CBTS NOFO Lead rev 4-19-17.pdf

DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS-Lead

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)

DHS Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) Center of Excellence (COE)

Center for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense –

Center Lead

NOTE: If you are going to apply for this funding opportunity and have not obtained a Data

Universal Numbering System (DUNS) number and/or are not currently registered in the

System for Award Management (SAM), please take immediate action to obtain a DUNS

Number, if applicable, and then to register immediately in SAM. It may take 4 weeks or more after you submit your SAM registration before your registration is active in SAM, then an additional 24 hours for Grants.gov to recognize your information. Information on obtaining a DUNS number and registering in SAM is available from Grants.gov at:

http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html Detailed information regarding DUNS and

SAM is also provided in Section D of this NOFO, subsection, Content and Form of Application

Submission.

http://www.grants.gov/web/grants/register.html

Table of Contents

A. Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Description

Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities I. Program Overview II. Application Project Narrative III. Research and Workforce and Professional Development Themes, Topics, and Questions

B. Federal Award Information

Award Amounts, Important Dates, and Extensions

Funding Instrument

C. Eligibility Information

Eligible Applicants

Eligibility Criteria

Cost Share or Match

D. Application and Submission Information

Submission Date and Other Key Dates and Times

Other Key Dates

Address to Request Application Package

Informational Webinar

Optional Forms

Other Submission Requirements

Funding Restrictions

Indirect (Facilities & Administrative (F&A) Costs

E. Application Review Information

Review and Selection Process I. Scientific Quality Review (External Review) II. DHS Relevancy Review (Internal DHS SMEs) III. Site Visit Review IV. Past Performance Review (if applicable)

Application Evaluation Criteria I. Geographic Distribution of the COEs II. Evaluation Criteria

F. Federal Award Administration Information

Notice of Award I. Work Plan Development Workshop

Administrative and National Policy Requirements

Reporting

G. DHS Awarding Agency Contact Information

Contact and Resource Information

H. Additional Information

Extensions

APPENDIX A: Terms and Conditions

APPENDIX B: Acronyms

APPENDIX C: End-to-End Approach

APPENDIX D: References for Themes, Topics and Questions

APPENDIX E: Checklist for Applicants

APPENDIX F: NOFO Alignment with Selection Process

A. Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Description

Issued By

U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate

(S&T)

Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance (CFDA) Number

97.061

CFDA Title

Centers for Homeland Security

Notice of Funding Opportunity Title

DHS S&T Center of Excellence for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply

Chain Defense- Lead

NOFO Number

Authorizing Authority for Program

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Section 308, as amended, P.L. 107-296.

Codified at 6 U.S.C. 188

Appropriation Authority for Program

Funds are not presently available to make awards under this Notice of Funding

Opportunity. DHS’s ability to make awards under this Notice of Funding Opportunity is contingent upon the availability of appropriated funds from which awards under this

Notice of Funding Opportunity can be made.

Program Type

New

Program Overview, Objectives, and Priorities

I. Program Overview

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology

Directorate (S&T) Office of University Programs (OUP) is requesting applications from accredited U.S. colleges and universities to lead a consortium of universities for a Center for Cross-Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain

Defense (CBTS). OUP is also posting a separate NOFO for eligible applicants to submit single project proposals for consideration as a partner to this Center of

Excellence (COE). Please see NOFO Number DHS-16-ST-061-CBTS-Partner or

97.061 on http://www.grants.gov for directions on how to submit single project proposals. DHS will select qualified individual projects from applications received for either the Center Lead NOFO or the Center Partner NOFO, regardless of the institution that is awarded as lead institution.

The DHS COEs are university consortia that work closely with DHS Components and their partners to conduct research, develop and transition mission-relevant science and technology, educate the next generation of homeland security technical experts, and train the current workforce in the latest scientific applications. Each COE is led by an accredited U.S. college or university and involves multiple partners for varying lengths of time. COE partners include other academic institutions, commercial industry, DHS Components, Department of

Energy National Laboratories and other Federally-Funded Research and

Development Centers (FFRDCs), other federal agencies that have homeland security-relevant missions, state/local/tribal governments, non-profits, and first responder organizations. DHS envisions the COEs as long-term trusted partners that provide an array of resources to help DHS achieve improve operations. OUP maintains both financial assistance and contract mechanisms for DHS to access

COE capabilities. The COEs that make up the COE network are listed at https://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence. The new Center will be a fully-integrated component of the COE network and will take advantage of the network's resources to develop mission-critical research, education, and technology transition programs.

