ACP DB II SOW .pdf

ACP - Division 01 Specifications ACP181031

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STATEMENT OF WORK

11/18

PART 1 GENERAL

1.1 PROJECT OBJECTIVES

1.1.1 Project Description

This contract is intended to provide a mechanism for Access Control Point repair, renovation, conversion, alteration, additions, construction, equipment procurement/installation, and maintenance services on installed equipment/systems at Government installations and facilities. The contractor may be required to survey the problem areas, evaluate and recommend solutions, develop and implement work plans/designs in a timely manner within negotiated costs.

Additional project specific features, concept design, requirements and criterai will be included in each of the Task Order contracts.

1.1.2 Location

This contract may apply to various Department of Defense (DOD) installations and facilities world-wide, the National Guard, and, pursuant to applicable authorities for interagency and intergovernmental support, to federal agencies, state and local governments on a case specific basis.

Task orders may be awarded for work world-wide for the following Government agencies: Department of Defense, Department of Homeland Security, Veteran's Administration, State Department, Department of Interior, Department of Energy, Department of Transportation, and state and local governments.

1.1.3 Consistency With State And Local Requirements

The project objective is to design and construct facilities for the military that are consistent with the design and construction practices used for civilian sector projects that perform similar functions to the military projects.

Comparison of Military Facilities to Civilian Facilities

Military Facility Civilian Facility

Access Control Point (ACP) Security Checkpoint

1.1.4 Sustainability

It is the Army's objective that these facilities, buildings, and functions will have a 50 year useful life. The design and construction shall provide an appropriate level of quality to ensure the continued use of the facility over that time period with the application of reasonable preventive maintenance and repairs that would be industry-acceptable to a major civilian sector project Owner. The facility design shall consider that the Army may repurpose the use of the facility over the 50-year

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DRAFT

life. The Army's intent is to install products and materials of good quality that meet industry standard average life that corresponds with the period of performance expected before a major renovation or repurpose.

The design shall be flexible and adaptable to possible future uses different than the current to the extent practical while still meeting the operational and functional requirements defined within. Flexibility is achieved through design of more flexible structural load-bearing wall and column system arrangements. The site infrastructure will have at least a 50-year life expectancy with industry-accepted maintenance and repair cycles. Develop the project site for efficiency and to convey a sense of unity or connectivity with the adjacent facilities and buildings and with the Installation as a whole.

1.1.5 Innovation

Requirements stated in this contract are minimums. Innovative, creative, and life cycle cost effective solutions, which meet or exceed these requirements are encouraged. Further, the Offeror is encouraged to seek solutions that will expedite construction (panelization, pre-engineered, etc.) and shorten the schedule where allowed in this documents. The intent of the Government is to emphasize the placement of funds into functional/operational requirements. Materials and methods shall reflect this by choosing the most economical (life cycle) Type of Construction allowed by code for this occupancy/project allowing the funding to be reflected in the quality of interior/exterior finishes and systems selected.

1.2 SECTION ORGANIZATION

This Section is organized under 6 major Parts.

a. PART 1 GENERAL is intended to define the project objectives and to provide a comparison between the military facilities, buildings, and functions and comparable "civilian" type facilities, buildings and functions.

b. PART 2 INTRODUCTION describes in more detail the overall project objectives by describing the components that make up an ACP and how they function. Specific criteria and requirements are not included.

c. PART 3 SCOPE describes the overall scope for the design and construction of a full ACP project. Each Task Order will include work elements that will either include a full ACP project (construction of a new Gate with a full ACP to include a Visitor Control Center) or portions of an ACP (replacement of an Active Vehicle Barrier).

d. PART 4 ACCESS CONROL POINTS provides the functional, operational and facility specific design criteria for the specific facility type(s) included in this contract or task order.

e. PART 5 APPLICABLE CRITERIA lists applicable industry and government design criteria, generally applicable to all facility types, unless otherwise indicated in the Section. It is not intended to be all-inclusive. Other industry and government standards may also be used, where necessary to produce professional designs, unless they conflict with those listed.

g. PART 6 APPENDICES contains the enclosures and attachments identified in this Section.

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PART 2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS

This Statement of Work (SOW) is intended to be in compliance with the Army Access Control Points (ACPs) Standard Design, Various Location (CONUS and OCONUS), dated October 2018, and avaiable at the Army Center of Standardization for Access Control Points. This October 2018 Army ACPs Standard Designd Design supersedes all previous versions for this facility type. Additional requirements are included in this SOW so that the overriding requirements included in UFC 4-022-01 SECURITY ENGINEERING:

ENTRY CONTROL FACILITIES / ACCESS CONTROL POINTS are met. These requriements shall be used for construction of all new ACP projects and renovations to existing ACP projects. It is intended for use anywhere in the continental United States (CONUS) or overseas locations (OCONUS). The design procedures and drawings included in this Standard Design provide flexibility to Army ACP designers in meeting the Army's baseline physical security requirements and the full range of Force Protection Conditions on Army Installations. This Standard Design meets the Army Standard (AS) for Access Control Points (ACPs) approved by the Army Facilities Standardization Committee. It also meets Architectural and Engineering design criteria established by the Headquarters U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (HQUSACE). The local Center of Standardization (COS) must approve all changes, deviations, or waivers to the Standard Design.

