Sajhedari_Request_for_Information_(RFI)_FINAL.pdf

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Sajhedari Federal contract opportunity
Solicitation number
72036718R00004
Issued by
US Agency for International Development Nepal

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U.S. Agency For International Development (USAID)

G.P.O. Box 295

U.S. Embassy, Maharajgunj

Kathmandu, Nepal

Telephone: +977.1.423.4000

Email: usaidnepal@usaid.gov

Website: https://www.usaid.gov/nepal

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI)

ISSUANCE DATE:

Friday, December 22, 2017

RFI CLOSING DATE:

Friday, January 26, 2018, 12:00 PM Nepal Time

SUBJECT: Sajhedari

REFERENCE: RFI No. 72036718R00004

Dear Prospective Respondents, The United States Government (USG), represented by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Nepal mission (USAID/Nepal) issues this RFI per the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) §§15.201(c)(7) and 15.201(e), respectively, to provide stakeholders an opportunity to review, comment, suggest, and enhance areas in the attached draft statement of objectives (SOO) for a new USAID/Nepal activity: Sajhedari. The USAID/Nepal mission intends to award a cost-reimbursement, cost-plus-fixed-fee (CPFF) completion type contract per FAR 16.306(d)(1) for a period of six years – a two year Base Period and four one year Option Periods.

USAID issues this RFI solely for information and planning purposes and it does not constitute a request for proposals. Moreover, responses to this RFI shall neither constitute proposals nor will USAID accept any responses to form a binding agreement. It should be noted that responding to or providing comment on this RFI will not give any advantage to any organization in any subsequent procurement. Lastly, USAID/Nepal will not provide answers to any question submitted in response to this request.

Nepal’s governance challenges are complex and multidimensional. Meaningful reform must be led by Nepalese and will not be realized through ‘best practice,’ supply-driven approaches.

Through Sajhedari, USAID/Nepal seeks to use its convening power and limited resources to support stakeholders from government, civil society, and the private sector in applying problem-driven iterative adaptation to address core governance challenges, particularly those related to Nepal’s decentralization and federalization processes under the new constitution.

USAID has revised its program cycle guidance to facilitate more adaptive, contextually-driven programming approaches, and the choice of an SOO rather than a more prescriptive statement of work reflects this. The attached draft SOO presents Sajhedari’s proposed objectives and expected outcomes. Nevertheless, USAID/Nepal may significantly revise this proposed new activity and planned solicitation resulting from comments received and further stakeholder consultations.

By issuing the draft for comment, USAID/Nepal aims to consult with a broad community of public and private sector actors concerned with improving governance in Nepal. USAID/Nepal requests your comments to help refine the SOO to ensure clarity, maximum development impact, coordination with existing and planned USAID and other development partner programs, and alignment with the Government of Nepal’s priorities. While there are no limits on mailto:usaidnepal@usaid.gov https://www.usaid.gov/nepal http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/doing_problem_driven_work_wp_307.pdf http://bsc.cid.harvard.edu/files/bsc/files/doing_problem_driven_work_wp_307.pdf

Sajhedari the length of submissions accepted, we value concise, issue-specific comments with reference to page and section numbers in the draft SOO.

USAID seeks feedback on the following matters in particular:

(1) Are the Sajhedari activity’s expected objectives clear and realistic? How may USAID improve them?

(2) Are the expected objectives necessary and sufficient to achieve the proposed project impacts?

(3) Is the proposed integrated, scenario-based approach an appropriate way of addressing the development challenges outlined in this RFI? Feel free to comment on perceived strengths or weaknesses, as well as to suggest alternative pathways for change.

(4) What suggestions do you have for ways to measure Sajhedari outcomes and impacts?

What would be useful context indicators to monitor?

(5) USAID requests prospective respondents’ input with respect to operating constraints under SOO Section L.5.6.

Issuance of this RFI neither obligates the USG to issue a solicitation or award a contract nor commits the USG to pay for any costs incurred or information resulting from this request.

Respondents remain solely responsible for all expenses associated with responding to this RFI.