Process for Establishing a New COE

Before DHS posts a COE NOFO on grants.gov, DHS subject matter experts

(SMEs) identify priority research and workforce development themes, topics, and questions that will be the focus of the COE. Proposals responding to the NOFO are screened for eligibility (see “Eligibility Information”). Ineligible or non-responsive proposals receive no further consideration. Eligible and responsive proposals are reviewed by up to three separate review panels (see “Application

Review Information,” for a full description of how DHS reviews, rates and selects

COE proposals). Each panel focuses on specific proposal characteristics (e.g., scientific quality, mission relevance) and provides ratings that determine which, if any, proposals are forwarded to the subsequent review panel. DHS may combine elements from several highly-rated proposals to create a new COE.

Priorities and Expectations for a COE

It is critical for university applicants to understand the roles and requirements of being a COE lead institution before submitting an application, and to craft a proposal to meet all the requirements of a DHS COE. The DHS COEs are led by an accredited U.S. based academic institution, with research partners from the commercial sector, national laboratories, and state and local consortia that work closely with each other and with DHS Offices and Components to: conduct http://www.grants.gov/ https://www.dhs.gov/st-centers-excellence research, develop and transition mission-relevant science and technology, educate the next generation of homeland security technical experts, and train the current workforce in the latest scientific applications. DHS COEs operate using a unique research management approach where researchers work alongside operational and decision-making personnel to find opportunities to use science and technology to enhance homeland security capabilities. The skill sets required to make a COE successful are more extensive than research expertise alone. COEs need to have the ability and commitment to communicate frequently with a variety of actors from federal staff, to attorneys, to university administrators, to the private sector.

The COE team must demonstrate their commitment to develop a long-term trust-based partnership between universities and federal agencies; to do that, a range of skills is essential.

In addition to a multidisciplinary research team, COEs should include experts in finance, project management, education, training, outreach and marketing, intellectual property management, technology development, and technology transfer. Applicants should have an understanding of how to translate research to practice including licensing, the ability to work with transition partners, and an understanding of federal acquisition.

The COEs are 10-year partners with DHS and priorities will evolve during that period. DHS expects the COE leadership to end non-performing projects as soon as possible using this research and development framework, and move on to others within the scope of the portfolio. Managing a COE as an evolving portfolio of projects gives DHS and the COEs the flexibility to fail fast and adjust to fund new efforts with higher marginal benefit for homeland security.

The Center will be expected to construct a plan and schedule describing the specific business steps needed to execute subcontracts, identify data needs and the acquisition of such data, establish intellectual property sharing agreements, and engage customers to refine proposals into a workplan. The Center will be required to have these elements in place within 6 months following award.

The DHS COEs are different from many other federally funded university centers, and DHS expects a lot more from them. Each COE lead institution must:

Work closely with DHS and others on an on-going basis to formulate research projects so that those efforts are aligned with the most critical knowledge and technology gaps

Work with research teams to build appropriate stage-gate plans to manage research including test and evaluation plans; identify key value added propositions to support

Place faculty and students (U.S. citizens eligible for clearances) in operational agencies early and often, in order to develop solutions appropriate to complex homeland security problems

Build a nation-wide or world-wide network of academic and other subject matter experts in order to be able to access the best experts for each problem in short order

Replace researchers whose projects are not progressing as planned, and establish a competitive process to replace projects that have ended

Develop detailed plans for transitioning research results into use, including plans to pursue intellectual property protections and to support the transfer of research to those capable of further developing the technology or service.

DHS funds the COEs through cooperative agreements, which provide support for research for general public purposes, yet enable substantial federal agency involvement in COE activities and research (for details on the agreement, please refer to APPENDIX A: Terms and Conditions, Programmatic Involvement). OUP facilitates interactions between researchers, DHS SMEs, and customers from the public and private sectors (i.e., homeland security practitioners). The goal of this hands-on management is to develop a trusting, sustained relationship between universities and DHS Components.

The COEs are expected to develop relationships and partnerships with DHS

Components and the larger first responder community to provide targeted capabilities and education resources. OUP will work with COE management to formulate the COE’s research and education projects and to develop communication and transition strategies. Interactions commonly include COE-sponsored workshops that bring together diverse SMEs, industry representatives, and federal managers. DHS believes this frequent interaction is the most effective way to get the federal government’s research investments into operational use by security, intelligence, and emergency response personnel. Only academic institutions that can embrace this type of close working relationship should apply for this funding opportunity.

The DHS mission requires that its operational Components [e.g., U.S.