2.2 ACP DEFINITION

An Access Control Point (herein referred to as ACP) is a corridor at an Installation cantonment perimeter through which all vehicles and/or pedestrians must pass when entering or exiting the Installation cantonment area. An ACP provides the first physical security boundary layer that restricts access to Department of Army (DA) Installation cantonment areas. ACP guards control the active barriers to deny or permit entry on to the Installation.

2.3 ACP CLASSIFICATIONS

DA ACP classifications are: (a) Primary, (b) Secondary, (c) Limited Use, and (d) Pedestrian. Primary and Secondary ACPs can accommodate privately owned vehicles (POVs), commercial vehicles (trucks), pedestrians, bicycles or any combination thereof. Primary and Secondary ACPs provide the means to defeat a vehicular and/or pedestrian threat via permanent measures defined in the Army Standard (AS) for Access Control Points (ACPs) dated 13 April 2012. Limited Use ACPs provide means to defeat vehicular and/or pedestrian threats via temporary or permanent measures. Limited Use ACPs do not have routine hours of operation. A Pedestrian ACP may be part of an ACP that accommodates vehicles or it may stand alone.

For definitions of Installation, Primary ACP, Secondary ACP, Limited Use ACP, Approach Zone, Access Control Zone, Response Zone, and other definitions, see Army Standard (AS) for Access Control Points (ACPs) dated 13 April 2012.

2.4 ACP FUNCTIONS

2.4.1 Site Functions

ACP site functions include, but are not limited to, Approach Zone, Access

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Control Zone, Response Zone, Passive Vehicle Barriers, Active Vehicle Barriers, Command and Control, ID Check Area, Overwatch, Canopies, Turn Arounds, Search Areas, Lighting, and CCTV.

2.4.2 Building Functional Areas

Visitor Control Center (VCC), Guard Booths (ID Check and Pedestrian ID Check), Search Area Building, Command and Control, Mechanical/Electrical, Communications, Security, Gatehouse, Latrine, Storage, and Overwatch are some building function components of the ACP. This SOW includes some of the function combinations that are deemed acceptable. Combinations of functional areas not included as Standard Designs may be possible but will require COS review and approval, with Standard Design exception. The only functions that cannot be combined with other functions is the Vehicle ID Check and Vehicle ID Check Guard Booths.

2.5 ACP WAIVERS

See Army Standard (AS) for Access Control Points (ACPs) dated 13 April 2012. Army Standard exception and waiver process is identified in AR 420-1.

Waivers to the Army ACP Standard Design must require a COS position statement and approved by HQ USACE.

2.6 MANDATORY CRITERIA

See Army Standard (AS) for Access Control Points (ACPs) dated 13 April 2012 for mandatory criteria for Primary and Secondary ACPs, Limited Use ACPs, and Pedestrian ID Check.

2.7 DEFEAT OF VEHICLE THREAT SCENARIOS

2.7.1 Office Of Provost Marshal General (OPMG) Vehicle Threat Scenarios

ACPs shall be designed to defeat the following four minimum vehicle threat scenarios. Additional vehicle threat scenarios shall be included if required by a local threat assessment.

2.7.1.1 Vehicle Threat Scenario #1

Threat vehicle enters the ACP in the inbound or outbound lane(s) at the maximum speed attainable at the ACP entrance and then immediately accelerates at its maximum acceleration rate through the ACP.

a. Threat vehicle characteristics shall be as defined below (includes, but is not limited to: top speed, acceleration, etc.)

2.7.1.2 Vehicle Threat Scenario #2

Threat vehicle enters the ACP in the inbound or outbound lane(s) at or under the posted ACP Speed Limit and then, later at some point further in the Approach Zone, accelerates at its maximum acceleration rate through the remainder of the ACP.

Note that 'some point' shall be interpreted as being the worst case threat delay time from point of detection to Active Vehicle Barrier (AVB) location(s) in the response zone. If multiple zones of overspeed detection are utilized the analysis will include the worst case

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 9 situations for each overspeed zone.

2.7.1.3 Vehicle Threat Scenario #3

Threat vehicle feigns compliance and stops in lane. The guard detects threat behavior or criminal status through observation or electronic means and moves to guard booth to initiate denial process. Threat vehicle occupant(s) attempt to force entry (tactics include potential use of direct fire weapons and acceleration through the ACP).

a. Baseline protection for direct fire weapon shall be UL 752-Level 3. A higher level is required if direct fire weapons are identified in local threat assessment/policy that exceed the capabilities of UL 752-Level 3. The contents of local threat assessment/policy are not sufficient justification for the lowering of the baseline ballistic resistance (UL 752-Level 3). Use of ballistic standards other than UL 752 may be utilized anywhere where the barrier rating can be verified as clearly meeting or exceeding UL requirement designated.

