BT-19-052_OPOC_Revised_JOFOC_Redacted.pdf

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA)

LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER (JSC)

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

Pursuant to 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2304(c)(1) and Federal Acquisition Regulation

(FAR) 6.302-1

Orion Production and Operations Contract (OPOC)

1. FAR 6.303-2(b)(1) – Agency and Contracting Activity: The procuring agency is NASA, and the contracting activity is JSC.

2. FAR 6.303-2(b)(2) – The nature and/or description of the action being approved: This justification provides the rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition for production and operations of the Orion spacecraft, which was developed under the current Orion contract NNJ06TA25C by Lockheed Martin Corporation (LM), acting by and through Lockheed Martin Space.

The Orion spacecraft will serve as the NASA exploration vehicle that will carry the crew to Beyond Earth Orbit, provide emergency launch abort capability, sustain and support the crew during in-space operations, and provide safe re-entry, descent, and landing from deep space return velocities.

The Orion spacecraft is an element of the overall Exploration Systems Development (ESD) architecture that includes launch vehicles, spacecraft, mission systems and ground systems, as well as future in-space and surface systems, needed to embark on a robust human solar system exploration program.

The contemplated acquisition, the OPOC, will support the ESD architecture through the low-rate initial production of the Orion spacecraft for exploration Missions potentially through 2030, including sustaining engineering, ground and flight operations support. The OPOC will also support special studies, the delivery of Orion components in support of other NASA Programs and Projects, and the Design, Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E) of mission kits, which represent new capabilities and functions required in addition to the base vehicle design to enable the Orion spacecraft to meet mission-specific requirements for missions as they are further defined by NASA during the period of performance.

3. FAR 6.303-2(b)(3) – Description of the supplies or services required to meet the Agency’s needs (including an estimated value): NASA’s current Orion contract with LM, NNJ06TA25C, requires DDT&E of the Orion Spacecraft System to meet the mission requirements through Artemis 2. The Orion contractor is required to deliver the Orion spacecraft configurations described below per requirements in the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV)- 72000, Orion MPCV System Requirements Document.

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The following defines the different design reference missions which the Orion Spacecraft was developed around:

• Pad Abort-1: Developmental flight test to demonstrate the concept of an abort from the launch pad, as might be necessary for emergency removal of the Orion spacecraft from the launch system.

• Exploration Flight Test-1 (EFT)-1: Configuration that supports an un-crewed Earth orbit test flight to demonstrate critical systems and high speed re-entry.

• Artemis 1: Configuration that supports un-crewed Distant Retrograde Orbit with free return trajectory and high speed re-entry, with a mission duration of approximately 25 days, to demonstrate integrated spacecraft systems performance prior to crewed flight.

• Artemis 2: Configuration that supports crewed Near Rectilinear Halo Orbit mission with a mission duration of approximately 21 days, to demonstrate crewed flight beyond Low Earth Orbit (LEO).

The Artemis 2 configuration of the Orion spacecraft represents the fundamental capabilities needed for the crewed, beyond LEO missions and will be the “base vehicle” configuration to be produced under the contemplated OPOC acquisition. The following is a summary of the elements which comprise the Orion spacecraft configuration that will be produced under the

OPOC:

• A Crew Module (CM),

• A Service Module (SM), which includes:

- Crew Module Adapter (CMA)

- Spacecraft Adapter (SA)

- Spacecraft Adapter Jettison (SAJ) Fairings

• A Launch Abort System (LAS) to provide a means for crew abort

The contemplated follow-on contract, OPOC, will require the low-rate initial production of the Orion spacecraft to support the Agency’s exploration launch date requirement of Artemis 3 in August 2024 and a subsequent launch rate currently estimated at one launch per year for 6 to 12 total missions. The lead-time for the production of an Orion spacecraft through launch is approximately 5 years. Low-rate initial production for Orion is considered to represent the production and operations efforts for approximately the first 6 to 12 missions following completion of the Orion spacecraft design on the current DDT&E contract. This is based on the estimated 5 year lead-time along with the currently planned launch rate of one launch per year, which would align with the completion of approximately 7 missions within an ordering period of approximately September 2019 through September 2030. However, it is anticipated that the OPOC will allow the Government to procure Orion spacecraft for up to 12 missions in order to accommodate any potential acceleration in launch rate or other strategic changes that may occur during the OPOC ordering period. Production and operations of the spacecraft for these first 6 to 12 missions are anticipated to demonstrate a core set of mission-kit capabilities, stabilize the production process, and demonstrate refurbishment and reusability of spacecraft components.

