Attachment J_Azure Information System Contingency Plan Associate Template.docx
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- Solicitation number
- 36C10B21R0039
About this file
This document describes a federal contract opportunity for the Department of Veterans Affairs. The contractor shall maintain Authority To Operate certification and perform upgrades for the Social Security Number Reduction tool hosted in the VA Enterprise Cloud environment. This includes meeting Technical Reference Model requirements and ensuring long-term sustainability, security, and legal compliance. The contractor will also provide database management, troubleshooting, and user support to VA officials utilizing the tool. The goal is the eventual collection, reduction, and elimination of Social Security numbers in VA databases.
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VA Enterprise Cloud (VAEC) Amazon Web Services (AWS) GovCloud Security Classification: High GRC Boundary Alignment: VAEC AWS GOVCLOUD HIGH
And [Organization 2 name/acronym] Security Categorization: Low/Moderate/High GRC Boundary Alignment: XYZ
Version X.X
MONTH YYYY
Information System Contingency Plan
Entries in GREEN are instructions (to be replaced with instruction request) Entries in RED are to be replaced/completed by the System/Application Team
Entries in BLACK should NOT to be changed, they are boiler plate changed (if changes are necessary, please highlight)
[Organization 2] is the organization/system/application hosted in the VAEC.
1. All colored texts should be removed or converted to black (or matching text) when finalized for signature.
2. This box/page should be removed when finalized.
3. Send to VAECSecurityTeam@va.gov for review PRIOR to final VAEC sign off/approval.
i OFFICE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
Actual Emergency Instruction Page
In the event of an actual emergency, Go directly to:
SECTION 3: Activation and Notification i OFFICE OF INFORMATION SECURITY Table of Contents
| Actual Emergency Instruction Page | 2 | |
| Table of Figures | 4 | |
| List of Tables | 4 | |
| Document Change Control Record | 6 | |
| Information System Contingency Plan (ISCP) Approval | 7 | |
| ISCP Distribution | 8 | |
| ISCP Distribution [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 9 | |
| INTRODUCTION | 10 | |
| 1.1 | Background | 10 |
| 1.2 | Critical Exposure Report of IS Services | 11 |
| 1.3 | GRC Boundary Alignment | 13 |
| 1.4 | Scope | 13 |
| 1.5 | Assumptions | 14 |
| 1.6 | Threats and Vulnerabilities | 15 |
| CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS | 17 | |
| VAEC System Description | 17 | |
| System Architecture | 17 | |
| Network Traffic Flow | 18 | |
| System Operating Environment | 20 | |
| Physical Locations | 20 | |
| General Location of Users | 20 | |
| Partnerships with External Organizations / Systems | 20 | |
| Special Technical Considerations Important for Recovery Purposes | 20 | |
| IS System Inventory of Components | 20 | |
| Associated Plans and System Interconnections | 21 | |
| Overview of ISCP Phases | 22 | |
| Roles and Responsibilities | 23 | |
| ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION | 25 | |
| Activation Criteria and Procedures | 25 | |
| Notification Procedures | 25 | |
| VAEC Service Desk Instructions | 26 | |
| Outage Assessment | 26 | |
| RECOVERY | 27 | |
| Sequence of Recovery Activities | 27 | |
| Escalation Notices / Awareness | 27 | |
| RECONSTITUTION | 28 | |
| Concurrent Processing | 28 | |
| Data Validation and Functionality Testing | 28 | |
| Reconstitution Declaration | 28 | |
| Notifications (Users) | 28 | |
| Cleanup | 28 | |
| Data Backup | 28 | |
| Event Documentation | 28 | |
| Deactivation | 29 | |
| TEST, TRAINING AND EXERCISE (TT&E) | 30 | |
| DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT | 33 | |
| Document Ownership | 33 | |
| Plan Review and Maintenance | 33 | |
| Document Distribution | 33 |
Table of Figures
| Table 1: Document Change Control Record | 6 |
| Table 2: ISCP Distribution List | 8 |
| Table 3: ISCP Distribution List [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 9 |
| Table 4: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service VAEC AWS | 12 |
| Table 5: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 13 |
List of Tables
| Table 1: Document Change Control Record | 6 |
| Table 2: ISCP Distribution List | 8 |
| Table 3: ISCP Distribution List [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 9 |
| Table 4: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service VAEC AWS | 12 |
| Table 5: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 13 |
| Table 6: Contingency Planning Controls Addressed in this ISCP | 14 |
| Table 7: Contingency Planning Controls Addressed in this ISCP [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 14 |
| Table 8: VAEC AWS GovCloud High IS Threat Assessment | 15 |
| Table 9: [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] IS Threat Assessment | 16 |
| Table 10: VAEC AWS GovCloud High IS Vulnerability Assessment | 16 |
| Table 11: [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] IS Vulnerability Assessment | 16 |
| Figure 1: System Architecture Diagram | 18 |
| Figure 2: [Organization 2 name/acronym] System Architecture Diagram | 18 |
| Figure 3: Network Traffic Flow Diagram | 19 |
| Figure 4: [Organization 2 name/acronym] Network Traffic Flow Diagram | 19 |
| Table 12: IS System Components | 21 |
| Table 13: IS System Components [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 21 |
| Table 14: Associated Plans | 21 |
| Table 15: Associated Plans [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 21 |
| Table 16: Information Systems That Connect with IS System name | 22 |
| Table 17: Information Systems That Connect with IS System name [Organization 2 name/acronym] | 22 |
| Table 18: AWS GovCloud ISCP Roles and Responsibilities (Primary and Alternate) | 24 |
| Table 19: [Organization 2 name/acronym] ISCP Roles and Responsibilities (Primary and Alternate) | 24 |
| Table 20: VAEC AWS TT&E Calendar | 31 |
| Table 21: [Organization 2 name/acronym] TT&E Calendar | 32 |
| Table 22: ISCP Personnel Contact Data – VA | A-34 |
| Table 23: ISCP Personnel Contact Data – [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-35 |
| Table 24: Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel Contact Data | A-35 |