2.7.1.4 Vehicle Threat Scenario #4

Similar to Threat Scenario 3 above, except the driver of the denied vehicle drives toward the Turn-around or Search Area at the ACP Speed Limit as if complying with guard instructions, but then fails to turn and instead accelerates at its maximum acceleration rate through the ACP while attempting to enter the Installation cantonment area.

2.7.2 Threat Vehicle Characteristics

2.7.2.1 Acceleration Rate

Threat calculations shall utilize the acceleration rate of 11.3 feet per second squared (feet/second/second) when determining delay.

a. Where applicable the lower acceleration rates associated with trucks/commercial vehicles can be utilized for calculating the required stopping capability of passive and active vehicle barrier systems; however, lower acceleration rates are not relevant to delay calculations.

2.7.2.2 Deceleration Rate

Threat calculations shall utilize a deceleration rate of 24.1 feet per second squared (feet/second/second) when calculating delay.

2.7.2.3 Friction Factors

Threat calculations shall utilize a friction factor of 0.75. Calculations performed for threat purposes differ significantly from calculations typically performed for consideration of driver comfort. Lower friction factors associated with highway safety shall not be used for threat calculations.

2.7.2.4 Maximum Velocity

The maximum velocity of the 4,630 pounds baseline threat vehicle utilized for delay calculations shall be 130 mph. This parameter shall be utilized for calculation of delay unless a 'local' threat assessment and/or policy identifies a vehicle that is capable of a greater velocity. The addition

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 10 of larger vehicles or trucks through mandatory incorporation of threats identified in 'local' threat assessments and/or policies shall not be considered justification for use of a reduced velocity in delay calculations.

a. The maximum velocity of specific threat vehicles (where local threat analysis and/or policy identifies a specific vehicle) shall be obtained from manufacturer specifications.

b. The maximum velocity of other vehicle classes (where a type of vehicle e.g. 'pickup truck' is identified in local threat analysis and/or policy) shall be calculated through acquisition of information on at least 5 vehicles within the type and averaging the top speed of the lot. If significant outliers (atypical vehicles with unusual characteristics) exist they may be removed from the sample set.

2.7.2.5 Vehicle Mass

The baseline threat vehicle shall be a large passenger car as defined in ASTM F2656. The weight of the baseline threat vehicle is 4,630 pounds and the mass is 143.8 slugs. This mass shall be utilized for kinetic energy calculations unless a vehicle of larger mass is included due to the aforementioned incorporation of local threat analysis and/or policy.

a. Modification of baseline vehicle threat - The baseline threat vehicle must be adjusted in accordance with all applicable 'local' threat analysis and policy. All relevant 'local' threat analyses and policy shall be reviewed and incorporated. Classification of such documentation is not justification for exclusion of baseline threat vehicle for barrier impact energy and/or delay calculations. Both the baseline vehicle and the additional vehicle(s) (identified by 'local' threat assessment and/or policy) shall be analyzed and the more stringent of results shall be applied.

2.8 TRAFFIC AND TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING

2.8.1 Traffic Engineering Study (TES)

a. The ACP shall be planned, designed, and so located as not to create un-safe off-Installation traffic queuing or any other un-safe traffic practices as defined by Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency (SDDCTEA) and all other applicable roadway standards/criteria.

b. The traffic engineering study shall be either conducted or approved by the Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command Transportation Engineering Agency (SDDCTEA).

1) In some instances (e.g. very low volume ACPs) SDDCTEA may accept, at their discretion, abbreviated traffic engineering studies. The contents required for programming/design of key ACP design features may be determined by SDDCTEA on a case by case basis.

c. The traffic engineering study shall be based on the largest anticipated design demand value that occurs between the current traffic volume and the projected traffic volume five (5) years in the future.

d. The traffic engineering study shall not project future demand through

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 11 use of standardized population growth rates for the Installation itself unless supported by Installation specific data. The traffic engineering study may utilize standardized population growth rates for surrounding communities.

2.8.2 Transportation Engineering

a. The ACP shall be capable of handling the largest expected vehicle that will be processed. However, if the ACP processes trucks, it shall be capable of processing the largest truck common to state or host nation roadways.

b. Analyses related to determination of the required number of ID check area lanes may include queuing but shall not include queuing that result in off-Installation traffic impacts.

c. Calculate existing and future lane requirements per Pamphlet 55-15, Traffic and Safety Engineering for Better Entry Control Facilities or similar method with consideration of growth, as well as single or tandem lane processing and Automated Installation Entry (AIE), etc.).

d. The efficient use of guard manpower will be considered when calculating the number of ID check area lanes.

e. In locations where AIE is anticipated calculations related to ID check area lane quantities shall not anticipate throughput rates in excess of 375 vehicles/hour/lane. Locations using other forms of automation shall utilize validated processing rates for that specific form of automation.

f. The calculations for the number of ID check lanes shall not be based on the use of more than 2 guards per lane.

g. Utilize the ACP/ ECF SMART Decision Evaluator© (or other methods to accomplish the same results) to evaluate the existing, short-term and long-term impact of security, manpower, automation, and roads and traffic.

h. Identify traffic control requirements per SDDCTEA Pamphlet 55-15, Traffic and Safety Engineering for Better Entry Control Facilities.