This will progressively reduce the risk associated with performance and support a future contract for full-rate production and operations. Based on the Government’s knowledge to-date, it is anticipated that the Orion spacecraft flown on Artemis 3, Artemis 4, and Artemis 5 may provide

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 3 opportunity for substantial reuse on Artemis 6, Artemis 7, and Artemis 8, respectively.

However, if the launch rate during the OPOC period of performance is accelerated, refurbished components may not be able to be incorporated until later missions, given the estimated production lead-time for each Orion vehicle. Therefore, the estimated 6 to 12 mission scope for OPOC provides the Government the capability to demonstrate reusability of spacecraft components within the OPOC period of performance to ensure incorporation of such reuse in the design requirements for a future full-rate production contract.

The OPOC will require production of the Orion spacecraft based on data and experience developed under the current Orion DDT&E contract, such as:

• Comprehensive spacecraft system-level technical specifications

• Drawings and Computer-aided Design models, and certified system performance analysis models

• Plans and standards for development, production, testing, qualification, and certification

• Proven manufacturing tooling, supply chain, techniques, and procedures to produce the spacecraft

The OPOC will require the contractor to provide for production and sustaining of the following Orion assets, including augmentation of functionality, interfaces, and performance as required for development and integration of mission kits:

• Flight Elements

- CM, SM, CMA, SA, SAJ, and LAS

• Software and Data

- Flight Software

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- Simulation Software

- Electrical Ground Support Equipment Software (EGSE)

- Orion Data Services Software

• Mechanical Ground Support Equipment

• Ground Data Systems Infrastructure

• Hardware, Software, and Data Infrastructure, including labs for support of development, manufacturing, assembly, and testing

The OPOC contractor will also be required to provide integration support for Government furnished property, as well as interface sustaining and integration support with assets from other Programs, such as the Space Launch System (SLS) Program, Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) Program, and Space Communications and Navigation Program. In the event the amount of Government furnished property is decreased, the contractor may be required to provide the necessary property to fulfill the requirements of OPOC.

The OPOC contractor will be required to provide any and all facilities not currently provided by the Government that are necessary to meet the contract requirements. Examples of facilities currently provided by the contractor for performance of the current Orion contract include:

• Integrated Test Laboratory (ITL) for integrated avionics hardware and software testing

• Software development facilities

• Electronics manufacturing facilities

• Heat Shield manufacturing facilities

• Large composite structure manufacturing facilities

The contemplated ordering period for the OPOC will be September 2019 through September 2030. The OPOC will require the production of the first unit of the Orion spacecraft in time to support a launch date of Artemis 3 in August 2024, with an estimated subsequent launch rate of one launch per year thereafter.

The estimated value of the base vehicle production and operations for the OPOC’s minimum of 6 missions is estimated at approximately $4.6 billion.

4. FAR 6.303-2(b)(4) – An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition: The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C. 2304(c)(l), as implemented by FAR 6.302-1(a)(2)(ii), Only One Responsible Source and No Other Supplies or Services Will Satisfy Agency Requirements. This authority allows for other than full and open competition when supplies are deemed to be available only from the original source in the case of a follow-on contract for the continued development or production of a major system or highly specialized equipment, including major components thereof, when it is likely that award to any other source would result in substantial duplication of cost to the Government that is not expected to be recovered through competition, or unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Agency’s requirements.

5. FAR 6.303-2(b)(5) – A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 5 qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited: The OPOC is a follow-on contract for the low-rate initial production and operations of the highly specialized Orion spacecraft that is being developed under the current Orion DDT&E contract NNJ06TA25C. The OPOC will provide the initial production of the Orion spacecraft as necessary to support the Agency’s requirement for a launch date of Artemis 3 in August 2024 with a subsequent launch rate of one launch per year through September 2030. Given currently available performance data on the Orion DDT&E contract, the lead-time for the production of an Orion spacecraft through launch is approximately 5 years. This would result in an overlap of approximately 3 years between the period of performance of the current Orion DDT&E contract, finishing Artemis 2 in October 2022, and the OPOC performing initial production and operations for an Artemis 3 launch in August 2024. This would also lead to a subsequent overlap of approximately 4 years between the launch of each mission and the start of production to support each successive mission, resulting in at least 4 spacecraft being in the production flow at any given time throughout the majority of the OPOC period of performance.

Responses to the Request for Information (RFI), addressed in sections 6 and 8, below, indicated competition for a production and operations contract would be best supported by a well-defined or “frozen” design. However, the Orion design will continue to mature as knowledge gained from production and operation of the first several vehicles is continuously transferred into the production of successive vehicles. Given the 5-year lead-time necessary to produce and launch the Orion spacecraft, as well as the planned 1-year launch rate beginning with Artemis 3, data from the first crewed Orion mission, Artemis 2, will not be available until after production of Artemis 3, Artemis 4, Artemis 5, and Artemis 6 are scheduled to begin. The OPOC is contemplated to support the low-rate initial production of the Orion spacecraft for multiple missions in order to enable the data from the early missions under OPOC to inform the production and operations of the later OPOC missions; allow demonstration of the design in multiple crewed missions; enable the demonstration of any potential vehicle refurbishment and reuse; and support the further stabilization of the design requirements for the base vehicle to support subsequent full-rate production. The completion of approximately 6 to 12 crewed missions under OPOC will result in maturation of the design and production process, which will progressively reduce the risk associated with the overlap in launch schedules and the currently heightened need for seamless incorporation of lessons learned across contract vehicles given the nature of Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 being the first crewed flights of the Orion spacecraft.

LM is the incumbent contractor under the current Orion contract, and is responsible for the DDT&E of the highly specialized Orion spacecraft system to meet the mission requirements through Artemis 2. LM has developed unique and critical knowledge, capabilities, and essential infrastructure during performance of the DDT&E of the Orion spacecraft design which uniquely qualifies them to support the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production of the Orion spacecraft under the OPOC. Given the anticipated overlap between the current DDT&E contract and OPOC, as well as the overlap in production processes throughout low-rate initial production, LM is uniquely qualified as the incumbent DDT&E contractor to ensure knowledge gained in performance of the current DDT&E contract is continuously and effectively transferred into and across the low-rate initial production of spacecraft under the OPOC in order to avoid the introduction of undue risk to crew safety and mission schedules.

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LM’s unique qualifications to perform the low-rate initial production under OPOC also include its ownership of Orion unique facilities and capital equipment, integrated corporate processes for material handling, manufacturing, and production processes that support Orion spacecraft production, as well as exclusive familiarity and experience with the design, development, and testing of the Orion spacecraft. These qualifications, developed under the current DDT&E contract, uniquely position LM to support an effective, timely, and safe transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production without the substantial duplication of cost and schedule delay that would result from beginning the OPOC work with a new contractor.

The Government does not currently have alternatives for the facilities or capabilities provided by the LM for supporting these Orion-unique testing and production needs for transition into the low-rate initial production and operations to be performed under OPOC. Based on market research, the Government did not identify any facilities within industry at this time, outside of the incumbent contractor, that are equipped with the necessary equipment and tooling, and have personnel, procedures, equipment, and facilities that have been certified to perform these Orion-unique testing and production requirements without significant modifications. Therefore, award to any other source besides LM would require: 1) the Government to invest in similar facilities and capabilities for use by the OPOC contractor, or 2) the OPOC contractor to provide their own facilities and capabilities, or 3) the Government to move the Government-owned equipment from LM’s facilities to a Government-owned facility and enable the shared use of those facility assets and capabilities between the Orion DDT&E and OPOC contractors. All of these potential alternatives would result in unacceptable delays in fulfilling the Government’s requirements for Artemis 2, Artemis 3, or both Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 due to the estimated duration needed to build and certify the facilities and capabilities. Any delay to Artemis 2 or Artemis 3 would be expected to result in a direct delay of subsequent missions, thereby resulting in an unacceptable delay to the Government’s overall launch manifest requirements for low-rate initial production under OPOC. All of these alternative also would result in substantial duplication of the costs the Government has already invested in the existing facilities and equipment.

The following is a discussion of LM’s unique qualifications and the rationale supporting the use of the authority cited.

Orion-Unique Capital Equipment and Facilities LM’s unique qualifications to support the low-rate initial production and operations under OPOC include existing ownership of Orion specific capital equipment and facilities to support the unique testing and production needs of the Orion spacecraft, including the Integrated Test Laboratory (ITL) and the Electronics Manufacturing Facility (EMF).

ITL

The ITL is used to perform Orion-specific integrated avionics hardware and software testing for each Orion mission. The ITL facility is owned by the contractor and consists of Government-owned and contractor-owned capital assets including flight hardware or functionally equivalent hardware integrated with EGSE and lab-specific equipment, interface emulators, and the latest versions of Orion software. The ITL has the capability to validate procedures that will be used for Orion Initial Power-On and functional post-assembly checkout. The ITL also has the capability to perform regression testing of integrated avionics and software verification test

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 7 cases; mission-specific testing; and regression testing of Orion external interfaces with other ESD Program hardware. The testing currently performed in the ITL is essential for problem discovery and resolution on a component level prior to broader levels of spacecraft integration and testing for each mission. The ITL capabilities are required during the production phase of the Orion spacecraft, during the mission, and 1-month post-landing to support post-flight analysis.

