ACC-NJ JA STINGER M934E6 FINAL_19JAN_Redacted.pdf

Control No. :

Approval

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of STINGER M934E6 Fuzes, STINGER M934E7 Fuzes, Warhead Body Assemblies, and Warhead Body Assemblies with Antenna on an Other Than Full and Open Competition basis pursuant to the authority of Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2304(c)(1) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6.302-1 - Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements. The total value of this action is . Approval is subject to the availability of funds, and provided that the services and property described herein have otherwise been authorized for acquisition.

i

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JUSTIFICATION REVIEW DOCUMENT

FOR OTHER THAN

FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Control No.:

Program/Equipment: STINGER M934E6 Fuzes, STINGER M934E7 Fuzes, Warhead Body Assemblies (WBAs) and Warhead Body Assemblies with Antenna (WBA/A)

Authority: Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2304(c)(1) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 6.302-1 -- Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.

Amount:

Prepared by:

Contracting Officer:

Technical Representative:

Requirements Representative:

Control No.:

Reviews: I have reviewed this justification and find it adequate to support other than full and open competition.

Program Manager:

Justification and Approval for Other than Full and Open Competition

1. Contracting Activity: U.S. Army Contracting Command-New Jersey

2. Description of Action: The Project Manager for Cruise Missile Defense Systems, on behalf of the Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space, requests approval for a new Firm-Fixed Price Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (ID/IQ) contract. This action will use

3. Description of Supplies/Services: This planned acquisition is for the procurement of the STINGER M934E6 Fuze, STINGER M934E7 Fuze, and their respective Warhead Body Assemblies (WBAs) which are critical components to the functionality of the STINGER Missile and will support the STINGER Missile Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) and Missile production.

The ceiling value is based upon the maximum quantity of anticipated orders over the planned contract period.

The STINGER is a Man-Portable Air-Defense System that operates as an infrared homing surface-to-air missile. It can be adapted to fire from a wide variety of ground vehicles and helicopters. The SLEP will utilize expiring missiles from existing inventory and replace their components susceptible to degradation due to aging. Some of the degrading components include: the flight motor, standard warhead with proximity warhead, and the gas generator cartridge.

The STINGER M934E6 Fuze and WBA configuration will be produced to support part replacement in the FIM-92 STINGER Missiles. This WBA and Fuze provide impact, delay, and hard target function modes to achieve lethality metrics for the STINGER Missile System that uses the M934E6 Fuze configuration.

The contract will be comprised of the following items:

v) An Engineering Services line item to support the total life cycle management of the Government-Furnished Equipment (GFE) provided to the contractor will also be included under this procurement. The Engineering Services will support necessary updates to non-functional and/or obsolete measurement equipment that interconnects to the computer controlled in-process inspection and lot acceptance test stations located at LMS. The GFE that will be utilized under this effort includes a computer with customized test software and measurement equipment that does not support current technology direct drop in replacement items. The custom computer test software must be re-written to work with current technology, computers, and equipment interface device drivers prior to use on this contract.

The following tables represent the funds and quantities allocated to the STINGER Fuzes and WBAs:

4. Authority Cited: Title 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 2304(c)(1) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.302-1 (a)(2)(ii)(B)-- Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements.

5. Reason for Authority Cited: As described at FAR 6.302-1 (a)(2)(ii)(B), when the supplies or services required by the agency are available only from one responsible source, or, for DoD, NASA and the Coast Guard, from only one or a limited number of responsible sources, and no other types of supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements, full and open competition need not be provided for. Supplies may be deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, including major subcomponents thereof, when it is likely that award to any other source would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency's requirements.

The proposed contractor for this action is Lockheed Martin Sippican, Inc. (LMS), Marion, MA 02738.

While the U.S. Government owns the intellectual property to the M934E6 Fuzes, M934E7 Fuzes, WBAs and WBA/As designs, competition for this requirement could not be obtained. LMS is the only source currently capable of meeting the U.S. Government's requirement for the STINGER M934E6 Fuzes, M934E7 Fuzes, and associated WBAs without unacceptable delays associated with competition and a new producer. Should award be made to any other contractor other than the proposed contractor, assuming a satisfactory alternative configuration was identified for the STINGER M934E6 Fuzes, M934E7 Fuzes, and associated WBAs, .

The STINGER Fuzes are specifically designed to work along with their associated WBAs being procured under this proposed action. Once the Fuze is implemented in its respective WBA, the WBA would then be ready for delivery and installation in the FIM-92 STINGER Missile. Any other Fuze or WBA would not be feasible for implementation because after performance verification testing would pass, the design would still need to be qualified.

They also possess the required technical knowledge and expertise to fulfill this requirement within the necessary delivery timeframe. Once produced, the STINGER M934E6 Fuzes, STINGER M934E7 Fuzes, and associated WBAs would be delivered, as Government-Furnished Material (GFM), and used for explosive Loading, Assembly and Pack (LAP) into warhead sections, which would subsequently be used for assembly into the STINGER Missiles. If the U.S. Government were unsuccessful in meeting the delivery dates for the Fuzes, the

Table-3 below outlines the delays the U.S. Government would experience if award was made to any contractor, other than LMS, to self-facilitate a STINGER Fuze production line that would be required for performance of this requirement.

Design/Procure/Install new production line automated test equipment, tooling/fixtures in 10,000/100,000 class Clean Room including explosive loading area.

Debug & Prove-out automated test equipment & software

Conduct U.S. Government equipment demonstration and approval

Total Time Duration

Design/Procure/Install Production Line:

The production line equipment (Electronic Circuit Assembly (ECA) test station, Lot Acceptance Tester (LAT) test station, centrifuge, impact switch test station, and vibration test stand) is part of a complete production line facility that is capable of producing and testing the items under this requirement. If another contractor was identified with having a technical capability to meet this requirement, they would also need to self-facilitate a

Fuze production line that would include First Article Acceptance Testing and Initial Lot Delivery as there are no tools and testers currently known to be available in the market that can meet this custom production line requirement.

First, the contractor would need to design/procure/install new production line automated test equipment that includes the tooling and necessary fixtures in a 10,000/100,000 class Clean Room containing an explosive loading area. To satisfy production line needs, customized special tooling and testers must be designed, and would require for the design, procurement, and installation process. This step is further broken out with steps for a System Requirements Review, Preliminary Design Review, Critical Design Review, and troubleshooting. This process begins with a System Requirements Review to establish the baseline testing requirement for each of the testing stations. The contractor would develop data testing points and work to complete up to of the tester station design during this step. Another are needed for the Preliminary Design Review (PDR) process in which both the contractor and U.S.

Government team would work together to establish a preliminary and critical design process and the test requirements would be distilled into tester performance requirements. The design would then be traced to those requirements.

Once the PDR is complete, the station design would be roughly complete. The contractor may then proceed to the Critical Design Review (CDR) step and begin an intricate hardware and software development process requiring approximately to complete.

CDR is a multi-disciplined technical review needed to ensure that the system can proceed into fabrication , demonstration, and test to support that it can meet the stated performance requirements within cost, schedule, and risk. Once the CDR is complete, the contractor would have the design ready and hardware identified. They would then begin procurement of the custom fixtures used to interface with the Fuze hardware and interface electronics for the operating computer. This process would take approximately for the procurement, receipt, and inspection of hardware. Once hardware is received , an would be needed for the assembly of the prototype testers in order to proceed with the troubleshooting process.

De-bug and Prove-Out:

Following the installation of the production line equipment, the contractor would have to perform a debug and prove-out procedure on the developed automated test equipment (ECA) test station, LAT test station, centrifuge, impact switch test station, and vibration test stand) and associated software to ensure that the systems meet all requirements as specified in the Technical Data Package (TOP), which would take . Debug and prove-out activities include a process that begins with hardware troubleshooting and evaluation and then proceeds with a software debugging process.

The contractor can move forward with a fixture prove-out to ensure the operability of the hardware and software functionality. Once completed, a verification of environmental test capability that tests the control of the centrifuges and chambers is performed. At this point, the initial data is evaluated against performance metrics and the software would finally be updated and calibrated.

Conduct Government Equipment Demonstration:

Once the contractor has completed the debug and prove-out process for the test equipment and has verified the systems are performing properly, a U.S. Government in person demonstration would be required for each test station prior to use in production.

During this period, multiple safety and certification tests would need to be supported, such as RADAR testing, environmental testing, electrical testing, and verification of safety critical inspections. After witnessing the demonstration, a report compiles the data from the tests that is submitted for review and approval to ensure compliance requiring approximately , based on the recent tester replacement efforts.

If the U.S. Government does not meet the required delivery dates for Fuzes, it would be late delivering GFM to and compound the delay in providing the LAP as GFM to for inclusion to the Stinger Missile. As the Fuzes from this action serve as GFM for the M258 Warhead Section production contract, a Fuze delivery delay could expose the U.S. Government to a request for equitable adjustment under the Warhead Section contract, and also the contract for the STINGER Missile production, where the Warhead Section is provided as GFM to the contractor. Any type of delay would lead to an unacceptable delay in the delivery of the completed STINGER Missiles to the U.S. Army and its customers, ultimately leading to a severe degradation of mission readiness because FIM-92 STINGER Missiles would be unavailable.

Since this contract would be awarded subsequent to the on-going production of Contract which is currently utilizing this U.S. Government-owned equipment, any transition to a new producer would require significant down-time for relocation and requalification prior to entering production. As the Government owns, and for the equipment being used on the contract, there would be no return on its investment by repurchasing new equipment for a potential new contractor. The existing equipment currently installed and in use at LMS cannot be re-located to another contractor facility due to its age and condition. Any equipment that could be re-located would still need to go through the debugging, prove out of automated test equipment and software, as well as the U.S. Government equipment demonstration and approval.

If any delay occurs in the production of the STINGER M934E6 and M934E7 Fuzes, the U.S. Army will be unable to provide service life extended improved STINGER Missiles to theatre for use in the short range air defense role against weapons used against low flying targets. As a result, , Award of a sole source contract to LMS for the

STINGER M934E6 Fuze, STINGER M934E7 Fuzes, WBAs and WBA/A's is the only alternative that assures delivery of the items stated above that meets the U.S.

Government's delivery requirements without incurring unacceptable delays. LMS is the only current producer that can meet the requirements for the STINGER Fuzes and WBAs within schedule constraints.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition:

a. Effective competition is not anticipated for this effort. The notices required by FAR 5.201 shall be published and any bids or proposals received shall be considered .

b. Subcontracting Competition: Subcontracting opportunities will be maximized to the fullest extent possible. The proposed contractor is not a small business and will therefore be required to furnish a Small Business Subcontracting Plan in accordance with FAR 52.219-9, Small Business Subcontracting Plan. The following clauses will be included in the contract to encourage maximum subcontracting competition: FAR 52.219-8, Utilization of Small Business Concerns, and FAR 52.244-5, Competition in Subcontracting.

7. Actions to Increase Competition:

Although the U.S. Government owns the intellectual property to the STINGER M934E6 Fuze, STINGER M934E7 Fuze, and the respective WBAs, it was unsuccessful in locating other potential sources with the current capability to meet this requirement.

Should there be any future procurements for the STINGER Fuzes, the requirement will be re-evaluated for opportunities to execute under full and open competition. Several efforts to obtain competition were used, including issuing a sources sought notice, discussions with other U.S. Government employees with knowledge of similar production contractors with similar capabilities, and reaching out to industry partners who have potential production capabilities that may be able to support this program.

8. Market Research:

Market research occurred from December 2017 through May 2019 to ensure industry was aware of potential opportunities and to assess whether market conditions had changed in relation to production of the Fuzes. During this time, the PEO Missile & Space Technical Team reviewed contracts for related or relevant items and potential sources and were unable to locate an alternative item or other potential source with the capability to meet the Governments requirements. They performed various internet searches for the STINGER Fuzes to identify potential sources and capabilities and were unsuccessful in identifying an alternative source to meet the Government's requirements.

In accordance with the Department of Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 205.205-71 , DFARS 206.302-1(d), and DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) 206.302-1(d), a sources sought notice, , was issued on the Federal Business Opportunity (FBO) website on .

This notice yielded zero responses from industry. A previous sources sought notice that closed on , had received responses from

Lockheed Martin Sippican and MIL-SPEC-Industries, and the evaluation of those responses are provided below.

The Sources Sought Notices listed above requested respondents to provide a brief summary demonstrating company's capabilities to produce the STINGER M934E6 and STINGER M934E7 Fuzes and WBAs, a description of facilities and equipment, manufacturing process, inspection capability, personnel, past experience (including RADAR sensors and conformal antennas) as a missile Fuze and WBA producer and proven monthly production capacity.

Lockheed Martin Sippican (LMS)-Large Business-Capable

LMS has been the only production contractor for the STINGER M934E6 Fuze since 1998, and was a second source producer before that starting in 1987. LMS has manufactured over to date that have properly interfaced with the warhead section and missile. The U.S. Government, under LMS ContractW15QKN-06-C-0077, owns all the production manufacturing and Special Acceptance Inspection Equipment (SAIE) (Computer Automated and manual) required to produce the STINGER M934E6 and M934E7 Fuzes at a production rate capability of 720 Fuzes per month. The anticipated production requirement will be produced at a minimum rate of 90 Fuzes per month. In addition, LMS manufactures the Fuze IAW the U.S. Government-owned Description of Manufacturer (DofM) and inspection procedures. The DofM contains the Flow Chart showing the overall production process, assembly process steps, inspection, test/calibration points and references to other subassembly flowcharts.