Yours truly, Jack M. Adrien Contracting Officer

Sajhedari Statement of Objectives (SOO)

C.1 OVERVIEW

The Statement of Objectives (SOO), included as Section L.5, provides the Government’s overall objectives for this solicitation. FAR 2.101 defines a SOO as a “Government-prepared document incorporated into the solicitation that states the overall performance objectives. It is used in solicitations when the Government intends to provide the maximum flexibility to each offeror to propose an innovative approach.” As per FAR 37.602(c), Offerors shall use the SOO, together with other applicable portions of this RFP, as the basis for preparing their performance work statement (PWS). FAR 2.101 defines a PWS as “a statement of work for performance-based acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, specific and objective terms with measurable outcomes.” The offeror must ensure all aspects of the SOO are addressed. The PWS should specify in clear, understandable terms the work to be done in developing or producing the goods to be delivered or services to be performed by the contractor. Preparation of an effective PWS requires both an understanding of the goods or services that are needed to satisfy a particular requirement and an ability to define what is required in specific, performance based, quantitative terms. The offerors understanding of both required goods/services, and work effort required to accomplish should be fully demonstrated in the offeror’s proposed PWS. Within this request for proposal (RFP), the terms “concept paper,” “performance work statement,” or “PWS” are often used interchangeably.

C.2 PRINCIPLES OF ENGAGEMENT

As per Section C.1 above, USAID intends to provide the maximum flexibility to each offeror to propose an innovative approach. Nevertheless, below please find USAID’s principles of engagement that outline the Mission’s existing priorities, and to which the offeror’s proposed Sajhedari activities contained in the PWS should address:

● Alignment with the Government of Nepal’s (GoN’s) and other donors’ local governance national activities;1

● To the greatest extent possible and when applicable, Nepali-led through the GoN’s own institutions;

● Cooperation and coordination with USAID/Nepal’s other programs (specifically those advancing Democracy and Governance) and other relevant donor programs;

● Collaborate cross-sectorally with relevant non-governance activities, such as in the area of health and education, on common issues such as local government management, public financial management, budget and procurement transparency, service delivery monitoring, civic education, and media;

● Adaptively managed to proactively allow for course corrections if interventions are not yielding results, based on rigorous evidence review and learning; and

● Implemented with a systems approach so that interventions focus on the biases and incentives driving systems and behaviors (as opposed to technical fixes to those systems).

Offerors should refer to Annex XX and the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for a more detailed description of the terms and concepts used above.

1 The current program is called the “Local Government and Community Development Program II” and will expire in June 2018. It will be followed by the “Sub National Governance Program” (SNGP), which is currently being designed.

C.3 SYSTEMS APPROACH

As per Section C.1 above, USAID intends to provide the maximum flexibility to each offeror to propose an innovative approach. Nevertheless, a systems approach to governance interventions requires a focus on the biases and incentives driving systems and behaviors as opposed to technical fixes to those systems. Interventions should focus on changing biases and incentives in such a way that the system of governance in Nepal evolves to be more accountable, participatory, inclusive, devolvedand democratic. The approach considers the capacity and resilience of local systems, and systemic constraints to functions that affect governance in Nepal. Analysis should focus on understanding the driving reasons why people, firms, networks, etc., self-organized to perform the way they do. Systems thinking requires consideration of behavior patterns, flows of information and finance, relational networks, trust and dispute patterns, interconnectivity and patterns of influence between the government and other social systems (i.e., political, civil society, communal/friends and family, etc.).

C.4 SCENARIO PLANNING

Scenario planning is a tool that can be used to engage with an uncertain future and to enable flexible and proactive program adaptation. Scenario planning links important organizational processes such as strategic planning, innovation, risk management, monitoring and evaluation, and relationship building. It encourages actors to make assumptions about the future explicit, providing a foundation and safe space for participatory discussions about risks and opportunities. Scenario planning enhances organizational capacity to perceive, interpret and respond to change, as well as the capacity for organizational learning and therefore adaptive management. It promotes technical agility and operational flexibility and encourages decision makers to pay attention to novel and less obvious signals of change, as well as to prepare for major shifts in context.

As per Section C.1 above, USAID intends to provide the maximum flexibility to each offeror to propose an innovative approach. Nevertheless, the offeror should propose at least three scenarios, from the macro to the micro level, which might impact programming options. Scenarios should be discussed not only in terms of impact but also likelihood, with an attempt to assess the probability that one or more of the scenarios might be realized in the future. Scenarios that have a higher probability and plausibility should be discussed in added detail. Scenarios should demonstrate strong logic and should be accompanied with evidence to the extent possible.

