A02 - Exception to Fair Opportunity MFOCS PU J_A for posting_Redacted.pdf

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Control Number:

Contractor: DRS Network & Imaging Systems

Joint Battle Command – Platform (JBC-P) Mounted Family of Computer Systems (MFoCS)

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Reviews:

I have reviewed this justification and find it adequate to support other than full and open competition.

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FAR Part 16 Exception to Fair Opportunity Justification Under Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Contracts For

Actions Exceeding the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT)

1. Contracting Activity: U.S. Army Contracting Command Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) Division E 6565 Surveillance Loop, Building 6001 Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD 21005-

2. Description of Action:

The United States Army Contracting Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground (ACC-APG) proposes to issue a Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) delivery order (DO) against the DRS National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Solutions for Enterprise Wide Procurement (SEWP) V contract NNG15SE05B. The Army will leverage NASA SEWP V current Contract Line Item Numbers (CLINS) for the procurement of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) ruggedized, Selective Availability Anti Spoofing Module (SAASM) capable, and Mounted Family of Computer Systems (MFoCS) processor units. The proposed DO will procure a quantity (QTY) of 542 Processor Units (PUs), NSN 7021- 01-622-8908, which are Government configured ruggedized computer components in support of Army Materiel Command (AMC) requirements and Project Management Office Mission Command (PM MC); on behalf of the Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) Integrated Logistics Support Center (ILSC).

The Government projects award by 14 May 2021 and Army Working Capital Funds (AWCF) will be used to fund this procurement.

The estimated contract dollar value for this contract is .

An acquisition plan is not required because this procurement does not meet the threshold at Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 207.103(d)(i)(B).

3. Description of Supplies/Services

The MFoCS are tactical ruggedized, dismountable, computerized components/Line Replaceable Units (LRUs) that provide secure data communication capabilities to Army Aviation platforms and ground troops conducting military operations. The MFoCS equipment runs Joint Battle Command - Platform (JBC-P) software applications, which distribute accurate Command and Control (C2), Situational Awareness (SA) information, and assist Users in achieving common battlefield

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visualization and situational understanding. The subject PUs (NSN: 7021-01-622- 8908, p/n: 9800-96000-5001, manufactured by DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC (CAGE Code 32865, Melbourne, FL) are designed to be installed as an integral component of a specified JBC-P MFoCS Block I computer configuration in specified vehicles. The JBC-P MFoCS Block I is a mounted family of computer systems that is responsible for distributing accurate digital C2 and SA at all echelons to the platform and dismounted domains to reduce the risk of fratricide.

The location data for friendly forces is collected through the Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) line of sight tactical radio network and Blue Force Tracker (BFT) and BFT-2 networks.

The subject PU is an integral component of a specified FBCB2 / JBC-P MFoCS Block I computer configuration in specified vehicles.

Item Name Supplier P/N NSN Qty

PROCESSOR

UNIT (PU)

9800-96000-5001 7021-01-622-8908 542

The components being procured are associated with the MFoCS Block I only. Due to several Army modernization initiatives, in support of the Army, Chief of Staff and the legacy equipment experiencing high volume breakage, CECOM has seen a surge in demand for the MFoCS Block I components. When the MFoCS Block I End of Life (EOL) Memo was produced, Warfighter demand was not what it is today. Today, in accordance with our Logistics Modernization Program (LMP) Material Reservation Planning (MRP) and Demand Planning (DP), we only have sufficient stock on hand for MFoCS Block I to last until the delivery of this procurement.

The estimated period of performance (PoP) for this requirement is twelve (12) months from award date.

4. Authority Cited:

10 United States Code 2304c(b)(2) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.505(b)(2)(i)(B) – Only one awardee is capable of providing the supplies or services required at the level of quality required because the supplies or services ordered are unique or highly specialized.

5. Reason for Authority Cited:

a)

The OEM, DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC, 100 N. Babcock Street, Melbourne, Florida 32935 (CAGE Code 32865), owns the technical data for the

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subject PU (NSN: 7021-01-622-8908, p/n: 9800-96000-5001). The MFoCS computerized hardware was designed, developed and produced by DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC. DRS is the only source that produces MFoCS equipment. No other source possesses the knowledge of the design of MFoCS, which is necessary to provide the required product configuration and support to the Government.

