CBTS NOFO Partner Final 3-8-17.pdf

DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS-Partner

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)

DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Center of Excellence (COE) Center for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense –

Center Partner

NOTE: If you are going to apply for this funding opportunity and have not obtained a Data Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number and/or are not currently registered in the System for Award Management (SAM), please take immediate action to obtain a DUNS Number, if applicable, and then to register immediately in SAM. It may take 4 weeks or more after you submit your SAM registration before your registration is active in SAM, then an additional 24 hours for Grants.gov to recognize your information. Information on obtaining a DUNS number and registering in SAM is available from Grants.gov at:

http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html Detailed information regarding DUNS and SAM is also provided in Section D of this NOFO, subsection, Content and Form of Application Submission.

http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html

Table of Contents A. Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Description

Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities I. Program Overview II. Application Project Narrative III. Research and Workforce and Professional Development Themes, Topics, and Questions

B. Federal Award Information

Award Amounts, Important Dates, and Extensions

C. Eligibility Information

Eligible Applicants Eligibility Criteria Cost Share or Match

D. Application and Submission Information

Submission Date and Other Key Dates and Times Address to Request Application Package Informational Webinar Optional Forms Other Submission Requirements Funding Restrictions Indirect (Facilities & Administrative (F&A)) Costs

E. Application Review Information

Review and Selection Process I. Scientific Quality Review (External Review) II. DHS Relevancy Review (Internal DHS SMEs)

Application Evaluation Criteria I. Evaluation Criteria

F. Federal Award Administration Information

Notice of Award I. Work Plan Development Workshop

Administrative and National Policy Requirements Reporting

See 56

See 56

See 56

G. DHS Awarding Agency Contact Information

Contact and Resource Information

H. Additional Information

Extensions

APPENDIX A: Terms and Conditions

APPENDIX B: Acronyms

APPENDIX C: References for Themes, Topics and Questions

A. Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Description

Issued By U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number 97.061

CFDA Title Centers for Homeland Security

Notice of Funding Opportunity Title

DHS S&T Center of Excellence for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense – Center Partner

NOFO Number

Authorizing Authority for Program Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 308, as amended, P.L. 107-296.

codified at 6 U.S.C. 188

Appropriation Authority for Program Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, P.L. 114-4, Title IV, Science and Technology, Research, Development, Acquisition and Operations.

Program Type New

Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities

I. Program Overview

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Office of University Programs (OUP) is requesting applications from U.S. colleges and universities to serve as a partner institution for the Center for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense (CBTS).

OUP is also posting a separate NOFO for eligible applicants to submit lead proposals for consideration. Please see NOFO Number DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS- Lead or 97.061 on http://www.grants.gov for directions on how to submit Lead http://www.grants.gov/ proposal. DHS will select qualified individual projects from applications received for either the Center Lead NOFO or the Center Partner NOFO, regardless of the institution that is awarded as lead institution. Principal Investigators that are already Partners under a Center Lead application may not submit the same application under this Partner NOFO.

The DHS COEs are university consortia that work closely with DHS Components and their partners to conduct research, develop and transition mission-relevant science and technology, educate the next generation of homeland security technical experts, and train the current workforce in the latest scientific applications. Each COE is led by a U.S. college or university and involves multiple partners for varying lengths of time. COE partners include other academic institutions, industry, DHS Components, Department of Energy National Laboratories and other Federally-Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs), other federal agencies that have homeland security-relevant missions, state/local/tribal governments, non-profits, and first responder organizations. DHS envisions the COEs as long-term trusted academic partners that provide an array of resources to help DHS and its partners achieve their missions, and improve their operations. OUP maintains both financial assistance and contract mechanisms for DHS to access COE capabilities. The COEs that make up the COE network are listed at https://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence. The new Center will be a fully-integrated component of the COE network and will take advantage of the network's resources to develop mission-critical research, education, and technology transition programs.

Process for Establishing a New COE

Before DHS posts a COE NOFO on grants.gov, DHS subject matter experts (SMEs) identify priority research and workforce development themes, topics, and questions that will be the focus of the COE. Proposals responding to the NOFO are screened for eligibility (see “Eligibility Information”). Ineligible or non-responsive proposals receive no further consideration. Eligible and responsive proposals are reviewed by three separate review panels (see “E. Application Review Information,” for a full description of how COE applicants are reviewed, rated and selected). Each panel provides ratings that determine which, if any, proposals are forwarded to the subsequent review panel. DHS may combine elements from several highly-rated proposals to create a new COE.