Proposed scenarios must directly correlate to the Adaptive Management evaluation factor under Section M.XX below.

[END OF SECTION C]

L.3 GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO OFFERORS

(a) The Government anticipates awarding one contract from this RFP; however, it reserves the right not to make an award.

(b) RFP Instructions: If an Offeror fails to follow the instructions set forth herein, the Offeror’s proposal may be eliminated from further consideration or the proposal may be downgraded and not receive full or partial credit under the applicable evaluation criteria.

(c) Accurate and Complete Information: Offerors must set forth full, accurate and complete information as required by this RFP. The penalty for making false statements to the Government is prescribed in 18 U.S.C. 1001.

(d) Offer Acceptability: The Government may determine an offer to be unacceptable if the offer does not comply with all of the terms and conditions of the RFP.

(e) Proposal Preparation Costs: The USG will not pay for any proposal preparation costs.

(f) Negotiation Process: USAID envisages a multiphase process toward award of the final Sajhedari contract:

L.4 PROPOSAL PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS

L.4.1 CONCEPT PAPER

Offerors must submit a concept paper (i.e., proposal) per FAR 15.208(a) that responds to the objectives outlined in the SOO under Section L.5.1 below. USAID will conduct a technical evaluation of the concept papers per FAR 15.305(a)(3), establish a competitive range of the most highly rated proposals per FAR 15.306(c), and invite the organizations that have submitted the most highly rated concept papers to the oral presentation phase. Moreover, the contracting officer shall notify offerors promptly in writing when their proposals are eliminated from the competitive range per FAR 15.503(a)(1). The contracting officer will indicate to, or discuss with, each offeror still being considered for award, deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past performance information to which the offeror has not yet had an opportunity to respond per FAR 15.306(d)(3).

L.4.2 ORAL PRESENATIONS

After evaluation of submitted concept papers per Section L.4.1 above, USAID will request oral presentations per FAR 15.102(a) by offerors whose concept papers were rated highest and establishment of a competitive range to augment the information provided in the concept papers.

Further, the oral presentations remain subject to the same restrictions as written information, regarding timing (see FAR 15.208) and content (see FAR 15.306). Lastly, since oral presentations

Concept Paper (i.e., Proposal)

Evaluation of Concept Papers

Competitive Range & Notice to Offerors Excluded from

Competitive Range

Oral Presentation Evaluation of

Oral Presentations

Discussions Final Proposal Evaluation of Final Proposal

Selection (i.e., Award to Successful Offeror)

Co-creation Work Planning

Workshop will occur after establishment of the competitive range, any exchanges will constitute discussions per FAR 15.306(d).

Below please find the presentation content:

• The oral presentations are restricted to the topics identified in RFP Sections L and M. The offeror may not provide any additional topics or information.

• The oral presentation may not address information provided in the concept paper, particularly cost or pricing information.

• The offeror may not reference the written proposal as support for information furnished. If the offeror finds it necessary to address information contained in the concept paper, the offeror must fully present the written information.

Offerors invited to participate in the oral presentations phase must appear in person in Kathmandu, Nepal. The proposed Chief of Party must lead the presentation and USAID encourages the presence and participation of other proposed Key Personnel. The maximum number of participants who may attend on behalf of each Offeror is four from the prime offeror and one from each major subcontractor (defined as any subcontractor expected to perform 20 percent or more of the scope of work). USAID will allow a maximum of five persons to formally participate with the oral presentation. However, Offerors may opt to bring additional personnel (maximum of three) for the purpose of preparing responses to Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) questions, but shall not formally participate with the oral presentation.

Failure of the proposed Chief of Party to lead the oral presentation for any reason will result in a full adjectival rating downgrade for the Management and Staffing Plan evaluation criteria per Section M.XX below.

USAID will review and evaluate each oral presentation against the evaluation criteria under Section M.XX below. Further, USAID restricts evaluation of an oral presentation only to the information presented verbally.

L.4.3 CO-CREATION

As per ADS 201.3.4.3, Missions are encouraged to use solicitation approaches that support innovation, co-creation, or co-design when appropriate for creative programming opportunities.

ADS 201.6 defines co-creation as “a design approach that brings people together to collectively produce a mutually valued outcome, using a participatory process that assumes some degree of shared power and decision-making.”

