shooter24

• Ability to police the display site for duds, and blind stars or effects immediately after the fireworks display, and again at first light.25

• Access and logistics to the discharge site (Haul the firing equipment and fireworks in and the firing equipment out)

• Ability to manage the spectator viewing and parking areas safely 26

• Ability to secure the discharge site(s) and fallout area(s) prior to27, during28 and after29 the fireworks display

• Ability to mitigate the risks to the crew for a fireworks display from floating vessels and floating platforms30 or a rooftop, other structure or other limited egress discharge site31

21 1123 8.1.1* 22 1123 7.6.4 23 1123 8.1.2.1 and 8.1.4.1 24 1123 8.1.4.3.2 25 1123 8.2.12* 26 1123 8.1.2* 27 1123 8.1.2.4 28 1123 8.1.2.1 and 8.1.4.1 29 1123 8.2.12* 30 1123 Chapter 6 31 1123 Chapter 7

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• Ability of the fire protection and emergency response personnel to respond to a situation32

• Potential for hazardous condition given the variables of the fireworks display, the display site and the weather33

Operator, Sponsor(s) and AHJ(s) Duties

Ultimately the decisions on how a fireworks display is planned, set up and operated and how the display site(s), discharge site(s), fallout area(s) will be decided by the Operator (there is only one) with the Sponsor(s) and the AHJ(s). The decisions that are made or not made will determine the likely outcome of any equipment failure or fireworks malfunction.

What happens in the event of an equipment failure or fireworks malfunction is likely to be almost instantaneous and unfold very rapidly and result in a series of hazardous situations that are potentially deadly to people and dangerous to property. The typical failures and malfunctions at a fireworks display occur so rapidly they are almost impossible for any human to react to, much less respond to, with any response too little, and too late to mitigate the hazardous situation. At that point, luck is the only potential mitigating factor.

This is why it is so important to design and plan a fireworks display anticipating the worst-case scenarios so the risks can be mitigated to an acceptable level of safety. The primary goal is to eliminate as many risks to life and property as possible, and mitigate the risks that cannot be eliminated.

32 1123 8.1.4.4 and 8.1.5 33 1123 8.1.4

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Photo 9 An example of a catastrophic aerial shell malfunction in a mortar. A 6” single break color shell has just burst inside a 6” HDPE mortar with a wood plug in an above ground wood frame rack. This photo was taken from over 100 feet away. Note an HDPE mortar from the mortar rack and pieces of the mortar rack flying up and out from the explosion with the fireball of the burst charge and burning stars, some of which landed still burning over 200 feet away.

Fireworks Failures and Malfunctions

There are a number of fireworks failures and malfunctions34 that are wort-case scenarios that the Operator as well as the Sponsor(s) and AHJ(s) must consider. Here are a few:

• A catastrophic aerial shell malfunction of an aerial fireworks shell in a mortar is always a possibility. Such an event in a mortar made of lightweight mortar materials in an above ground wood frame rack, particularly of a larger, more powerful aerial shell can lead to devastating results. This type of malfunction can

34 See Author’s Terms for Malfunctions

Page 25 of 162 November 2019 be compounded by the methods that mortar racks are grouped or not, the materials and methods to secure the mortar racks and the elevation of the discharge site in relationship to the fallout areas and spectator viewing areas.

• A catastrophic aerial shell malfunction of an aerial fireworks shell in a mortar in a mortar rack containing chain fused aerial shells (or a blowout of a tube in a cake or finale box). Once ignited, the chained aerial shells or devices will continue to fire until it blows itself out, or it is spent.

• Failing to secure mortar racks properly or grouping them together so the mortar racks rely on each other for mutual support can result in mortars or mortar racks being realigned and firing aerial shells well outside the display site.

• Aerial shells that break low, especially over a fallout area with a substantial amount of fuel load, such as an area with lots of dry vegetation.

• Firing aerial shells at steep angles without adding additional fallout area to compensate.

• Failing to angle mortars and mortar racks away from the spectators and increasing separation distances in anticipation of winds blowing towards the spectators or over a sensitive part of the fallout zone.

• The Operator and AHJs being unable to communicate effectively with each other, as well as the Shooter and Spotters during the fireworks display

• Failing to recognize the difference between normal debris and hazardous debris.

• Selecting fireworks that are inappropriate for the display site and the conditions

• Failing to modify plans when things do not go as expected (they never do)

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There are many others from possible incursions into the fallout area by a few spectators to the Shooter being unable to hear a call on the radio from a Spotter to a fire fighter overreacting to a few small pieces of glowing paper debris that helicopter outside the display site.

