ExD_Security Addendum Pages from CJIS_Security_Policy_v6_6-25-26.pdf
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- Solicitation number
- RFP QAAA 2027000079 2
- Issued by
- Arapahoe County, Colorado
About this file
This document is the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Security Addendum issued by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, establishing security requirements for private contractors accessing Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) and other sensitive criminal justice data maintained by federal and state systems. The Security Addendum, effective June 25, 2026, addresses the legal framework authorizing the privatization of traditional law enforcement functions under controlled circumstances, as permitted under 28 U.S.C. § 534 and 28 CFR 20.33. The addendum applies to all private contractors entering into agreements with authorized government agencies (Criminal Justice Agencies or Noncriminal Justice Agencies) to provide services related to criminal justice administration, including database support, enhancement, and maintenance services such as those described in Colorado's CCCLS Database Support, Enhancement, & Maintenance contract opportunity (OB 50896616). The document incorporates extensive security control requirements covering access control, awareness and training, audit and accountability, assessment and authorization, configuration management, contingency planning, identification and authentication, incident response, maintenance, media protection, physical and environmental protection, planning, personnel security, risk assessment, system and services acquisition, system and communications protection, system and information integrity, and supply chain risk management.
Contractor responsibilities under the Security Addendum include maintaining a comprehensive security program consistent with federal and state laws, regulations, and standards, including the CJIS Security Policy in effect at contract execution and all subsequent versions, as well as policies established by the CJIS Advisory Policy Board. The Contracting Government Agency must ensure all contractor employees receive and acknowledge the Security Addendum and CJIS Security Policy, with signed acknowledgments retained for audit purposes. Security violations can justify contract termination, and the FBI reserves the right to investigate unauthorized use, suspend or terminate access and services, and conduct final audits of contractor systems upon termination. All contractor records containing CHRI must be deleted or returned to the government agency upon termination. The Security Addendum does not constitute the sole understanding between parties and may be modified only by the FBI; parties may impose more stringent security requirements in their underlying contract agreement. All notices and correspondence shall be forwarded to the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division Information Security Officer in Clarksburg, West Virginia.
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Text version
06/25/2026 CJISSECPOL v6.1
H-1
APPENDIX H: SECURITY ADDENDUM
The following pages contain:
The legal authority, purpose, and genesis of the Criminal Justice Information Services Security
Addendum (H-2-H-4);
An example of a contract addendum (H-5);
The Security Addendum itself (H-6-H-7);
The Security Addendum Certification page (H-8).
H-2
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SERVICES
SECURITY ADDENDUM
Legal Authority for and Purpose and Genesis of the Security Addendum
Traditionally, law enforcement and other criminal justice agencies have been responsible for the confidentiality of their information. Accordingly, until mid-1999, the Code of Federal Regulations Title 28, Part 20, subpart C, and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) policy paper approved December 6, 1982, required that the management and exchange of criminal justice information be performed by a criminal justice agency or, in certain circumstances, by a noncriminal justice agency under the management control of a criminal justice agency.
In light of the increasing desire of governmental agencies to contract with private entities to perform administration of criminal justice functions, the FBI sought and obtained approval from the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) to permit such privatization of traditional law enforcement functions under certain controlled circumstances. In the Federal Register of May 10, 1999, the FBI published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, announcing as follows:
1. Access to CHRI [Criminal History Record Information] and Related Information, Subject to Appropriate Controls, by a Private Contractor Pursuant to a Specific Agreement with an Authorized Governmental Agency To Perform an Administration of Criminal Justice Function (Privatization). Section 534 of title 28 of the United States Code authorizes the Attorney General to exchange identification, criminal identification, crime, and other records for the official use of authorized officials of the federal government, the states, cities, and penal and other institutions. This statute also provides, however, that such exchanges are subject to cancellation if dissemination is made outside the receiving departments or related agencies. Agencies authorized access to CHRI traditionally have been hesitant to disclose that information, even in furtherance of authorized criminal justice functions, to anyone other than actual agency employees lest such disclosure be viewed as unauthorized. In recent years, however, governmental agencies seeking greater efficiency and economy have become increasingly interested in obtaining support services for the administration of criminal justice from the private sector. With the concurrence of the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board, the DOJ has concluded that disclosures to private persons and entities providing support services for criminal justice agencies may, when subject to appropriate controls, properly be viewed as permissible disclosures for purposes of compliance with 28 U.S.C. 534.
We are therefore proposing to revise 28 CFR 20.33(a)(7) to provide express authority for such arrangements. The proposed authority is similar to the authority that already exists in 28 CFR 20.21(b)(3) for state and local CHRI systems. Provision of CHRI under this authority would only be permitted pursuant to a specific agreement with an authorized governmental agency for the purpose of providing services for the administration of criminal justice.
The agreement would be required to incorporate a security addendum approved
H-3 by the Director of the FBI (acting for the Attorney General). The security addendum would specifically authorize access to CHRI, limit the use of the information to the specific purposes for which it is being provided, ensure the security and confidentiality of the information consistent with applicable laws and regulations, provide for sanctions, and contain such other provisions as the Director of the FBI (acting for the Attorney General) may require. The security addendum, buttressed by ongoing audit programs of both the FBI and the sponsoring governmental agency, will provide an appropriate balance between the benefits of privatization, protection of individual privacy interests, and preservation of the security of the FBI’s CHRI systems.
The FBI will develop a security addendum to be made available to interested governmental agencies. We anticipate that the security addendum will include physical and personnel security constraints historically required by NCIC security practices and other programmatic requirements, together with personal integrity and electronic security provisions comparable to those in NCIC User Agreements between the FBI and criminal justice agencies, and in existing Management Control Agreements between criminal justice agencies and noncriminal justice governmental entities. The security addendum will make clear that access to CHRI will be limited to those officers and employees of the private contractor or its subcontractor who require the information to properly perform services for the sponsoring governmental agency, and that the service provider may not access, modify, use, or disseminate such information for inconsistent or unauthorized purposes.
Consistent with such intent, Title 28 of the Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) was amended to read:
§ 20.33 Dissemination of criminal history record information.
a) Criminal history record information contained in the Interstate Identification Index (III) System and the Fingerprint Identification Records System (FIRS) may be made available:
1) To criminal justice agencies for criminal justice purposes, which purposes include the screening of employees or applicants for employment hired by criminal justice agencies.
2) To noncriminal justice governmental agencies performing criminal justice dispatching functions or data processing/information services for criminal justice agencies; and
3) To private contractors pursuant to a specific agreement with an agency identified in paragraphs (a)(1) or (a)(6) of this section and for the purpose of providing services for the administration of criminal justice pursuant to that agreement. The agreement must incorporate a security addendum approved by the Attorney General of the United States, which shall specifically authorize access to criminal history record information, limit the use of the information to the purposes for which it is provided, ensure the security and confidentiality of the information consistent with these regulations, provide for sanctions, and contain such other provisions as the Attorney General may require. The power
H-4 and authority of the Attorney General hereunder shall be exercised by the FBI Director (or the Director’s designee).
This Security Addendum, appended to and incorporated by reference in a government-private sector contract entered into for such purpose, is intended to insure that the benefits of privatization are not attained with any accompanying degradation in the security of the national system of criminal records accessed by the contracting private party. This Security Addendum addresses both concerns for personal integrity and electronic security which have been addressed in previously executed user agreements and management control agreements.
A government agency may privatize functions traditionally performed by criminal justice agencies (or noncriminal justice agencies acting under a management control agreement), subject to the terms of this Security Addendum. If privatized, access by a private contractor’s personnel to NCIC data and other CJIS information is restricted to only that necessary to perform the privatized tasks consistent with the government agency’s function and the focus of the contract. If privatized the contractor may not access, modify, use or disseminate such data in any manner not expressly authorized by the government agency in consultation with the FBI.
H-5
EXAMPLE OF A CONTRACT ADDENDUM
AMENDMENT NO. ___ TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
[PARTY NO. 1] AND [PARTY NO. 2], ENTERED INTO [DATE]
[Name of Law Enforcement Agency] and [Party No. 2], upon notification and pursuant to Paragraph/Section No. ___ [the amendment clause of the original contract] of that certain contract entered into by these parties on [date][and entitled “___”], hereby amend and revise the contract to include the following:
1. Access to and use of criminal history record information and other sensitive information maintained in [state and] FBI-managed criminal justice information systems by
[private party] are subject to the following restrictions:
a.
b.
c.
and
d. The Security Addendum appended hereto, which is incorporated by reference and made a part thereof as if fully appearing herein.
This amendment is effective the ____ day of _________, 20__.
On behalf of [Party No. 1]:
Printed Name Title
Signature Date
On behalf of [Party No. 2]:
Printed Name Title
Signature Date
H-6
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
The goal of this document is to augment the CJIS Security Policy to ensure adequate security is provided for criminal justice systems while (1) under the control or management of a private entity or (2) connectivity to FBI CJIS Systems has been provided to a private entity
(contractor). Adequate security is defined in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-
130 as “security commensurate with the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of information.”
The intent of this Security Addendum is to require that the Contractor maintain a security program consistent with federal and state laws, regulations, and standards (including the CJIS Security Policy in effect when the contract is executed), as well as with policies and standards established by the Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy
Board (APB).
This Security Addendum identifies the duties and responsibilities with respect to the installation and maintenance of adequate internal controls within the contractual relationship so that the security and integrity of the FBI’s information resources are not compromised. The security program shall include consideration of personnel security, site security, system security, and data security, and technical security.