Co-creation is a design approach that brings people together to collectively produce a mutually valued outcome, using a participatory process that assumes some degree of shared ownership and decision-making. By involving local organizations, the private sector, traditional USAID implementing partners, local experts, and host country government officials during the co-creation process, co-creation can greatly enhance opportunities for increasing local ownership of USAID programming. Moreover, co-creation can also lower the programmatic risk that USAID will not achieve the intended results, because the activity design and implementation will be informed by engagement with a broader array of stakeholders. USAID envisages an open, creative back-and-forth process with external experts and implementers to:

• build a strong analysis rooted in multiple, diverse perspectives and forms of expertise;

• promote multiple viewpoints that will help to identify parameters, prioritize focus areas, or identify opportunities for system collaboration;

• solicit the feedback, validation, and buy-in of multiple stakeholders;

• better understand local needs and constraints and encourage local communities to act; and

• approach development through a more inclusive, collaborative, creative, and open process.

Following execution of the contract award to the successful offeror per FAR 15.504 based on a comparative assessment of proposals against all source selection criteria in the solicitation per FAR 15.308, USAID will invite the successful offeror (i.e., contractor) to develop the final Sajhedari PWS through a multi-stakeholder co-creation work planning workshop per ADS 201.3.4.8.

L.5 STATEMENT OF OBJECTIVES (SOO)

USAID has made a deliberate choice of an SOO for this new activity rather than a more prescriptive statement of work (SOW) with a set list of illustrative activities. Learning from USAID and other development partner experience, and drawing upon ongoing research and learning about how external actors can support more sustainable, locally-driven change,2 USAID intends for Sajhedari to serve as a platform for problem-driven, iterative adaptation3 in achieving programmatic objectives.

The selected implementing partner will be encouraged to:

(a) seek out positive deviance;4

(b) build on what is already working and support ‘best fit’ rather than ‘best practice’ approaches;

(c) test pathways to advance Sajhedari’s goals; and

(d) nurture Nepali-led coalitions for change.

L.5.1 PURPOSE

The Sajhedari activity will primarily provide technical assistance and capacity building to the Government of Nepal (GoN) in the transition from a unitary state to a federation of provinces and to enhance citizen participation in and oversight of local governance.

L.5.2 SCOPE OR MISSION

USAID envisions a six-year period of performance – a two year Base Period and four, one-year Option Periods – under the Sajhedari contract with an estimated cost, subject to the availability of funds, ranging between $12M – $15M. The services required shall include, but may not be limited to:

2 Please see http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/where-have-we-got-to-on-adaptive-learning-thinking-and-working-politically-doing-development-differently-etc-getting-beyond-the-peoples-front-of-judea/.

3 Please see https://Sajhedari.cgdev.org/publication/escaping-capability-traps-through-problem-driven-iterative-adaptation-pdia-working-paper.

4 Please see http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/why-positive-deviance-could-be-the-answer-to-working-in-complex-messy-places-like-papua-new-guinea/.

(a) training;

(b) consulting;

(c) advising and capacity-building in the areas of public administration;

(d) creating oversight and accountability mechanisms;

(e) public financial management;

(f) supporting the drafting of policy, legislative and regulations;

(g) auditing;

(h) human resource management;

(i) public service delivery;

(j) alternative dispute resolution and grievance management;

(k) civil society advocacy work; and

(l) strategic communication.

Offerors may propose small-scale infrastructure projects or “Grants Under Contract” (GUCs) per ADS 302.3.4.13, but are not required to do so. Any such proposed approaches are advised to carefully consider a “do no harm” approach that advances government ownership and delivery of services at the new municipal level.

Most activities will be at the municipality-level with elected representatives (executive and legislative), local civil servants, line ministry representatives and civil society at the ward and settlement (tole) level. Activities at this level will result in increased local government effectiveness in delivering services, becoming more responsive to citizen needs (with an emphasis on women and historically disadvantaged groups), and greater transparency and accountability. Activity will further improve municipal procedures and systems for better planning, budgeting, budget execution and conflict mitigation. Sajhedari will also result in better intra-municipal accountability through council oversight of municipal executives.

Sajhedari activities with civil society at the municipal, ward, and settlement (tole) level will lead to greater citizen and existing civil society organization involvement in the participation in local government decision-making and the oversight of municipal governance.