As discussed above, award to a source other than the LM would require one of the following approaches in order to fulfill the requirements currently provided by the ITL:

(1) The Government to invest in similar facilities and capabilities for use by the OPOC contractor, or

(2) The OPOC contractor to provide their own facilities and capabilities, or

(3) The Government to move the Government-owned equipment from LM’s ITL to a

Government-owned facility and enable the shared use of those facility assets and capabilities between the Orion DDT&E and OPOC contractors.

Approaches 1 and 2 both would result in substantial duplication of cost and significant delay. As both of these approaches would involve the establishment of a new facility dedicated for use under the OPOC, while use of the ITL would continue under the current DDT&E contract, new assets (i.e. flight hardware, functionally equivalent hardware, EGSE, lab-specific equipment, and interface emulators) would need to be procured and produced in support of the new facility.

Such activities would not be initiated until the completion of a competition and award of the contract, which would be estimated to take approximately 18 months. The procurement and production of new assets to establish such a facility is estimated to take 24-30 months. It is estimated to take 16 months to assemble these assets resulting in a fully certified facility capable of performing Artemis 3 avionics and software testing. The Artemis 3 avionics and software testing timeline is estimated to be 10 months once the capability is established in a new facility.

When considering the time necessary to establish these capabilities in a new facility, the test requirements to support flight, and the subsequent 8 to 10 months of activities required to complete Orion production integration and integrate the Orion spacecraft with the launch vehicle and perform complete system verification and confirm launch readiness; the earliest readiness date for Artemis-3 launch would be in the Spring of 2024. At the time the Government needed to determine its procurement strategy, the Agency had a requirement for a launch date for Artemis 3 no later than August 2023, but as early as August 2022. Therefore, the readiness date for a new facility would have resulted in an unacceptable delay of approximately 6-18 months for Artemis 3. This delay to Artemis 3 would be expected to result in a direct delay of subsequent missions, thereby resulting in an unacceptable delay to the Government’s overall launch manifest requirements for low-rate initial production under OPOC. In addition, the estimated cost to establish a new facility with these capabilities is approximately $175 million, which would result in duplication of cost that would not be incurred if the OPOC is performed by the current incumbent using the existing facilities. In 2019, the Government’s launch dates for Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 subsequently shifted to October 2022 and August 2024, respectively. Following the shift in launch dates in 2019, and considering the lead times discussed above, if the Government were to pursue either of these approaches, it would still encounter unacceptable delays to its updated launch schedule.

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In regards to approach 3, moving the Government-owned equipment from the ITL to a Government-owned facility prior to the completion of use of the ITL on Artemis 2 would result in unacceptable delays to meeting the Artemis 2 schedule. As the schedule for Artemis 2 is already constrained, moving this equipment during the production process and resuming Artemis 2 work at a new facility would directly cause delays in Artemis 2 launch readiness. Moving the equipment to a new facility would also cause significant delays to the Artemis 3 launch schedule.

At the time the Government needed to determine its procurement strategy, the Artemis 2 launch (previously Exploration Mission 2), was planned for August 2021 and the Artemis 3 launch was planned for no later than August 2023. Based on a planned August 2021 launch of Artemis 2, a mission duration of 21 days, and an approximate 1-month post-flight analysis period, the ITL assets would not be available for relocation until November 2021. It is estimated to take 16 months to re-establish the ITL capability in a Government-owned facility. The Artemis 3 avionics and software testing timeline is estimated to be 10 months once the capability is established in a new facility. When considering the time necessary to establish these capabilities in a new facility, the test requirements to support flight, and the subsequent 8 to 10 months of activities required to complete Orion production integration and integrate the Orion spacecraft with the launch vehicle and perform complete system verification and confirm launch readiness;

the earliest readiness date for the Artemis 3 launch would be in the fall of 2024. As the Agency’s requirement for a launch date of Artemis 3 was in August 2023, but as early as August 2022, this readiness date for a new facility would have resulted in an unacceptable delay of approximately 12-24 months. In 2019, the Government’s launch dates for Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 subsequently shifted to October 2022 and August 2024, respectively. Following the shift in launch dates in 2019, and considering the lead times discussed above, if the Government were to pursue either of these approaches, it would still encounter unacceptable delays to its updated launch schedule.

EMF

The EMF is currently used to integrate electronic parts into select Circuit Card Assemblies (CCAs), and then perform integration and testing of manufactured and supplied CCAs into Orion avionics components. Similar to the ITL, the EMF consists of Government-owned and contractor-owned capital assets, and the Government does not currently have an alternative facility to accommodate electronics manufacturing during the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production. Market research did not identify any facilities within industry at this time, outside of the incumbent contractor, that are equipped and certified to perform these Orion-unique electronics manufacturing requirements without significant modifications. Therefore, if a source other than the current incumbent were to be selected for award of the OPOC through the competitive process, the new contractor would need to establish this capability upon award.

Establishing a new electronics manufacturing capability is estimated to take 18 months, but split into two phases. The first phase, estimated to be 12 months, is independent of Orion design or the Artemis 2 work flow, and could begin at the onset of the OPOC. This would involve establishing new suppliers for the required manufacturing or performing facility and infrastructure preparations for any electronics manufacturing capability that the OPOC contractor would perform directly. The second phase, estimated to be 6-months, includes the transition of Orion-specific design data and processes, which will be in active use in support of Artemis 2 on

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 9 the current DDT&E contract. This phase includes configuring and setting up the equipment for Orion CCA layouts, instituting manufacturing Work Instructions, and performing an acceptance test of the capabilities for manufacturing Orion electronics. To avoid interrupting the Artemis 2 work flow and operation support which would result in an unacceptable delay in meeting the Agency’s requirements for Artemis 2, this second phase would not begin until the Artemis 2 spacecraft is delivered for ground operations.

At the time the Government needed to determine its procurement strategy, the Artemis 2 launch was planned for August 2021 and the Artemis 3 launch was planned for no later than August 2023. Based on the planned delivery date for the Artemis 2 vehicle of November 2020, and the estimated time to complete the Phase 1 and Phase 2 activities, the Artemis 3 circuit card build and subsequent component assembly, test, and delivery would not be completed until approximately July 2022. It is estimated to take approximately 19 months to complete subsequent spacecraft assembly, integrated testing, and integrated ground operations. As the Agency’s requirement for a launch date of Artemis 3 was no later than August 2023, but as early as August 2022, this readiness date for a new electronics manufacturing capability would result in an unacceptable delay of approximately 6-18 months. In 2019, the Government’s launch dates for Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 subsequently shifted to October 2022 and August 2024, respectively. Following the shift in launch dates in 2019, and considering the lead times discussed above, if the Government were to pursue either of these approaches, it would still encounter unacceptable delays to its updated launch schedule.

The ITL and the electronics manufacturing capabilities are integral to the production and testing of the Orion spacecraft. The estimated schedules for both activities described above are driven by no earlier than scheduling constraints required to preclude impact to the Artemis 2 work flow on the current Orion DDT&E contract. Establishing a new facility capable of fulfilling requirements currently performed in the ITL and establishing electronics manufacturing capabilities to replace current capital capabilities prior to Artemis 3 would both result in unacceptable delays to fulfilling the Agency’s requirements for Artemis 3. This delay to Artemis 3 would be expected to result in a direct delay of subsequent missions, thereby resulting in an unacceptable delay to the Government’s overall launch manifest requirements for low-rate initial production under OPOC.

Integrated Corporate Processes Orion drawings developed under the current DDT&E contract currently reference LM specific material and process standards, and Orion manufacturing build instructions reference LM specific manufacturing standards. If a source other than LM were to be selected for award of the low-rate initial production under OPOC, that new contractor would have to transition all of the existing Orion engineering specifications into their own corporate configuration and data management system. It is estimated that there are approximately 500 material and process standards that would require re-mapping, over 22,000 manufacturing build instructions, and over 35,000 Orion drawings that would need to be reviewed and where the current DDT&E contractor’s corporate processes are referenced, appropriately updated to reference the OPOC contractor’s corporate processes. When considering the time it would reasonably be expected to take the new OPOC contractor to review each of these tens of thousands of documents, remove the DDT&E contractor’s standards and processes, revalidate their own production processes and

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 10 perform regression testing as appropriate, and re-map and replace with references to their own corporate standards and processes, it would be expected that the overall schedule to supporting Artemis 3 would be impacted substantially. In addition, as this effort represents work that would only be necessary in the event of selection of an OPOC contractor other than LM, all costs associated with such review and re-mapping would represent substantial duplication of cost to the Government.

Established Supply Chain The Government has invested significant time and resources into defining and designing components, systems, and the overall Orion spacecraft to reach a design which satisfies the Agency’s requirements for human spaceflight. LM has established an extensive supply chain of nearly 100 vendors that have developed unique expertise and component manufacturing and testing capabilities to meet these requirements, thereby uniquely qualifying them to support the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production and operations of the Orion spacecraft.

Performance by this supply chain under the DDT&E contract has led to the refinement of manufacturing, assembly, integration, and testing processes, which have improved the reliability and safety of the Orion system. In the event a new contractor were to utilize alternate sources to those currently performing under the existing DDT&E contract, a potential schedule delay of as long as 2 years could be expected, based on the time needed to re-compete supplier contracts, establish and complete training of personnel to perform the related process, and the need to repeat the numerous design and technical reviews and testing that would be necessary to reach a certified design for human-rating with new suppliers. In addition, the use of different vendors and processes than those currently utilized on the Orion DDT&E contract could introduce undue risk to the reliability and safety of future crews during low-rate initial production and operations, as lessons learned through the evolution of the design under the current DDT&E contract would be lost. Either approach, or a combination of both approaches, would reasonably be expected to notably extend the normally anticipated 5-year production to launch lead-time, resulting in an unacceptable delay in fulfilling the Government’s requirements for low-rate initial production under OPOC.

Overall Unique and Critical Depth of Knowledge of the Orion Spacecraft In consideration of the 3.5-year overlap between the Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 production process flows, as well as the overlap associated with the production processes throughout low-rate initial production, LM will have the unique insight and experience to actively and continually incorporate status and lessons learned from performance under the current Orion DDT&E contract into and across the processes and work flows for the low-rate initial production of the Artemis 3 vehicle under the OPOC.

As an example, at the time work is anticipated to begin in support of Artemis 3 on OPOC, the Artemis 2 Orion vehicle will have only reached the initial steps of spacecraft assembly and component production and delivery. It is anticipated that during the overlap in the Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 production processes, LM could encounter significant changes in status regarding DDT&E maturity, as well as numerous lessons learned in areas such as mechanical tooling, avionics testing, software development, and test lab operations. For example, software and data content and test maturity will continue evolving up to 30 days prior to Artemis 2 launch when the final release occurs. Only LM would have the unique insight into the Artemis 2 production

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 11 process to immediately ensure that maturity status and lessons learned are taken into account for the Artemis 3 production flow. If the OPOC were to be competed and awarded to any source other than LM, the incorporation of such knowledge could not be performed as efficiently or effectively since constant coordination would be required between multiple prime contractors.

In addition, Government direction would be necessary to institute the required changes to the OPOC production processes, which would result in additional and duplicative transactional cost to the Government. The criticality of such coordination between multiple prime contractors, and the level of Government involvement required to direct changes introduces significant risk to efficient, and effective instantiation of OPOC production processes.

Artemis 3 is anticipated to be only the second Orion crewed mission and significant overlap between production of Artemis 2 and Artemis 3 is necessary to meet Agency schedule requirements for Artemis 3. In addition, the overlap in production processes throughout low-rate initial production on OPOC results in at least 4 vehicles being in production flow simultaneously for most of the contract’s period of performance. Therefore, effective incorporation of DDT&E status and lessons learned during transition into OPOC and throughout low-rate initial production are of utmost importance to ensuring crew safety and mission success. Acquisition and transition from the current DDT&E contract to the low-rate initial production and operations under OPOC must account for these critical characteristics at the current time in the Orion lifecycle.

LM currently is the only available source possessing the unique and critical depth of knowledge of the Orion spacecraft design needed to fulfill the Government’s requirements for the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production and operations of the highly specialized Orion spacecraft without resulting in unacceptable delays in fulfilling Agency requirements, introduction of undue risk to crew safety, or incurrence of substantial duplication of cost.

6. FAR 6.303-2(b)(6) – A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.2 and, if not, which exception under 5.202 applies:

Pursuant to FAR 5.201(b)(1); Synopses of Proposed Contract Actions, General; the proposed contract action was synopsized via the Government Point of Entry (GPE). The website for the GPE is the Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps) website is located at https://www.fbo.gov.

A Sources Sought Synopsis, in the form of a RFI, was posted on September 6, 2016, and closed on October 6, 2016. The RFI included a request for the expression of interest in the Orion Production and Operations requirements, which would require reproducing the Orion spacecraft developed under the current Orion contract based on government-provided data. Three responses were received, which are discussed in section 8, below.

On June 28, 2017, a pre-solicitation synopsis was posted to the GPE which provided notification of the Government’s intent to procure the OPOC requirements on a sole-source basis from LM and included a statement that all responsible sources may submit a written capability statement which shall be considered by the Agency. No responses were received by the closing date of July 13, 2017.

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7. FAR 6.303-2(b)(7) – A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable: A cost and price analysis was performed in accordance with FAR 15.404-1(a)(3), Proposal Analysis Techniques, to evaluate the reasonableness of individual cost elements and to verify that the overall price was fair and reasonable. LM has submitted a proposal that was evaluated and negotiated by the Government.

The proposed cost and price was compared to an Independent Government Estimate and historical data established under the current Orion contract NNJ06TA25C for cost comparisons, where applicable.

8. FAR 6.303-2(b)(8) – A description of the market survey conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons a market survey was not conducted: A market survey for the proposed acquisition was conducted to assess if sources other than LM exist which could fulfill the Government’s requirements for the production and operations of the Orion spacecraft. This market survey included discussions with knowledgeable NASA personnel regarding requirements and potential sources, a review of internet resources for relevant information, and publication of a formal RFI, which was posted to the GPE on September 6, 2016.

The RFI allowed industry to express interest in competing in the contemplated acquisition and provide suggested contract type(s) and incentive structure(s) for the Government's consideration.

The RFI also allowed industry to identify data needed to facilitate competition, potential barriers to competition, transition risk, and Government resources needed to ensure lowest possible cost and effective transition to support the planned exploration missions.

NASA received two responses for the production and operations of the Orion spacecraft and one alternate response, which recommended NASA allow Offerors to propose alternative methods (i.e. spacecraft other than the Orion vehicle) to complete the Orion missions. A review of the two responses for the production and operations of the Orion spacecraft identified numerous barriers to competition and transition risks which would need to be overcome in order to enable competition. Such barriers and risks included equal access to unique infrastructure; access to drawings, analysis, and other details created under the current Orion DDT&E contract; and the ability for NASA to freeze the design of the base vehicle at Artemis 2. These barriers to competition and transition risks, as well as the cost and schedule impacts of mitigating these barriers, were considered by the Government in the assessment of the available sources in the market for meeting the Agency’s mission requirements.

Equal Access to Orion-Unique Infrastructure The RFI responses addressed the need for equal access to Orion-unique infrastructure to support a competition for the OPOC. The Government assessed the specific facilities, tooling, and handling equipment that are unique to the Orion spacecraft production needs which would require access to perform the OPOC requirements. There is anticipated to be a

3.5 year overlap between the periods of performance of the current Orion DDT&E contract finishing Artemis 2 and the contemplated OPOC performing initial production operations on Artemis 3. The Government could consider facilitating non-interference use agreements between the incumbent DDT&E contractor and the successful OPOC offeror for use of government provided facilities. While possible, this approach would present a number of

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 13 challenges in areas such as maintaining configuration of such tooling and equipment between two prime contractors working on two separate vehicles. This would introduce a potential to reduce efficiency in operations to process specific usage requests and to account for the production down-time and schedule conflicts that would be likely to arise between two prime contractors for such an extensive period of time. While this challenge does present schedule risk for both Artemis 2 and Artemis 3, it could be mitigated with the proper non-interference usage agreements. In regards to Orion unique facilities owned by LM (i.e. ITL and EMF), access by the OPOC contractor to the testing and manufacturing capabilities would likely be accomplished through one of the three approaches described above, which would involve Government investment in a new facility, the requirement for the successful offeror to provide such a facility, or moving government equipment from the LM facilities into a government facility. As previously discussed in section 5 of this document, such mitigation efforts would be expected to result in unacceptable delays to fulfilling the Agency’s requirements.

Access to Orion DDT&E Drawings, Analysis, and Data The RFI responses also indicated a need to access all drawings, analysis, and other details created under the current Orion DDT&E contract, including those provided with limited rights to the Government. The majority of drawings and design data delivered under the current Orion DDT&E contract have been provided with unlimited rights and could therefore be provided to OPOC offerors. However, there are also numerous areas in which limited rights data have been incorporated into the design of the vehicle as a means to leverage cost savings and existing technology possessed by LM and its subcontractors. While the Government has the right to reproduce and use this data, the data may not be used for the purposes of manufacture by a new contractor under OPOC.

In order to fulfill the OPOC requirements, a potential offeror would need to establish agreements with all suppliers that currently possess the limited rights data or to redesign those areas of the Orion spacecraft that were developed utilizing limited rights data under the current DDT&E contract. The establishment of agreements between a new potential offeror and every supplier with limited rights data on the current contract would be expected to be challenging, yet feasible.

However, the time needed to establish such agreements could reasonably be anticipated to result in an extended phase-in period and potential delay to overall performance on the contract.

Should a new OPOC contractor choose to redesign or procure subcomponents from vendors other than those currently performing on the Orion DDT&E contract to fulfill low-rate initial production under the OPOC, such choice would require the OPOC contractor to perform DDT&E and qualification of the new design. The time necessary to complete DDT&E and qualification of new components could vary significantly, depending on the particular design, but it could be expected to extend the normally anticipated 5-year production time substantially.