The provisions of this Security Addendum apply to all personnel, systems, networks and support facilities supporting and/or acting on behalf of the government agency.
1.00 Definitions
1.01 Contracting Government Agency (CGA) – the government agency, whether a Criminal
Justice Agency or a Noncriminal Justice Agency, which enters into an agreement with a private contractor subject to this Security Addendum.
1.02 Contractor – a private business, organization or individual which has entered into an agreement for the administration of criminal justice with a Criminal Justice Agency or a
Noncriminal Justice Agency.
2.00 Responsibilities of the Contracting Government Agency.
2.01 The CGA will ensure that each Contractor employee receives a copy of the Security
Addendum and the CJIS Security Policy and executes an acknowledgment of such receipt and the contents of the Security Addendum. The signed acknowledgments shall remain in the possession of the CGA and available for audit purposes. The acknowledgement may be signed by hand or via digital signature (see glossary for definition of digital signature).
3.00 Responsibilities of the Contractor.
3.01 The Contractor will maintain a security program consistent with federal and state laws, regulations, and standards (including the CJIS Security Policy in effect when the contract is executed and all subsequent versions), as well as with policies and standards established by the
Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Advisory Policy Board (APB).
4.00 Security Violations.
H-7
4.01 The CGA must report security violations to the CJIS Systems Officer (CSO) and the
Director, FBI, along with indications of actions taken by the CGA and Contractor.
4.02 Security violations can justify termination of the appended agreement.
4.03 Upon notification, the FBI reserves the right to:
a. Investigate or decline to investigate any report of unauthorized use;
b. Suspend or terminate access and services, including telecommunications links. The
FBI will provide the CSO with timely written notice of the suspension. Access and services will be reinstated only after satisfactory assurances have been provided to the FBI by the CGA and Contractor. Upon termination, the Contractor’s records containing CHRI must be deleted or returned to the CGA.
5.00 Audit
5.01 The FBI is authorized to perform a final audit of the Contractor’s systems after termination of the Security Addendum.
6.00 Scope and Authority
6.01 This Security Addendum does not confer, grant, or authorize any rights, privileges, or obligations on any persons other than the Contractor, CGA, CJA (where applicable), CSA, and
FBI.
6.02 The following documents are incorporated by reference and made part of this agreement: (1) the Security Addendum; (2) the NCIC 2000 Operating Manual; (3) the CJIS
Security Policy; and (4) Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20. The parties are also subject to applicable federal and state laws and regulations.
6.03 The terms set forth in this document do not constitute the sole understanding by and between the parties hereto; rather they augment the provisions of the CJIS Security Policy to provide a minimum basis for the security of the system and contained information and it is understood that there may be terms and conditions of the appended Agreement which impose more stringent requirements upon the Contractor.
6.04 This Security Addendum may only be modified by the FBI, and may not be modified by the parties to the appended Agreement without the consent of the FBI.
6.05 All notices and correspondence shall be forwarded by First Class mail to:
Information Security Officer
Criminal Justice Information Services Division, FBI
1000 Custer Hollow Road
Clarksburg, West Virginia 26306
H-8
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
CERTIFICATION
I hereby certify that I am familiar with the contents of (1) the Security Addendum, including its legal authority and purpose; (2) the NCIC Operating Manual; (3) the CJIS Security
Policy; and (4) Title 28, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, and agree to be bound by their provisions.
I recognize that criminal history record information and related data, by its very nature, is sensitive and has potential for great harm if misused. I acknowledge that access to criminal history record information and related data is therefore limited to the purpose(s) for which a government agency has entered into the contract incorporating this Security Addendum. I understand that misuse of the system by, among other things: accessing it without authorization; accessing it by exceeding authorization; accessing it for an improper purpose;
using, disseminating or re-disseminating information received as a result of this contract for a purpose other than that envisioned by the contract, may subject me to administrative and criminal penalties. I understand that accessing the system for an appropriate purpose and then using, disseminating or re-disseminating the information received for another purpose other than execution of the contract also constitutes misuse. I further understand that the occurrence of misuse does not depend upon whether or not I receive additional compensation for such authorized activity. Such exposure for misuse includes, but is not limited to, suspension or loss of employment and prosecution for state and federal crimes.