2.8.3 Turning Movements

a. Turning movement calculations/modeling shall be performed to confirm that the correct vehicle turning radius is achieved and to demonstrate there is no conflict with other vehicles in the ACP corridor. Turning movement analysis shall address all traffic types to be processed.

Turning movements shall address, at a minimum, both POVs and trucks, if applicable. If trucks are prohibited at the ACP truck modeling may terminate at the post ID Check rejection point. The turning movement calculations/models shall be provided for all turning movements.

b. The turning movement analysis shall be performed for all anticipated vehicle paths.

c. The turning movement analysis shall include, but not be limited to:

horizontal road alignment, turn-around and rejection, entrance and egress paths for the ACP corridor, search areas and visitor control centers (when present).

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2.9 APPROACH ZONE

2.9.1 Entry Gate

Entry gate will have the same level of protection as the adjacent perimeter.

2.9.1.1 Signage

a. Entry gate signage shall be Type III barricade signage in conformance with Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) section 2B.67, except striping colors shall be red and white for CONUS locations (to include both Hawaii and Alaska). OCONUS entry gate signage shall conform to host nation criteria for closure/barricading of a normally open roadway lane. In the absence of applicable host nation criteria the entry gate shall be signed in accordance with the aforementioned MUTCD criteria.

b. Retroreflectivity: Entry gate signage shall be red/white retroreflective or illuminated to show the same shape and similar color by both day and night. Retroreflectivity and/or illumination shall be in accordance with the (MUTCD for CONUS locations (to include both Hawaii and Alaska). OCONUS entry gate signage shall include retroreflectivity and/or illumination in accordance with host nation criteria where such exists. If no host nation criteria exists for retroreflectivity/illumination of barricade signage then the MUTCD criteria shall be utilized.

2.9.1.2 Impact Resistance

a. Impact resistance. Where adjacent perimeter is not vehicle resistant, the fence gate is not required to exceed the kinetic energy mitigation/defeat capabilities of the adjacent perimeter fence.

b. Impact resistance. Where adjacent perimeter is vehicle resistant and vehicle resistant capability of adjacent perimeter is manmade, the fence gate shall match or exceed the kinetic energy rating of the adjacent perimeter fence/wall/barrier., except where the adjacent perimeter anti-ram capabilities is provided by topographic feature.

The fence gate shall match or exceed the kinetic energy mitigation/defeat capabilities of the adjacent perimeter. However, the fence gate is not required to exceed 1,250,000 ft-lbs of kinetic energy resistance (limit of requirement is K12 equivalent).

2.9.2 Passive Vehicle Barriers

2.9.2.1 General

a. Passive vehicle barriers in the approach zone will begin at the entry gate/perimeter and extend to the control zone passive vehicle barriers. Transitions between passive vehicle barrier systems and entry gate/perimeter shall not represent weak points in the barrier system. Transition between approach zone and control zone passive barriers shall not represent a weak point in the system.

b. Will be designed to defeat the kinetic energy associated with the baseline threat and any additional threat identified in 'local' threat analyses or policy.

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c. Achievable angle and velocity shall be included in such calculations.

d. Kinetic energy calculations must be performed for the baseline threat vehicle as well as any additional vehicles included through mandatory incorporation of 'local' threat analyses.

e. Must be approved in accordance with one of the following:

1) Included on the list of Department of Defense (DOD) Anti-Ram Vehicle Barriers maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)-Protective Design Mandatory Center of Expertise (PD-MCX),

2) Analysis of the proposed system has been accepted by the USACE PD-MCX. Analysis will provide the PD-MCX with calculations that certify compliance with stated stopping capability as cited above, stamped by a registered Professional Engineer and includes a model of all barrier components to capture the interaction of their individual responses equivalent to a LS- DYNA model.

2.9.2.2 Capacity (Kinetic Energy Defeat/Mitigation Capability)

The kinetic energy mitigation capacity of the system shall be capable of defeating the baseline threat vehicle and any additional threat vehicles identified in 'local' threat assessment and/or policy.

However, the capacity of the passive vehicle barrier system is not required to exceed 1.25 million ft-lbs of kinetic energy defeat capability unless 'local' threat assessment and/or criteria identifies a threat vehicle in excess of 15,000 pounds and that threat vehicle is capable of approaching the passive vehicle barrier system at a speed and angle resulting in impact energy in excess of the previously mentioned 1.25 million ft-lbs.

The ACP passive vehicle barrier corridor shall be analyzed in segments.

1.9.2.2 Capacity (Kinetic Energy Defeat/Mitigation Capability)

The kinetic energy mitigation capacity of the system shall be capable of defeating the baseline threat vehicle and any additional threat vehicles identified in 'local' threat assessment and/or policy.

However, the capacity of the passive vehicle barrier system is not required to exceed 1.25 million ft-lbs of kinetic energy defeat capability unless 'local' threat assessment and/or criteria identifies a threat vehicle in excess of 15,000 pounds and that threat vehicle is capable of approaching the passive vehicle barrier system at a speed and angle resulting in impact energy in excess of the previously mentioned 1.25 million ft-lbs.

