Request for Information_Protective Email Service_GSA Ref 47QFRA22K0005_QandA.xlsx
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PES RFI Q&A
Question No. QUESTION RESPONSE
| 1 | Is this a new requirement? Or is there an incumbent contract/contractor currently performing the same or similar work? If an incumbent exists, are you able to provide the contract number and vendor’s name? | The purpose of this RFI is to assist the Government in conducting market research focused on gaining technical feedback from industry on protective email service capabilities specifically to protect email traffice for U.S.- based government organizations and to conduct threat hunting and incident response. This information will be used for market research only. The Government is not obligated to release a future solicitation based on this market research. |
| 2 | What endpoint integrations are important for a proposed architecture? | As noted in the PES Core Functional Capabilities under the Sandbox (Local and Network) row, the PES can sandbox email on the email platform, on the endpoint, or at a point before it enters the network. The Government also welcomes feedback on types of endpoint integrations within these capabilities. |
| 3 | What design considerations do you recommend in planning for a hybrid cloud (e.g. multiple cloud vendor) implementation? | The Government is seeking industry feedback and recommendations on the technical design and architecture functions of a PES capability including planning for hybrid cloud environments. |
| 4 | Is Content Disarm and Reconstruction a feature that is of interest for this implementation? | The Government welcomes feedback on tools/techniques that would ensure a robust set of email security capabilites are available to FCEB agencies, including whether threat extraction techniques such as Content Disarm and Reconstruction are recommended features. |
| 5 | For those FCEB agencies with a deployed PES (cloud or on-prem), will the locally deployed PES be required to be managed by CISA PES (i.e., API and console access to publish policy, push IOC, and hunt)? | PES management will be a shared responsibility between CISA and FCEB agencies. This may include PES policy settings, operations, and maintenance. The shared responsibilities between CISA and each agency will depend on the solution design. |
| 6 | For those FCEB agencies with a deployed PES (cloud or on-prem), will the locally deployed PES be required to be integrated with CISA PES (i.e., API and console access to publish policy, push IOC, and hunt)? | Refer to Question 5 response. |
| 7 | Is the CISA provided PES only required for those FCEB agencies that do not already have a deployed PES? | CISA Global Operators will use PES to execute the CISA protection mission for all FCEB agencies. Agency email service operators and administrators will continue to perform their operational mission. They will have access to their agency PES data and additional policy settings but will not be able to override CISA globally provisioned policies. Reuse of existing FCEB email security solutions may be considered as a component of the PES solution, provided that existing solutions meet some portion of PES capabilities. |
| 8 | Would CISA anticipate expanding this platform to inspect more than email? | The Government welcomes feedback on the types of PES Use Cases that should be considered for this platform. |
| 9 | Would the PES solution assume the MX for the DA or would the MX would still be handled by the D/A and the PES solution would sit behind their actual mail solution (O365/Gmail/On-Prem)? |
MX handling is envisioned to be PES solution dependent. As stated in the RFI, CISA is seeking solutions that protect FCEB email and will consider concepts such as those described in the question as well as hybrid solutions that use multiple enforcement points.
| 10 | For data access, will it be upon the PES to provide storage for 1-2 years, or will that data be provided for the PES to search upon? If it is being provided, how would this be made available to be searchable? | Federal data retention requirements (specifically for email) will be considered as part of and future PES activities. The Government is interested in industry's approach for the PES data access capabilities and lessons learned from previous use cases. |
| 11 | Will Einstein E3A be a part of the architecture? | No. However, other existing CISA capabilities may be integrated into the PES solution. |
| 12 | Will the PES need to send logs to the Cloud Log Aggregation Warehouse as part of the TIC 3.0 requirements? |
Yes. However, solution implementation is still to be determined and the Government is seeking input on deployment considerations.
| 13 | Will the PES hold the MX record of each eligible FCEB agency? | This will be solution dependent. The Government is interested in industry's feedback and if this would raise implementation challenges. |
| 14 | How does DHS intend to provide tenancy and access to on-boarded agencies? | CISA is seeking to balance maximizing FCEB security improvements and minimizing FCEB operational impact. Specific adoption, transition, and operational considerations will be solution dependent. RFI respondents may include any related, relevant operational considerations as part of the RFI response. |
| 15 | What types of queries will the CISA Global Operators need to conduct across all FCEB? Is there a format, script, or YARA rules currently being used? |
CISA Global Operators need the ability to conduct in depth hunting and incident response missions across FCEB. Specific query methods are solution dependent. RFI respondents may include any related, relevant operational considerations as part of the RFI response. RFI respondents should refer to existing cybersecurity executive orders as background material to reference relevant policies.
16 What email providers will be in scope?
PES intends to address all FCEB email traffic. RFI respondents should present solutions that most effectively address this intent, and explain any envisioned coverage gaps.
| 17 | Does CISA have the expectation that the PES will be for both In and Out bound scanning? | Yes. The general intent is to cover all FCEB email traffic. However, RFI respondents should note that CISA has not baselined PES requirements. |
| 18 | Reference: Page 2, Figure 1. Protective Email Service (PES) Overview |
Question: When deployed inline, is the intention for the PES system to sit as the MX record and
| act as the first hop when email is received externally? | This level of solutioning is not defined at this point in time; RFI respondents may offer concepts that they believe to be most effective and efficient. RFI respondents may include any related, relevant operational considerations as part of the RFI response. | ||
| 19 | Question: Will the PES system scan internal FCEB (intra-tenant) email? | Refer to question 17 response | |
| 20 | Reference: Page 4, Email Protection Services, API Access |
Question: Can CISA provide more details around the API services and intended integrations?
| APIs are intended to provide CISA Global Operators with the ability to conduct threat hunting and incident response missions across FCEB. RFI respondents are free to offer additional API and integration recommendations as they deem appropriate. | |
| 21 | Reference: Page 4, Email Protection Services, Email Protection Service Roles |
Question: Does CISA intend to use the Global Operator Access API for configuration changes,
| for gathering logs, or for both? | Refer to question 20 response | |
| 22 | Reference: Page 4, Email Protection Services, Email Protection Service Roles |
Question: Can CISA elaborate on the CISA indicators? Approximately, how many indicators need to be in the system at any given time and what type of indicators?
RFI respondents should consider indicators such as those commonly used by security operators in any large organization, and note that CISA tracks a large number of threat indicators that can be applied to the cyber-domain. CISA envisions that the solution's architecture would have the capability to scale.
23 Reference: Page 3, Scalability, FCEB Agency Size Question: When deployed inline, does CISA intend for all 100 agencies to leverage the same cloud infrastructure or would CISA require a separate cloud infrastructure for each agency?
RFI respondents should offer recommendations that address this question; CISA does not have an approved PES solution architecture at this time.
24 Reference: Page 4, Email Protection Services, Email Protection Service Roles Question: Can CISA elaborate on the access needed for the FCEB administrator? What is the primary function of these administrators, will they have the ability to create policies and rules? Will the administrator for FCEB agency A be able to view rules that pertain specifically to other FCEB agencies? Will the FCEB administrator view Global CISA policies?
CISA intends to minimize the impact to FCEB agencies, to include FCEB administrators. CISA understands that a balance must exist such that CISA Global Operators and FCEB administrators are both able to perform their respective misssions. However, RFI respondents may include any related, relevant operational considerations as part of the RFI response.
25 Reference: Page 4, Data Access, Email Data Access Question: Does CISA intend to store internal agency email for 1 – 2 years? Approximately, how many messages and what is the average message size for all emails that need to be stored?
| Approximately, how many messages and what is the average message size for malicious emails? | Yes, the PES platform will need to be able to store complete email storage and malicious email storage. Federal data retention requirements (specifically for email) will be considered as part of and future PES activities. | |
| 26 | Reference: Page 4, Data Access, Email Data Access |
Question: Does CISA intend to import previously archived messages for the FCEB agencies? If so, what is the size of the import?
This level of detail has not been defined. RFI respondents may address this and provided recommendations in RFI responses.
27 Reference 1: NAICS CODE Question 1: As per the Sources Sought on Sam.gov, the NAICS code referenced is 541330 Engineering Services, small business. To allow for as much competition as possible but still allow a small business set-aside, it is recommended to consider 541519 Computer Related Services and allow exception note 18 for 150 employee size standard. This will allow various small business contractors and Best in Class contract options such as GSA Schedule, CIO-CS or SEWP V which benefits CISA. This will allow small business solution providers who sell COTS products that meet CISA requirements to provide a proposal and ensure sufficient competition and competitive solutions.
| Thank you for providing feedback on the NAICS code distinctions. | |
| 28 | 10. Reference: Page 3, Email Protection Services, Scanning and Filtering |
Question: Can CISA elaborate on the CISA proprietary threat intelligence feeds? What format are these feeds provided in? What types of indicators are present in these feeds? How often are the
| feeds updated? | RFI respondents should consider the ability to support formats and update frequencies similar to commercial threat feeds such as those commonly used by security operators in any large organization. See also response to question 22. | |
| 29 | Question 1: How will CISA expect to collect, manage, and store the data ingested from PES? |
Question 1.a: Should the data be expected to be shared with other CISA data sources for correlation?
Question 1.b: Will CISA be looking to collocate this data with other systems?
| Question 1.c: Will CISA be looking for an integrator to provide a Data Management Approach with COTS tooling to supplement long term email analysis? | The Government welcomes feedback from industry on how to collect, manage and store data. Additionally, industry should highlight their solution capabilities in regard to data analyses, visualization, and dissemination. | ||
| 30 | Question 2: Where will the data be distributed or is it to be stored at the Agency level with direct access by the CISA PES team? | This level of detail has not been defined. RFI respondents may address this and provide recommendations in RFI responses. | |
| 31 | Question 3: Will PES have dependencies based on the existing Einstein (E3a) email quarantine capability? | ||
| Question 3.a: If so, what are they? (E3a’semail quarantine could have detrimental affects on PES’s ability to analyze and the overall efficiency of hunt capability if not managed correctly) | Refer to question 11 response | ||
| 32 | Question 4: Under Email Platform Configuration, Agency compliance identification appears to insinuate that either 1. Agencies may not elect to use the PES system and PES can determine if the agency Email system is up to CISA PES standards. 2. That each agency can manage their own PES system independent from CISA or E3a. That a uniform IaC type capability is not expected from this solution otherwise a uniform configuration would be assured. Are any of these accurate with regard to agency compliance checking? Can CISA define what “compliance” means in this context. | Reuse of existing FCEB agency capability to meet some level PES capability needs is a possible solution approach. Specific operational control roles and configuration standards have not been defined at this time. RFI respondents may address these areas and provide recommendations in RFI responses. | |
| 33 | III. BACKGROUND |
Will agencies be required to leverage this service?
The intent is to ensure PES capability protects all FCEB email traffic.
34 IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES
Regarding Sandbox, is sandboxing of email attachments allowed on the Vendor Cloud or does CISA require sandboxing in a CISA or Agency-specific datacenter?
Specific operational considerations will be solution dependent. Respondents may address this as an assumption and/or provide recommendations in RFI responses.
35 IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES
Is there an expected SLA for email delivery or other system accesses by CISA or Agency administrators?
This level of detail has not been defined beyond the general concept of minimizing impact to FCEB operations. RFI respondents may address this and provide recommendations in RFI responses.
36 IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES
Will agencies continue to leverage their own PES, in addition to this common service? If so, will this service be the first hop or second hop in the email pipeline (being second hop will minimize insights due to filtering already done in first PES hop)?
| Reuse of existing FCEB email security solutions may be considered as a component of the PES solution, provided that existing solutions meet some portion of PES capabilities. Integration considerations should be identified, as necessary, in the RFI response. | |
| 37 | IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES |
Would this capability augment or replace current E3A services?
| Refer to question 11 response | |
| 38 | IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES |
Will each agency define their own policy rules (e.g., filters, DLP, scanning) or will there be central governance to decide on common rules across agencies?
CISA understands that both CISA policy (e.g., CISA developed indicators), which is expected to be mandatory, and Agency policy (e.g., Agency DLP rules) must be supported by the PES capability. RFI respondents may offer recommendations on how this can best be accomplished. (note: CISA will also allow for list-exceptions for Agencies)
39 IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES
Regarding Email Data Access, is the PEX expected to archive emails for long-term storage or will this be an agency responsibility? If Agency responsiblity, is PES expected to retain email logs for long-term storage?
Federal data retention requirements (specifically for email) will be considered as part of and future PES activities. RFI respondents may offer recommendations on how this can best be accomplished.
40 IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES
Regarding Advanced Protection, is the PES expected to use specific External Threat Feeds? If so, are they in STIX format from a TAXII server?
| The government is interested in recieving industry feedback including assumptions and/or recomendations in terms of technical characteristics of the solutions. RFI respondents should consider the ability to support formats and update frequencies similar to commercial threat feeds such as those commonly used by security operators in any large organization. See also response to questions regarding CISA provided indicators. If there are lessons learned or percieved limitations regarding STIX/TAXII conformance, please identify them in the response. | |
| 41 | IV. OVERVIEW OF SECURITY OPERATIONS SERVICES CAPABILITIES |
Regarading Email Compromise and Data Loss Prevention, is the DLP only for email textual content or does it extend to attachments?
Ideally, DLP capabilities will include attachments but as the question states industry may offer specific DLP solution recommendations in the RFI response as desired.
42 VI. RFI RESPONSE, Question 2 Is FEDRamp required now or is the goal to be FedRamp prior to service going operational?
| Due to the high sensitivity of email content, industry should highlight if any current offerings are Federal Risk and Management Program (FEDRAMP) authorized, or if there plans for authorization for current offerings. | |
| 43 | VI. RFI RESPONSE, Question 2 |
When and if will FEDRamp be required? Will a phased approach be used?
| Refer to question 42 response | |
| 44 | VI. RFI RESPONSE, Question 3 |
How does CISA envision the PES capability being integrated with other shared cyber security solutions (e.g., PDMS)?
| Since CISA has not defined or approved a PES solution architecture, the Government welcomes feedback on how a PES capability would integrate with other CISA shared cyber security solutions. Integration considerations should be identified, as necessary, in the RFI response. | |
| 45 | VII. CONTRACTOR NOTIFICATION AND SUBMITTAL INSTRUCTIONS |
Would the government consider increasing the response to questions (Section 2) to be no longer than fourteen (14) pages in length?
| The responses to the questions should follow the requirements in Section 2 and can be no longer than nine (9) pages in length. | ||
| 46 | Is the PES RFI related to the Top Level Domain Initiative of CISA? | No |
PES RFI Compliance
| EDR RFI COMPLIANCE CHECKLIST | |||||||||||||
| RFI No: | 47QFRA22K0005 | ||||||||||||
| Project Title: | Protective Email Service (PES) | ||||||||||||
| RFI Closing Date: | December 20, 2021 | ||||||||||||
| Date of Compliance: | |||||||||||||
| Compliance done by: | Diana | ||||||||||||
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