Printed Name/Signature of Contractor Employee Date
Printed Name/Signature of Contractor Representative Date
Organization and Title of Contractor Representative
| Executive Summary |
| Change Management |
| Summary of Changes |
| Table of Contents |
| List of Figures |
| List of Priorities |
| 1 Introduction |
| 1.1 Purpose |
| 1.2 Scope |
| 1.3 Relationship to Local Security Policy and Other Policies |
| 1.4 Terminology Used in This Document |
| 1.5 Distribution of the CJIS Security Policy |
| 2 CJIS Security Policy Approach |
| 2.1 CJIS Security Policy Vision Statement |
| 2.2 Architecture Independent |
| 2.3 Risk Versus Realism |
| 3 Roles and Responsibilities |
| 3.1 Shared Management Philosophy |
| 3.2 Roles and Responsibilities for Agencies and Parties |
| 3.2.1 CJIS Systems Agencies (CSA) |
| 3.2.2 CJIS Systems Officer (CSO) |
| 3.2.3 Terminal Agency Coordinator (TAC) |
| 3.2.4 Criminal Justice Agency (CJA) |
| 3.2.5 Noncriminal Justice Agency (NCJA) |
| 3.2.6 Contracting Agency (CA) |
| 3.2.7 Agency Coordinator (AC) |
| 3.2.8 CJIS Systems Agency Information Security Officer (CSA ISO) |
| 3.2.9 Organizational Personnel with Security Responsibilities |
| 3.2.10 FBI CJIS Division Information Security Officer (FBI CJIS ISO) |
| 3.2.11 Repository Manager |
| 3.2.12 Interface Agency (IA) Official |
| 3.2.13 State Compact Officer (SCO) |
| 4 Criminal Justice Information and Personally Identifiable Information |
| 4.1 Criminal Justice Information (CJI) |
| 4.1.1 Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) |
| 4.2 Access, Use and Dissemination of Criminal History Record Information (CHRI), NCIC Restricted Files Information, and NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information |
| 4.2.1 Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of CHRI |
| 4.2.2 Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Restricted Files Information |
| 4.2.3 Proper Access, Use, and Dissemination of NCIC Non-Restricted Files Information |
| 4.2.3.1 For Official Purposes |
| 4.2.3.2 For Other Authorized Purposes |
| 4.2.3.3 CSO Authority in Other Circumstances |
| 4.2.4 Storage |
| 4.2.5 Justification and Penalties |
| 4.2.5.1 Justification |
| 4.2.5.2 Penalties |
4.3 Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
| 5 Policy and Implementation |
| 5.1 Policy Area 1: Information Exchange Agreements |
| 5.1.1 Information Exchange |
| 5.1.2 Monitoring, Review, and Delivery of Services |
| 5.1.2.1 Managing Changes to Service Providers |
| ACCESS CONTROL (AC) |
| AC-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| AC-2 ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT |
| (1) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED SYSTEM ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT |
| (2) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED TEMPORARY AND EMERGENCY ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT |
| (3) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS |
| (4) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | AUTOMATED AUDIT ACTIONS |
| (5) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | INACTIVITY LOGOUT |
| (13) ACCOUNT MANAGEMENT | DISABLE ACCOUNTS FOR HIGH-RISK INDIVIDUALS |
| AC-3 ACCESS ENFORCEMENT |
| (14) ACCESS ENFORCEMENT | INDIVIDUAL ACCESS |
| AC-4 INFORMATION FLOW ENFORCEMENT |
| AC-5 SEPARATION OF DUTIES |
| AC-6 LEAST PRIVILEGE |
| (1) LEAST PRIVILEGE | AUTHORIZE ACCESS TO SECURITY FUNCTIONS |
| (2) LEAST PRIVILEGE | NON-PRIVILEGED ACCESS FOR NONSECURITY FUNCTIONS |
| (5) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS |
| (7) LEAST PRIVILEGE | REVIEW OF USER PRIVILEGES |
| (9) LEAST PRIVILEGE | LOG USE OF PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS |
| (10) LEAST PRIVILEGE | PROHIBIT NON-PRIVILEGED USERS FROM EXECUTING PRIVILEGED FUNCTIONS |
| AC-7 UNSUCCESSFUL LOGON ATTEMPTS |
| AC-8 SYSTEM USE NOTIFICATION |
| AC-11 DEVICE LOCK |
| (1) DEVICE LOCK | PATTERN-HIDING DISPLAYS |
| AC-12 SESSION TERMINATION |
| AC-14 PERMITTED ACTIONS WITHOUT IDENTIFICATION OR AUTHENTICATION |
| AC-17 REMOTE ACCESS |
| (1) REMOTE ACCESS | MONITORING AND CONTROL |
| (2) REMOTE ACCESS | PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY USING ENCRYPTION |
| (3) REMOTE ACCESS | MANAGED ACCESS CONTROL POINTS |
| (4) REMOTE ACCESS | PRIVILEGED COMMANDS AND ACCESS |
| AC-18 WIRELESS ACCESS |
| (1) WIRELESS ACCESS | AUTHENTICATION AND ENCRYPTION |
| (3) WIRELESS ACCESS | DISABLE WIRELESS NETWORKING |
| AC-19 ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES |
| (5) ACCESS CONTROL FOR MOBILE DEVICES | FULL DEVICE OR CONTAINER-BASED ENCRYPTION |
| AC-20 USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS |
| (1) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | LIMITS ON AUTHORIZED USE |
| (2) USE OF EXTERNAL SYSTEMS | PORTABLE STORAGE DEVICES — RESTRICTED USE |
| AC-21 INFORMATION SHARING |
| AC-22 PUBLICLY ACCESSIBLE CONTENT |
| AWARENESS AND TRAINING (AT) |
| AT-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| AT-2 LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS |
| (2) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | INSIDER THREAT |
| (3) LITERACY TRAINING AND AWARENESS | SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND MINING |
| AT-3 ROLE-BASED TRAINING |
| (5) ROLE-BASED TRAINING | PROCESSING PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION |
AT-4 TRAINING RECORDS
| AUDIT AND ACCOUNTABILITY (AU) |
| AU-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| AU-2 EVENT LOGGING |
| AU-3 CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS |
| (1) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | ADDITIONAL AUDIT INFORMATION |
| (3) CONTENT OF AUDIT RECORDS | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS |
| AU-4 AUDIT LOG STORAGE CAPACITY |
| AU-5 RESPONSE TO AUDIT LOGGING PROCESS FAILURES |
| AU-6 AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING |
| (1) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | AUTOMATED PROCESS INTEGRATION |
| (3) AUDIT RECORD REVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND REPORTING | CORRELATE AUDIT RECORD REPOSITORIES |
| AU-7 AUDIT RECORD REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION |
| (1) AUDIT RECORD REDUCTION AND REPORT GENERATION | AUTOMATIC PROCESSING |
| AU-8 TIME STAMPS |
| AU-9 PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION |
| (4) PROTECTION OF AUDIT INFORMATION | ACCESS BY SUBSET OF PRIVILEGED USERS |
| AU-11 AUDIT RECORD RETENTION |
| AU-12 AUDIT RECORD GENERATION |
| ASSESSMENT, AUTHORIZATION, AND MONITORING (CA) |
| CA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| CA-2 CONTROL ASSESSMENTS |
| (1) CONTROL ASSESSMENTS | INDEPENDENT ASSESSORS |
| CA-3 INFORMATION EXCHANGE |
| CA-5 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES |
| CA-6 AUTHORIZATION |
| CA-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING |
| (1) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT |
| (4) CONTINUOUS MONITORING | RISK MONITORING |
CA-9 INTERNAL SYSTEM CONNECTIONS
| CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT (CM) |
| CM-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| CM-2 BASELINE CONFIGURATION |
| (2) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR ACCURACY AND CURRENCY |
| (3) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | RETENTION OF PREVIOUS CONFIGURATIONS |
| (7) BASELINE CONFIGURATION | CONFIGURE SYSTEMS AND COMPONENTS FOR HIGH-RISK AREAS |
| CM-3 CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL |
| (2) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | TESTING, VALIDATION, AND DOCUMENTATION OF CHANGES |
| (4) CONFIGURATION CHANGE CONTROL | SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPRESENTATIVES |
| CM-4 IMPACT ANALYSES |
| (2) IMPACT ANALYSES | VERIFICATION OF CONTROLS |
| CM-5 ACCESS RESTRICTIONS FOR CHANGE |
| CM-6 CONFIGURATION SETTINGS |
| CM-7 LEAST FUNCTIONALITY |
| (1) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PERIODIC REVIEW |
| (2) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | PREVENT PROGRAM EXECUTION |
| (5) LEAST FUNCTIONALITY | AUTHORIZED SOFTWARE — ALLOW-BY-EXCEPTION |
| CM-8 SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY |
| (1) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | UPDATES DURING INSTALLATION AND REMOVAL |
| (3) SYSTEM COMPONENT INVENTORY | AUTOMATED UNAUTHORIZED COMPONENT DETECTION |
| CM-9 CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT PLAN |
| CM-10 SOFTWARE USAGE RESTRICTIONS |
| CM-11 USER-INSTALLED SOFTWARE |
| CM-12 INFORMATION LOCATION |
| (1) INFORMATION LOCATION | AUTOMATED TOOLS TO SUPPORT INFORMATION LOCATION |
| CONTINGENCY PLANNING (CP) |
| CP-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| CP-2 CONTINGENCY PLAN |
| (1) CONTINGENCY PLAN | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS |
| (3) CONTINGENCY PLAN | RESUME MISSION AND BUSINESS FUNCTIONS |
| (8) CONTINGENCY PLAN | IDENTIFY CRITICAL ASSETS |
| CP-3 CONTINGENCY TRAINING |
| CP-4 CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING |
| (1) CONTINGENCY PLAN TESTING | COORDINATE WITH RELATED PLANS |