Priorities and Expectations for a COE

It is critical for university applicants to understand the roles and requirements of being a COE lead institution before submitting an application. The DHS COEs are university consortia that work closely with each other and with DHS Offices and Components and their partners to conduct research, develop and transition mission-relevant science and technology, educate the next generation of homeland security technical experts, and train the current workforce in the latest scientific https://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence https://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence applications. DHS COEs operate using a unique research management approach where researchers work alongside operational and decision-making personnel to explore opportunities to use science and technology to enhance capabilities in line with DHS’ mission. The skill sets required to make a COE successful are more extensive than research expertise alone. COEs need to have the ability and commitment to communicate frequently with a variety of actors from federal staff, to attorneys, to university administrators. COE teams should include experts in finance, project management, education, training, outreach and marketing, intellectual property management, technology development, and technology transfer. Applicants should also have an understanding of how to translate research to practice including licensing, the ability to work with transition partners, and an understanding of federal acquisition. The COE team must demonstrate their commitment to develop a long-term trust-based partnership between universities and federal agencies; to do that, this wide range of skills is essential.

The Center will be expected to construct a plan and schedule describing the specific business steps needed to execute subcontracts, identify data needs and the acquisition of such data, establish intellectual property sharing agreements, and engage customers to refine proposals into a workplan. The Center will be required to have these elements in place within 6 months following award.

The DHS COEs are different than many other federally funded university centers, and DHS expects a lot more from them. Each COE lead institution must:

• Work closely with DHS and others to identify the most critical knowledge and technology gaps that a COE can address, on an on-going basis

• Place faculty and students (U.S. citizens eligible for clearances) in operational agencies early and often, in order to develop solutions appropriate to complex homeland security problems

• Build a nation-wide or world-wide network of academic and other subject matter experts in order to be able to access the best experts for each problem in short order

• Develop plans for replacing researchers whose projects are not progressing as planned, and a process to hold competitions to replace projects that have ended

• Work with DHS and other operational customers to identify projects with a high potential of generating usable knowledge or technologies, and developing a plan to implement operationally

• Develop detailed plans for transitioning research results into end uses, including plans to pursue intellectual property protections and execute those decisions to support the transfer of research to those capable of further developing the technology or service.

DHS funds the COEs through cooperative agreements, which provide support for research for general public purposes, yet enable substantial federal agency involvement in COE activities and research (for details on the agreement, please refer to

APPENDIX A: Terms and Conditions, Programmatic Involvement. On a regular basis, OUP facilitates interactions between researchers, DHS SMEs, and customers from the public and private sectors (i.e., homeland security practitioners). The goal of this hands-on management is to develop a trusting, sustained relationship between universities and homeland security operational agencies.

The COEs are expected to develop relationships and partnerships with DHS Components and the larger first responder community to provide targeted research and education resources. OUP will work with COE management to formulate the COE’s research and education projects, and to develop communication and transition strategies. Interactions commonly include COE-sponsored workshops that bring together diverse SMEs, industry representatives, and federal managers. DHS believes this frequent interaction is the most effective way to get the federal government’s research investments into operational use by security, intelligence, and emergency response personnel. Only academic institutions that can embrace this type of close working relationship should apply for this funding opportunity.

The DHS mission requires that its operational Components [e.g., U.S.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), U.S.

Secret Service (USSS)] be responsive to a wide range of constantly evolving homeland security challenges and threats, both natural and manmade. As a result, DHS priorities and operational challenges may change over the course of a COE’s performance period. Therefore, COE research programs should be flexible enough to adapt to new homeland security challenges and priorities, while at the same time maintaining focus on their core research areas. DHS looks to COE leadership to maintain situational awareness of cutting edge research to inform the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) of research futures, and to identify potential threats arising from, or to be mitigated by, novel technology.