The Fuze is manufactured in a dedicated contractor owned 10,000/100,000 parts per million class clean room. LMS possesses the trained and certified operators, test personnel, quality technicians, and support engineers required to re-start the production build. LMS has manufactured and delivered reliable and fully compliant Fuzes in accordance with the requirements contained in the Government issued TOP, . LMS has demonstrated the ability to successfully pass the First Article Acceptance and Lot Acceptance test. All Fuzes were delivered on schedule and without cost impact to the contract. LMS has maintained the Government Furnished/Owned Equipment in place within the dedicated clean room area and it is currently being utilized to produce the M934E7 Fuze and WBA/A configuration to support Qualification Testing on the Defense Ordnance Technology Consortium (DOTC) agreement. The fact that the GFE is currently in-place supports LMS's ability to meet the required PoP for the initial lot delivery.

Other U.S. Government contract efforts will upgrade problematic test stations that required repair during the recent production or contain obsolete/non-calibratable component test equipment. LMS has demonstrated that they have the capability to safely handle and store explosives in the STINGER production area and storage bunker through a Safety Site Plan which was previously approved by the U.S. Government.

LMS will leverage the from development effort on the existing DOTC Other Transaction Agreement (OT A) agreement , Ordnance Technology Initiative Agreement Initiative No. 1; LMS is highly qualified to produce the M934E7 Fuze and WBA/A, by leveraging the experience used to deliver the existing M934E6 Fuze. LMS will manage the subcontracts for the M934E7 Fuze and WBA/A utilizing the experience developed with the key incumbent suppliers from the DOTC development effort.

. The M&S resources were developed for the U.S. Army as part of the M934E7 Fuze DOTC Development and Qualification agreement. Based on the results of the market research and the specific information provided in paragraph nine below, LMS is the only current source that has the ability to meet all of the U.S. Government requirements without incurring unnecessary delays to the U.S. Government. Based upon the above evaluation, LMS has been found to have low programmatic risk in their ability to manufacture and deliver the proposed production requirements for the STINGER M934E6 and M934E7 Fuze and WBAs.

-Small Business-Not Capable only provided a general capability statement without an actual response to the information requested. Additional information was sought out and evaluated as detailed below.

submitted a catalog displaying a variety of devices using Pyrotechnics, Energetic Pellets and Powders. On their web site, Corp. identifies themselves as a U.S. Government contractor and a global manufacturer and supplier to both Defense and Commercial industries for Special Chemicals, Energetic Materials, Pyrotechnics, Ordnance and Aerospace components & systems and other related Defense products and solutions. Their technical capabilities center on Pyrotechnic and Explosive powder loading assemblies. website overview does not provide information relating to production line capabilities, automated test equipment, environmental testing capabilities, or clean room production area.

Nothing in the catalog product line utilizes electronic circuitry, proximity technology, or is MIL-STD-1316 (Department of Defense Design Criteria Standard: Fuze Design, Safety criteria for) compliant fuzing. The product line does not demonstrate a current capability to manufacture the STINGER M934E6, STINGER M934E7 Fuze and WBAs.

response did not contain sufficient information related to the company's production capabilities and expertise to meet this requirement. The information submitted was irrelevant to the Sources Sought Notice and did not provide information that could allow the U.S. Government technical team to assess the capabilities of this contractor. Further, the Sources Sought Notice identified specific topics that each respondent was required to address. did not adequately address the specific requirements of the notice, but merely provided a generic capability statement, and that generic capability statement ·did not demonstrate a current capability to manufacture this requirement. The technical team sought out the missing information from the respondent's response and evaluated capabilities in respect to meeting this requirement. As such, the response to the Sources Sought Notice has been evaluated to have a high and likely unacceptable programmatic risk to the U.S. Government.

Based on the above information, LMS is the only known contractor that can satisfy the government's requirements.

9. Interested Sources: To date, no other sources have expressed interest in this action.

10. Other Facts:

Control No.: CAO-19-0359

b. Other facts: No other facts.

11. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

12. Requirements Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance which are included in the justification are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

13. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination: I hereby determine that the anticipated cost to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable. The resulting proposal will be subjected to a formal technical evaluation, cost/price analysis, and comparison to the Independent Government Estimate that will be used to determine that the anticipated costs are fair and reasonable. In addition, certified cost and pricing data will be required .

14. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.