Sajhedari activities will result in data and lessons gleaned from the municipal level being used at the national and provincial level to inform the creation of policy, legislation and regulations. Sajhedari will facilitate intergovernmental coordination across all three levels of government.

Sajhedari activities will results in increased data and evidence on cross-USAID programming collaboration, leveraging and continuity to inform USAID management decisions on sub-national whole-of-USAID bilateral development programming. Sajhedari will facilitate inter-project coordination under the guidance of USAID leadership to include development coordination with other key actors.

L.5.3 PERIOD AND PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

The Sajhedari estimated period of performance consists of a two-year Base Period and four, one-year Option Periods for a total possible six-year period of performance. The estimated start of performance is no more than 30 calendar days from the date of contract award.

The place of performance shall be within select locations in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (Nepal). Sajhedari shall work at the national level in Kathmandu. The Contractor must also implement activities in two provincial capitals. Most of the level of effort of Sajhedari shall be expended within a select number of rural and urban municipalities within the to be identified Provinces. Targeted municipalities shall be within the two target provinces and must be willing and able to participate in Sajhedari.

L.5.4 BACKGROUND

The GoN continues to undergo a major transformation to the structure of the state. The promulgation of a new constitution in 2015 fundamentally changed Nepal from a unitary state to a federation of provinces. Firstly, a reorganization of this magnitude is an enormously complicated, lengthy and costly undertaking for any government. However, it will likely be even more difficult for Nepal, a very poor, developing country with weak institutions of governance.5 Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the motivation to federalize Nepal is directly linked to the cessation of the armed conflict. On one hand, if the GoN fails to federalize, it could reopen the grievances related to poor local governance and social, as well as geographic, exclusion that in large part led to the conflict. A failure to restructure the state could also call into question the very legitimacy of Parliament and the new constitution itself, creating a constitutional crisis. On the other hand, if the GoN does at least structurally transform itself into a federal state but service delivery in the new provinces and local governments does not improve, tensions could also again simmer. People are expecting to see impacts of the restructuring in their lives; expectations for improved service delivery and enhanced opportunities for political participation date back to the conflict era. If disappointed, people’s frustrations could lead to a crisis of legitimacy for the state, opening a pathway for increased corruption and potential conflict.

Devolution is often a concession made by governments to anti-governmental forces to bring about a cessation in hostilities. This certainly played a role in Nepal, where the decision to federalize is in large part a concession that helped bring the armed conflict to an end. However, the decentralization literature shows that globally, giving insurgents greater regional political autonomy and resources is often not enough to keep the peace. Devolution should also assure that previously restive areas have a greater say in national politics, and not just more regional autonomy. Countries that fail to provide greater voice in national politics to former rebels after the end of a conflict are more likely to return to strife than countries that do.6

Federalization will devolve elected leadership, authority and resources closer to the citizenry.

Empirical evidence from around the world suggests that citizens are, all other factors held constant, better able to hold their elected leaders accountable for being responsive to their needs and for providing better government services.7 However, devolution in the absence of active civil society, robust political competition and a strong media can result in local elite capture and clientelism.8 Also

5 Nepal scored 131st out of 176 countries (with the 176th being perceived as most corrupt) in Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index available at:

http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016#table.

6 “Decentralization in Post-Conflict Settings: Assessing Community-Driven Development in the Wake of Violence” Fotini Christia, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Nov, 2016 7 “Leadership Selection Rules and Decentralized Governance”, Guy Grossman, University of Pennsylvania, Oct, 2016 8 “Clientelism in Decentralized States”, Gianmarco León, Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Leonard Wantchekon, Princeton University. Aug, 2016.

people’s assumptions about proximation to government might not be borne out fully by the local governance system put in place if opportunities for citizen engagement and social accountability mechanisms are not designed and implemented.