Ability for NASA to Freeze Base Vehicle Design at Artemis 2 While the major DDT&E of the base vehicle will be complete with Artemis 2, the Government anticipates that capability upgrades will be necessary during low-rate initial production to ensure Orion’s ability to meet specific mission requirements which have yet to be defined. Some of these upgrades will have a notable impact on the base vehicle design as integration of the upgraded capabilities will affect the design of the overall base vehicle, as opposed to a modular addition to the existing design. Therefore, while these upgrades will be developed through the

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DDT&E of mission kits, the integration requirements will likely be substantial enough to require evolution of the base vehicle design. While the market survey indicated there are sources with the potential capability to provide specific mission kits, it would not be in the Government’s best interest to compete the mission kit requirements for OPOC given the evolving nature of the baseline interfaces and the level of advanced integration which will be required of such mission kits into the vehicle. The completion of low-rate initial production for approximately 6 to 12 crewed missions under OPOC, including completion of the DDT&E of mission kits to support a variety of mission profiles, will result in maturation and stabilization of the overall base vehicle design. This will progressively reduce the risk associated with the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production, supporting a competition for a future full-rate production contract.

Assessment of Barriers to Competition and Transition Risks In summary, the Government assessed the barriers to competition and transition risks identified by the RFI respondents and concluded with consideration of the unique qualifications of the incumbent discussed in section 5 of this document, the nature of this procurement being the transition from DDT&E to low-rate initial production of the highly specialized Orion spacecraft, the overlap between the production process flows for Artemis 2 and Artemis 3, and the anticipated annual launch rate thereafter, that there are no other sources currently available to fulfill the OPOC requirements without introducing unacceptable risks and delays in fulfilling Government requirements.

Assessment of Alternate Response The alternate response received was reviewed to assess the feasibility of the alternative approach to meet NASA’s mission requirements. This alternate response recommended NASA allow Offerors to meet its overall mission objectives through use of spacecraft other than the Orion spacecraft developed under the current Orion DDT&E contract. Market research indicated that there is not currently any other spacecraft that has demonstrated an ability to support a crewed mission beyond LEO. Market research indicated there are companies currently working to develop capabilities to travel to LEO to transport crew to the International Space Station (ISS).

These spacecraft are designed with life support systems and consumable capacities to support short duration flights of approximately 3 days. Furthermore, the communication and navigation systems on these spacecraft are designed to support communication with earth-based operations centers from LEO and the thermal protection systems are only designed to withstand re-entry from LEO velocities (slower than deep space return velocities). In addition, since these spacecraft are limited to traveling only to the ISS, they do not have the capabilities necessary to fulfill Orion beyond LEO mission requirements.

The Orion spacecraft being designed and developed under the current Orion DDT&E supports mission durations of at least 21 days and will carry humans beyond LEO to multiple deep space destinations, such as lunar orbit, near-earth objects, earth-moon Lagrange points, the moons of Mars, and eventually Mars itself. In order to meet the requirements of traveling to deep space, the Orion spacecraft is designed to provide life support and consumables necessary to sustain crew for at least 21 days in sortie operation mode, and multi-hundred days of crewed operations integrated with other exploration elements. In addition, the Orion spacecraft will be equipped with communication and navigation systems that will interface with the Deep Space Network, thereby enabling communication with earth-based operations centers from deep space

BT-19-052, OPOC Revised JOFOC 15 destinations far beyond LEO. Furthermore, the Orion spacecraft is designed with unique propulsion; launch abort capability; thermal and radiation protection; micro-meteoroid protection; data relay and tracking; and avionics systems needed to support crewed deep space travel and operations, as well as provide safe re-entry during the much higher velocities needed to return from deep space. Based on market research, these spacecraft designed to travel to the ISS would not meet the overall integrated ESD deep space requirements to support travel beyond

LEO.

In addition to the sources currently developing crew transportation capabilities to the ISS, market research also identified a number of sources which are currently in the early phases of concept development and design of spacecraft to potentially provide crewed travel beyond LEO.

However, information available to the Government to-date has not indicated that these spacecraft are at a comparable level of maturity as the Orion spacecraft. For example, the Orion design has undergone rigorous testing under the current Orion DDT&E contract, including a two-orbit flight that tested many of the systems most critical to safety. This test, EFT-1, demonstrated successful launch and high-speed re-entry systems, such as avionics, attitude control, parachutes, and the heat shield. Therefore, while there are other sources currently in the early phases of concept development and design of spacecraft potentially capable of crewed deep-space travel, they have not yet demonstrated a level of maturity to indicate to a reasonable degree of confidence that it is in the Government’s best interest to pursue spacecraft other than Orion to serve as the exploration space vehicle supporting the integrated ESD architecture.

When considering the Government’s investment to-date in the DDT&E of the current Orion spacecraft and the investment in DDT&E that would be required to mature alternate space vehicles to meet the overall integrated ESD requirements for the OPOC scope of work, the Government would reasonably expect to incur billions of dollars in duplication of cost that would not be expected to be recovered through competition and would be likely to result in an unacceptable delay in meeting the Government’s requirements for Artemis 3.