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Customs and Border

Protection (CBP), Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), and the

U.S. Secret Service (USSS)] be responsive to a wide range of constantly evolving homeland security challenges and threats, both natural and manmade. As a result, DHS priorities and operational challenges may change over the course of a COE’s performance period. Therefore, COE research programs should be flexible enough to adapt to new homeland security challenges and priorities, while at the same time maintaining focus on their core research areas. DHS looks to COE leadership to maintain situational awareness of cutting edge research to inform the

HSE of research futures, and to identify potential threats arising from, or to be mitigated by, novel technology.

Overarching Vision of the Cross Border Threat Screening and

Supply Chain Defense Center of Excellence

The Cross Border Threat Screening and Supply Chain Defense Center of

Excellence will research and develop solutions, protocols, and capabilities to support DHS operations that detect, assess, and respond to known and unknown biological threats and hazards that could adversely impact the Nation’s people, agriculture, and economy. There are numerous organizations across the public and private sector that have a role in detecting threats and mitigating consequences. This Center will support DHS improve its operational capabilities that contribute the Nation’s layered defense.

New biological threats and hazards have the potential to significantly affect the health and well-being of DHS personnel. These threats may also spread to people, animals, plants, and negatively affect the Nation’s economy and critical infrastructure. Persistent and emerging threats exist such as invasive species, novel biological agents and materials, infectious human and zoonotic diseases, and counterfeit goods that could cause significant harm to health and economic stability. Biological and chemical threats can affect our infrastructures directly;

halt their productivity, or utilize those systems to promulgate across nodes within supply chains.

Capabilities in biotechnology will advance, including ready access to component hardware, precursor chemicals and materials; likewise, the knowledge and expertise in creating modified or novel organisms will advance. Traditional and non-traditional actors and adversaries will explore new toxins, live agents, and bioregulators that will in turn require new integrated systematic techniques and technology systems to detect, prevent, and treat these broad threats. Biology and biological processes are becoming programmable and scalable, providing tremendous advances in healthcare, but are also lowering barriers for malicious actors to leverage these technologies for nefarious purposes. The inherently dual-use nature of many biological technologies and infrastructure means that anticipating such threats and hazards and monitoring their emergence on the global scene, especially the potential for their dispersal (intentional or natural) through the other noted trends in globalization, will be increasingly difficult .

The biodefense enterprise must approach the future with flexibility to prevent, detect and respond to biological threats and hazards in order to avoid surprise by adversaries who would seek to employ biological means against the U.S. and its allies and prevent the inadvertent release of biological hazard within the U.S.

Current biosecurity and biosafety policies struggle to keep up with the pace of technological advancement, diffusion of technology, and the emergence of new capabilities that result from the convergence of traditional biological disciplines with engineering, bioinformatics, and information technology. At the same time, supply chains are becoming more complex and agile. These efficiencies and connections often support economic growth, but also potentially introduce opportunities for malicious activities or biological threats to enter commerce and adversely impact health and the economy.

The DHS 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review posits a future environment characterized by several persistent trends related to globalization, including increased trade; accessible and increased world-wide travel to a growing number of the earth’s population; and improved accessibility to, and proliferation of, life-sciences knowledge.

DHS seeks to understand alternative approaches to reduce risks posed by new biological threats encountered at borders, ports of entry (POEs), and within the global supply chain in which DHS has responsibility. DHS is most concerned with transnational agro- and bio-terrorism, pandemics, transboundary animal diseases, and other unknown biothreats. Faced with ever-increasing volumes of trade and travelers, border security and immigration managers need technological innovations and better management of information.

COEs should describe how technologies and concepts could be integrated into

DHS operations to enhance screening and bio-threat identification, assessment, and prevention. Potential approaches include the utilization of innovative technologies (e.g., screening physical cargo and passengers and data analysis to identify potential conditions that warrant greater scrutiny), optimized operational procedures, and a skilled workforce trained in latest methods to identify and respond to biological threats and their corresponding impact on health and the economy.

DHS Operational Environment

Since 2001, the U.S. Government has worked with numerous public and private sector agencies and entities in efforts to enhance resiliency against natural and manmade disasters. In 2002, The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established to prevent terrorism and enhance security, secure and manage our borders, enforce and administer immigration laws, safeguard and secure cyberspace, and ensure resiliency to disasters. DHS has a diverse role in supporting federal, state, and local agencies prepare for, protect against, respond to, and recover from catastrophic incidents that may affect our citizens’ health and impact the Nation’s infrastructures.