Many development professionals presuppose that devolution improves government services, be it in Nepal or elsewhere. The theory goes that having government closer to the citizens it serves will help elected officials better understand the quantity and quality of services desired. Improved health and education services could eventually lead to a healthier, better educated and more productive population, thus facilitating economic growth. Improved local infrastructure, especially in the areas of roads, potable and irrigation water can also promote economic growth. Furthermore, many argue that it is easier to hold government accountable when it is closer to its constituents, as opposed to trying to hold a ministry located in a distant capital to account. However, devolution can be anything but a panacea for improving government services. Devolving power and resources to local governments which lack capacity can actually worsen the quality of and the access to public services.9

There is another risk, in addition to those stated above, which has the potential for undermining the benefits that federalization could otherwise bring. Because there had been no local elections for over twenty years, the GoN put in place a so-called “All Party Mechanism” (APM). The APMs consisted of representatives of political parties and were intended to facilitate with local decision-making in the absence of locally elected leaders. The GoN later disbanded the APMs due to corruption. APMs then transmogrified into the now also disbanded Ward Citizen Forums (WCFs), which at their best significantly improved the upholding of non-partisan governance in the continued vacuum of elected officials. But even informal mechanisms to garner political party buy-in (looking very much like the historic APMs) continue to informally operate in many local bodies (again exemplifying the weakness of the state).10 There is even more at stake now, because the GoN will transfer about 20 percent of its budget to the subnational level, much more than in the past. If political capture pervade Nepal’s political transition, the country’s constitutional move to federalism is jeopardized by capture of local level resources, continue practicing cronyism and nepotism, and disempowering of formal rule of law. This could cause the tensions that led to the armed conflict to once again stew.

The concept paper should speak to how the project will support avenues for citizen engagement in Government, and should specifically address sustainability and conflict sensitivity issues related to the multiplication of “groups” at the local level.

The inclusion of historically marginalized populations and women into local decision-making through the WCFs and Citizen Awareness Center (CAC) was a successful feature of USAID’s Sajhedari Bikaas program. However, WCFs no longer exist, now that local officials are elected. Some believe that quotas for locally-elected positions for the marginalized and women will resolve the issue of inclusion. However, USAID remains concerned that local officials elected to satisfy quotas may be sidelined from local governance. The meaningful participation of these officials in local decision-making is key to addressing many of the grievances that led to the armed conflict. While quotas might ensure that previously marginalized groups have a seat at the table, if cultural and political barriers are not addressed, it is unlikely they will be able to use that seat to effectively serve

9 “The Social Underpinnings Of Decentralized Governance: Networks, Technology And The Future Of Social Accountability”, Erik Wibbels and Robert O. Keohane, Duke University, 2014.

10 “Democracy, Human rights, and Governance Assessment of Nepal” USAID, October, 2012 (Sensitive But Unclassified, and not available for distribution).

as a voice for the groups they represent. Additionally, there is a risk that if the new locally-elected officials from marginalized communities are not provided with the assistance required to participate effectively, discriminatory stereotypes about these groups’ leadership capacities could be reinforced and resurfaced.

Federalization has the potential to address one of the main drivers of the insurgency, namely the absence of the state, public services and infrastructure for large, marginalized portions of the population. The Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Assessment of Nepal states that this devolution of power presents the greatest opportunity for DRG breakthroughs in Nepal. USAID anticipates that facilitating Nepal’s transition to a federation will help move the country from a state of negative peace to one of positive peace.11

L.5.5 PROGRAM OBJECTIVES (i.e., DESIRED OUTCOMES)

USAID/Nepal issues this SOO to obtain proposals for an activity that will support the GoN in its transition from a unitary to a federal state. Use of a SOO provides the maximum flexibility to offerors to propose an innovative technical approach.

At the highest level, the Sajhedari activity will advance the U.S. Embassy’s Integrated Country Strategy Goal One: “Support Nepal’s efforts to complete the peace process and to institutionalize democratic procedures, human rights protections, and the rule of law to create stability, peace, and prosperity in the country.”

Sajhedari is intended to contribute towards USAID/Nepal’s Fiscal Year 2014 – 2018 Country Development Cooperation Strategy12 (CDCS) Development Objective One (DO1): More inclusive and effective governance. Sajhedari shall support the following DO1 Intermediate Results (IRs):

IR 1.1 – Peaceful political environment sustained;

IR 1.2 – Accountability of selected institutions strengthened;

IR 1.3 – Civic participation and advocacy increased; and IR 1.4 – Public policy and performance improved.

IR 1.4.1 – The Sajhedari activity will directly support the GoN and relevant, anticipated new ministries, as well as the Ministry of Federal Affairs and Local Development (MoFALD), and other government institutions, such as relevant parliamentary committees, in the transition to a federal state. Further, Sajhedari activities will result in advancing sound, publically consulted, policies, legislation and regulations that define the assignment of functions, roles and responsibilities of the three levels of government (federal, provincial and local), in areas such as revenue assignment, intergovernmental transfers, conflict mediation and oversight mechanisms.