| CP-6 ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE |
| (1) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE |
| (3) ALTERNATE STORAGE SITE | ACCESSIBILITY |
| CP-7 ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE |
| (1) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | SEPARATION FROM PRIMARY SITE |
| (2) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | ACCESSIBILITY |
| (3) ALTERNATE PROCESSING SITE | PRIORITY OF SERVICE |
| CP-8 TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES |
| (1) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | PRIORITY OF SERVICE PROVISIONS |
| (2) TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES | SINGLE POINTS OF FAILURE |
| CP-9 SYSTEM BACKUP |
| (1) SYSTEM BACKUP | TESTING FOR RELIABILITY AND INTEGRITY |
| (8) SYSTEM BACKUP | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION |
| CP-10 SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION |
| (2) SYSTEM RECOVERY AND RECONSTITUTION | TRANSACTION RECOVERY |
| IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (IA) |
| IA-0 USE OF ORIGINATING AGENCY IDENTIFIERS IN TRANSACTIONS AND INFORMATION EXCHANGES |
| IA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| IA-2 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |
| (1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS |
| (2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | MULTI-FACTOR AUTHENTICATION TO NON-PRIVILEGED ACCOUNTS |
| (8) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCESS TO ACCOUNTS — REPLAY RESISTANT |
| (12) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS |
| IA-3 DEVICE IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION |
| IA-4 IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT |
| (4) IDENTIFIER MANAGEMENT | IDENTIFY USER STATUS |
| IA-5 AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT |
| (1) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | AUTHENTICATOR TYPES |
| (a) Memorized Secret Authenticators and Verifiers: |
| (b) Look-Up Secret Authenticators and Verifiers |
| (c) Out-of-Band Authenticators and Verifiers |
| (d) OTP Authenticators and Verifiers |
| (e) Cryptographic Authenticators and Verifiers (including single- and multi-factor cryptographic authenticators, both hardware- and software-based) |
| (2) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PUBLIC KEY BASED AUTHENTICATION |
| (6) AUTHENTICATOR MANAGEMENT | PROTECTION OF AUTHENTICATORS |
| IA-6 AUTHENTICATION FEEDBACK |
| IA-7 CRYPTOGRAPHIC MODULE AUTHENTICATIONF |
| IA-8 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) |
| (1) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF PIV CREDENTIALS FROM OTHER AGENCIES |
| (2) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | ACCEPTANCE OF EXTERNAL AUTHENTICATORS |
| (4) IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (NON-ORGANIZATIONAL USERS) | USE OF DEFINED PROFILES |
| IA-11 RE-AUTHENTICATION |
| IA-12 IDENTITY PROOFING |
| (2) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE |
| (3) IDENTITY PROOFING | IDENTITY EVIDENCE VALIDATION AND VERIFICATION |
| (5) IDENTITY PROOFING | ADDRESS CONFIRMATION |
| INCIDENT RESPONSE (IR) |
| IR-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| IR-2 INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING |
| (3) INCIDENT RESPONSE TRAINING | BREACH |
| IR-3 INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING |
| (2) INCIDENT RESPONSE TESTING | COORDINATION WITH RELATED PLANS |
| IR-4 INCIDENT HANDLING |
| (1) INCIDENT HANDLING | AUTOMATED INCIDENT HANDLING PROCESSES |
| IR-5 INCIDENT MONITORING |
| IR-6 INCIDENT REPORTING |
| (1) INCIDENT REPORTING | AUTOMATED REPORTING |
| (3) INCIDENT REPORTING | SUPPLY CHAIN COORDINATION |
| IR-7 INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE |
| (1) INCIDENT RESPONSE ASSISTANCE | AUTOMATION SUPPORT FOR AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION AND SUPPORT10F |
| IR-8 INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN |
| (1) INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAN | BREACHES |
| MAINTENANCE (MA) |
| MA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| MA-2 CONTROLLED MAINTENANCE |
| MA-3 MAINTENANCE TOOLS |
| (1) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT TOOLS |
| (2) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | INSPECT MEDIA |
| (3) MAINTENANCE TOOLS | PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED REMOVAL |
| MA-4 NONLOCAL MAINTENANCE |
| MA-5 MAINTENANCE PERSONNEL |
| MA-6 TIMELY MAINTENANCE |
| MEDIA PROTECTION (MP) |