The ACP passive vehicle barrier corridor shall be analyzed in segments.

Segments will be restricted in length to those locations where the potential impact energy of a threat vehicle on the vehicle barrier system is equal.

Segments will break where a change in passive barrier alignment in relation to the ACP roadway differs or the layout of the barriers and roadway differs.

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In any other way increases or decreases the potential impact energy of a threat vehicle.

a. Gaps. The gaps between elements of a passive barrier system (or between systems) shall not exceed 4 feet where potential angle of impact exceeds 60 degrees and achievable speed (for impact at the 60 degrees or more angles) exceeds 40 miles per hour. The gaps between elements of a passive barrier system (or between systems) where potential velocity and angle of impact do not meet or exceed the threshold identified above shall not exceed 5 feet.

b. Transition. The transition between passive vehicle barrier systems shall not result in weak points. Transitions between barrier systems or types will include measures to ensure that the transition meets or exceeds the kinetic energy mitigation/defeat level of the adjacent barrier systems.

2.9.3 Visitor Control Center (Vcc)

a. Must be located such that visitor processing occurs prior to entry into the Installation (prior to ID Check location).

b. Paved road surface used to support movement to/from the visitor control center location must not provide opportunity for undetected bypass of the ID check area. Configuration shall not anticipate control of bypass by personnel working at the visitor control center, ID check area, or search areas. These personnel are not capable of monitoring paved bypass paths for the visitor control center.

c. If the Installation accepts visitors and does not currently possess a VCC one should be included in the first available ACP project.

d. The VCC shall include the following:

1) Parking.

2) Service Counter.

3) Waiting Area.

e. The VCC may include the following:

1) Self-registering kiosks.

2) Administration Office.

3) Break Room.

4) Electric Water cooler.

5) Latrines.

f. Ballistic protection of guard positions

1) When guard functions requiring ballistic protection (e.g. command & control, pedestrian ID check, etc.) are combined in a facility with the visitor control center function the guards must be separated from VCC personnel (both workers and visitors waiting to

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 15 be processed) by ballistic rated building components (walls, glazing, doors, etc.).

2) Where guards are utilized solely to perform visitor control center function(s) it is not necessary to provide a ballistic rated separation between the guard and the visitor. Non-ballistic rated guard positions cannot be designed to require shared VCC responsibility with guards responsible for command & control, ID check area, overwatch building, active vehicle barrier deployment or similar functions.

3) Visitor control center worker positions (non-guard) are not required to include ballistic protection.

g. Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

h. Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements.

2.9.4 Lighting

See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements on lighting requirements for the Approach Zone.

2.10 ACCESS CONTROL ZONE

2.10.1 Passive Vehicle Barriers

a. Passive vehicle barriers in the control zone will begin at the termination of the approach zone passive vehicle barriers and extend to the response zone passive vehicle barriers. Transitions between passive vehicle barrier systems shall not represent weak points in the barrier system.

1) Will be designed to defeat the kinetic energy associated with the baseline threat and any additional threat identified in 'local' threat analyses or policy.

Achievable angle and velocity shall be included in such calculations.

Kinetic energy calculations must be performed for the baseline threat vehicle as well as any additional vehicles included through mandatory incorporation of 'local' threat analyses.

2) Must be certified or approved in accordance with one of the following:

Included on the list of DOD Anti-Ram Vehicle Barriers maintained by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)-Protective Design Mandatory Center of Expertise (PD-MCX), Analysis of the proposed system has been accepted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Protective Design Center (PD-MCX). Analysis was provide the PD-MCX with calculations that certify compliance with stated stopping capability as cited above, stamped by a registered Professional Engineer and includes a model of all barrier components to capture the interaction of their individual

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 16 responses equivalent to a LS- DYNA model.

b. Capacity (kinetic energy defeat/mitigation capability)

The kinetic energy mitigation capacity of the system shall be capable of defeating the baseline threat vehicle and any additional threat vehicles identified in 'local' threat assessment and/or policy.

However, the capacity of the passive vehicle barrier system is not required to exceed 1.25 million ft-lbs of kinetic energy defeat capability unless 'local' threat assessment and/or criteria identifies a threat vehicle in excess of 15,000 pounds and that threat vehicle is capable of approaching the passive vehicle barrier system at a speed and angle resulting in impact energy in excess of the previously mentioned 1.25 million ft-lbs.

The ACP passive vehicle barrier corridor shall be analyzed in segments.

Segments will be restricted in length to those locations where the potential impact energy of a threat vehicle on the vehicle barrier system is equal.

Segments will break where a change in passive barrier alignment in relation to the ACP roadway differs or the layout of the barriers and roadway differs.

Segments will also be broken where any other existing or proposed topography or ACP features in any other way increases or decreases the potential impact energy of a threat vehicles speed or angle of approach prior to impact with the passive vehicle barrier system.

a. Gaps. The gaps between elements of a passive vehicle barrier system (or between systems) shall not exceed 4 feet where potential angle of impact exceeds 60 degrees and achievable speed (for impact at the 60 degrees or more angles) exceeds 40 miles per hour. The gaps between elements of a passive barrier system (or between systems) where potential velocity and angle of impact do not meet or exceed the threshold identified above shall not exceed 5 feet.

b. Transition. The transition between passive vehicle barrier systems shall not result in weak points. Transitions between barrier systems or types will include measures to ensure that the transition meets or exceeds the kinetic energy mitigation/defeat level of the adjacent barrier systems.