| Table 25: Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel Contact Data – [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-35 |
| Table 26: [Organization 2 name/acronym] Team Key Personnel Contact Data | A-36 |
| Table 27:Call Tree | A-37 |
| Table 28: Call Tree [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-37 |
| Table 29: ISCP Vendor Contact Data | A-38 |
| Table 30: ISCP Vendor Contact Data [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-39 |
| Table 31: Recovery Site Data | A-40 |
| Table 32: Recovery Site Data [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-41 |
| Table 33: Alternate Storage Facility Data | A-42 |
| Table 34: Alternate Storage Facility Data [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-43 |
| Table 35: Detailed Recovery Priority Procedures | A-48 |
| Table 36: Detailed Recovery Priority Procedures [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-48 |
| Table 37: Critical Business Process Mapping / IS Services | A-53 |
| Table 38: Critical Business Process Mapping / IS Services [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-54 |
| Table 39: Service / Business Line Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) | A-54 |
| Table 40: Service / Business Line Maximum Tolerable Downtime (MTD) [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-54 |
| Table 41: IS Service Recovery Time Objective (RTO) | A-54 |
| Table 42: IS Service Recovery Time Objective (RTO) [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-54 |
| Table 43: Service / Business Line MTD / RTO Gap Analysis | A-55 |
| Table 44: Service / Business Line MTD / RTO Gap Analysis [Organization 2 name/acronym] | A-55 |
| Table 45: Acronym List | A-59 |
i OFFICE OF INFORMATION SECURITY Document Change Control Record
| Version |
| Release Date |
| Summary of Changes |
| Author |
| 1.0 |
| 10/30/2018 |
| Converted document to new template. |
| Kristen Hill - VAEC AWS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.1 |
| 11/06/2018 |
| Updated document with AWS information |
| Kristen Hill - VAEC AWS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.2 |
| 11/14/2018 |
| Updated Template |
| Kristen Hill - VAEC AWS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.3 |
| 06/13/2019 |
| Updated Template |
| Kristen Hill - VAEC AWS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.4 |
| 11/08/2019 |
| Updated contact info with VAEC Help Desk info |
| Michael Lucas - VAEC AWS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.5 |
| 06/12/2019 |
| Updated template |
| Larry Do |
| 1.6 |
| 11/08/2019 |
| Updated contact info with VAEC Help Desk info |
| Kristen Hill - VAEC COMS Security Team/Cognosante |
| 1.7 |
| 02/28/2020 |
| Updated Template 2020 |
| Larry Do | CAS Security |
| 1.8 |
| 04/03/2020 |
| Updated for April 2020 Release. |
| Larry Do | CAS Security |
| 1.9 |
| 10/30/2020 |
| Updated for October 2020 Release |
| Larry Do | CAS Security |
| 1.10 |
| 01/10/2021 |
| Updated for Jan 2021 Release. |
| Larry Do | CAS Security |
| 2.0 |
| MM/DD/YYYY |
| ISCP Updated with Organization 2 Information. |
| Organization 2 Author name - [System Acronym] |
Table 1: Document Change Control Record
Provide Organization 2 Author Name and System Acronym in the Document Change Control Record table.
Information System Contingency Plan (ISCP) Approval As the designated authority for [Organization 2 name/acronym] hosted on VA Enterprise Cloud (VAEC) Amazon Web Services (AWS) GovCloud High, I hereby certify that the information system contingency plan (ISCP) is complete and that the information contained in this ISCP provides an accurate representation of the application, it’s hardware, software, and telecommunication components. I further certify that this document identifies the criticality of the system as it relates to the mission of the organization, and that the recovery strategies identified will provide the ability to recover the system functionality in the most expedient and cost-beneficial method in keeping with its level of criticality.
I further attest that this ISCP for AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] will be tested at least annually. This IS Service was last tested on MMMMM DD, YYYY. The test, training and exercise material associated with this plan are found in the VA plan repository. This document will be modified as changes occur and will remain under version control, in accordance with Federal regulations and guidance to include VA Handbook 6500.8 guidance.
Enter your Organizations signatory authorities below (May include but not limited to: Director, SO, ISSO, Manager, and/or PM).
[Organization 2 name/acronym] signatory authorities
<Plan Approver Name> <Job Title>
<Plan Approver Name> <Job Title>
<Plan Approver Name> <Job Title>
<Plan Approver Name> <Job Title>
VAEC Review:
ISCP Distribution Distribution of the ISCP should be restricted to personnel involved in the activities for the continued operations of systems and system owners. Update this table with key personnel required to receive and hold a copy of this plan, as well as plan updates when they are issued.
VAEC:
| Name |
| Title |
| Submitted via eMASS |
| VA AO via eMASS |
| Joseph Stevenson |
| DRP Coordinator |
| Christopher Cardella |
| DRP Coordinator (Alternate) |
| David Catanoso |
| DRP Director |
| Sue Speck |
| DRP Director (Alternate) |
| Christopher Cardella |
| Outage Assessment Team POC |
| Joseph Stevenson |
| Outage Assessment Team POC (Alternate) |
| David Catanoso |
| Business / Service Line POC |
| Sue Speck |
| Business / Service Line POC (Alternate) |
| Joseph Fourcade |
| Cyber Security |
| Albert Estacio |
| Information System Security Officer (ISSO) |
| William McDonough |
| Cloud System Architect |
| AWS COMS |
| ComsRequests@va.gov |
| VAEC Ops Team |
| VAEC-OPS-Team@va.gov |
VAEC-AWS-Ops@va.gov
| VAEC Security |
| VAECSecurityTeam@va.gov |
All Disaster Recovery Activation Teams Cognosante Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Microsoft Azure Government (MAG) Amazon Web Services (AWS) Disaster Recovery Activation Team
Table 2: ISCP Distribution List
ISCP Distribution [Organization 2 name/acronym] Distribution of the ISCP should be restricted to personnel involved in the activities for the continued operations of systems and system owners. Update this table with key personnel required to receive and hold a copy of this plan, as well as plan updates when they are issued.