The Government does possess some MFoCS Technical Data, such as depot level training manuals and technical manuals to support depot level sustainment. However, this technical data will not facilitate competition for the required items. A Technical Data Package (TDP) to facilitate competition was not bought at the time of initial procurement by the PM in 2013 and did not pass to CECOM as the system transitioned to sustainment. The Government does not own the rights to the drawings or the software/hardware associated with the MFoCS. The Government requested to purchase these rights in April 2021 but DRS was not willing to sell the data rights associated with these products. The subject PU is a critical component of a parent system, and therefore it is vital that an exact part be used to ensure full integration and mission readiness. This acquisition is absolutely necessary to avoid MFoCS supply chain shortfalls and fulfill critical demands in support of the Army Command and Control (C2) sustainment requirements and ensure U.S. Government requirements are acquired expeditiously and ensure mission readiness objectives

b) The following alternatives were considered:

(i) Suspend operations: A bona fide need exists for this requirement and the Government has the responsibility of supplying Department of Defense Services and Army Users with approved Command and Control (C2) JBC-P configured MFoCS communication equipment. The alternative to suspend operations and not acquire additional MFoCS LRUs is not a viable alternative as these specific items are needed to fill Department of the Army secure JBC-P capability gaps and sustainment needs. MFoCS equipment enables a converged assured network in an interoperable Mounted Computing Environment (MCE). JBC-P MFoCS fulfills technology gaps and provides increased Electronic Warfare (EW)/Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) gathering, situational awareness, and hardening for Beyond Line of Sight communications within a contested domain/environment. MFoCS hardware must be procured to meet high demand Command and Control (C2) capabilities and accommodate Army force structure growth and Pre-position Stock (APS) combat requirements. CECOM ILSC procurement efforts align with the Fiscal Year (FY) 21 National Defense Strategy (NDS) and the Secretary of the Army’s Readiness, Modernization, and Reform priorities as they relate to Computing Environment (CE) capacity, resiliency, and cyber hardening requirements. The equipment CECOM ILSC procures must be interoperable with existing Army Aviation and Ground equipment. The MFoCS is a critical link element within the Army Mission Command (MC) Portfolio. MFoCS

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hardware is designed to distribute accurate digital C2 and Situational Awareness (SA) at all echelons to the platform and dismounted domains, populating a Common Operating Picture (COP) and reducing the risk of fratricide. If the User community does not receive MFoCS equipment the result will be cataclysmic as it may lead to battlefield loss of life from combatant or ally Military forces.

Warfighters will be unable to adequately differentiate between friendly and oppositional forces.

(ii) Replace or repair legacy equipment rather than acquire new ruggedized components: In lieu of purchasing additional MFoCS equipment, the Government considered repairing old legacy equipment systems. However, this alternative is not viable. Based on the quantity of LRUs and systems fielded to accomplish C2 mission objectives, relying on repair and returned obsolete assets will result in non-mission capable systems, as has already been reported to upper military echelons. Army Aviation and Ground Platforms will experience significant MFoCS shortfalls in the near future. The MFoCS repair capability does not currently exist. As well, legacy C2 equipment is currently being divested as it no longer provides the necessary capability that the MFoCS equipment does; and therefore does not lend to battlefield dominance and adversary overmatch. As of today, with an immediate need to support theater operations, this approach would negatively impact the sustainment of the approximately 50,000 Block I assets existing in the field. There is true sustainment need to procure new MFoCS equipment to mitigate inventory shortages in support of Army requirements.

(iii) Seek non-OEM component parts – reverse engineering. There are highly ruggedized systems in the market similar to MFoCS. These non-OEM systems will not communicate to the same degree, if at all, as the existing software in currently fielded system and ruggedizing parameters as the current MFoCS system, making it unusable in the environment and by the system. At this time, no other replacement material solution is available, as addressed above.

Furthermore, the MFoCS LRU items cannot be broken down into procurable subcomponents without significant integration and compatibility testing required to ensure the safety of Warfighters and Army Users.