2.10.2 Id Check Area

2.10.2.1 ID Check Area Islands

a. Design shall provide opportunity for a guard to step out of guard booth onto a flat, relatively level surface or step.

b. Locations where ID checks occur shall include all likely positions for such operations along and within the ID check island (for lighting and island surface).

c. Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communication and Security Systems.

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d. Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements.

2.10.2.2 ID Check Area Canopy

a. Individual canopy columns shall limit field of view from ID check guard booth by no more than 11 degrees. Where automated means include driver use of pedestal mounted credential validation, no canopy feature shall interfere with the view of this pedestal from the related ID check guard booth.

b. Canopy shall provide 15 feet clear height where ACP use is limited to POVs.

c. Canopy shall provide 17.5 feet clear height where commercial traffic is allowed.

d. Canopy shall cover, as a minimum, routinely occupied guard positions and locations where drivers or pedestrians are required to interact with guards or equipment.

e. Ceiling/underside of canopy roof shall include reflective coating to aid light distribution.

f. Canopy clear height shall include lighting, signage and all other objects or equipment hung from, or projecting from, the underside of the canopy structure.

g. Provide an open/close visual indicator on the canopy over each lane that is controlled from the ID Check area or Command and Control.

h. Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communication and Security Systems.

i. Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements for electrical and lighting requirements.

2.10.2.3 Turn-Arounds

a. Definition - Turn-around 'lane' shall be defined as a median opening, widened area or other feature(s) devised to permit an inbound vehicle to move from the ingress to the egress lanes.

b. TurnAround - For the turn around prior to the ID check the turning movement analysis shall, as a minimum, allow rejection of the largest common commercial vehicle allowed (without special permit) on the public roads near the Access Control Point.

c. Rejection

For ACPs restricted to POV use; the rejection after the ID check turning movement analysis shall, at a minimum, allow rejection of the largest POV common to public roadways leading to the Installation.

Where commercial vehicles are allowed the rejection after the ID check turning movement analysis shall, at a minimum, allow rejection of the largest common commercial vehicle allowed on the

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 18 public road leading to the Installation.

2.10.2.4 Search Area

Assumption must be that the search area will not be open 24/7. Bypass provided by paved search area lanes must be capable of closure during periods when search area is vacant.

a. Closure of search area lanes shall consist of one of the following:

Vehicle resistant blockage - Utilize vehicle resistant blockage to prevent or mitigate the inconspicuous movement of vehicles through the search area when the search area is unmanned.

Blockage shall ensure disabling of a vehicle attempting to utilize the search area as a bypass and/or ensure guard awareness of an attempted bypass.

Delineation of closure with alarm for ID check location - Alarm annunciation will be audible (above traffic and other background noise) for guards in each ID check guard booth(s), at the command and control functional area and all areas under the ID check area canopy where guards may be standing adjacent to inbound lanes conducting validation of credentials. Alarm levels will be 85 - 90 dB interior and 105 - 115 dB exterior to guard booth(s).

b. Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements.

Requirements can be found in paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems of this document.

c. Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements for electrical and lighting requirements.

d. Search Area Canopy or Enclosed Facility

Where necessary for protection in extreme climatological areas/zones an enclosed facility may be utilized in lieu of a canopy. In locations with both a Search Area Enclosed Facility functional area and Search Area Office functional area, the two functional areas may be combined into one facility.

1) Search Area Canopy

Canopy shall provide 15 feet clear height where ACP use is limited to POVs.

Canopy shall provide 17.5 feet clear height where commercial traffic is allowed.

Canopy clear height shall include lighting, signage and all other objects or equipment hung from, or projecting from, the underside of the canopy structure.

Canopy shall cover, as a minimum, the search lane(s) routinely occupied guard positions and locations where drivers or pedestrians are required to interact with guards or equipment.

Canopy shall extend a minimum of 4 feet beyond these locations.

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Ceiling/underside of structure shall include reflective coating to aid light distribution.

Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements for electrical and lighting requirements.

2) Search Area Enclosed Facility

Enclosed Facility shall provide 15 feet clear height where ACP use is limited to POVs.

Enclosed Facility shall provide 17.5 feet of clear height where ACP allows commercial traffic.

Enclosed Facility clear height shall include the structure itself as well as lighting, signage and all other objects hung from, or projecting from, the underside of the roof structure, doorways, or other facets of the facility.

Enclosed Facility shall cover, as a minimum, the search lane(s) and the locations routinely occupied by guards as well as locations where drivers or pedestrians are required to interact with guards or equipment.

Enclosed Facilility shall extend a minimum of 4 feet beyond these locations.

The inside of the Search Area Enclosed Facility shall include a light reflective coating to aid in light distribution.

Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements for electrical and lighting requirements.

- Provide interior power outlets for offices or other spaces if they are included within the Search Area Enclosed Facility.

- Provide interior power outlets for the Search Area Enclosed Facility. Outlets must be provided along the periphery of the Facility as well as near each search lane.

- Provide exterior power outlets near the entry and egress points (both vehicular and pedestrian doors).

HVAC.

- Ventilation of the Enclosed Facility shall be designed in accordance with all relevant standards related to ventilation of enclosed spaces which accommodate motor vehicles.

- Required for enclosed occupied spaces (e.g. offices, waiting areas, etc.) within the Search Area Enclosed Facility.

- Not normally feasible for the vehicle search bay(s).

However, consider the use of radiant heating for northern climates.

Electronic Security.

Duress Alarms.

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 20

IDS.

e. Search Area Building - The search area office or search shelter shall shelter personnel removed from vehicles being searched.

2.10.3 Guard Facilities

a. Vehicle ID Check Area Guard Booths (Used by guards responsible for validating credentials of vehicle occupants)

1) Provide a minimum of one for each vehicle ID check area entry lane.

2) Raised traffic island - The guard booth will be protected by a raised traffic island in one of the following ways:

Locate the guard booth on a raised traffic island. Provide a minimum of 3' setback between doorways of guard booth and face of raised traffic island curb. Must also include, as a minimum, a 1' horizontal clearance between face of traffic island curb and guard booth roof, gutters or any other objects protruding from the guard booth.

Recess the guard booth within a raised traffic island. Curb may be interrupted to allow movement of guard between booth and ID check position (adjacent to vehicles) to occur without stepping onto, off or over raised island or curb sections.

3) Passive Barrier Protection

Provide protection against errant impact.

The protection provided for the guard booth structure is not required to be an ASTM, Department of State (DOS) or DOD anti-ram capable product.

Protection (passive barrier) may be located on the leading edge of the island on which the guard booth is located.

Where breaks in ID check traffic island curb-line exist, additional protection should be included to mitigate errant impact.

4) Dimensions

Minimum nominal ID check area guard booth width shall be 4 feet.

Minimum nominal ID check area guard booth length shall be 10 feet.

5) Prohibition of Combining with Other Functions - The function performed by the ID Check Area Guard Booths used for validating credentials of vehicle occupants shall not be combined with any other function.

6) Field of View - Shall provide a 360 degree field of view for occupant. With the exception of the door frame interruptions in lines of sight shall not exceed 11 degrees for a guard sitting or standing at the counter. Door frame interruption of guard line of sight shall be minimized.

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 21

7) Ballistic Rating - Shall, as a minimum, be ballistic rating of UL 752 - Level 3 with a higher level being required if prescribed in 'local' threat analyses or policy.

8) Blast Resistance - Given the proximity of the guard booth to vehicular traffic it is normally not considered feasible to provide blast protection for ID check guard booth occupants.

9) HVAC

Required - General Requirements - General requirements pertaining to HVAC can be found in paragraph 3.11 Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) Requirements of this document.

Ballistic Rating - All penetrations of guard booth resulting from incorporation of HVAC shall provide the same level of ballistic resistance as the rest of the guard booth. The roof and floor of the guard booth (to include HVAC penetrations) shall not require ballistic protection unless direct fire trajectory is possible through roof/floor and into the occupied portion of the guard booth.

10) Energy Policy - Shall adhere to the latest national energy policy unless applicable exemption exists within said policy and can be found in paragraph 3.14. Sustainable Design.

11) Counter - Must include a counter oriented such that a guard is facing inbound (ingress) traffic while seated or standing at the counter.

12) Door(s) - Must include door(s) oriented in the direction of each lane for which a guard occupying the booth has vetting responsibility (includes situations where vehicle occupants Identification is validated remotely through use of automated equipment).

13) Provide exterior power outlet sufficient to power hand-held searchlights, and bug zappers etc.

14) Provide interior power outlet sufficient for radio chargers, and computers, etc.

15) Provide active vehicle barrier control console with annunciator, computer workstation, and communications equipment including Local Area Network (LAN), telephone, and Internet connections.

16) Communications. Provide a minimum of two (2) means of communications from the facility and with the Central Security Monitoring Station.

17) Electronic Security.

Duress Alarms. Provide duress alarm capability that annunciates at both the Command and Control and the Central Security Monitoring Station.

Intrusion Detection. The entry doors to the ID Check Area Guard Booths are to be equipped with Balanced Magnetic Switches (BMS)

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 22 for intrusion detection.

CCTV. Provide the means to control the cameras from Command and Control. It is recommended that CCTV monitors be placed above the counter, if there is wall space.

18) Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

19) Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements.

20) Active Vehicle Barrier Controls.

Provide emergency-fast-operate (EFO) controls for all active vehicle barriers related to the ACP.

Panel is to have LED indicator lights showing whether or not the panel is functional and capable of barrier deployment.

See requirements on Active Vehicle Barrier Controls in paragraph

4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

b. Pedestrian ID Check functional area (Used by guards responsible for validating credentials of pedestrians)

1) Raised traffic island - The Pedestrian ID Check will be protected by a raised traffic island in one of the following ways:

If located within the roadway clear zone, locate the guard booth on a raised traffic island. Provide a minimum of 3 feet setback between doorways of guard booth and face of raised traffic island curb.