| MP-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| MP-2 MEDIA ACCESS |
| MP-3 MEDIA MARKING |
| MP-4 MEDIA STORAGE |
| MP-5 MEDIA TRANSPORT |
| MP-6 MEDIA SANITIZATION |
| MP-7 MEDIA USE |
| PHYSICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (PE) |
| PE-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| PE-2 PHYSICAL ACCESS AUTHORIZATIONS |
| PE-3 PHYSICAL ACCESS CONTROL |
| PE-4 ACCESS CONTROL FOR TRANSMISSION |
| PE-5 ACCESS CONTROL FOR OUTPUT DEVICES |
| PE-6 MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS |
| (1) MONITORING PHYSICAL ACCESS | INTRUSION ALARMS AND SURVEILLANCE EQUIPMENT |
| PE-8 VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS |
| (3) VISITOR ACCESS RECORDS | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS |
| PE-9 POWER EQUIPMENT AND CABLING |
| PE-10 EMERGENCY SHUTOFF |
| PE-11 EMERGENCY POWER |
| PE-12 EMERGENCY LIGHTING |
| PE-13 FIRE PROTECTION |
| (1) FIRE PROTECTION | DETECTION SYSTEMS — AUTOMATIC ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION |
| PE-14 ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS |
| PE-15 WATER DAMAGE PROTECTION |
| PE-16 DELIVERY AND REMOVAL |
| PE-17 ALTERNATE WORK SITE |
| PLANNING (PL) |
| PL-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| PL-2 SYSTEM SECURITY AND PRIVACY PLANS |
| PL-4 RULES OF BEHAVIOR |
| (1) RULES OF BEHAVIOR | SOCIAL MEDIA AND EXTERNAL SITE/APPLICATION USAGE RESTRICTIONS |
| PL-8 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ARCHITECTURES |
| PL-9 CENTRAL MANAGEMENT |
| PL-10 BASELINE SELECTION |
| PL-11 BASELINE TAILORING |
| PERSONNEL SECURITY (PS) |
| PS-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| PS-2 POSITION RISK DESIGNATION |
| PS-3 PERSONNEL SCREENING |
| PS-4 PERSONNEL TERMINATION |
| PS-5 PERSONNEL TRANSFER |
| PS-6 ACCESS AGREEMENTS |
| PS-7 EXTERNAL PERSONNEL SECURITY |
| PS-8 PERSONNEL SANCTIONS |
| PS-9 POSITION DESCRIPTIONS |
| RISK ASSESSMENT (RA) |
| RA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| RA-2 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION |
| RA-3 RISK ASSESSMENT |
| RA-5 VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING |
| (2) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | UPDATE VULNERABILITIES TO BE SCANNED |
| (5) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | PRIVILEGED ACCESS |
| (11) VULNERABILITY MONITORING AND SCANNING | PUBLIC DISCLOSURE PROGRAM |
| RA-7 RISK RESPONSE |
| RA-9 CRITICALITY ANALYSIS |
| SYSTEM AND SERVICES ACQUISITION (SA) |
| SA-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| SA-2 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES |
| SA-3 SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT LIFE CYCLE |
| SA-4 ACQUISITION PROCESS |
| (1) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONAL PROPERTIES OF CONTROLS |
| (2) ACQUISITION PROCESS | DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION FOR CONTROLS |
| (9) ACQUISITION PROCESS | FUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES IN USE |
| (10) ACQUISITION PROCESS | USE OF APPROVED PIV PRODUCTS |
| SA-5 SYSTEM DOCUMENTATION |
| SA-8 SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES |
| (33) SECURITY AND PRIVACY ENGINEERING PRINCIPLES | MINIMIZATION |
| SA-9 EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES |
| (2) EXTERNAL SYSTEM SERVICES | IDENTIFICATION OF FUNCTIONS, PORTS, PROTOCOLS, AND SERVICES |
| SA-10 DEVELOPER CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT |
| SA-11 DEVELOPER TESTING AND EVALUATION |
| SA-15 DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS |
| (3) DEVELOPMENT PROCESS, STANDARDS, AND TOOLS |CRITICALITY ANALYSIS |
SA-22 UNSUPPORTED SYSTEM COMPONENTS
| SYSTEM AND COMMUNICATIONS PROTECTION (SC) |
| SC-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| SC-2 SEPARATION OF SYSTEM AND USER FUNCTIONALITY |
| SC-4 INFORMATION IN SHARED SYSTEM RESOURCES |
| SC-5 DENIAL-OF-SERVICE PROTECTION |
| SC-7 BOUNDARY PROTECTION |
| (3) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ACCESS POINTS |
| (4) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | EXTERNAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES |
| (5) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | DENY BY DEFAULT — ALLOW BY EXCEPTION |
| (7) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | SPLIT TUNNELING FOR REMOTE DEVICES |
| (8) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | ROUTE TRAFFIC TO AUTHENTICATED PROXY SERVERS |
| (24) BOUNDARY PROTECTION | PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION |
| SC-8 TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY |
| (1) TRANSMISSION CONFIDENTIALITY AND INTEGRITY | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION |
| SC-10 NETWORK DISCONNECT |
| SC-12 CRYPTOGRAPHIC KEY ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT |
| SC-13 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION |
| SC-15 COLLABORATIVE COMPUTING DEVICES AND APPLICATIONS |
| SC-17 PUBLIC KEY INFRASTRUCTURE CERTIFICATES |
| SC-18 MOBILE CODE |
| SC-20 SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (AUTHORITATIVE SOURCE) |
| SC-21 SECURE NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE (RECURSIVE OR CACHING RESOLVER) |
| SC-22 ARCHITECTURE AND PROVISIONING FOR NAME/ADDRESS RESOLUTION SERVICE |
| SC-23 SESSION AUTHENTICITY |
| SC-28 PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST |
| (1) PROTECTION OF INFORMATION AT REST | CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTECTION |
SC-39 PROCESS ISOLATION
| SYSTEM AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY (SI) |
| SI-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| SI-2 FLAW REMEDIATION |
| (2) FLAW REMEDIATION | AUTOMATED FLAW REMEDIATION STATUS |
| SI-3 MALICIOUS CODE PROTECTION |
| SI-4 SYSTEM MONITORING |
| (2) SYSTEM MONITORING | AUTOMATED TOOLS AND MECHANISMS FOR REAL-TIME ANALYSIS |
| (4) SYSTEM MONITORING | INBOUND AND OUTBOUND COMMUNICATIONS TRAFFIC |
| (5) SYSTEM MONITORING | SYSTEM-GENERATED ALERTS |
| SI-5 SECURITY ALERTS, ADVISORIES, AND DIRECTIVES |
| SI-7 SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY |
| (1) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRITY CHECKS |
| (7) SOFTWARE, FIRMWARE, AND INFORMATION INTEGRITY | INTEGRATION OF DETECTION AND RESPONSE |
| SI-8 SPAM PROTECTION |
| (2) SPAM PROTECTION | AUTOMATIC UPDATES |
| SI-10 INFORMATION INPUT VALIDATION |
| SI-11 ERROR HANDLING |
| SI-12 INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION |
| (1) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | LIMIT PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION ELEMENTS |
| (2) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | MINIMIZE PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION IN TESTING, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH |
| (3) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT AND RETENTION | INFORMATION DISPOSAL |
SI-16 MEMORY PROTECTION
| SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT (SR) |
| SR-1 POLICY AND PROCEDURES |
| SR-2 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN |
| (1) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT PLAN | ESTABLISH SCRM TEAM |
| SR-5 ACQUISITION STRATEGIES, TOOLS, AND METHODS |
| SR-8 NOTIFICATION AGREEMENTS |
| SR-10 INSPECTION OF SYSTEMS OR COMPONENTS |
| SR-12 COMPONENT DISPOSAL |
| 5.20 Policy Area 20: Mobile Devices |
| 5.20.1 Wireless Communications Technologies |
| 5.20.1.1 802.11 Wireless Protocols |
| 5.20.1.2 Cellular Devices |
| 5.20.1.2.1 Cellular Service Abroad |
| 5.20.1.2.2 Voice Transmissions Over Cellular Devices |
| 5.20.1.3 Bluetooth |
| 5.20.1.4 Mobile Hotspots |
| 5.20.2 Mobile Device Management (MDM) |
| 5.20.3 Wireless Device Risk Mitigations |
| 5.20.4 System Integrity |
| 5.20.4.1 Patching/Updates |
| 5.20.4.2 Malicious Code Protection |
| 5.20.4.3 Personal Firewall |
| 5.20.5 Incident Response |
| 5.20.6 Access Control |
| 5.20.7 Identification and Authentication |
| 5.20.7.1 Local Device Authentication |
| 5.20.7.2 Advanced Authentication |
| 5.20.7.2.1 Compensating Controls |
5.20.7.3 Device Certificates
| Appendices |
| APPENDIX A: TERMS AND DEFINITIONS |
| APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS |
| APPENDIX C: NETWORK TOPOLOGY DIAGRAMS |
| APPENDIX D: SAMPLE INFORMATION EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS |
| D.1 CJIS User Agreement |
| D.2 Management Control Agreement |
| D.3 Noncriminal Justice Agency Agreement & Memorandum of Understanding |
| D.4 Interagency Connection Agreement |
| APPENDIX E: SECURITY FORUMS AND ORGANIZATIONAL ENTITIES |
| APPENDIX F: SAMPLE FORMS |
| F.1 Security Incident Response Form |
| APPENDIX G: BEST PRACTICES |
| G.1 Virtualization |
| G.2 Voice over Internet Protocol |
| G.3 Cloud Computing |
| G.4 Mobile Appendix |
| G.5 Administrator Accounts for Least Privilege and Separation of Duties |
| G.6 Encryption |
| G.7 Incident Response |
| G.8 Secure Coding |
| G.9 NIST Authentication Primer |
| APPENDIX H: SECURITY ADDENDUM |
| APPENDIX I: REFERENCES |
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .