(CUI) BA Inc2 RFI2 v2_22AUG2024.docx
DOCX document 2 MB Posted
- Attached to
- BlackArrow Increment 2 RFI2
- Solicitation number
- BlackArrowInc2RFI2
About this file
This document is a Request for Information (RFI) for the BlackArrow Increment 2 system, which is being developed as a modernization of the current Remote Re-Key (RRK) system. The RFI provides background on the BlackArrow program, details the capabilities of the BlackArrow system, and outlines specific information requests for respondents.
The key details are:
- BlackArrow is being developed to address the 42 gaps identified in the Cryptographic Modernization 2 (CM2) Initial Capabilities Document. It will have capabilities such as remote End Cryptographic Unit (ECU) configuration, control, and monitoring, key management, centralized network management, and security monitoring.
- This RFI is specific to Increment 2 of BlackArrow, which will focus on developing a cloud-based application to enhance the existing operator workstation capabilities. Respondents are asked to provide information on their experience in areas such as cloud environments, software development, and cryptographic device management.
- Responses are due by September 9, 2024. Submissions should be a maximum of 10 pages and will be reviewed by the government, but respondents will not be contacted unless further information is needed.
View the file
On GovTribe
Work with this file
- Download the original file
- Contacts named in this file
- Similar government files
- Ask GovTribe AI about this file
Text version
(U) United States Air Force BlackArrow Increment 2 Request for Information (RFI) #2
(U) Version 1.0 August 2024 Prepared by:
Cryptologic and Cyber Systems Division
(AFLCMC/HNCA)
250 Hall Blvd., Suite 122 Joint Base San Antonio-Lackland, TX 78243k
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by AFLCMC/HNCAM (August 2024) or higher DoD authority.
WARNING: This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C. Sec 2751 et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended (Title 50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.). Violations of these export-control laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Dissemination of this document is controlled under DoD Directive 5230.25.
DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Destroy by any method that will prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.
Controlled by: AFLCMC HNCAM CUI Category: OPSEC Distribution/Limited Dissemination Control: FEDCON
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
POC: Dan Garber, AFLCMC/HNCAM
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK
Contents
1. (U) Scope/Introduction
1.1. (U) Program Background
1.2. (U) CM2
1.3. (U) BlackArrow Capabilities
2. (U) Request for Information
2.1. (U) General
2.2. (U) Information Requests
3. (U) Submissions
List of Figures
Figure 1: (U) CM2 ICD Requirement Gaps Figure 2: (U) BlackArrow Operational View (OV-1) Figure 3: (U) BlackArrow System Architecture
List of Tables
Table 1: (U) Information Requests Table 2: (U) Acronyms
THIS PAGE IS INTENTIONALLY BLANK
CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
1. (U) Scope/Introduction
1.1 (U) Program Background (CUI) The current Remote Re-Key (RRK) system is being modernized in accordance with the National Security Agency (NSA) Cryptographic Modernization 2 (CM2) Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) requirements. The Remote Re-Key NexGen (hereinafter referred to as “BlackArrow”) system is being developed as a modernization for the currently operating RRK system. The Air Force is in the development phase for BlackArrow.
(U) The RRK system is an NSA Type 1 key distribution and key management system that supports the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Tactical Air Defense mission as well as the Federal Aviation Administration air traffic control mission. RRK delivers National Security Agency cryptographic key material to End Cryptographic Units (ECUs) such as the KIV-77 (IFF Mode 5) when it is deployed to the Air Defense Sectors (ADS)—Eastern, Western, Hawaiian and Alaskan ADS—and their associated Long Range Radar sites. The CI-13 remote rekey legacy system that was deployed to NORAD sites in 1995 was replaced by the RRK system. RRK is also used to deliver key material and remotely rekey end cryptographic units at the Alaskan (Alaska Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation), Nellis Air Force Base (AFB) (Nevada Test and Training Range), and Hill AFB (Utah test and Training Range). Features of the RRK system also allow network control, ECU device control and status reporting.
(CUI) The RRK system and BlackArrow provide the following capabilities:
· (CUI) Remote ECU configuration, control, and monitoring
· (CUI) Black and Red Key Management (load, store, and distribute)
· (CUI) Centralized RRK network configuration and status monitoring
· (CUI) Communication Set subsystem configuration and management
· (CUI) RRK network and component diagnostics and trouble shooting
· (CUI) Role Based Access Control (RBAC) and Identity and Authentication (I&A) management
· (CUI) Intrusion Detection System/Attack, Sensing, Warning, and Response system security monitoring and management
· (CUI) Audit data collection and reporting for security related events
· (CUI) Event data collection and reporting for non-security related events
(CUI) BlackArrow will be given consideration as a remote re-key solution for not just the ADS, but also as a solution to remotely re-key autonomous unmanned craft from other military branches.
1.2. (U) CM2
(CUI) The NSA CM2 ICD identifies six major gap categories, which contain 42 total gaps. BlackArrow will address the 42 gaps as applicable.
(CUI) These 6 gap categories contain 42 total gaps to be addressed by BlackArrow.
Figure 1: (U) CM2 ICD Requirement Gaps
1.3. (U) BlackArrow Capabilities
(CUI) BlackArrow will adhere to Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA)/Sensors Open Systems Architecture (SOSA) initiatives and provide the following capabilities:
· (CUI) Remote ECU configuration, control, and monitoring
· (CUI) Remotely reprogram Trust Anchors (TA)
· (CUI) Key Management (load, store, and distribute)
· (CUI) Red Key Encryption Key (KEK)/Black Traffic Encryption Key (TEK) Key Transfer
· (CUI) Support for future Over The Network Keying (OTNK) capabilities
· (CUI) Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) Aware Product Distribution Enclave (PDE) Enabled
· (CUI) Centralized BlackArrow network configuration and status monitoring
· (CUI) Communication Set subsystem configuration and management
· (CUI) BlackArrow network and component diagnostics and trouble shooting
· (CUI) RBAC and I&A management
· (CUI) Intrusion Detection System/Attack, Sensing, Warning, and Response system security monitoring and management
· (CUI) Audit data collection and reporting for security related events
· (CUI) Event data collection and reporting for non-security related events
· (CUI) Open-systems approach, maintaining the ability to upgrade or exchange subsystems in the future to address new requirements and use cases.
Figure 2: (U) BlackArrow Operational View (OV-1)
Figure 3: (U) BlackArrow System Architecture
2. (U) Request for Information
2.1. (U) General (CUI) Cryptologic and Cyber Systems Division (CCSD) and BlackArrow have divided the effort into two increments. This RFI is specific to Increment 2 of BlackArrow, as the BlackArrow system – Increment 1 is currently in development phase.
(CUI) Increment 1 (platform/hardware-focused)
· KMI Aware (registered, initialized, endorsed)
· Schedule and Automate Remote Key Fill
· FMS Releasable (upon certification)
· MOSA/SOSA Compliant
· Support for future Over The Network Key (OTNK) capabilities
(CUI) Increment 2 (software-focused)
· Build upon the foundational system by developing and implementing a Cloud Application to enhance and replace the existing Operator Workstation’s capabilities
· Leverage existing Cloud Service Providers to:
· Provide a Distributed Edge Cloud environment for the Cloud App
· Implement a Parent-Child relationship with automatic failover between the Core Cloud and Edge Cloud deployments of the Cloud App
· Ensure the Security and Management of the underlying Infrastructure
· Leverage existing DevSecOps Software Factories to:
· Enable rapid development of continuous updates and improvements to the Cloud App
· Provide well-defined processes in order to gain near immediate Certificate to Field (CTF)
· Provide integrated Hardware in the Loop (HWIL) testing environments to ensure compatibility with Existing Hardware
· The Cloud App will be expected to improve upon the Operator Workstation in multiple ways, including:
· Converging data flows into “single pane of glass” GUI for BlackArrow operators
· Use extrapolation techniques on collected data sources (telemetry, logs) to supply operators with more relevant information
· Adopt Next Gen HAIPE management specifications
· Enhanced support for future Over The Network Key (OTNK) capabilities
· Provide a platform for management of more types of cryptographic devices as they are developed
(CUI) As the BlackArrow design matures in each increment, CCSD would like to increase the variety of Platforms (NEW, Pocket J, LAK etc.) that BlackArrow can support. Thus, an open systems approach (MOSA/SOSA), which minimizes the system boundary while maximizing the connectable systems, is necessary to avoid over-constraining the design. The BlackArrow software capabilities provided in Increment 2 will permit continuous maturation of the software, allowing the ecosystem to grow, expand, adjust, and forge the way for the long-term evolution of the program.
2.2. (U) Information Requests
(U) Please respond to the information requests outlined in Table 1.
Table 1: (U) Information Requests
(CUI)
| Request ID |
| Request |
| R001 |
| Please describe your experience collaborating with Platform One’s Party Bus. |
| R002 |
| Please provide a detailed account of your experience working with DAF CLOUDWorks ODIN. |
| R003 |
| Please discuss your experience working with NIWC-Pacific’s iApp software, focusing on work in a containerized environment if able. |
| R004 |
| Please provide a comprehensive overview of your experience working with Edge Cloud environments. |
| R005 |
| Please discuss the significant factors to consider for development when creating a Cloud application that relies on a Distributed Edge Cloud environment. |
| R006 |
| What key factors should be prioritized for deployment when designing a Cloud application that relies on a Distributed Edge Cloud environment? |
| R007 |
| Please outline the primary considerations for redundancy in the design of a Cloud application that depends on a Distributed Edge Cloud infrastructure. |
| R008 |
| What critical aspects should be addressed for disaster recovery during the development of a Cloud application leveraging a Distributed Edge Cloud environment? |
| R009 |
| In the context of a Distributed Edge Cloud environment, what major considerations should be taken into account for testing a Cloud application? |
| R010 |
| What essential elements should be incorporated for prototyping when designing a Cloud application that operates within a Distributed Edge Cloud framework? |
| R011 |
| When assuming responsibility for supporting a software capability, what are your expectations regarding the documentation? |
| R012 |
| What expectations do you have for the APIs when taking on the support of a software capability? |
| R013 |
| What expectations do you have for the dependent hardware when taking on the support of a software capability? |
| R014 |
| What are your expectations concerning the UX design when taking over the support of a software capability? |
| R015 |
| What are your expectations for managing external dependencies when taking over the support of a software capability? |
| R016 |
| Describe your experience working with Crypto devices and key management in regard to the transfer of Naval assets between AORs during a deployment. |
| R017 |
| Describe your experience working with the NSA to achieve OA for Crypto device management software. |
| R018 |
| Describe your experience designing applications for use on SIPR/IL6. |
| R019 |
| Describe your experience with securing/validating re-used code. |
| R020 |
| Describe your experience working with dynamic allocation/failover of Command-and-Control resources. |
3. (U) Submissions
(U) Responses are to be 8.5 X 11 inch, single-sided pages, 10 pages maximum. Contractors who submit information for review do so with the understanding that U.S. Government personnel as well as support contractors will review their material and data. Respondents will not be contacted regarding their submission or information gathered as a result of this notice nor the outcome of the Government's review of the solicited information unless the Government desires further information. Submitted information packages will be retained by the Government and not returned to the contractor.
(U) All interested, capable and responsible sources that wish to respond to this RFI are required to electronically supply their responses (.doc or .pdf format) in the order and format in which they are presented, to brooke.carpino@us.af.mil and ethan.hardin@us.af.mil, no later than 0900 hrs CDT, 9 September 2024. "Black Arrow Increment 2 RFI #2 Response" must be included in the subject line. Telephonic responses will not be accepted. Electronic media can be mailed to:
Cryptologic Systems Division Contracting Division/AFLCMC/HNCKA (Attn: Brooke Carpino) 130 Norton St, San Antonio, TX 78226-1810
Contracting Officer: Brooke Carpino, brooke.carpino@us.af.mil Contracting Specialist: Ethan Hardin, ethan.hardin@us.af.mil
Table 2: (U) Acronyms
| ADS |
| Air Defense Sector |
| AFB |
| Air Force Base |
| AFLCMC |
| Air Force Life Cycle Management Center |
| CCI |
| Controlled Cryptographic Item |
| CCSD |
| Cryptologic and Cyber Systems Division |
| CI-3 |
| Capability Increment 3 |
| CM2 |
| Cryptographic Modernization 2 |
| CUI |
| Controlled Unclassified Information |
| DoD |
| Department of Defense |
| ECU |
| End Cryptographic Unit |
| I&A |
| Identity and Authentication |
| ICD |
| Initial Capabilities Documents |
| IFF |
| Identify Friend or Foe |
| IRAD |
| Independent Research and Development |
| KEK |
| Key Encryption Key |
| KMI |
| Key Management Infrastructure |
| LAK |
| Link-16 Alaska |
| MOSA |
| Modular Open System Architecture |
| NEW |
| Network Enabled Weapons |
| NORAD |
| North American Aerospace Defense Command |
| NSA |
| National Security Agency |
| OTNK |
| Over The Network Keying |
| PDE |
| Product Distribution Enclave |
| RBAC |
| Role Based Access Control |
| RFI |
| Request For Information |
| RMF |
| Risk Management Framework |
| RRK |
| Remote Re-Key |
| RRK-NexGen |
| Remote Re-Key Next Generation |
| SOSA |
| Sensors Open System Architecture |
| SWaP |
| Size, Weight, and Power |
| TA |
| Trust Anchor |
| TEK |
| Traffic Encrypt Key |
| U |
| Unclassified |
| USAF |
| United States Air Force |
Interoperability
Flexible and Robust Security
Sustainability
Operational Management
Key Management
Standardization
(U) The ability of systems to provide information services to, and accept information services from, other systems.
(U) The ability to provide security for crypto systems and equipment through assured control of NSS networks with the aim of countering modern threats such a CRQC.
(U) The ability to ensure crypto systems meet the operational mission needs of protected systems.
(U) The ability to provide secure situational awareness, oversight, planning, management, and control of cryptographic solutions to enable access to those resources by authorized users
(U) The ability to provide and accept electronic key management services to and from NSA/CSS-approved public key or key management infrastructures.
(U) The ability to use standardized cryptographic form factors, human-machine interfaces and machine-to-machine interfaces across multiple vendors image1.png image14.png image15.png image2.png image11.svg image12.png image13.svg image3.svg image4.png image5.svg image6.png image7.svg image8.png image9.svg image10.png
File details come from the government source that posted it. Updated .