If located within the roadway clear zone, the functional area must include, as a minimum, a 1 feet horizontal clearance between the face of traffic island curb and guard booth roof, gutters or any other objects protruding from the guard booth.

2) Passive Barrier Protection

Must be provided with protection against errant impact if located on a traffic island or within the roadway clear zone.

Protection (passive barrier) may be located on the leading edge of the island on which the guard booth is located.

3) Dimensions: Minimum width of 4 feet and minimum length of 10 feet, but in no case shall the building exceed the maximum square footage specified in the Army Standard (AS).

4) Prohibition of Combining with Other Functions - This function differs from the vehicle ID check guard booth. The pedestrian ID check guard booth function may be combined with other functions.

5) Field of View - Shall provide a 180 degree field of view for guard. Interruptions in lines of sight shall not exceed 11 degrees for a guard sitting or standing at the counter.

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6) Ballistic Rating - As a minimum, shall have a ballistic rating of UL 752 - Level 3 with a higher level being required if prescribed in 'local' threat analyses or policy.

7) HVAC

Required - General Requirements - General requirements pertaining to HVAC can be found in paragraph 3.11 Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) Requirements of this document.

Ballistic Rating

All penetrations of guard booth resulting from incorporation of HVAC shall provide the same level of ballistic resistance as the rest of the guard booth. The roof and floor of the guard booth (to include HVAC penetrations) shall not require ballistic protection unless direct fire trajectory is possible through roof/floor and into the occupied portion of the guard booth.

The guard position shall be separated from pedestrian traffic by ballistic rated materials whether the ballistic rated material is exterior to a facility or interior to a facility.

8) Material transfer - A 'deal tray' or other device offering a similar level of protection shall be included for transfer of materials (e.g. identification, and/or passes, etc.) between pedestrians and guard personnel.

9) Energy Policy - Shall adhere to the latest national energy policy unless applicable exemption exists within said policy and can be found in paragraph 3.14.Sustainable Design.

10) Counter - Must include a counter oriented such that a guard is facing pedestrian traffic while seated or standing at the counter.

11) Provide exterior power outlet sufficient to power hand-held searchlights.

12) Provide interior power outlet sufficient for radio chargers, and computers, etc.

13) Provide active vehicle barrier control console with annunciator, computer workstation, and communications equipment including Local Area Network (LAN), telephone, and Internet connections.

14) Communications. Provide a minimum of two (2) means of communications from the facility and with the Central Security Monitoring Station.

15) Electronic Security.

Duress Alarms. Provide duress alarm capability that will annunciate at both the Command and Control and the Central Security Monitoring Station.

Intrusion Detection. The entry door(s) is to be equipped with Balanced Magnetic Switches (BMS) for intrusion detection.

16) Communication and Security Systems - General Requirements. See

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 24 paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

17) Electrical - General Requirements. See paragraph 4.11 Electrical Requirements.

18) Active Vehicle Barrier Controls.

Provide emergency-fast-operate (EFO) controls for all active vehicle barriers related to the ACP.

Panel is to have LED indicator lights showing whether or not the panel is functional and capable of barrier deployment.

See paragraph 4.10 Communications and Security Systems.

2.10.4 Command and Control

a. Functional Location - The command and control function will be located in either the Control Zone or the Response zone. The location will be conducive to the monitoring of activities at and near the ID check area canopy as well as the rejection path for vehicles being turned away from the ID check area. The location will also allow monitoring of vehicles exiting the search area to ensure that proper actions are taken by those vehicles.

b. Field of View - Shall include a view of the ID check area. View shall be direct if the command and control function is located within the control zone. If the command and control function is located within the response zone the view of ID check area will be augmented with CCTV where direct view is distant or limited.

c. Ballistic Rating

Ballistic rating shall protect against all feasible firing angles achievable from a ground based attack from a direct fire weapon.

Ballistic rating shall include ceiling/roof protection where the topography or the structures location provides opportunity for direct fire from an elevated position (when angle is sufficient to impact guard standing and/or sitting at the counter).

When combined with other facilities only the portion of the facility defined as Command and Control and all other areas specifically designated as requiring a ballistic rating shall require a ballistic rating. Under these circumstances, the requirement for a ballistic rating shall include both the exterior walls and the interior walls which separate the Command and Control function from other functional areas.

Shall include, as a minimum, a UL 752 - Level 3 ballistic rating with a higher level being required if prescribed in 'local threat analysis or policy.

d. HVAC

Requirement - The Command & Control function includes a requirement for ballistic protection. This function requires both heating and air conditioning. Ballistic rating precludes the feasibility of mechanical-ventilation as an alternative to heating

SECTION 01 11 00.10 Page 25 or air conditioning.

General Requirements - General requirements pertaining to HVAC can be found in paragraph 3.11 Heating, Ventilating, and Air-Conditioning (HVAC) Requirements of this document.

Ballistic Rating - Building envelope penetrations created…