IR 1.4.2 – Sajhedari will also engage with two not yet established provincial governments. At this level, activities shall result in advancing the creation of sound, publically consulted, provincial level policy, legislation and regulations, mechanisms for municipal financing and oversight, and coordination processes between the national, provincial and municipal levels of government. The counterparts shall be elected provincial (executive and legislative) officials as well as civil servants and line ministry representatives.

The Development Hypothesis that the Sajhedari design is based on holds that:

11 Please see http://www.irenees.net/bdf_fiche-notions-186_en.html.

12 Please see https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1861/CDCS%20summary_Final.pdf.

“Supporting Nepal’s transition to a federal system with devolved authorities to enhance access and utilization of equitable, quality state services, with a focus on accountability, inclusive participation, and conflict mitigation will lead to improved and inclusive representation in government and sector level outcomes for all Nepalis, particularly for the historically marginalized groups.”

Sajhedari has three program objectives, which are designed to advance the aforementioned strategy documents. They follow below:

Objec t ive One : The GoN creates sound policies and legislation that empower, finance and regulate provincial and municipal governments

Objec t ive Two : Provincial and municipal governments in Province Seven are more responsive, accountable, transparent and effective

Objec t ive Three : Citizens and civil society organizations in the target municipalities are more involved in local decision-making and oversight

Assuming that Nepal is generally on a path towards more inclusive, participatory and effective local governance, Offerors must prepare a concept paper that shall achieve results in response to the objectives listed above. Additionally, Offerors must prepare an annex presenting possible scenarios and activity adaptations based on what would be required if the process of federalization is derailed, stalls, or is even rolled back, and competencies or additional resources are not devolved to the provincials or municipal level. All proposed activities for scenarios shall be traceable to this SOO.

L.5.5.1 CROSS-CUTTING THEMES

Offerors shall also address the following cross-cutting themes in their concept papers:

(a) accountability and transparency;

(b) gender, equality, and social inclusion (GESI);

(c) youth/adolescent-friendly governance; and

(d) conflict sensitivity (i.e., “Do No Harm”).

L.5.5.2 CROSS-SECTORAL COLLABORATION

USAID/Nepal’s CDCS elevates the importance of integrated development assistance, and the Mission anticipates that Sajhedari will play an important role in identifying and pursuing synergies with other USAID/Nepal and USG programs. Such cross-sectoral linkages could entail collaboration around local government management, public financial management, budget and procurement transparency, service delivery monitoring, civic education, and media. Cooperation and coordination with USAID/Nepal’s other DG programs and other relevant donor programs will be particularly important to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication.

L.5.5.3 CONFLICT SENSITIVITY AND DO NO HARM

Offerors must ensure that project activities maximize positive and constructive dynamics in the context and communities in which they operate, and not exacerbating negative or destructive dynamics. A conflict sensitive approach reflects understanding of the context in which the project will operate; the interaction between the proposed intervention and that context; and innovative thinking for avoiding negative impacts and maximizing positive ones. For more information see Annex XX.

L.5.6 OPERATING CONSTRAINTS

Identify any constraints that could affect the offeror’s proposed performance work state and how the performance might be measured. There may be constraints, such as security, privacy, safety, and accessibility to government facilities. Identify any government policies, directives, standards, or regulations with which an offeror must comply. If appropriate, identify any government property to be provided. Potential constraints should be a matter of interest for the program and contracting personnel, and particular users of the services, when initially developing the SOO.13 This section describes all constraints that may negatively impact the successful completion of a project. A constraint is defined as any event that may:

• Prevent the service provider from delivering the services or product required;

• Limit the availability of alternative solutions;

• Inhibit the client from meeting their obligations.

Constraints on a project may include the budget, security, facilities, geography, [or] resources. Any constraints identified in the SOO must be considered as potential risk by offerors, and should be addressed accordingly in their proposals.14

13 PETER S. COLE, HOW TO WRITE A STATEMENT OF WORK 126 (Management Concepts) (2003).

14 MICHAEL G. MARTIN, FEDERAL STATEMENTS OF WORK: A PRACTICAL GUIDE 120 (Management Concepts) (2008).

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