DHS has a central role in the Nation’s security. Its seven operational Components have a diverse set of missions and operations, all focused on making the U.S.

more secure and resilient. The Components are present across the country at ports

“The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. The Department of Homeland Security. June 18, 2014.

https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf of entry including land borders, air and sea ports, and international cargo ports. A significant part of the Components’ missions are to maintain the continuity of the nation’s trade and economic activities.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is the principal agency responsible for securing the borders, enabling safe and secure commerce, and protecting our citizens and economy from foreign-sourced threats. This mission is supported in varying ways by the DHS Office of Health Affairs (OHA), the Transportation

Security Agency (TSA), the National Protection and Programs Directorate

(NPPD), and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Collectively, the DHS enterprise and its federal partners work to understand how best to support the safety and security of the Nation’s citizens, infrastructures, and the economy.

It is critical for DHS CBP, OHA, FEMA, TSA and their partners in United States

Department of Agriculture (USDA), Health and Human Services (HHS), and industry to know in advance about emerging and imminent biological threats, have the capability to detect these threats, and to understand how such threats could be introduced and moved throughout our infrastructure and supply chain systems. DHS is not the lead sector specific agency for the Food and Agriculture

Sector or the Public Health Sector, but it has a substantial role in coordinating and sharing information with federal, state, local, tribal, territorial and industry partners.

DHS seeks research and development to assist CBP field personnel prepare for and respond to biological threats, or known hazards could impact border security, public health, trade, and travel. Ports of Entry (POEs) are Federal inspection facilities where travelers and goods are processed by immigration and customs officials. POEs also serve as gateways to flows of people and goods throughout the global community. CBP inspection operations involve multilayered screening processes to identify, target, and inspect high-risk entries in cargo, international mail, and passenger pathways.

OHA is DHS’s principal authority for all medical and public health issues.

OHA’s five divisions guide DHS leaders on medical and public health issues related to national security and long-term policies. OHA supports DHS Components and public health communities nationwide to plan for, respond to, and recover from crises. OHA monitors the environment for dangerous biological agents, analyzes data for early signs of chemical and biological threats, and plans responses to pandemics. OHA works closely with DHS professionals on the frontlines, like

CBP and TSA officers, to keep them healthy and safe. OHA also helps DHS officials coordinate medical resources and understand health and medical risks during incidents

Department of Homeland Security Office of Health Affairs. Accessed on 8/30/2016. https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs https://www.dhs.gov/office-health-affairs

FEMA’s mission is to help citizens and first responders build, sustain and improve the Nation’s capability for preventing, mitigating, responding to, and recovering from all domestic disasters, whether natural or man-made, including acts of terror. FEMA’s efforts at the national and regional levels are led by individuals with a broad range of hands-on emergency management, fire, rescue, emergency medical services, law enforcement, military and private sector experience.

Timely and accurate information on biological and chemical threats is essential to develop an effective FEMA response.

TSA was established after the events of September 11, 2001, by the Aviation and

Transportation Security Act. This act charged TSA with the responsibilities for enforcing security-related regulations and requirements. This includes: identifying and undertaking research and development (R&D) activities necessary to enhance transportation security; inspecting, maintaining, and testing security facilities, equipment, and systems; ensuring the adequacy of security measures for the transportation of cargo; overseeing implementation efforts, and; ensuring the adequacy of security measures at airports and other transportation facilities

The scope of DHS operations necessary to support efficient and secure trade is immense. CBP and TSA are critical agencies within this layered defensive structure. Each year, more than 11 million maritime containers arrive at the

Nation’s seaports. At land borders, another 11 million arrive by truck and 2.7 million by rail.

The CBP antiterrorism mission is not limited to the physical examination of cargo when it arrives in U.S. POEs. CBP uses intelligence from a number of sources to identify high-risk shipments in order to concentrate its inspection resources.

In addition to its own regulations, CBP enforces over 400 laws on behalf of over

40 other U.S. Government agencies.

A large number of these import rules were designed to protect American agriculture and citizens from health risks, and dangerous, illegal, or counterfeit goods. CBP has a number of initiatives including use of non-intrusive inspectional technology to examine cargo effectively with little disruption in the flow of trade and inconvenience to travelers. Similarly, TSA works with federal and international partners to secure the global supply chain that drives the Nation’s domestic critical infrastructures. TSA is utilizing a multi-layered, risk-based approach to air cargo security focused on emerging and next generation threats. In 2015, TSA screened more than 432 million checked

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Accessed on 8/30/2016. www.fema.gov

“Aviation and Transportation Security Act”. Transportation Security Administration (TSA). November 19, 2001.

https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/aviation_and_transportation_security_act_atsa_public_law_107_1771.pdf “Cargo Security and Examinations”. United States Customs and Border Protection. https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security “Cargo Examination”. United States Customs and Border Protection. https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination http://www.fema.gov/ https://www.tsa.gov/sites/default/files/aviation_and_transportation_security_act_atsa_public_law_107_1771.pdf https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/ports-entry/cargo-security/examination bags, more than 1.6 billion carry-on bags, 708 million passengers, and 12.9 million airport employees.

Today, nearly 51,000 officers screen passengers and their belongings to ensure the safety of aviation security and to protect against introduced threats.

The increase number and efficiency of transportation networks and supply chains can increase the chances to introduce new strains of diseases, pathogens, hazardous substances, and invasive species, all of which can adversely impact human and animal health and the economy (Figure 1). According to the USDA

Economic Research Service (ERS), the value of U.S. agricultural exports increased from $85 billion in 1995 to over $144 billion in 2013.

Agriculture and agriculture-related industries contributed $835 billion to the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014.

If a disease outbreak were to occur in the U.S., agricultural exports to other countries would be curtailed, with severe impacts to the economy.

Seventy five percent of new diseases affecting humans are zoonotic, while twenty well-known diseases--including tuberculosis (TB), malaria, and cholera--have reemerged or spread geographically since 1973, often in more virulent and drug-resistant forms. At least 30 previously unknown disease agents have been identified since 1973, including HIV, Ebola, hepatitis C, and Nipah virus, for which no cures are available.

The global food supply chain is a network of producers, processors, distributors, consumers, and government/non-governmental regulators. Technological advances enable the food supply chain to increase to meet demand, which increases the likelihood of accidental or deliberate contamination by counterfeit products, chemicals, pests, pathogenic diseases, or invasive species. Globalization of the food supply has led to the rapid and widespread international distribution of foods and anything those foods may be contaminated with.

“National Press Release: TSA 2015 Statistics”. Transportation Security Aviation. January 21, 2016.

https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2016/01/21/tsa-releases-2015-statistics United State Department of Homeland Security, Aviation Security. September 23, 2015. Available at:

https://www.dhs.gov/aviation-security United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. “The Evolution of U.S. Agriculture Exports”.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx

United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service. “Ag and Food Sectors and the Economy”.

http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734

World Health Organization. “Veterinary Public Health”. http://www.who.int/zoonoses/vph/en/ https://www.tsa.gov/news/releases/2016/01/21/tsa-releases-2015-statistics https://www.dhs.gov/aviation-security http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/international-markets-trade/us-agricultural-trade/exports/interactive-chart-the-evolution-of-us-agricultural-exports-over-the-last-two-decades.aspx http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734 http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/chart-gallery/detail.aspx?chartId=40037&ref=collection&embed=True&widgetId=39734 http://www.who.int/zoonoses/vph/en/

Figure 1

Strategic Guidance and Legal Authorities Relevant to this COE

Please see Appendix D for the full list of relevant guidance. The following strategic documents guide or partially guide DHS operations and investment:

CBP’s mission is to prevent terrorists and weapons of terrorism from entering the

United States by eliminating potential threats before they arrive at our borders and ports. The United States Coast Guard and Customs and Border protection secure the waterways and land borders. Homeland Security Presidential Directive thirteen (HSPD-13) underscores the importance of securing the Maritime Domain, defined as “All areas and things of, on ,under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities ,infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyance.”

Agriculture, food, and people are all susceptible to exposure to biological threats and hazards. In 2004, HSPD-9 Defense of United States Agriculture and Food established a national policy to defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.

The U.S. food supply system is comprised of thousands of potential targets for terrorist attacks or naturally occurring diseases, pests, or toxins.

“Maritime Security Policy”. The Department of Homeland Security Digital Library. December 21, 2004.

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470301

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (February 9,2004), v.40 n.6, p.183-187 http://www.gpoacces.gov/wcomp/index.html https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=470301 http://www.gpoacces.gov/wcomp/index.html

HSPD-10 Biodefense for the 21st Century was enacted four months after HSPD-9.

This directive states that “the United States will use all means necessary to prevent, protect against, and mitigate biological weapons attacks perpetrated against our homeland and our global interests.”

HSPD-10 also sets forth four pillars of U.S. biodefense: threat awareness; prevention and protection;

surveillance and detection; and, response and recovery. The HSPD-10 requires collaboration and synergistic efforts among various federal agencies (i.e. DHS, DoD, HHS, and USDA).

The Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port Act) requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to develop and implement a strategic plan to enhance the security of the international supply chain, in consultation with appropriate Federal, State, local and tribal government agencies, the private sector, and the international community.

To strengthen global supply chains and encourage actions to increase resilience, the U.S. created the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security in

. A key attribute of our public health and economic stability is the ability to identify and mitigate threats to our supply chains. The global supply chain that serves the U.S. can be targeted by malicious actors, or disrupted by infectious diseases, natural disasters, or other catastrophes.

In 2011, the Federal Government enacted Presidential Policy Directive Eight

(PPD-8): National Preparedness. Leveraging the importance of protecting critical infrastructure from terrorism, this directive was aimed at strengthening the security and resilience of the United States through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation, including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters.

“Biodefense for the 21 st

Century”. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. April 28, 2004.

https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=784400

“Security Safe Port Act”. Congress. October, 13, 2006. https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW- 109publ347.pdf

“National Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security”. The White House, Office of the Press Secretary. January 23, 2012. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_strategy_for_global_supply_chain_security.pdf https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=784400 https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW-109publ347.pdf https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ347/PLAW-109publ347.pdf https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/national_strategy_for_global_supply_chain_security.pdf

DHS’s Approach to COEs

Establishing a COE is a major and expensive effort that involves numerous individuals and organizations. There are important elements of standing up and operating a COE that every applicant should understand prior to applying:

1. The overarching research areas that are the focus of all COE NOFOs, are driven by DHS’s critical needs and enduring missions.

2. The research topics and questions contained in the NOFO are developed by the DHS Component agencies that have to implement those difficult missions.

3. Proposals for re-branded off-the-shelf research or pet projects will not survive DHS’s rigorous review processes. DHS needs use-inspired, results-focused research that generates customized and innovative solutions

4. DHS’s expectations for a COE will require university faculty to spend time working with customers in the field to better understand their needs, participate in project teams, execute the work necessary to protect intellectual property, and assess current technology and business markets.

5. DHS expects COE research to make a difference. Universities must actively manage COE research from a sound theoretical base, through methods development, data collection, testing and evaluation to operational use (i.e., End-to-End) in close partnership with DHS.

6. DHS will manage this COE carefully to provide value to operational users.

Research-based solutions generated by this Center must be innovative and well positioned to be transitioned into use by DHS customers. CBTS’s research will be based on the HSE needs expressed by HSE practitioners in this NOFO.

Research outcomes will include analytical tools, technologies, and knowledge products, e.g., best practices, resource guides, and case studies, which can be transitioned to the HSE workforce. DHS-sponsored researchers will produce new capabilities, and work with partners and stakeholders at all levels to test these capabilities in operational settings, and then take steps to make these solutions available and useful to agencies at all levels.

DHS envisions that multi-disciplinary research teams working closely with DHS and other subject matter experts will develop successful innovations to confront future homeland security challenges. The teams will need various combinations of academic disciplines, including operations research, social sciences, engineering, biological and physical sciences, and mathematics. This COE will focus on major and cross-cutting DHS mission areas in ways that previous COEs have not addressed. For more information about DHS S&T and its organizational structure, visit http://www.dhs.gov/st-organization. For more information about the COEs, visit: http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org.

http://www.dhs.gov/st-organization http://www.hsuniversityprograms.org/

This COE will support a portfolio of projects that range in technical maturity, potential impact, and that address different elements of the complex challenges associated with integrating information relevant to protecting the Nation against next generation biological threats. Centers are required to develop and adhere to a systematic framework that guides project teams through appropriate developmental steps, addresses critical regulatory, market, and other business factors that will impact the likelihood that the outcome will be used by customers.

CBTS researchers, faculty and students must work closely with DHS Components and other federal, state local, territorial, and tribal law enforcement and emergency management partners to develop and deploy tools and methods to support homeland security decision makers.

DHS funds research so that DHS can use the technology or knowledge to accomplish its mission. It is critical for researchers to understand how the Federal government does business. Selected COE Directors and Research Theme leaders must spend 1-3 months in DHS operational environments early in the research life cycle to understand both the technical and business requirements of DHS

Components. This emphasizes the intellectual property, sustainability of technologies, security, and other legal requirements that Federal agencies must follow.

The Center will be expected to construct a plan and schedule describing the specific business steps needed to execute subcontracts, identify data needs and the acquisition of such data, establish intellectual property sharing agreements, and engage customers to refine proposals into a workplan. The Center will be required to have these elements in place within 6 months following award.

In order to avoid duplication of existing work, applicants must demonstrate a working knowledge of the scientific landscape, the quantitative methods, policies, and findings relevant to the topics in this NOFO through literature reviews, analysis of alternative approaches, and market-based assessments of related/ emerging technology.

Access to Data

Researchers and analysts must be able to obtain access to needed analytical products, relevant data, and open source and publicly available information. They also should anticipate interacting with homeland security partners and stakeholders and other subject matter experts. Applicants must discuss any needs for unique or sensitive data, testing, or laboratory facilities that will be required to conduct the research, and how the applicant will ensure its researchers can access necessary data and facilities. See Data Acquisition and

Management Plan in Appendix A.

II. Application Project Narrative

This NOFO has three sections that align with the evaluation and selection process:

(Section A) Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO) Description, (Section D)

Application and Submission Information, and (Section E) Application Review

Information. See Appendix F for an outline of how these sections connect to each other and the review process.

The below section outlines requirements, and suggested page counts

, for the

Project Narrative portion of the application package.

1. Strategic Approach (3 pages)

2. Research Program (35 pages)

3. Workforce and Professional Development Program (8 pages)

4. Leadership (5 pages)

5. Transition (8 pages)

6. Program and Project Evaluation (3 pages)

7. Communications and Integration with the HSE (2 pages)

8. Past Performance (7 pages)

1. Strategic Approach (suggested: 3 pages)

Successful applicants will propose an integrated research and workforce and professional development plan that incorporate new approaches, including theory, methods and data to meet CBTS and DHS goals.

Applicants must describe:

The overall focus including a discussion of the proposed research themes and state of the art scientific approaches relevant to this scope.

The key functions within the Center and how those functions will work together as an integrated system to achieve the vision, mission, and goals

The key strategic partnerships needed to ensure the successful implementation of the Center’s research and education program and delivery of research outputs, tools, and technologies to customers;

including to develop, test, and evaluate the outcomes of the research. This includes how the individual projects will acquire the necessary data required to execute the proposed efforts

The Center narrative is limited to 64 single-spaced pages with 12-point font, Times New Roman, and one-inch margins. For applicants who have previously led a DHS S&T Center of Excellence, the Center narrative is limited to

71 pages to include a summary of their past performance as a DHS COE. Pages in excess of the page limitations will not be reviewed.

Only applicants who have previously led a DHS COE must submit a summary of their past performance as a DHS

COE

How the Center will evaluate the project progress, integrate projects into capabilities, and determine the appropriateness of the proposed solutions to the culture and resources of the target users

How the Center will engage target customers in problem framing and solution testing

How the Center will maintain situational awareness and managing projects within a portfolio designed to increase responsiveness to emerging events and scientific advancements

2. Research Program (suggested: 35 pages)

Applicants should identify multidisciplinary, comprehensive approaches to address each of the research themes and a selection of topics outlined below in

Section III “Research and Workforce and Professional Development Themes, Topics, and Questions”. Successful proposals must address all themes;

however, DHS does not expect or encourage applicants to address every topic within a theme or every question within a topic. Applicants must describe why their projects address the biggest knowledge gaps in each theme and more broadly, why these projects are critically needed for homeland security threat and hazard challenges. The Research Program should describe which projects will be integrated and how the Applicant will integrate projects to form a coherent approach to achieve the Center’s goals. The Research Program should consist of: a) an overview of the research program, b) specific project proposals , and c) a detailed description of the transition a plan and characterization of the stage of maturity for each research effort, including how each effort will advance through discovery, testing, evaluation, development, and transfer to customer utilization.

a. Applicants must address the following in their research program overview:

Describe a comprehensive approach that explains how the COE’s projects support the vision and goals of the Center. Each theme should have a lead investigator that will monitor projects that relate to the theme and promote efforts that foster collaboration and synergy.

Descriptions should address the strategic approach to integrating outputs from individual projects that will form the basis of sustainable and useable capabilities. The Applicant should address how project integration will occur across its network of performers. This will include how intellectual property is identified and managed and the decision making process required to execute.

Describe the maturity and state-of-the-art of the respective theories, technologies, and applications of the proposed areas of study to homeland security. The research program overview should describe how individual projects will integrate to formulate the proposed capabilities. Demonstrate that they and/or their partners have a high level of expertise in the areas in which they propose research and in transitioning technology to commercialization entities or directly to customers for field use.

Demonstrate knowledge of the DHS operational environment for which the outputs of the research are intended. Applicants should describe how screening, detection, and risk assessments are currently performed.

Description of the current technologies or concepts/procedures in use by the target customers and the technical and programmatic steps that emerging technologies will have to undergo to be field deployable (see transition requirements on stage-gate research management) Describe an interdisciplinary approach that incorporates researchers from a variety of academic disciplines and practices with the goal of producing a more effective comprehensive solution. Either the Center or the individual researchers must include milestones to protect intellectual property and to pursue the transfer of knowledge to entities willing and capable of transitioning the capabilities

Provide a comprehensive bibliography of their own and others relevant publications. Omitting these supporting documents may result in DHS dismissing a proposal without review. Applicants should provide a bibliography under “Other Attachments.”

Submit project proposals for the first two years that either end with a discrete output or that describe in detail the continuing steps necessary to develop a final capability useful to DHS. Proposals should be descriptive in detail and include stages of research and development (see pages 25-

28). However, note that Center projects are funded in 1-year increments, with future funding dependent on research excellence, progress, relevance, and utility.

Discuss any unique data, testing, or laboratory facilities that will be required to conduct the research and how the applicant will ensure its researchers can access the data and facilities prior to funding.

b. Applicants must include the following elements for each project Applicants may submit up to ten research projects total.

Title

Principal investigator (name, title, school/business/non-profit)

Other key technical and project personnel supporting intellectual property and administrative tasks (name, title, school/business/non-profit)

Specifically identify which theme area and topic the project addresses - if a proposed project falls under multiple themes/topics, identify those as primary, secondary, tertiary, etc.

Project abstract

Goals and objectives of the research

Significant partners and their roles

Technical capability or knowledge gap this project addresses and what

DHS Office aligns with the gap

How the work builds upon the state-of-the-art of the respective theories, technologies, and applications of the proposed areas of study

How the work represents an improvement (incremental or fundamental change) to the current operational posture being used

Theoretical approach, hypothesis to be tested

Methods for data collection and analysis

Methods section including study design

Technical technology performance metrics being tested (e.g. specificity, sensitivity, cost, etc.)

Expected outputs and outcomes and how those outputs would be used

Total projected costs per year for two years and forecasted costs for up to five years

Data access plans should data be needed to execute the project

Relevant Citations

c. Transition - See “Transition” p 25 of this NOFO for requirements on how to propose projects using the stage-gate methodology.

Transition pathway from lab to field to include identifying the key technical scientific and development steps necessary to transfer the technology to customers or commercialization partners.

The stages and gates that will be used to evaluate the technical progress and efforts to frame the business environment that the resulting outputs will effect.

A year-by-year description of key milestones and the schedule for the project for the first two years

Identification of commercial partners with the necessary complementary assets needed to realize the technology/approaches/concepts

3. Workforce and Professional Development Program (suggested: 8 pages)

The CBTS workforce and professional development program should include innovative initiatives to educate students in both theoretical and methodological underpinnings of the relevant disciplines, as well as practical applications for homeland security operations. As part of this, applicants should describe how they would embed their students and faculty, individually or in teams, with homeland security practitioners to conduct research, and foster opportunities for students to gain practical experience in homeland security-related professions. Applicants should also describe how they would integrate homeland security-related courses of study into existing science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) degree programs.

Additionally, applicants should describe how their Center would provide and enhance technical education and training programs for HSE and DHS professionals, for example, at CBP, OHA, TSA, FEMA, or specific training

Centers such as the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center, and the

Emergency Management Institute.

The overarching goals of a COE’s workforce and professional development program are to:

Build universities’ capacity in security focused science, engineering, mathematics and analysis. Analysis includes business administration and policy analysis, as applied to homeland security-related challenges

Strengthen the science, engineering, and analytical capabilities of the homeland security workforce, both current (professional development) and future (workforce development)

Diversify the homeland security technical workforce by building homeland security science, engineering, and analysis capacity at Minority

Serving Institutions (MSIs)

Link students and researchers to practitioners in operational settings to develop more robust tools, technologies, and capabilities

Teach students the business elements of transitioning emerging concepts into the commercial or government markets

Develop and train existing homeland security professionals in science, engineering, and business administration disciplines for the current and future workforce. Applicants should be familiar with the current methods by which Federal and State employees receive training.

Applicants must propose a plan for an integrated workforce and professional development program across the Center’s core STEM disciplines to align with

Section A.III “Research and Workforce and Professional Development

Themes, Topics, and Questions” below. DHS encourages proposals that include plans to integrate workforce…