Enter Organization 2 ISCP Distribution Personnel involved in the activities for the continued operations of systems and system owners in the following table.
| Name |
| Title |
Table 3: ISCP Distribution List [Organization 2 name/acronym]
INTRODUCTION
Information Systems (ISs) are vital to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) business processes; therefore, it is critical that services provided by VAEC Amazon Web Services (AWS) GovCloud High and [Organization 2 name/acronym] operate effectively without excessive interruption. This Information System Contingency Plan (ISCP) establishes comprehensive procedures to recover VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] quickly and effectively following a service disruption.
VA requires a robust IS contingency planning process that includes both ISCPs and disaster recovery plans (DRPs) that are fully compliant with:
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA 2014), December 2014 OMB Circular A-130, Managing Federal Information as a Strategic Resource, July 2016 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Security Presidential Directive 51 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 20, National Continuity Policy, May 2007 DHS, Federal Continuity Directive 1, Federal Executive Branch National Continuity Program and Requirements, January 2017 DHS, National Response Framework, October 2019 DHS, Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP), January 2020 Homeland Security Council, National Continuity Policy Implementation Plan, August 2007 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP) 800-34, Revision 1, Contingency Planning Guide for Information Technology Systems, November 2010 NIST SP 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, January 2015 NIST SP 800-84, Guide to Test, Training, and Exercise Programs for IT Plans and Capabilities, September 2006 VA Handbook 6500.8, Information Technology Contingency Planning, April 2011 OIT Comprehensive Emergency Management Homeland Security Test, Training & Exercise Program Strategy (Draft), January 2010
Background This VAEC AWS ISCP establishes procedures to recover VAEC AWS following a disruption. The following recovery plan objectives have been established:
Maximize the effectiveness of contingency operations through an established plan that consists of the following phases:
Activation and notification phase to activate the plan and determine the extent of damage Recovery phase to restore VAEC AWS operations Reconstitution phase to ensure VAEC AWS is validated through testing and normal operations are resumed Identify the activities, resources and procedures to carry out VAEC AWS processing requirements during prolonged interruptions to normal operations.
Assign responsibilities to designated VAEC AWS GovCloud High personnel and provide guidance for recovering VAEC AWS during prolonged periods of interruption to normal operations. For a complete list of personnel, refer to Appendix A: Personnel Contact Data – VA and Appendix B: Call Tree.
Ensure coordination with other personnel responsible for VAEC AWS GovCloud High contingency planning strategies.
Ensure coordination with external points of contact (POC) and vendors associated with VAEC AWS and execution of this plan. For a list of vendors associated with this ISCP, refer to Appendix C: Personnel Contact Data – Vendors.
Enter Organization 2 Background in the following paragraph, which can be modified at will.
This [Organization 2 name/acronym] ISCP establishes procedures to recover [Organization 2 name/acronym] following a disruption. The following recovery plan objectives have been established:
Maximize the effectiveness of contingency operations through an established plan that consists of the following phases:
Activation and notification phase to activate the plan and determine the extent of damage Recovery phase to restore [Organization 2 name/acronym] operations Reconstitution phase to ensure [Organization 2 name/acronym] is validated through testing and normal operations are resumed Identify the activities, resources and procedures to carry out [Organization 2 name/acronym] processing requirements during prolonged interruptions to normal operations.
Assign responsibilities to designated [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] personnel and provide guidance for recovering [Organization 2 name/acronym] during prolonged periods of interruption to normal operations. For a complete list of personnel, refer to Appendix A: Personnel Contact Data – VA and Appendix B Call Tree.
Ensure coordination with other personnel responsible for [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] contingency planning strategies.
Ensure coordination with external points of contact (POC) and vendors associated with [Organization 2 name/acronym] and execution of this plan. For a list of vendors associated with this ISCP, refer to Appendix C: Personnel Contact Data – Vendors.
Critical Exposure Report of IS Services This ISCP describes contingencies for circumstances, events or acts that could cause harm to VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] by destroying, disclosing, modifying or denying access to VAEC AWS GovCloud High and [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] information resources. It provides flexible and scalable response and recovery strategies to accommodate a variety of disruptions.
The Critical Exposure report, as shown in Table 3a, is the culmination of the Information System Contingency Planning Assessment (ISCPA) process, in that it uses data and values gathered and assigned during the process to produce the IS exposure description for each IS service. This description is calculated by inserting threat, vulnerability and business impact values into the following algorithm: Threat x Vulnerability x Impact = Critical Exposure. Table 3a shows a critical exposure report for the VAEC AWS IS Service.
| Threat |
| Threat Value |
| Vulnerability |
| Vulnerability Rating |
| Impact Value |
| Exposure Value |
| Hacker, Cracker |
| High |
| Use of a computer system without proper authorization with the intent to cause harm or theft |
| High |
| High |
| High |
| Malicious Code |
| High |
| Malicious computer software that interferes with normal computer functions |
| High |
| High |
| High |
| Password Privacy Negligence |
| Moderate |
| Users, systems, or software not following VA standards for password privacy |
| Moderate |
| Moderate |
| Low |
| Personnel Unavailable |
| Moderate |
| Actions that cause staff to be unavailable to work |
| Moderate |
| High |
| Low |
| Sabotage |
| High |
| Purposeful acts by non-VA staff to destroy VA facilities or capabilities |
| Moderate |
| High |
| Low |
System Intrusion, Break-Ins
| High |
| Unauthorized access |
to the system by an intruder
| Moderate |
| Moderate |
| Low |
| System Misconfiguration |
| High |
| System hardware, software, or parameters not configured properly |
| High |
| High |
| Moderate |
| System Penetration |
| High |
| Actions by software to gain unauthorized access to a system |
| High |
| High |
| High |
| System Tampering |
| High |
| Malicious actions to modify the normal configuration of a system |
| High |
| High |
| Moderate |
| User Negligence |
| Moderate |
| Unintentional acts by authorized VA system users that cause harm to the VA |
| Moderate |
| High |
| Low |
| User Sabotage |
| Moderate |
| Intentional acts by VA authorized users of VA systems to destroy VA facilities or capabilities |
| Moderate |
| High |
| Low |
Table 4: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service VAEC AWS
Enter Organization 2 Critical Exposure Report for IS Service in the following table.
| Threat |
| Threat Value |
| Vulnerability |
| Vulnerability Rating |
| Impact Value |
| Exposure Value |
Table 5: Critical Exposure Report for IS Service [Organization 2 name/acronym]
GRC Boundary Alignment Based on guidance from the Office of Cyber Security (OCS), this ISCP is aligned with the following GRC boundary(ies): AWS GovCloud and [Organization 2 name/acronym] [GRC Boundary Alignment].
Scope This ISCP has been developed for VAEC AWS, a High-impact system and [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization], in accordance with FIPS 199, and designed for an instantaneous failover of VAEC AWS [Organization 2 name/acronym] within RTO at both the primary and alternate sites. This plan does not address replacement or purchase of new equipment, short-term disruptions and loss of data at the onsite facility or at the user-desktop levels.
With respect to facilities that are supported by a parent facility’s single IT Management staff and located on the same campus or within a reasonable distance from one another, the AWS Availability Zone 2 VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] ISCP may be utilized for all parent / child facility relationships. The following verifications of the relationship will be required: 1) the existence of an artifact demonstrating that the IT administration groups identified provide support across all parent / child facilities, and 2) an artifact demonstrating all administrators have logged into the facilities’ machines.
This ISCP addresses contingency planning (CP) controls contained within the family of contingency planning controls from NIST SP 800-34, Rev 1 and NIST SP 800-53, Rev 4. The controls for NIST 800-53, Rev 4 are matched with the sections of this plan, as shown in Table 4a, providing a means of reference for documenting required elements within the control for systems with high critical exposures.
| Contingency Planning Controls |
| Relevant Section of ISCP |
| CP-1 Policy & Procedures |
| Section 1, Section 1.1, Section 1.3, Section 3.1, Section 4.2 |
| CP-2 Contingency Plan |
| ISCP Approval, ISCP Distribution, Section 2.1.2, Section 2.3, Section 4.1, Section 7.3, Appendix A, Appendix B, Appendix C, Appendix D, Appendix F, Appendix H, Appendix J, Appendix N |
| CP-3 Contingency Training |
| ISCP Approval, Section 6 |
| CP-4 Testing & Exercises |
| Plan Approval, Section 6, Appendix D |
| CP-6 Alternate Storage Site |
| Section 1.4, Section 5.6, Section 5.7, Appendix E, Appendix I |
| CP-7 Alternate Processing Site |
| Section 1.4, Section 5.7, Appendix D |
| CP-8 Alternate Telecomm Services |
| Appendix H |
| CP-9 System Backup |
| Section 1.4, Section 2.1.1, Section 4.1, Section 5.7, Section 6, Appendix E, Appendix I |
| CP-10 Recovery and Reconstitution |
| Section 4, Section 5, Appendix J, Appendix K, Appendix L, Appendix M |
| CP-11 Alternate Communications Protocols |
| Not Applicable |
| CP-12 Safe Mode |
| Not Applicable |
| CP-13 Alternate Security Mechanisms |
| Not Applicable |
Table 6: Contingency Planning Controls Addressed in this ISCP
Enter Organization 2 Contingency Planning Controls Addressed in this ISCP in the following table.
| Contingency Planning Controls |
| Relevant Section of ISCP |
Table 7: Contingency Planning Controls Addressed in this ISCP [Organization 2 name/acronym]
Assumptions The following assumptions were used when developing this ISCP:
VAEC AWS has been established as a High impact system, in accordance with FIPS 199.
Business Impact Analysis results developed for this plan have been incorporated in the development strategy of other organizational plans including, but not limited to, COOP, BCPs and DRP.
Information System Owners have worked in coordination with service/business lines to identify essential mission, service and business functions.
Recovery sites and offsite storage are required for High and Moderate systems, optional for Low systems, and have been established for this system as described in Appendix D and Appendix E.
Alternate processing procedures have been established by business / service lines. Alternate processing procedures are manual procedures that can be initiated in lieu of the application to maintain business operations during an outage.
Current backups of the system software and data are intact and available at the offsite storage facility or facilities.
AWS GovCloud High is inoperable and cannot be recovered within the RTO required to operate normally.
The IS Service component restoration priorities have been established.
Key VAEC AWS GovCloud High personnel have been identified and trained in their emergency response and recovery roles; they are available to activate the VAEC AWS ISCP.
This plan does not apply to the situations described below (inherited from AWS FedRAMP Package [F1603047866]):
Emergency evacuation of personnel addressed by the occupant evacuation plan.
Overall recovery of business operations. Business / service line owners should address recovery of business operations in a separate business recovery plan.
Enter Organization 2 Assumptions (made while developing this ISCP).
Threats and Vulnerabilities The data gathered through the Information System Contingency Planning Assessment (ISCPA) process is used in the completion of a Business Impact Analysis (BIA), a Vulnerability assessment and a Threat assessment. The results of the Threat and Vulnerability assessments for VAEC AWS GovCloud High and [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] are shown in Tables 5a and 6a.
| IS Threat | Likelihood | Capacity | Threat Rating |
| Unpatched operating systems create a potential threat to the system | Low | Low | Low |
| Network misconfigurations create a potential threat to the system | Low | Low | Low |
Table 8: VAEC AWS GovCloud High IS Threat Assessment
Enter Organization 2 Threat Assessments Results in the following table.
IS Threat Likelihood Capacity Threat Rating
Table 9: [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] IS Threat Assessment
| IS Threat | Vulnerability | Exploit Potential | Mitigation Effectiveness | Mitigation Strength |
| System Administration | Unpatched operating systems create a potential threat to the system | Operating Systems Required Patch Service Updates | Low | High |
| System Administration | Network misconfigurations create a potential threat to the system | Network daemons not managed by the package system | Low | High |
Table 10: VAEC AWS GovCloud High IS Vulnerability Assessment
Enter Organization 2 Vulnerability Assessments Results in the following table.
IS Threat Vulnerability Exploit Potential Mitigation Effectiveness Mitigation Strength
Table 11: [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization] IS Vulnerability Assessment i OFFICE OF INFORMATION SECURITY
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS
The Concept of Operations section provides details about VAEC AWS, an overview of the three phases of the ISCP (Activation and Notification, Recovery and Reconstitution) and a description of the roles and responsibilities for VAEC AWS GovCloud High personnel during a contingency activation.
VAEC System Description The VA Enterprise Cloud AWS GovCloud High (VAEC AWS) is a General Support System that provides a secure application and hosting environment for VA applications, content and utilities that are used to deliver content and applications to an audience made up of employees, veterans, contractors and partners across all VA medical centers and component facilities and the Federal government, veterans and the general public. Content and applications are provided by Veterans Benefits Administration (VBA), Veterans Health Administration (VHA), National Cemetery Administration (NCA) and Support Offices. VAEC AWS provides the following services: Content delivery, Application Hosting and Management Services. The VAEC AWS infrastructure is hosted by AWS GovCloud, a cloud service provider. The AWS GovCloud platform is used to provide a variety of hosting environments to suit a variety of needs. AWS GovCloud can support applications categorized up to High as rated in accordance with Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS)199. VA applications available to the public are hosted in AWS GovCloud. A dedicated private data link (AWS Direct Connect) provides all connectivity for VA resources communicating to the environment. Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs) wrap the applications within AWS GovCloud to encapsulate network access. Access from the applications to VA internal resources such as Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM) and Active Directory (AD) Services are conducted over the encrypted private data link to the VA Network. VAEC AWS is located in region(s) with multiple Availability Zones designed to allow U.S. government agencies, contractors and customers to move sensitive workloads into the cloud for addressing specific regulatory and compliance requirements. AWS GovCloud does not manage logical access controls within the VAEC AWS system boundary. VAEC AWS offers the same level of security as other VA physical technology centers and supports existing VA security controls and certification requirements such as FISMA, Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH), Statement on Auditing Standards (SAS-70), International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 27001, FIPS 140- 2 compliant end points, and PCI DSS.
Enter Organization 2 System Description in the following.
[Organization 2 name/acronym] System Description
System Architecture VAEC-AWS Diagram LINK
Figure 1: System Architecture Diagram
Enter Organization 2 System Architecture Diagram in the following.
Figure 2: [Organization 2 name/acronym] System Architecture Diagram
Network Traffic Flow
Figure 3: Network Traffic Flow Diagram
Enter Organization 2 Network Traffic Flow Diagram in the following.
Figure 4: [Organization 2 name/acronym] Network Traffic Flow Diagram
System Operating Environment The VAEC AWS is a cloud-based system hosted in AWS GovCloud High. The system is segregated into Virtual Private Clouds (VPCs). These are: 1 for the Core Services applications provided by VAEC AWS to the customers (host applications), 1 for hosted systems categorized as High, and 1 for hosted system categorized as Moderate or Low. These are further divided to provide segregations for various environments such as Development, Production and Security.
Enter Organization 2 System Operating Environment.
The [Organization 2 name/acronym] is…
Physical Locations The VAEC AWS is in the AWS GovCloud region(s) with multiple Availability Zones.
Enter Organization 2 Physical Location.
The [Organization 2 name/acronym] is…
General Location of Users The internal VA and veterans.
Enter Organization 2 General Location of Users.
The [Organization 2 name/acronym]…
Partnerships with External Organizations / Systems None.
Enter Organization 2 Partnerships with External Organizations / System.
Special Technical Considerations Important for Recovery Purposes None.
Enter Organization 2 Special Technical Considerations Important for Recovery Purposes.
IS System Inventory of Components
| Application |
| Type |
| Data Storage |
| Name |
| Model |
| RPO (where applicable) |
| RTO |
Tivoli BigFix
Table 12: IS System Components
Enter Organization 2 IS System Inventory of Components in the following table.
| Application |
| Type |
| Data Storage |
| Name |
| Model |
| RPO (where applicable) |
| RTO |
Table 13: IS System Components [Organization 2 name/acronym]
Associated Plans and System Interconnections ISCP or Other (Full Name) Version # Location (URL if Web-Based) POC Title
VA CSOC
VA AD Service
Table 14: Associated Plans *Refer to Appendix A for POC contact information.
Enter Organization 2 Associated Plans in the following table.
ISCP or Other (Full Name) Version # Location (URL if Web-Based) POC Title
Table 15: Associated Plans [Organization 2 name/acronym] *Refer to Appendix A for POC contact information
Information System Information Transferred or Support Provided POC Title POC’s Organization
VA CSOC
VA AD Service
Table 16: Information Systems That Connect with IS System name *Refer to Appendix A for POC contact information.
Enter Organization 2 Information Systems That Connect with IS System name.
Information System Information Transferred or Support Provided POC Title POC’s Organization
Table 17: Information Systems That Connect with IS System name [Organization 2 name/acronym] *Refer to Appendix A for POC contact information.
Overview of ISCP Phases This ISCP has been developed to recover VAEC AWS using a three-phased approach. This approach ensures system recovery efforts are performed in a methodical sequence to maximize the effectiveness of the recovery effort and minimize system outage time due to errors and omissions.
The three ISCP phases are:
1. Activation and Notification Phase – Activation of the ISCP occurs after a disruption or outage that may reasonably extend beyond the RTO established for a system. Once the ISCP is activated, system owners and users are notified of an outage and a thorough outage assessment is performed for the system. Information from the outage assessment is presented to system owners and may be used to modify recovery procedures specific to the cause of the outage.
2. Recovery Phase – The recovery phase details the activities and procedures for recovery of the affected system. Activities and procedures are written at a level that an appropriately skilled technician can recover the system without intimate system knowledge. This phase includes notification and awareness escalation procedures for communication of recovery status to system owners and users.
3. Reconstitution Phase – The reconstitution phase defines the actions taken to test and validate system capability and functionality. This phase consists of two major activities: validating successful recovery and deactivating the plan. During validation, the system is tested and validated as operational prior to returning operation to its normal state. Validation procedures may include functionality or regression testing, concurrent processing and /or data validation. The system is declared recovered and operational by system owners upon successful completion of validation testing. Deactivation includes activities to notify users of system operational status. This phase also addresses recovery effort documentation, activity log finalization, incorporation of lessons learned into plan updates, and readying resources for any future recovery events.
Provide Organization 2 Overview of ISCP Phases.
Roles and Responsibilities The following table includes responsibilities that describe each role and identifies the individual or team responsible for executing or supporting system recovery.
| ISCP Role |
| Job Title |
| Responsibilities |
| ISCP Director |
| Director, Business Continuity Management |
| · Overall responsibility for the development, execution, and maintenance of the ISCP |
· Ensures the ISCP is developed with the cooperation of managers associated with the business processes supported by the system
· Confirms expected duration of the system disruption with the ISCP Coordinator based on the outage assessment
· Declares activation of the ISCP
· Determines if interim / secondary processing procedures activities should be initiated to maintain current business operations or if operations should be suspended until the system has been recovered
· Contacts organization officials if the situation needs to be escalated
· Responsible for the testing, maintenance and distribution of the ISCP, which may be delegated to other personnel
· Authorizes all changes to the ISCP
| ISCP Director (Alternate) |
| Business Continuity IT Specialist |
| · Same responsibilities as ISCP director |
· Activated when the ISCP director is unavailable
| ISCP Coordinator |
| Business Continuity Program Manager |
| · Monitors Recovery Team activities until the system is fully recovered |
· Ensures recovery operations are being performed consistent with service level agreements / service level requirements
· Provides periodic status updates to the ISCP director
· Files an after-action report (AAR) upon resumption of normal operations
· Assists the ISCP director in testing, maintenance and distribution of the ISCP
| ISCP Coordinator (Alternate) |
| Business Continuity Program Manager |
| · Same responsibilities as ISCP coordinator |
· Activated when the ISCP coordinator is unavailable
| Business / Service Line POC |
| Manager, Cloud |
Infrastructure
· Represents the recovery and restoration interests of the affected business / service line
| Outage Assessment Team |
| Manager, Cloud Infrastructure |
| · Assesses the extent of damage to the facilities and the information systems |
· Estimates the time to recover operations
· Determines accessibility to facility, building, offices and work areas
· Identifies salvageable hardware
· Maintains a log / record of all salvageable equipment
· Supports the cleanup of the data center following an incident
· Develops and maintains a damage assessment plan
· Estimates levels of outside assistance required
· Reports updates, status and recommendations to the ISCP coordinator
| VAEC AWS COMS Team |
| VAEC-AWS-Ops@va.gov |
| · Determines the expected duration of the failover to the alternate site |
· Prioritizes the sequence of resource recovery
· Performs all system recovery and resumption activities
· Powers on / off systems
· Restoring from back up instances in AWS
· Configures systems
· Ensures voice and data communications are functioning: activate pagers, sat phones, etc.
· Provides IP numbers and network routing information
· Includes validation testing teams or personnel
Table 18: AWS GovCloud ISCP Roles and Responsibilities (Primary and Alternate)
Enter your organization Roles and Responsibilities in the following table.
| ISCP Role |
| Job Title |
| Responsibilities |
Table 19: [Organization 2 name/acronym] ISCP Roles and Responsibilities (Primary and Alternate)
ACTIVATION AND NOTIFICATION
The activation and notification phase define initial actions taken once a VAEC AWS disruption has been detected or appears to be imminent. This phase includes activities to notify recovery personnel, conduct an outage assessment, and activate the ISCP. At the completion of the activation and notification phase, VAEC AWS ISCP staff will be prepared to perform recovery measures to restore system functions.
Enter Organization 2 Activation and Notification Phase.
Activation Criteria and Procedures The VAEC AWS ISCP may be activated when one or more of the following criteria are met:
The type of outage indicates VAEC AWS will be down for more than RTO.
The ISCP Director determines that VAEC AWS can be recovered on the primary site.
Additionally, the decision to activate the VAEC AWS ISCP may require the ISCP Director to consult with the facility leadership.
Enter Organization 2 Activation Criteria and Procedure.
The [Organization 2 name/acronym]…
Notification Procedures The first step upon activation of the VAEC AWS ISCP is notification of appropriate business and system support personnel.
Notification procedures may include:
Identification of who makes the initial notifications The sequence in which personnel are notified (e.g., ISCP coordinator, business / service line POC, outage assessment team POC and recovery team POC) The method of internal and external notifications (e.g., email, mobile phone, automated notification system; etc.)
What to do if any single person in the notification sequence cannot be reached Alert / notification messages Open a VAEC ServiceDesk ticket by using the following link: https://vaec-servicedesk.ec.va.gov/servicedesk/customer/portal/ or phone: 1-855-255-1854 Contact NDC 24/7 Support Line: 1-304-260-6687 (if necessary)
Enter Organization 2 Notification Procedures in the following.
VAEC Service Desk Instructions For a full list of all ISCP specific key personnel and contact information, refer to Appendix A.
For a list identifying leadership, recovery personnel and any facility POCs that are to be alerted of the ISCP activation, refer to Appendix A.
Call trees are an effective means of conveying the communication sequence in which leadership, recovery personnel and facility POCs should be alerted. Refer to Appendix B.
Outage Assessment Following notification, a thorough outage assessment is necessary to determine the extent of the disruption, any damage, potential for further disruption or system damage and an expected recovery time of VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym].
The outage assessment team conducts this outage assessment. Assessment results are provided to the ISCP coordinator to assist in the coordination of the recovery of VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym]. The outage assessment process is located in Appendix G.
RECOVERY
The recovery phase provides formal recovery operations that begin after the ISCP has been activated, outage assessments have been completed (if possible), personnel have been notified and appropriate teams have been mobilized. Recovery phase activities focus on implementing recovery strategies to restore system capabilities through the restoration of IS components, repair of damage and resumption of operational capabilities at the original or new permanent location. At the completion of the recovery phase, VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] will be functional and capable of performing the functions identified in the plan.
Note: If the original facility is declared unusable, refer to the VAEC AWS GovCloud High DRP for guidance on recovering data and system operations at the alternate site.
Sequence of Recovery Activities The following high-level activities occur during the VAEC AWS recovery phase:
1. Identify recovery location (if not at original location) Identify all required resources to perform recovery procedures Retrieve backup and system installation media Recover hardware and operating system (OS) (if required) Recover system from backup and system installation media (refer to Appendix I) Recover system from detailed recovery procedures (refer to Appendix J) Perform validation and functional system tests (refer to Appendix K)
Enter Organization 2 Sequence of Recovery Activities.
Escalation Notices / Awareness Notifications include problem escalation to leadership and status awareness to system owners and users. Call Trees are an effective means of conveying the communication sequence in which leadership, recovery personnel and facility POC should be alerted.
RECONSTITUTION
Reconstitution is the process by which a recovered system is tested to validate system capability and functionality. During reconstitution, recovery activities are completed, and normal system operations are resumed. If the original facility is unrecoverable, the activities in this phase can also be applied to preparing a new permanent location to support system processing requirements. This phase consists of two major activities: validating successful recovery and deactivation of the plan.
Concurrent Processing If concurrent processing occurs for the system prior to making it operational, see Appendix L for the appropriate procedures.
Data Validation and Functionality Testing Data validation and functionality testing is the process of testing and validating recovered data, data files or databases and functionality after the IS Service has been completely recovered, before granting user access. See Appendix K for the data validation and functionality testing procedures.
Reconstitution Declaration Upon successfully completing testing and validation, the ISCP Director will formally declare recovery efforts complete. Facility leadership, business / service line and technical POCs will be notified of the declaration by the ISCP Director.
Notifications (Users) Upon return to normal system operations, VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] users will be notified by the ISCP director or designee using predetermined notification procedures (e.g., VA-PAS, email, broadcast message, phone calls; etc.).
Cleanup Cleanup is the process of restocking supplies used, returning manuals or other documentation to their original locations, and readying the system for a possible future contingency event. See Appendix M for the cleanup procedures.
Data Backup As soon as reasonable following recovery, the system should be fully backed up and a new copy of the current operational system stored for future recovery efforts. This full backup is then kept with other system backups. See Appendix I for detailed backup procedures.
Event Documentation It is important that all recovery events be well documented. It is the responsibility of each recovery team or person to document their actions during the recovery effort, and to provide that documentation to the ISCP Coordinator. Alternatively, one of the recovery teams may be appointed the task of tracking the events. Event documentation should include:
· Activity logs (including recovery steps performed and by whom, the time the steps were initiated and completed, and any problems or concerns encountered while executing activities)
· Functionality and data testing results
· Lessons learned documentation
· After Action Report (AAR) Deactivation Once all activities have been completed and documentation has been updated, the ISCP Director will formally deactivate the ISCP recovery efforts. Notification of this declaration will be provided to all business and technical POCs.
TEST, TRAINING AND EXERCISE (TT&E)
All ISCPs should be reviewed and tested at least yearly or whenever there is a significant change to the system.
· For low-impact systems, a yearly tabletop exercise is sufficient. The tabletop exercise should include all ISCP POCs and be conducted by an outside or impartial observer.
· For moderate-impact systems, a yearly functional test is required. The functional test should include all ISCP POCs and be facilitated by an outside or impartial observer.
· For high-impact systems, a yearly full functional test is required.
The full functional test should include all ISCP POC and be facilitated by an outside or impartial observer. A formal test plan is developed prior to the tabletop or functional test and exercise. Tabletop questions or functional test procedures are developed to include key sections of the ISCP, including a walk-through of the following:
· Notification procedures
· System recovery on an alternate platform from backup media
· Internal and external connectivity
· Reconstitution procedures
Results of the test are documented in an after-action report, and Lessons Learned are developed for updating information in the ISCP.
Persons or teams with assigned ISCP roles must be trained to respond to a contingency event affecting the VAEC AWS and [Organization 2 name/acronym] efficiently and correctly. VA OIT has developed a test, training and exercise (TT&E) program compliant with the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) and supports the following objectives:
Ensure VAEC AWS’s and [Organization 2 name/acronym]’s personnel are familiar with the ISCP and its associated activation, recovery and reconstitution procedures Validate ISCP policies and procedures Exercise procedures through the use of tabletop and functional exercises, as appropriate Ensure hardware, software, backup data and records required to support recovery are available
NOTE: Full functional tests of systems normally are failover tests to the alternate locations, and may be very disruptive to system operations if not planned well. Other systems located in the same physical location may be affected by or included in the full functional test. It is highly recommended that several functional tests be conducted and evaluated prior to conducting a full functional (failover) test.
| Activities | Tests | Training |
| Frequency |
| DHS test reporting of the formal reporting processes of test results as directed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). This report is prepared by the Office of Operations, Security and Preparedness (OSP) with input from the Administrations and Staff Offices to include OIT. |
| Annually |
| Alert, Notification and Activation Procedures Testing for mission critical/emergency personnel. |
| Annually |
| Continuity Facility Logistics Testing and exercising of required physical security capabilities at the identified continuity facility(s). |
| Annually |
| Continuity communications testing of communications equipment (both secure and non-secure) to ensure the internal and external interoperability and viability of continuity communications systems and capabilities. |
| Annually |
| Test ISCP communications. |
| Annually |
| Test recovery of vital classified and unclassified records, critical information systems, services, and data. |
| Annually |
| Test ISCP notification/activation procedures. |
| Annually |
| Internal and External Interdependency Testing of internal and external interdependencies identified in the OI&T CEMP plans, with respect to performance of, and other agencies’ MEFs. |
| Annually |
| Test primary and backup infrastructure systems and services at alternate operating facilities, (e.g., power, water, fuel). |
| Annually |
| Documenting and reporting testing of the internal processes for formally documenting and reporting tests and their results. |
| Annually |
| CEMP Awareness/Orientation training: a high-level overview presentation of CEMP concepts for all OIT staff (both mission critical/emergency personnel and non-mission critical/emergency personnel, to include contractors). |
| Annually |
Table 20: VAEC AWS TT&E Calendar
Enter Organization 2 Test, Training and Exercise Calendar in the following table.
| Activities | Tests | Training |
| Frequency |
Table 21: [Organization 2 name/acronym] TT&E Calendar
DOCUMENT MANAGEMENT
Document Ownership The contents of this document are the responsibility of VAEC AWS GovCloud High and [Organization 2 name/acronym] [Security Categorization], which has assigned the ISCP director with responsibility for its content, modifications, currency, distribution to stakeholders and its presence in the VA plan repository.
Plan Review and Maintenance To ensure currency, this document will be reviewed annually in conjunction with the annual test / exercise and if system modifications occur.
Document Distribution A copy of this ISCP will be:
Provided to system stakeholders who have an interest or responsibility for the development or testing of this plan Held electronically or in hard copy or both by every member of the Outage Assessment and Recovery Teams where it is easily accessible in an emergency Entered in the VA plan repository Stored in an off-site location in both soft and hard copy format for ease of use under a wide range of circumstances
: Personnel Contact Data - VA
| Key Personnel |
| Contact Information |
| ISCP Director |
| Work #: 732-440-9583 |
| Name: David Catanoso |
| VA Cellular #: 732-440-9583 |
| Title: Director, Enterprise Cloud Solutions Office (ECSO) |
| VA E-mail: david.catanoso@va.gov |
| Alternate ISCP Director |
| Work #: 801-588-5013 |
| Name: Sue Speck |
| VA Cellular #: 801-209-4839 |
| Title: Deputy Director, Enterprise Cloud Solutions Office (ECSO) |
| VA E-mail: sue.speck@va.gov |
| ISCP Coordinator |
| Work #: 202-461-0447 |
| Name: Joseph Stevenson |
| VA Cellular #: NO PHONE NUMBER LISTED |
| Title: VAEC Implementation Team Leader |
| VA E-mail: Joseph.Stevenson@va.gov |
| Alternate ISCP Coordinator |
| Work #: TBD |
| Name: TBD |
| VA Cellular #: TBD |
| Title: AWS Program Manager Lead |
| VA E-mail: TBD |
| Outage Assessment Team POC |
| Work #: 512-326-6180 |
| Name: Christopher Cardella |
| VA Cellular #: 512-590-9414 |
| Title: Manager, Cloud Infrastructure |
| VA E-mail: Christopher.Cardella@va.gov |
Table 22: ISCP Personnel Contact Data – VA
Enter Organization 2 Personnel Contact Data in the following table.
| Key Personnel |
| Contact Information |
| ISCP Director |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| VA E-mail: |
| Alternate ISCP Director |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| VA E-mail: |
| ISCP Coordinator |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| VA E-mail: |
| Alternate ISCP Coordinator |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| VA E-mail: |
| Outage Assessment Team POC |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| VA E-mail: |
Table 23: ISCP Personnel Contact Data – [Organization 2 name/acronym]
Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel
| Key Personnel |
| Contact Information |
| Team Lead |
| Work #: (512) 326-6180 |
| Name: Christopher Cardella |
| VA Cellular #: (512) 590-9414 |
| Title: Manager, Cloud Infrastructure |
| E-mail: Christopher.Cardella@va.gov |
| Team Member |
| Work #: (512)-981-4792 |
| Name: LaDonn Wittenburg |
| VA Cellular #: 512-364-3517 |
| Title: IT Specialist, Core Systems Engineering |
| E-mail: LaDonn.Wittenburg@va.gov |
Table 24: Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel Contact Data
Enter Organization 2 Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel in the following table.
| Key Personnel |
| Contact Information |
| Team Lead |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: |
| E-mail: |
| Team Member |
| Work #: |
| Name: |
| VA Cellular #: |
| Title: IT Specialist, Core Systems Engineering |
| E-mail: |
Table 25: Outage Assessment Team Key Personnel Contact Data – [Organization 2 name/acronym]
Enter Organization 2 Team Key Personnel Contact Data in the following table.
| Key Personnel |
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