It is the nature that COTS products from different manufacturers have different designs and specifications. Their systems have specific encryption, performance parameters, ruggedizing parameters, and software. It is not possible for a system to function properly if any of the parts don’t meet the same parameters and have incompatible encryption and software. Trying to input products not tested and cleared for the MFoCS system will not only make MFoCS unusable but would cripple the JBC-P. As a result, these companies would have to, at best, reverse engineer the MFoCS Block I PU, perform Test and Inspect (T&I), and perform First Article Testing (FAT) in order to ensure operability, reliability, and compatibility of their PU with the rest of the MFoCS Block I equipment.

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In order for a third party vendor to reproduce these items for sustainment purposes, the vendor would either need a full TDP or to perform reverse engineering. As discussed above, the Government does not have access to, nor can it provide, a full TDP for production by a third party. Reverse engineering is not a viable alternative at this time. The time and effort to reverse engineer the components would require engineering support and additional time. The technical experts recently estimated significant duplication in excess of would be required to qualify any other PU for use with the MFOCS system. This figure is based off an analysis that broke down the time and cost for the planning, designing, development, testing and sustainment (all the stages of a product lifecycle) of the MFOCS if the Government were to seek an alternative source.

With an immediate need to support theater operations, this approach would negatively impact the sustainment of the existing system in the field.

With the MFoCS demand being high and current supply in jeopardy, acquiring DRS MFoCS computerized equipment is the only alternative to meet the Government’s requirement. Failure to acquire this equipment may impair the Army’s ability to effectively communicate and operate in a tactical environment, resulting in mission failure, thus, increasing the risks of serious injury or loss of life to Warfighters as mission critical secure communications capabilities will be rendered inoperable within existing DOD and Army weapon systems.

6. Efforts to Obtain Competition

In accordance with DFARS PGI 206.302-1(d), the Government issued a sources sought notice in an effort to locate potential sources capable of producing equivalents of the subject PU. The technical experts supporting the Army Communications-Electronics Command (CECOM) posted the Sources Sought notice Id: W56JSR-21-R-MFCS on beta.SAM.gov from December 14, 2020 to January 05, 2021.

The Government received three (3) responses by the closing date: DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC, Mercury Systems, Inc, and Systel, Inc. The three (3) responses were evaluated by the Government against each requirement in the sources sought announcement, as described in section 8 below only DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC was found capable for this requirement

In addition, this J&A will be made available for public inspection via beta.SAM.gov, after award, in accordance with FAR 6.305.

Pursuant to FAR 5.202(a)(6), synopsizing is not required for actions awarded under FAR 16.5 procedures.

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7. Actions to Increase Competition:

The Government will continue to conduct market research to ascertain if changes occur in the marketplace which would enable future requirements to sustain MFoCS components to be competed. Efforts to obtain competition on a full-and-open basis will continue for future computerized requirements. The Government will continue to publish Sources Sought Announcements, Requests for Information, attend trade shows, and conduct technical interchanges with vendors.

8. Market Research:

Pursuant to FAR part 10, a Sources Sought W56JSR-21-R-MFCS was published on the Beta SAM (beta.SAM.gov) website from 14 December 2020 through 05 January 2021. The announcement informed interested sources that the Government is seeking vendors with the capability to furnish the identified LRUs. The aforementioned LRUs, listed within the table above without cost information, were included in the sources sought announcement. The announcement stated that any information received would be considered solely for the purposes of determining whether conducting a competitive procurement is in the best interest of the Government.

The Government received three (3) response by the closing date on beta.SAM.gov.

The responses were evaluated by the Government. The review of the responses was conducted by examining if the solution was readily available and also how well the solution aligned with the requirements.

a. DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC

• DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC is the OEM of the subject PU (NSN 7021-01-622-8908, p/n: 9800-96000- 5001). DRS NIS is the MFoCS I Prime Contractor. As the MFoCS I Prime Contractor, DRS NIS has been responsible for all major aspects of the MFoCS I Program, from design, to production.

b. Mercury Systems, Inc.

• Mercury Systems, Inc. has extensive experience in virtually all aspects of a similar LRU program, but does not maintain a Technical Data Package of the subject MFoCS Block I PU. As a result, Mercury Systems would have to, at best, reverse engineer the MFoCS Block I PU, perform Test and Inspect (T&I), and perform First Article Testing (FAT) in order to ensure operability, reliability, and compatibility of a Mercury PU with the rest of the MFoCS

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Block I equipment. Such efforts are not feasible for this contractual effort.

c. Systel, Inc.

• Systel, Inc. was not able to provide full responses to the Market Survey, stating, in one case, “N/A” for the question of previous experience manufacturing the subject item or similar. As another example, for the question of whether the company maintained a Program and Assessment Tool, Systel, Inc. stated they did not currently maintain a Program and Assessment Tool. Lastly, Systel, Inc. did not state that they have a TDP for the subject MFoCS PU. Therefore, as in the case of Mercury Systems, Inc., at best, Systel, Inc. would have to reverse engineer the MFoCS Block I PU, perform Test and Inspect (T&I), and perform First Article Testing (FAT) in order to ensure operability, reliability, and compatibility of a Mercury PU with the rest of the MFoCS Block I equipment. Such efforts are not feasible for this contractual effort.

Based on the results, the Government determined that DRS Network & Imaging Systems, LLC (DRS NIS) was the only viable candidate for the contractual effort.

DRS NIS is the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) and maintains a complete Technical Data Package of the subject item PU (NSN 7021-01-622-8908, p/n: 9800- 96000-5001) of this procurement. DRS NIS has intimate familiarity with the MFoCS I Program as the MFoCS I Prime Contractor. As the MFoCS I Prime Contractor, DRS NIS has been responsible for all major aspects of the MFoCS I Program, from design, to production, and has provided over 35,000 MFoCS Block 1 Processing Units to the Government between the years of 2013 and 2018 alone. DRS NIS has an established testing apparatus, and has testing processes that have been used specifically in the testing and production of FBCB2/JBC-P, MFoCS I and MFoCS II LRUs. DRS NIS has an established Configuration Management program in which documentation compliance and configuration controls are “captured throughout a products lifecycle.” DRS NIS has provided a roadmap to of their obsolescence plan, described a robust DMSMS mitigation apparatus, and has described their overall process for redesigns. DRS NIS has the subject item readily available for order.

9. Other Facts:

Procurement History:

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Contract Number Date Awardee Summarized paragraph Action to Increase Competition of J&A

Notes

W15P7T-13-D-0054 14 June

DRS

Tactical Systems, Inc

N/A Unlike the 2013 action, this current action is a sustainment effort and not a developmental one

NNG15SE05B /

W56JSR20F0061

Mar

DRS

Network Imaging Systems, LLC

Conduct market research, publish sources sought, attend trade shows and conduct technical interchanges with vendor

Same circumstances were used to justify the 2020 procurement and this current action.

There’s no significant change since the 2020 action until now.

10. Technical Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance, which are included in the justification, are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

11. Requirements Certification: I certify that the supporting data under my cognizance, which are included in the justification, are accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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12. Fair and Reasonable Cost Determination: I hereby determine that the anticipated cost or price to the Government for this contract action will be fair and reasonable.

This determination will be based on price analysis, independent Government estimate, other than certified cost and pricing data and negotiations. Certified cost and pricing data is not required under FAR 15.403-1(b)(3). The Government may require other than certified cost and pricing data under clause 252.215-7010 to help determine fair and reasonableness.

13. Contracting Officer Certification: I certify that this justification is accurate and complete to the best of my knowledge and belief.

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Approval:

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of the Joint Battle Command – Platform (JBC-P) Mounted Family Computer Systems (MFoCS) equipment; QTY 542 EA Processor Units of NSN 7021-01-622-8908;

in the amount of on an other than full and open competition basis pursuant to the authority of 10 United States Code 2304c(b)(2) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.505(b)(2)(i)(B), “Only one awardee is capable of providing the supplies or services required at the level of quality required because the supplies or services are unique or highly specialized,” subject to availability of funds, and provided that the supplies herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition.