80MSFC18C0011 ESSCA JOFOC 24-month Extension_final with signature pages_Redacted.pdf

80MSFC18C0011

Rev.:5/2025 part of MSFC engineering and technical activities supporting the SLS program. As the Agency has prepared for the initial crewed flight launch of Artemis II and the lunar landing on Artemis III, ESSCA continues to provide the expertise needed to ensure mission safety and operational readiness. The realignment of the Artemis II launch to April 2026 and the Artemis III launch to mid-2027, as well as a shift in the competitive acquisition schedule for the ESSCA II follow-on contract have made the ability to maintain uninterrupted engineering support even more critical to the NASA mission objectives.

Activities supporting a timely re-competition of ESSCA requirements started in 2023, under the previous Administration. However, the current Administration has set forth several new priorities that are significant departures from the previous ones. NASA is assessing the impact of these priority changes on the ESSCA re-competition by considering efforts to promote Government efficiency, reviewing changes pending in the Revolutionary FAR Overhaul, and reviewing the FY26 Budget Proposal, which aims to refocus NASA’s funding towards putting the first human on Mars. It is not feasible for the follow-on competitive acquisition to appropriately account for these new priorities prior to current contract expiration. This action prevents a near-term (December 1, 2025) break in service and allows for continuity of the highly skilled engineering support services through critical milestones of SLS while the ESSCA II acquisition matures and aligns with current Administration priorities.

3. FAR 6.303-2(b)(3) – A description of the supplies or services required, to meet the Agency’s needs (including the estimated value):

The ESSCA contract provides highly specialized and mission critical services to MSFC with a wide variety of engineering, scientific, and technician skills necessary to support the Engineering Directorate (ED), Space Launch System Office (XP), Human Exploration Development and Operations Office (HP), Science and Technology Office (ST), Human Landing System Program Office (LP), and the Office of Center Operations (AS). Using these skill sets, the ESSCA contract augments the civil service workforce for a large number and variety of MSFC activities. These activities involve supporting NASA programs/projects and reimbursable work for which MSFC has responsibility, including: SLS; Human Landing System (HLS); International Space Station (ISS); Commercial Crew Program (CCP); as well as support of Department of Defense (DoD), other Governmental agencies, and commercial or educational activities.

The Government has a continuing requirement for the delivery of uninterrupted engineering, scientific, and technician support services at MSFC via the ESSCA contract through at least November 30, 2026, with an option to extend to November 30, 2027. Should MSFC exercise the option to extend the ordering period through November 30, 2027, the contracting office and requiring organization will balance the duration of task order extensions with the anticipated award schedule for the follow-on contract. These services are critical to maintaining continuous support for active and planned space missions essential for strategic capabilities and scientific advancement.

The support to be provided to Stennis is being incorporated into the current ESSCA contract due to delays in the ESSCA II acquisition, as Stennis currently has no dedicated contract mechanism to effectively and efficiently obtain these services. SSC committed to fulfilling their engineering design, review, and analysis support via the ESSCA II contract in 2023, early in the acquisition planning process. This work has the potential to support the Artemis Program as well as other NASA programs and projects. Previously, this support was fulfilled via the Synergy-Achieving Consolidated Operations and Maintenance (SACOM) contract.

The SACOM contract has since ended, and none of the contracts covering the follow-on support were awarded with the intent to cover this SSC engineering design, review, and analysis scope, as it has been planned to be incorporated in ESSCA II. The requirements will function as surge support for SSC and are not anticipated to exceed Work Year Equivalents (WYE) annually, representing of anticipated ESSCA requirements during the requested extension. Much, if not all, of the requested SSC support is anticipated to be performed at MSFC, allowing sharing WYE resources across both MSFC and SSC tasks. The potential SSC work fits within with the scope of the Test Design and Operations skill defined in the ESSCA Performance Work Statement. Including the work via this JOFOC permits MSFC to formally open task ownership and funds accountability to SSC for this small amount of surge work previously planned to be a part of ESSCA II award.

This extension permits the Agency time to consider new Administration priorities and restores the intended synchronization of the transition of the current contract to the follow-on at a time that supports critical milestones, now identified as the preparations, launch, and post-flight assessment of the Artemis II mission, specifically through task orders associated with SLS. Depending on the progress of the ESSCA competitive follow-on, the second 12-month option will be utilized to support critical milestones for Artemis III. The structure of the anticipated extension provides the minimum amount of time necessary to ensure continuous support for Artemis II, and Artemis III as appropriate, and provides sufficient time for completion of the ESSCA II acquisition with no interruption to MSFC and all of the programs/projects being supported. Due to the highly integrated nature of the engineering and technical skills provided to MSFC by the ESSCA contractor, continuation of all task orders ensures MSFC maintains the expertise needed for the critical SLS support.

The 24-month extension (if both 12-month periods are exercised) has a potential value of $579 million.

4. FAR 6.303-2(b)(4) – An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C.

3204(a)(1) as implemented by FAR 6.302-1, Only one responsible source and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency requirements.

5. FAR 6.303-2(b)(5) – A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited:

Under FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(iii), NASA may limit full and open competition when services may be deemed available only from the original source in the case of follow-on contracts for the continued provision of highly specialized services when it is likely that award to any other source would result in: (1) substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition; or (2) unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements. MSFC anticipates both substantial duplication of cost to the Government and unacceptable delay in fulfilling the agencies requirements should the requested extension not be awarded, as further described in this section.

The rationale supporting the use of 10 U.S.C. 3204(a)(1) is that as the incumbent, the ESSCA contractor is uniquely positioned to ensure continuity in support of multiple MSFC programs and projects, including and most significantly the SLS program support to Artemis II/III, while the Agency considers the impact of new Administration priorities in the subsequent follow-on procurement. As the SSC work planned to be incorporated into ESSCA II has no dedicated contract mechanism, this minor surge requirement scope will also be incorporated into the contract at this time.

Though ESSCA II finalized its acquisition strategy in January 2025, the acquisition was placed on a strategic pause in April 2025 to align the acquisition with new Administration priorities, including review of the FY26 Budget Proposal, attention to the RFO, and consideration of efforts to promote Government efficiency. The Government now estimates that the ESSCA follow-on cannot be competitively awarded any earlier than the fourth quarter of FY 2026, at least a year after expiration of the current contract. A break in service or introducing another contractor during the critical phases of Artemis II or III, either pre- or post-flight, would result in unacceptable risk to the NASA mission. Jacobs has developed unique knowledge and understanding of requirements, operations, testing and processes across the diverse technical disciplines supporting these activities at MSFC.

The ESSCA II procurement strategy was developed to support NASA’s prior budget planning, and its objectives of returning humans to the Moon and establishing a sustainable human presence on the lunar surface. Proceeding with the competition without realigning it to new Administration priorities will likely result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the agency’s requirements and may require restructuring of the acquisition framework. Any restructuring post-award would be time-consuming, costly, and inefficient. Moreover, if, after re-competition, the contract no longer supports NASA’s mission objectives, the cost, time, and effort to recompete the requirements and to terminate ESSCA II, would not be recovered.

Jacobs is currently providing engineering and scientific skills and support to the ongoing efforts needed to achieve NASA mission objectives. The services to be provided to Stennis Engineering are substantially similar to those currently being provided to MSFC, and SSC is fewer than 50 miles from MAF, a supported facility under the current contract. Though ESSCA technical scope aligns with SSC engineering design, review, and analysis needs, the current iteration of the ESSCA contract did not specifically allow access for other centers to fund orders. Adding the capacity for SSC to place engineering design, review, and analysis surge work to ESSCA will allow SSC a contract mechanism for the work slated to roll into the ESSCA follow-on. Sharing capacity over a larger base of work has the potential to save costs for both MSFC and Stennis, as compared to obtaining the work through separate contractual mechanisms. To achieve efficiencies, the ESSCA contract will be leveraged to fulfill these limited SSC requirements. Only Jacobs, performing under the ESSCA contract, has the ability to realize these efficiencies and potential savings.

Given the time and expense of flight missions, it is critical to ensure the continuity of this highly specialized support for design, test, analysis, verification and validation requirements during this time. These technical capabilities are critical for mission success and crew safety for Artemis II and III. These requirements will be best supported by a stable and continuous workforce through the launch preparations, launch support, and post-flight analysis of data for Artemis II and, depending on timing of the follow-on award, for Artemis III. Only Jacobs’ existing workforce and subcontractors currently possess the depth of knowledge and history of SLS through support provided to the previous Artemis I launch and are the only source able to provide the continuation of these services within the needed timeframe.

The ESSCA contract provides multiple and varied activities in support of the Artemis campaign and especially Artemis II/III. ESSCA will continue to perform systems analytical integration functions to ensure desired performance and compatibility of multiple complex elements and systems interacting and functioning together to accomplish program requirements. These functions include but are not limited to system requirements and verification, test, design and analysis integration, avionics and software systems engineering, and SLS element contractor insight and oversight. Many of these functions are affected by the dates, times, and weather associated with specific events and milestones that result from the launch countdown. Two areas where ESSCA support and experiences are vital include:

(1) SLS flight software. The final flight qualified solution is dependent upon multiple inputs from varied disciplines. The Aerosciences discipline develops the force and moment aero database that is provided to the Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) discipline.

GN&C designs the SLS flight trajectory with inputs from experts in, for example, Thrust Vector Control (TVC), that provide the amount of thrust needed and available to adjust flight angles. This information is shared with Flight Software and Avionics to design and build the guidance system for the launch vehicle. Systems Engineering experts ensure all the analyses and solutions are properly qualified for flight, including Day-Of-Launch Initialization Load Updates (DOLILU).

(2) RS-25 Engine Analysis. The Contractor provides extensive historical knowledge (dating back to the Shuttle Program) and analytical capabilities for the RS-25 liquid engines used in SLS. There are multiple sub-disciplines involved in an engine of this complexity including turbopumps, combustion devices, cryogenics, hydraulic actuators, valves, lines, ducts, and fluid dynamics, which are subjected to physics-based modeling to understand and interpret data through multiple events and activities through stacking of the vehicle, pre-launch testing, launch, and post-launch analysis. Leveraging experiences and data from Artemis I also contributes to developing the debris catalog for upcoming missions.

Each of these activities and disciplines, as well as their integration, are critical aspects in the development and review of Launch Commit Criteria, and ultimately provide essential inputs to the SLS Chief Engineer for determining flight rationale and readiness.

The competitively selected ESSCA contractor, Jacobs, is uniquely positioned to provide the uninterrupted engineering and scientific skills and support envisioned to support the initial crewed flight of SLS on Artemis II and lunar landing on Artemis III. A significant portion of the skills and services supplied across ESSCA are scarce, highly specialized, and unique to the aerospace industry. It is noteworthy to mention that competition in the commercial space industry for top engineering and technician talent has placed significant pressure on Government contractors attempting to retain incumbent staff and attract new talent from the same talent pool. While market research for ESSCA II indicates there are other qualified sources to perform these requirements, it will be critical to leverage the incumbent workforce for a high percentage of this specialized work, and it would be exceptionally high risk to make a contractor transition during critical programmatic milestones.

Additionally, with the current goal to land astronauts on the Moon (Artemis III), it is important for the SLS and HLS Programs to maintain the uninterrupted delivery of these specialized skills in meeting time critical schedules. Any disruption in these services prior to the completion of Artemis II, and Artemis III as appropriate, will result in unacceptable program delays and excessive cost to the Government. Approximately 60% of the ESSCA Work Year Equivalent (WYE) are funded by the SLS Program. The remaining 40% of the ESSCA workforce cannot be separated from the ESSCA extension without driving cost to both SLS and non-SLS task orders. The current contract structure makes use of significant efficiencies wherein the majority of the ESSCA SLS workforce also supports at least some non-SLS work. There is also shared use of equipment and facilities at MSFC between the SLS and non-SLS task orders, much of which is managed by ESSCA personnel. As such, splitting the non-SLS work from the ESSCA extension would be impractical and add cost and risk to the Government, including both program cost to SLS/Artemis, as well as other NASA programs, and institutional/administrative cost burdens. For example, in current Contract Year 7, the ESSCA contract employs individuals who provide some support to Commercial Crew Program (CCP). Of those contractors, support SLS. This shared support allows CCP to pay for necessary support, which would cost if CCP had to pay for a full WYE for each engaged ESSCA employee. A similar analysis across the work performed for the entire contract shows a potential of in annual cost avoidance through the efficiencies of ESSCA support across the entire portfolio of programs and projects.

It is in the Government’s best interest to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of these scarce engineering and scientific resources to support Artemis II, and Artemis III as appropriate, primarily through support of the SLS Program, and approval of this action will ensure continuity in highly specialized contractor support across MSFC during this critical time.

Transition to another contract and potentially to another qualified source must take place after Artemis II post-flight analysis, at the earliest, to minimize program risk from the transition. Extending the contract for up to 24 months will allow MSFC the flexibility to adapt the transition from ESSCA to the follow-on contract either before or after Artemis III, depending on launch schedule and follow-on status.

6. FAR 6.303-2(b)(6) – A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

A notice to the Government Point of Entry (GPE) website (SAM.gov) was published on December 13, 2024, in accordance with FAR Subpart 5.2. This posting informed potential sources of NASA’s intent to award a sole-source modification to Jacobs Technology Inc (Jacobs), under the ESSCA contract, number 80MSFC18C0011. The results of this synopsis are summarized in Section 10 below.

7. FAR 6.303-2(b)(7) – A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The Contracting Officer’s signature on this document indicates that the Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the government will be fair and reasonable. The ESSCA contract is a cost-reimbursement IDIQ contract that requires incurred cost proposals, which are audited, and final indirect rates are subject to adjustment pending conclusion of incurred cost audits. During the previous seven years, the contractor has submitted financial reports that provide actual cost performance that may be used to assess proposed cost and effort requirements. These historical costs will be used to prepare an Independent Government Cost Estimate that will be compared against the proposed rates. The technical team will thoroughly evaluate the proposed labor, materials, equipment, travel, and training requirements. The Government anticipates that there is adequate cost data to determine the negotiated cost is fair and reasonable.

8. FAR 6.303-2(b)(8) – Description of the market research conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted (e.g., urgent, and compelling requirement):

Market research was performed for the follow-on contract, ESSCA II, including a sources sought notice, request for information, and continued industry outreach. The market research did not indicate that there were any responsible sources that could fulfill the Agency’s requirement within the time constraint and need for continuity. The intent of this extension is to provide continuous support after the expiration of the current ESSCA contract, through Artemis II and III milestones as appropriate, consideration of new Administration priorities, and support for the Phase-In and Phase-Out activities required for transitioning from ESSCA to the follow-on contract. Jacobs has the expertise, procedures, and infrastructure, including the contractor-provided Automated Task Order Management System, necessary to ensure that intent is met. No other source other than Jacobs can continue this support without unacceptable delay; and without substantial duplication of cost to the Agency, which would not be recovered through competition.

9. FAR 6.303-2(b)(9) – Any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

None

10. FAR 6.303-2(b)(10) – A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed an interest in writing in the acquisition:

A notice of NASA’s intent to award this sole-source action was synopsized on the GPE website (SAM.gov) per FAR Subpart 5.2 (See Section 6 above). The synopsis (which included a draft justification) was posted on December 13, 2024, and closed on January 6, 2025. No firms expressed an interest in performing this requirement.

11. FAR 6.303-2(b)(11) – A statement of actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

This bridge contract action supports the continuity-of-service between the expiration of the current ESSCA contract and the award of the competitive follow-on acquisition. Considering the potential impact of new Administration priorities released in early 2025, the process of the competitive follow-on will not be completed before the end of the ESSCA contract and does not align with the shift in the Artemis launch schedule. Any other action would substantially increase risk of the impacted schedule and/or quality of service needed to support the Agency during this critical phase of operations. There is no opportunity for competition outside of those actions already being taken in the re-compete of the ESSCA contract and there are no alternative solutions. The Agency will continue to examine the market for alternative solutions or new sources before executing any subsequent acquisitions for the same requirements.

Engineering Services and Science Capability Augmentation (ESSCA) Contract 80MSFC18C0011

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

SIGNATURE PAGE

I certify that the facts presented in this justification are accurate and complete.

Lisa Bates Director, Engineering Directorate Technical Representative

I hereby certify that the above justification is complete and accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Michael C. Eagan Director, Engineering and OSAC Support Division (Acting) Contracting Officer

CONCURRENCES:

Adrian Clayton (Acting) Competition Advocate Marshall Space Flight Center

Kristina L. Parmenter Procurement Officer (Acting) and Head of Contracting Activity (Acting), Marshall Space Flight Center

Rev.:5/2025

LISA BATES

Digitally signed by LISA

BATES

Date: 2025.06.26 09:06:55 -05'00'

Michael Eagan Digitally signed by Michael Eagan Date: 2025.07.07 12:14:57 -05'00'

Adrian Clayton Digitally signed by Adrian Clayton Date: 2025.07.09 14:25:14 -05'00'

Kristina Parmenter

Digitally signed by Kristina Parmenter Date: 2025.07.08 16:21:50 -05'00'

Rev.:5/2025

Engineering Services and Science Capability Augmentation (ESSCA) Contract 80MSFC18C0011

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

SIGNATURE PAGE

Scott Barber Associate General Counsel for Acquisition Law Office of General Counsel at Headquarters

Marvin Horne Deputy Assistant Administrator for Procurement Agency Competition Advocate

APPROVAL:

Karla Smith Jackson Assistant Administrator for Procurement Senior Procurement Executive

Young Cho Digitally signed by Young Cho Date: 2025.07.18 14:13:42 -04'00'

Marvin Horne Digitally signed by Marvin Horne Date: 2025.07.21 13:23:16 -04'00'

Karla Smith Jackson

Digitally signed by Karla Smith Jackson Date: 2025.07.21 13:45:29 -04'00'