Overarching Vision of the Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense Center of Excellence

The Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense Center of Excellence will research and develop solutions, protocols, and capabilities to enhance the ability of DHS and its partners to detect, assess, and respond to known and unknown biological threats and hazards that could adversely impact the Nation’s people, agriculture, and economy. There are numerous organizations across the public and private sector that have a role in detecting threats and mitigating consequences. This Center will support DHS improve its operational capabilities that contribute the Nation’s layered defense.

New biological threats and hazards have the potential to significantly affect the health and well-being of DHS personnel. These threats may also spread to people, animals, plants, and negatively affect the Nation’s economy and critical infrastructure. Persistent and emerging threats exist such as invasive species, novel biological agents and materials, infectious human and zoonotic diseases, and counterfeit goods that could cause significant harm to health and economic stability. Biological and chemical threats can affect our infrastructures directly;

halt their productivity, or utilize those systems to promulgate across nodes within supply chains.

Capabilities in biotechnology will advance, including ready access to component hardware, precursor chemicals and materials; likewise, the knowledge and expertise in creating modified or novel organisms will advance. Traditional and non-traditional actors and adversaries will explore new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that will in turn require new integrated systematic techniques and technology systems to detect, prevent, and treat these broad threats. Biology and biological processes are becoming programmable and scalable, providing tremendous advances in healthcare, but are also lowering barriers for malicious actors to leverage these technologies for nefarious purposes. The inherently dual-use nature of many biological technologies and infrastructure means that anticipating such threats and hazards and monitoring their emergence on the global scene, especially the potential for their dispersal (intentional or natural) through the other noted trends in globalization, will be increasingly difficult .

The biodefense enterprise must approach the future with flexibility to prevent, detect and respond to biological threats and hazards in order to both avoid surprise by adversaries who would seek to employ biological means against the U.S. and its allies and the inadvertent release of biological hazard within the U.S. Current biosecurity and biosafety policies struggle with the pace of advancement and diffusion of technology, and the emergence of new capabilities that result from the convergence of traditional biological disciplines with engineering, bioinformatics, and information technology. Similarly, supply chains are becoming more complex, adaptable, which can support markets but potentially introduce the opportunity for malicious activities or new physical threats that affect health and the economy.

The DHS 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review posits a future environment characterized by several persistent trends related to globalization, including increased trade; accessible and increased world-wide travel to a growing number of the earth’s population; and improved accessibility to, and proliferation of, life-sciences knowledge. 1 DHS seeks to understand alternative approaches to reduce risks posed by new biological threats encountered at borders, ports of entry (POEs), and within the global supply chain in which DHS has responsibility. DHS is most concerned with transnational agro- and bio-terrorism, pandemics, transboundary animal diseases, and other unknown biothreats. Faced with ever-increasing volumes of trade and travelers, border security and immigration managers need technological innovations and better management of information.

COEs should describe how technologies and concepts could be integrated into DHS operations to enhance screening and bio-threat identification, assessment, and prevention. Potential approaches include the utilization of innovative technologies (e.g., screening physical cargo and passengers and data analysis to identify potential conditions that warrant greater scrutiny), optimized operational procedures, and a skilled workforce trained in latest methods to identify and respond to biological threats and their corresponding impact on health and the economy.

DHS Operational Environment

Since 2001, the U.S. Government has worked with numerous public and private sector agencies and entities in efforts to enhance resiliency against natural and manmade disasters. In 2002, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce and administer immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace, and ensure resiliency to disasters. DHS has a diverse role in supporting federal, state, and local agencies prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic incidents that may affect our citizens’ health and impact the Nation’s infrastructures.

DHS has a central role in the Nation’s security. Its seven operational Components have a diverse set of missions and operations, all focused on making the U.S.

more secure and resilient. The Components are present across the country at ports of entry including land borders, air and sea ports, and international cargo ports. A significant part of the Components’ missions are to maintain the continuity of the nation’s trade and economic activities.

It is critical for DHS Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Office of Health Affairs (OHA), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Transportation Security Agency (TSA) and their partners in United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and

1 “The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. The Department of Homeland Security. June 18, 2014.

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf industry to know in advance about emerging and imminent biological threats, have the capability to detect these threats, and to understand how such threats could be introduced and moved throughout our infrastructure and supply chain systems. DHS is not the lead sector specific agency for the Food and Agriculture Sector or the Public Health Sector, but it has a substantial role in coordinating and sharing information with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and industry partners.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal agency responsible for securing the borders, enabling safe and secure commerce, and protecting our citizens and economy from foreign-sourced threats. This mission is supported in varying ways by the DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the Transportation Security Agency (TSA), the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Collectively, the DHS enterprise and its federal partners work to understand how best to support the safety and security of the Nation’s citizens, infrastructures, and the economy.

DHS seeks research and development to assist CBP field personnel prepare for and respond to biological threats, or known hazards could impact border security, public health, trade, and travel. Ports of Entry (POEs) are Federal inspection facilities where travelers and goods are processed by immigration and customs officials. POEs also serve as gateways to flows of people and goods throughout the global community. CBP inspection operations involve multilayered screening processes to identify, target, and inspect high-risk entries in cargo, international mail, and passenger pathways.

OHA is DHS’s principal authority for all medical and public health issues. OHA’s five divisions guide DHS leaders on medical and public health issues related to national security and long-term policies. OHA supports DHS Components and public health communities nationwide to plan for, respond to, and recover from crises. OHA monitors the environment for dangerous biological agents, analyzes data for early signs of chemical and biological threats, and plans responses to pandemics. OHA works closely with DHS professionals on the frontlines, like CBP and TSA officers, to keep them healthy and safe. OHA also helps DHS officials coordinate medical resources and understand health and medical risks during incidents2.

FEMA’s mission is to help citizens and first responders build, sustain and improve the Nation’s capability for preventing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, including acts of terror. FEMA’s efforts at the national and regional levels are led by individuals with a broad range of hands-on emergency management, fire, rescue, 2 Department of Homeland Security Office of Health Affairs. Accessed on 8/30/2016. https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs emergency medical services, law enforcement, military and private sector experience. 3 Timely and accurate information on biological and chemical threats is essential to develop an effective FEMA response.

TSA was established after the events of September 11, 2001, by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. This act charged TSA with the responsibilities for enforcing security-related regulations and requirements. This includes: identifying and undertaking research and development (R&D) activities necessary to enhance transportation security; inspecting, maintaining, and testing security facilities, equipment, and systems; ensuring the adequacy of security measures for the transportation of cargo; overseeing implementation efforts, and; ensuring the adequacy of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities 4

The scope of DHS operations necessary to support efficient and secure trade is immense. CBP and TSA are critical agencies within this layered defensive structure. Each year, more than 11 million maritime containers arrive at the Nation’s seaports. At land borders, another 11 million arrive by truck and 2.7 million by rail.5 The CBP antiterrorism mission is not limited to the physical examination of cargo when it arrives in U.S. POEs. CBP uses intelligence from a number of sources to identify high-risk shipments in order to concentrate its inspection resources.

In addition to its own regulations, CBP enforces over 400 laws on behalf of over 40 other U.S. Government agencies.6 A large number of these import rules were designed to protect American agriculture and citizens from health risks, and dangerous, illegal, or counterfeit goods. CBP has a number of initiatives including use of non-intrusive inspectional technology to examine cargo effectively with little disruption in the flow of trade and inconvenience to travelers. Similarly, TSA works with federal and international partners to secure the global supply chain that drives the Nation’s domestic critical infrastructures. TSA is utilizing a multi-layered, risk-based approach to air cargo security focused on emerging and next generation threats. In 2015, TSA screened more than 432 million checked bags, more than 1.6 billion carry-on bags, 708 million passengers, and 12.9 million airport employees.7 Today, nearly 51,000 officers screen passengers and

3 The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Accessed on 8/30/2016. www.fema.gov 4 “Aviation and Transportation Security Act”. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). November 19, 2001.

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/aviation_and_transportation_security_act_atsa_public_law_107_1771.pdf 5 “Cargo Security and Examinations”. United States Customs and Border Protection. https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security 6 “Cargo Examination”. United States Customs and Border Protection. https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination 7 “National Press Release: TSA 2015 Statistics”. Transportation Security Aviation. January 21, 2016.

https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2016/01/21/tsa-releases-2015-statistics http://www.fema.gov/ https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/aviation_and_transportation_security_act_atsa_public_law_107_1771.pdf https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2016/01/21/tsa-releases-2015-statistics their belongings to ensure the safety of aviation security and to protect against introduced threats.8

The increase number and efficiency of transportation networks and supply chains can increase the chances to introduce new strains of diseases, pathogens, hazardous substances, and invasive species, all of which can adversely impact human and animal health and the economy (Figure 1). According to the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Economic Research Service (ERS), the value of U.S. agricultural exports increased from $85 billion in 1995 to over $144 billion in 2013. 9 Agriculture and agriculture-related industries contributed $835 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014. 10 If a disease outbreak were to occur in the U.S., agricultural exports to other countries would be curtailed, with severe impacts to the economy.

Seventy five percent of new diseases affecting humans are zoonotic, while twenty well-known diseases--including tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and cholera--have reemerged or spread geographically since 1973, often in more virulent and drug-resistant forms. At least 30 previously unknown disease agents have been identified since 1973, including HIV, Ebola, hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which no cures are available. 11

The global food supply chain is a network of producers, processors, distributors, consumers, and government/non-governmental regulators. Technological advances enable the food supply chain to increase to meet demand, which increases the likelihood of accidental or deliberate contamination by counterfeit products, chemicals, pests, pathogenic diseases, or invasive species. Globalization of the food supply has led to the rapid and widespread international distribution of foods and anything those foods may be contaminated with.

8 United State Department of Homeland Security, Aviation Security. September 23, 2015. Available at:

https://www.dhs.gov/aviation-security 9 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. “The Evolution of U.S. Agriculture Exports”.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx 10 United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. “Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy”.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734 11 World Health Organization. “Veterinary Public Health”. http://www.who.int/zoonoses/vph/en/ https://www.dhs.gov/aviation-security http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734 http://www.who.int/zoonoses/vph/en/

Figure 1

Strategic Guidance and Legal Authorities Relevant to this COE

Please see Appendix D for the full list of relevant guidance. The following strategic guidance documents guide or partially guide DHS operations investment:

CBP’s mission is to prevent terrorists and weapons of terrorism from entering the United States by eliminating potential threats before they arrive at our borders and ports. The United States Coast Guard and Customs and Border protection secure the waterways and land borders. Homeland Security Presidential Directive thirteen (HSPD-13) underscores the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, defined as “All areas and things of, on ,under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities ,infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyance.” 12

Agriculture, food, and people are all susceptible to exposure to biological threats and hazards. In 2004, HSPD-9 Defense of United States Agriculture and Food established a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.13 The U.S. food supply system is comprised of thousands of potential targets for terrorist attacks or naturally occurring diseases, pests, or toxins.

12 “Maritime Security Policy”. The Department of Homeland Security Digital Library. December 21, 2004.

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470301 13 Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (February 9,2004), v.40 n.6, p.183-187 http://www.gpoacces.gov/wcomp/index.html https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470301 http://www.gpoacces.gov/wcomp/index.html

HSPD-10 Biodefense for the 21st Century was enacted four months after HSPD-9.

This directive states that “the United States will use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests.”14 HSPD-10 also sets forth four pillars of U.S. biodefense: threat awareness; prevention and protection;

surveillance and detection; and, response and recovery. The HSPD-10 requires collaboration and synergistic efforts among various federal agencies (i.e. DHS, DoD, HHS, and USDA).

The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain, in consultation with appropriate Federal, State, local and tribal government agencies, the private sector, and the international community.15

To strengthen global supply chains and encourage actions to increase resilience, the U.S. created the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security in 201216. A key attribute of our public health and economic stability is the ability to identify and mitigate threats to our supply chains. The global supply chain that serves the U.S. can be targeted by malicious actors, or disrupted by infectious diseases, natural disasters, or other catastrophes.

In 2011, the Federal Government enacted Presidential Policy Directive Eight (PPD-8): National Preparedness. Leveraging the importance of protecting critical infrastructure from terrorism, this directive was aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.

14 “Biodefense for the 21st Century”. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. April 28, 2004.

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=784400 15 “Security Safe Port Act”. Congress. October, 13, 2006. https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW- 109publ347.pdf 16 “National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security”. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. January 23, 2012. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_strategy_for_global_supply_chain_security.pdf https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=784400 https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW-109publ347.pdf https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW-109publ347.pdf https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_strategy_for_global_supply_chain_security.pdf

DHS’s Approach to COEs

Establishing a COE is a major and expensive effort that involves a lot of actors on both the federal and university sides. There are important elements of standing up and operating a COE that every applicant should understand prior to applying:

1. The overarching research areas that are the focus of all COE NOFOs, are driven by DHS’s critical needs and enduring missions.

2. The research topics and questions contained in the NOFO are developed by the DHS Component agencies that have to implement those difficult missions.

3. Proposals for re-branded off-the-shelf research or pet projects will not survive DHS’s rigorous review processes. DHS needs use-inspired results-focused research that generates customized and innovative solutions.

4. DHS’s expectations for a COE will require university faculty to spend time working with customers in the field to better understand their needs, participate in project teams, execute the work necessary to protect intellectual property, and assess current technology and business markets.

5. DHS expects COE research to make a difference. Universities must actively manage COE research from a sound theoretical base, through methods development, data collection, testing and evaluation to operational use (i.e., End-to-End) in close partnership with DHS.

6. DHS will manage this COE carefully to provide value to operational users.

Research-based solutions generated by this Center must be innovative and well positioned to be transitioned into use by DHS customers. CBTS’s research will be based on the HSE needs expressed by HSE practitioners in this NOFO.

Research outcomes will include analytical tools, technologies, and knowledge products, e.g., best practices, resource guides, and case studies, which can be transitioned to the HSE workforce. DHS-sponsored researchers will produce new capabilities, and work with partners and stakeholders at all levels to test these capabilities in operational settings, and then take steps to make these solutions available and useful to agencies at all levels.

DHS envisions that multi-disciplinary research teams working closely with DHS and other subject matter experts will develop successful innovations to confront future homeland security challenges. The teams will need various combinations of academic disciplines, including operations research, social sciences, engineering, biological and physical sciences, and mathematics. This COE will focus on major and cross-cutting DHS mission areas in ways that previous COEs have not addressed. For more information about DHS S&T and its organizational structure, visit http://www.dhs.gov/st-organization. For more information about the COEs, visit: http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org.

http://www.dhs.gov/st-organization http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org/

This COE will support a portfolio of projects that range in technical maturity, potential impact, and that address different elements of the complex challenges associated with integrating information relevant to protecting the Nation against next generation biological threats. Centers are required to develop and adhere to a systematic framework that guides project teams through appropriate developmental steps, addresses critical regulatory, market, and other business factors that will impact the likelihood that the outcome will be used by customers.

CBTS researchers, faculty and students must work closely with DHS Components and other federal, state local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement and emergency management partners to develop and deploy tools and methods to support homeland security decision makers.

DHS funds research so that DHS can use the technology or knowledge to accomplish its mission. It is critical for researchers to understand how the Federal government does business. Selected COE Directors and Research Theme leaders must spend 1-3 months in DHS operational environments early in the research life cycle to understand both the technical and business requirements of DHS Components. This emphasizes the intellectual property, sustainability of technologies, security, and other legal requirements that Federal agencies must follow.

In order to avoid duplication of existing work, applicants must demonstrate a working knowledge of the scientific landscape, the quantitative methods, policies, and findings relevant to the topics in this NOFO through literature reviews, analysis of alternative approaches, and market-based assessments of related/ emerging technology.

Technology Transfer and Transition

As a mission agency, DHS funds projects with the ultimate goal of making homeland security practitioners more effective and efficient. Therefore, COEs are expected to have concrete objectives for how their research efforts will improve processes (e.g., operations, policies, decision-making), as well as impact homeland security (e.g., protect lives, property, and economies).

Transferring and transitioning research into the market requires a systematic understanding of customer needs, process and product design, and product and service development. The success of COEs depends on the ability to identify the needs of customers and quickly develop products and solutions that meet those needs. Delivering value to the customer is not simply a scientific problem, a design problem, or a market problem; it involves specific attention to each of the three general areas noted above.

DHS OUP utilizes a form of the stage-gate methodology to evaluate the performance of the Center and its projects. The stage-gate methodology, known as the industry and government standard, allows for reviewers to conduct evidence-based decision making that mitigates programmatic risk and enables program managers to monitor progress and make decisions.17 At each stage, the Center and program managers evaluate the project status and ensure specific criteria such as: strategic fit, technical feasibility, customer acceptance, market opportunity, and financial opportunity are met before proceeding to the next stage of investment. Figure 2 below is a depiction of a generic form of the stage-gate process.

Figure 2

The Center’s strategy, and each project that is awarded as part of the Center, must propose and adhere to this stage-gate methodology shown in Figure 2, and as described in further detail below. The applicant must use this framework to describe the planning and execution of studies and developmental steps and the corresponding market and business steps necessary to complete the effort and transfer program outcomes into use. As a result of using this framework, each performing institution under the COE should be able to characterize the proposed research as a function of its technical maturity and market readiness at any given time.

Center Partner Applicants are required to submit a detailed proposal addressing the overall purpose of the project, an assessment of the state of the art, a description of the current operational environment, the scientific hypothesis and methodology for the study, data acquisition methods, advanced test and evaluation future needs, intellectual property management approach, and customer involvement in the project. Not all projects will result in commercializable outputs; however, at a minimum, all teams should

17 “Innovation Process”. Stage-Gate International. http://www.stage-gate.com/resources_stage-gate.php

Research Development

Design & Launch

Testing & Validation

Proof of Concept

Planning & Concept

Refinement

Exploration & Customer

Discovery

Business Case - perform economic analysis, benchmark competitive products and services, and assess regulatory or cost considerations that may affect market acceptance http://www.stage-gate.com/resources_stage-gate.php describe how customers can access the program outputs, how the team will protect intellectual property, and what laws and regulations could impact the use of the program outputs.

Example stages of research are:

a) Exploration and Customer Discovery: the stage of research that generates hypotheses or theories through new and refined data analysis, produces observational findings, and creates other sources of research-based information. Efforts to explore customer gaps occurs early in the process. Projects in this stage should describe existing relevant standards, competing approaches, and provide an initial analysis of market conditions.

b) Planning and Concept Refinement: the stage of research that narrows project requirements. This includes conducting preliminary market and technical assessments, identifying customer needs and developing initial product specifications. Results from this stage of research may be used to inform the design of a study to test the efficacy of an idea/project.

Efforts to define the market and identify and assess market drivers that will affect the transfer or adoption of the project outputs should be initiated.

Example stages of development are:

a) Proof of Concept: the stage of development where key technical challenges are initially addressed. Activities may include verifying product requirements and implementing and testing (typically in controlled contexts) approaches to those capability requirements. A technology transfer plan is typically developed that outlines efforts to understand commercialization needs.

b) Testing and Validation: the stage of development where a fully-integrated and working prototype is tested. Activities may include iteratively refining the prototype, testing in operational environments, and verifying that all technical requirements are met. A technology transfer plan is typically ongoing in collaboration with the transfer partner(s). Stage results depict that a product embodiment is realizable.

c) Final Design and Launch: the stage of development where the product or service is finalized and made available for customer utilization. This likely requires the development of the corresponding business services that customers will use to buy, license, or otherwise acquire the product or service.

The DHS COEs must form teams of qualified professionals with the complementary skills necessary to transition research results from the research laboratory into the hands of homeland security customers. This includes understanding customer relations, conducting market assessments, managing intellectual property rights, considering commercialization, and assessing life cycle costs and needs (operations and maintenance and training).

The Center Lead Applicants are encouraged to develop proposals that include administrative support for facilitating transition, such as a staff member dedicated to assisting project leads with developing transition plans and the partnerships needed for successful transition, including with customers or the private sector. COEs are encouraged to leverage capabilities and resources offered through their university technology transfer offices in order to protect intellectual property by filing invention disclosures, patents, and licensing agreements. In addition, COEs are expected to participate in workshops, technology demonstrations, conferences, and other events hosted by OUP that may facilitate research and technology transition to customers.

COEs also should have specific objectives for transitioning their education efforts, which should include but are not limited to (1) capacity-building in disciplines relevant to homeland security, including at MSIs, (2) development and training of homeland security professionals for the current and future workforce through executive education programs, and (3) engagement of COE-supported students in research projects in applied or operational settings.

Historically, COEs that have effectively engaged stakeholders early in their activities have had great success. Examples of such engagement include:

• Inviting customers, such as DHS Component representatives or first responders, to work with principal investigators as they develop and implement their research and transition plans

• Conducting projects in coordination with DHS S&T technical divisions

• Inviting customers/stakeholders to participate in program/project reviews

• Holding workshops that bring researchers and homeland security practitioners together

• Partnering with private industry or business to co-develop technologies

• Embedding researchers or students in an operational environment

• Hosting an operational expert to participate in COE activities

Access to Data

Researchers and analysts must be able to obtain access to needed analytical products, relevant data, and open source and publicly available information. They also should anticipate interacting with homeland security partners and stakeholders and other subject matter experts. Applicants must discuss any needs for unique or sensitive data, testing, or laboratory facilities that will be required to conduct the research, and how the applicant will ensure its researchers can access necessary data and facilities. See Other Submission Requirements in Appendix A.

II. Application Project Narrative

This section outlines requirements for the Project Narrative portion of the application package.

S&T expects any Partner institution awarded under this NOFO to become a fully integrated component of the COE. Partner applicants must select and clearly identify if their proposed project aligns with the Research Program or the Workforce Development Program. Applicants may only propose 1 project per proposal; however they may submit more than 1 proposal.

Applicants may propose projects lasting up to 2 years, with total budgets up to $500,000. However, Center projects are funded in 1-year increments. Subsequent to the first year, Center and project funding is dependent on successful performance in prior years, the relevance of project outcomes to current homeland security research priorities, and availability of funds. Multi-year project proposals should provide a summary of their long-term vision, timeframe, research and education outcomes, technology transfer or transition pathway, and potential real-world applications.

Applicants must also summarize a results communication and transition plan that outlines how the Partner will implement its project(s) and how they will be transitioned to user groups. Elements of the plan may include: project milestones;

career development programs for research staff and students; identification of potential user groups; and a description of how the research results will be transitioned to DHS and other federal and state agencies.

Note: While not all Center projects will result in a final product that transitions to actual use by an end user, even earlier phase or exploratory research should still include a plan for disseminating results to end users/stakeholders in a form that enables end users/stakeholders to understand the potential applicability of the work and leverage outcomes to the maximum extent possible.

The following two sections outline requirements for 1) a Research project or 2) and Workforce and Professional Development project. Please select and clearly identify one area to propose a project.

1. Research Project (5 pages)

Applicants should identify multidisciplinary, comprehensive approaches to address one of the research themes and topics outlined below in Section VIII “Research Theme Areas”. Applicants should explain why they selected these topics or questions, and describe a proposed method, metrics and outcomes to answer the relevant questions.

Applicants should consider the maturity and state-of-the-art of the respective theories, technologies, and applications of the proposed areas of study when formulating their research portfolios.

Applicants must include the following elements for each project:

• Title

• Principal investigator (name, title, school/business/non-profit)

• Other key technical and project personnel supporting intellectual property and administrative tasks (name, title, school/business/non-profit)

• Specifically identify which theme area and topic the project addresses - if a proposed project falls under multiple themes/topics, identify those as primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.

• Project abstract

• Goals and objectives of the research

• Significant partners and their roles

• Technical capability or knowledge gap this project addresses and what

DHS Office aligns with the gap

• How the work builds upon the state-of-the-art of the respective theories, technologies, and applications of the proposed areas of study

• How the work represents an improvement (incremental or fundamental change) to the current operational posture being used

• Theoretical approach, hypothesis to be tested

• Methods for data collection and analysis

• Methods section including study design

• Data access plans should data be needed to execute the project

• Technical technology performance metrics being tested (e.g. specificity, sensitivity, cost, etc.)

• A year-by-year description of key milestones for the project for the first two years

• Expected outputs and outcomes and how those outputs would be used

• Transition pathway from lab to field to include identifying the key technical scientific and development steps necessary to transfer the technology to customers or commercialization partners.

• The stages and gates that will be used to evaluate the technical progress and efforts to frame the business environment that the resulting outputs will effect.

• A year-by-year description of key milestones and the schedule for the project for the first two years

• Identification of commercial partners with the necessary complementary assets needed to realize the technology/approaches/concepts

• Total projected costs per year for two years and forecasted costs for up to…