Applicable National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Codes & Standards

The Author has identified the following National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) codes and standards that are applicable to a fireworks display/proximate pyrotechnic Show at

MORU. These are:

• NFPA 1123, Code for Fireworks Display (2018)

• NFPA 1124, Code for the Manufacture, Transportation, and Storage of Fireworks and Pyrotechnic Articles (2017)

• NFPA 1126, Standard for the Use of Pyrotechnics Before a Proximate Audience

(2016).

• NFPA 101, Life Safety Code® (2018) [Egress and other safety to life issues in an

Assembly Occupancy]

Also applicable for a fireworks display/proximate pyrotechnic Show at MORU is:

• NFPA 1141, Standard for Fire Protection Infrastructure for Land Development in

Wildland, Rural, and Suburban Areas (2017)

• NFPA 1143, Standard for Wildland Fire Management (2018)

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Key NFPA 1123 Standards

The Operator

The most important standards in NFPA 1123 and NFPA 1126 are the definitions and requirements of the Operator/Pyrotechnic Operator. This one person is ultimately responsible for ensuring that all of the standards are followed and for the safe operation of the show. NFPA 1123

8.1.3 says it best: “The Operator shall have primary responsibility for safety”.

Minimum Required Radius of the Display Site

The minimum required radius of the Display Site is established in 1123 5.1.3.1. The formula is 70 feet per ID inch of mortar for the largest shell to be fired (in that discharge site).

Other provisions, such as 5.1.4 and 5.2 modify this formula based on other factors, such as for using mines and comets, the bulk storage of hazardous materials, and elevations above the spectator viewing areas, etc.35

35 The Display Fireworks Manual (2010) and from Natural Resources Canada and the Study Guide for Display Operator Training Program (2017) from the Pyrotechnics Guild International, Inc.

(PGI) address shell types and sizes, mortar placement and angle, elevated discharge site, wind speed and direction, and other factor in greater detail. Both documents provide for increased separation distances to spectator viewing areas based on these variables.

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However, the base formula in 5.1.3.1 is predicated on buried mortars that are vertical

(90°) and firing single break color shells one at a time with a wind speed of zero. It does not take into account the use of lightweight mortar materials in above ground wood frame racks that cannot withstand a catastrophic malfunction. It does not take into account a group of these racks in close proximity to one another, relying on each other for mutual support, or angled to as much as 45°, or the potential for equipment failures or fireworks malfunctions.

Photo 10 Flammable liquid and gas storage at different locations at MORU must be considered when establishing separation distances from discharge sites, in particular from any that are elevated.

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It also does not take into account aerial shells that are chain fused36 or the rapid pace a computer firing system can fire aerial shells, or wind speed and direction, and how these factor into separation distances in the event of equipment failures or fireworks malfunctions.

These factors are all up to the Operator to assess and determine using the applicable national fire codes and best practices37 in consultation with the Sponsor(s) and the AHJ(s).

An experienced and prudent Operator understands these are the minimum separation distances38, but will also know the worst case scenarios where mortars are knocked over from a catastrophic malfunction in a mortar or the failure of a mortar rack support, which can result in aerial shells firing at steep angles well beyond the designated fallout area.

An experienced and prudent Operator also understands that scale and proportion principles yield the optimum viewing of a show for the spectators. Generally, these are at distances greater than the minimums in the standards, especially for elaborate and complex pyromusicals.

36 1123 5.1.3.3.2 The minimum separation distances are doubled for “mortars, racks or other holders that are not sufficiently strong enough to prevent their being repositioned in the event of an explosive malfunction”

37 Best practices in the fireworks trade are developed within each professional fireworks display company and vary significantly. Some companies have comprehensive professional development and safety programs, while others simply do what they’ve always done in the past and trust to luck. The trade tends to be secretive and very little is shared, much less published. What is published are such things as the Display Fireworks Manual (2010) and Special Effects Manual (2014) from Natural Resources Canada, the Celebrate Safely (DVD), American Pyrotechnics Association (APA), (2014), and the Study Guide for Display Operator Training Program (2017) from the Pyrotechnics Guild International, Inc.

(PGI).

38 The Canadian minimum separation distances are significantly greater than NFPA 1123 (Table 3-1), with formulas for increasing the distances to compensate for wind speeds and directions, as well as mortar angles (Table 3-2). These minimum distances are tripled “When mortars are not properly buried, placed in non-destructible racks or barricaded”

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Overhead Projections and 25 Foot Clearance from Aerial Shell Trajectory

The issues of what constitutes an

“overhead projection”39 and the requirement for a 25-foot clearance from aerial shell trajectory is an essential standard when evaluating discharge sites at

MORU. Every proposed discharge site at

MORU has something that might be a potential “overhead projection”, depending on where mortars ore tubes are placed.

There are trees with branches, rock walls or stage walls that must be considered.

This standard has been in NFPA

1123 since it was first adopted by in 1978.

It has remained with the same exact wording ever since.

The purpose of the standard is twofold. First, protect property from potential damage from being struck by an aerial shell, and: second, protect the aerial shell from damage from an overhead object.

39 1123 5.1.4.7 The area selected for the discharge of aerial shells shall be located so that the trajectory of the shells shall not come within 25 ft. (7.6 m) of any overhead object.

Photo 11 If a human can get to or stand on a location, some type of holder and fireworks or pyrotechnic device can be placed there. Whether it is safe and prudent for a human to get to that location, or place and use any particular type of fireworks or pyrotechnic device requires a serious evaluation of the various risks involved. [Photo credit: Seattle Space Needle]

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At that time, fireworks displays were much smaller and typically fired from steel mortars buried in rows in the ground or troughs with the finale fired from cardboard mortars in above ground wood frame racks or finale boxes. The aerial shells were fired manually with fusees, portfires or other open flame sources, reloaded and fired multiple times.

The largest aerial shell size standard in the first two editions of NFPA 112340 was for 6” aerial shells (the separation distance and the fallout to the spectators was same at 150 feet, but

500 feet from hazardous materials, hospitals and penal facilities).

The buried mortars were angled slightly away from the Shooter and as the mortar was fired and reloaded over the course of the show, the recoil would often drive the mortar into the ground and/or change the angle of the mortar. Thus, the trajectory of the last shot could be very different than the first shot.

The vast majority of shows were then, and still are fired by volunteer groups in small communities across the country. They are often conducted in parks and ballfields and other public spaces with overhead wires, streetlamps, flagpoles, as well as trees and shrubs.

The standard is limited to only aerial shells. It does not include any other aerial fireworks such as comets, mines, Roman candles and cakes.

It is arbitrary because there is a single standard for all aerial shells no matter the size or type of the shell, or the mortar placement or angle. It is also the same for all overhead objects, no matter how tall or potentially sensitive to being damaged by an aerial shell, or causing damage to an aerial shell.

40 NFPA 1123, Code for the Public Display of Fireworks (1978 and 1982)

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A strict interpretation of the standard would treat any object that is within 25 feet of a mortar and taller by any measurement than that mortar as an overhead object. Thus, any mortar that is both taller than another mortar and within 25 feet would be considered and “overhead object” and one or the other mortar would be required to be moved further than 25 feet away.

Given that most fireworks displays now use lightweight mortars in above ground wood frame racks that are fired once and not reloaded, the concern over a mortar changing angles over the course of a show is no longer a concern; provided that the mortar rack is securely placed.

The intent of this standard is to prevent an aerial shell from striking and damaging an overhead object and/or being damaged by that overhead object. The distance needed to prevent this from happening is dependent on the size and type of the aerial fireworks, the type of mortar or tube and the method of placement, the angle of the mortar or tube in relationship to the overhead object, the height and type of overhead object, and the size and type of overhead object in combination with the potential for this event creating a hazardous situation.41

An example where 25 feet is more than is needed: A 3” aerial shell (round) is loaded into an HDPE mortar in an above ground wood frame rack that is at 85°. It is placed 5 feet away from a retaining wall in a park that is 50 feet tall and slopes away at 88°. The trajectory of a 3” aerial shell (round) will not be an issue with the retaining wall unless there is an incredibly strong wind towards the retaining wall at ground level.

An example where more than 25 feet is needed: A 12” aerial shell (round) is loaded into an HDPE mortar in an above ground drum filled with sand at 90°. It is placed 25 feet away from a cell phone tower that is 180 feet tall also at 90°. The trajectory of the 12” aerial shell (round)

41 Aerial shells can be fired through plywood sheets mounted a few feet above the mortar with little to no effect on their performance.

Page 33 of 162 November 2019 could possible strike the cell phone tower, even if there is a slight breeze away from the cell phone tower. [50 feet would be a more prudent distance].

An Operator will need to determine exactly where in any of the proposed MORU discharge sites mortars and tubes can be placed in relationship to overhead objects, whether it is rock walls or tree branches, and exactly what size and type of fireworks or pyrotechnics can be safely fired from those locations.

An Operator will need to substantiate the location and angle choices according to 1123-

1.3 Equivalency.

Photo 12 An example of troughs full of sand for 8”, 10” and 12” mortars. Troughs and drums are often used where ground water levels are high and the soil is too soft to handle the recoil from large diameter mortars, or where the ground is too hard to bury the mortars.

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AHJ Discretion

MORU is one of the more challenging venues one could pick for a fireworks display. The fact that it is a rocky mountain in a forest alone is enough of a challenge, but the many other variables, from the potential discharge sites at multiple elevations, to the angles needed to shoot bursting fireworks above the carvings, makes it incredibly complex.4243

The applicable fire codes for a show at

MORU as adopted by the NPS and the South Dakota

State Fire Marshal are NFPA 1123, 1124 and 1126.

Each is applicable to specific portions of a show depending on the timing and location of the show.

The NPS and other AHJs both can and should give consideration to establishing specific minimum standards for a fireworks show at MORU based on their collective knowledge and experience to ensure public safety and protect the national treasure of MORU.

42 1123 5.1.1 establishes additional criteria for the AHJ above and beyond the very broad definition of “Approved” for venues and situations just like MORU.

43 1123 5.2.2.1 in particular is applicable because MORU certainly has “unusual’ and “safety-threatening conditions” no matter the weather or wildland fire conditions

Photo 13 A 3” blowmolded HDPE mortar after a 3” single break salute shell was intentionally burst in the mortar. Note how the HDPE has stretched before failing in the classic banana peel deformation.

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Photo 14 The Hall of Records Canyon, Entry and Ridge from the top of the steps of the Guard Shack. The actual Hall of Records is to the left of the Canyon and the Entry is to the right. The Ridge is to the top left (Note the wiring crew up in the rocks of the Ridge)

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NPS Proposed Discharge Sites

In July 2019, staff from MORU and Regional NPS offices as well as from the South

Dakota State Fire Marshal (SD SFM) and the Rapid City Fire Department (RC FD) met with at

MORU and surveyed potential discharge sites for a July 3, 2020 fireworks display. The survey included taking photographs and geographic information system (GIS) measurements at the various potential discharge sites.

The group determined there were six potential discharge sites, which are as follows:

Hall of Records Discharge Site

The Hall of Records Discharge Site is the location used for the previous fireworks displays from 1998 to 2001 and 2003 to 2009. It is the logical first choice for a discharge site at

MORU because it is directly behind the carvings and only about 1,000 feet from the spectators in the Amphitheater. Most aerial fireworks fired from this location will burst above the carvings and be readily visible44 to the spectators in the Amphitheater.

This discharge site can only be reached by climbing the mountain or by helicopter.45

Transporting the equipment and the fireworks here is extremely difficult. The area is mostly rocky but there are nearby forests, in particular below the mountain.

44 What fireworks effects are readily visible from any discharge site or portion of a discharge site to the Spectators in the Amphitheater, especially those in the front rows with the backstage blocking the view of the carvings and in the Grand View Terrace to the sides with tree branches blocking the view of the carvings will be for the Operator to determine. This will require a viewshed analysis in combination with a detailed evaluation of the performance heights and widths of the various aerial shells, comets and mines.

45 A Special Permit from the U. S. Department of Transportation (DOT), Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) for aircraft to carry Class 1 Explosives. See 49 CFR, Part 107, Subpart B - Special Permits

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The Hall of Records Discharge Site is the most complex of the six NPS proposed discharge sites. It has multiple portions on different levels that must be considered when evaluating the potential for use as a discharge site. In order to better understand these differences, the Author divided the Hall of Records Discharge Site into five distinct portions in order to address the different issues presented in each portion.

Photo 15 The rough rule of thumb for performance heights of most aerial shells. The actual performance heights can vary significantly depending on the type, style, manufacturer as well as the mortars and their placement. The performance heights for articles pyrotechnic are much more precise due to the higher quality of the various propellants and compositions combined with the tighter tolerances between the device and the mortar or tubes. [Chart credit:

pyroinnovations.com]

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Portions of the Hall of Records Discharge Site

The five distinct portions of the Hall of Records Discharge Site are as follows:

• Hall of Records - Canyon (The wide portion of the canyon immediately in front of the Hall of Records)

• Hall of Records - Entry (The narrow entry into the Canyon at the top of the metal staircase. It has a chain link fence and gate with concertina wire)

• Hall of Records - Top of Carvings (The platform and rock shelf behind and on top of the carvings)

• Hall of Records - Guard Shack Steps (The steps and landing to the Guard Shack)

• Hall of Records - Ridge (The top of the ridge behind the Hall of Records)

Description of the Hall of Records Discharge Site

At the base of the steel steps up to the Hall of Records is a chain link fence and gate with concertina wire. Within the Entry at the top of the steps is another fence and gate with concertina wire.46

The Canyon and Entry vary…