Statement of Work - Boiler Plant Safety Device Repairs.docx

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J045--URGENT Boiler Plant Safety Repairs for RMR VAMC
Solicitation number
36C25925Q0016
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This document is a Statement of Work (SOW) for the repair and maintenance of the boiler plant safety devices at the Rocky Mountain Regional VA Medical Center (RMR VAMC) in Aurora, CO. The SOW outlines the scope of work required to repair and upgrade the boiler plant systems identified in a recent survey. Key objectives include restoring the plant to full operational status, enhancing reliability, and ensuring compliance with VHA directives and industry safety standards. The contractor will be responsible for conducting a detailed review of the survey findings, developing a comprehensive repair and maintenance plan, providing training to boiler plant operators, and submitting a final report. The work must be completed within a 90-day period of performance, with all schedules and work hours coordinated and approved through the Contracting Officer's Representative (COR). Acceptance criteria include completion of all tasks, verification of system performance, and approval of the final report by VA facilities management.

The related federal contract opportunity is a Request for Quote (RFQ) for the Boiler Plant Safety Repairs at the RMR VAMC. The work is a 100% small business set-aside, with a NAICS code of 238220. The Government anticipates awarding a firm-fixed price contract. Quotes are due by 12:00 pm MT on 10/11/2024 and will be evaluated on technical capability, past performance, and price.

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VHA Boiler and Associated Plant Safety Device Testing Manual 8th Edition.pdf PDF
36C25925Q0016 0002.docx DOCX document
Directive 1810.pdf PDF
36C25925Q0016 0001.docx DOCX document
Wage Determination 2015-5419 Rev 27.pdf PDF
36C25925Q0016.docx DOCX document

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Boiler Plant Safety Device Repairs

1700 N Wheeling St, Aurora, CO 80045

Statement of Work

A. Introduction and Background

The contractor will provide all supervision, labor, equipment, and materials needed to complete a Boiler Plant Repair of Safety Devices per this statement of work. A key component of the contract will be a resolving action items from a Boiler Safety Devices Testing Review (Attachment A). The primary objective of this SOW is to outline the scope of work required to repair and upgrade the boiler plant systems as identified in the survey. The goal is to restore the plant to full operational status, enhance reliability, and ensure compliance with VHA Directive 1810 – Boiler and Boiler Plant Operations as well as industry safety and regulatory standards.

The contractor shall provide comprehensive training to the designated Boiler Plant Operators on the operation, testing, and inspection of all newly installed an/or repaired safety devices.

The boiler plant at Rocky Mountain Regional VA Medical Center (RMR VAMC) is critical to maintaining optimal facility operations. Recent survey has identified issues requiring immediate attention to ensure the plant operates efficiently and safely. The survey, documented in Attachment A, provides a comprehensive overview of the existing conditions and recommended repairs.

General Requirements

1. Conduct a detailed review of the survey findings as documented in Attachment A.

2. Develop a comprehensive repair and maintenance plan based on the survey results.

3. Provide comprehensive training to the Boiler Plant Operators.

4. Ensure all work complies with relevant codes, standards, and regulations.

5. Coordinate with VA Medical Center facilities management to minimize disruption to hospital operations.

B. Scope

Specific Tasks

1. Boiler Inspection and Assessment

· Inspect all identified boiler units as per the survey findings.

· Evaluate the condition of boiler components, including burners, pumps, valves, and controls.

· Document any additional issues not previously identified in the survey.

· Documenting the location and type of any cast iron and malleable iron fittings ad components.

2. Repair and Replacement

· Replace or repair defective components as outlined in the survey.

· Perform necessary welding, sealing, and part replacements to address leaks, corrosion, or mechanical failures.

· Upgrade outdated components to enhance efficiency and compliance.

· Replacement of any cast iron and malleable iron fittings and components.

3. System Testing and Calibration

· Conduct comprehensive testing of the boiler systems post-repair.

· Calibrate controls and safety systems to ensure optimal performance.

· Verify that all repairs meet operational standards and specifications.

4. Safety and Compliance

· Ensure al repairs comply with local, state, and federal safety regulations.

· Conduct safety inspections and provide necessary documentation.

· Implement corrective actions if any compliance issues are identified.

5. Documentation and Reporting

· Provide detailed documentation of all repairs and replacements performed.

· Submit a final report outlining completed work, any deviations from the original plan, and recommendations for future maintenance.

Training Deliverable

1. Training Scope must cover but is not limited to:

· The purpose and function f each safety device.

· Proper procedures for testing each device.

· Inspection methods to ensure each safety device is functioning according to manufacturer specifications and safety standards.

· Troubleshooting and maintenance procedures.

2. Training Schedule

· The contractor shall coordinate with the boiler plant supervisor to schedule training sessions. Training shall occur prior to the final acceptance of the repairs and installation, with ample opportunity for hands-on-instruction.

3. Training Materials

· The contractor shall provide all necessary training materials, including manuals, testing procedures, and inspection checklists, in both digital and printed formats. These materials shall be left with the boiler plant for future reference.

4. Certification of Competency

· Upon completion of the training, the contractor shall issue a certificate of competency to each trained operator, confirming that they have successfully completed training on the operation, testing, and inspection of the installed safety devices.

5. Training Follow-up

· The contractor shall be available for up to 30 days following the training session to address any additional questions or provide clarification as needed.

Note:

1. All inspections and testing will be conducted during regular working hours.

2. Safety and operational protocols will be strictly followed during all site activities.

3. Impact of this work shall be minimized and mitigated in a way that limits disruption to the functioning of the RMR VAMC.

4. Scheduling and coordination with the RMR VAMC will be critical and must be approved by Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) prior to work.

Firetube Boilers:

Make: Cleaver Brooks
Model: 4WI 200-700-200ST

C. Deliverables

1. Detailed repair and maintenance plan.

2. Updated boiler system, fully operational and compliant with standards.

3. Thorough training with post-training support.

4. Comprehensive final report including inspection findings, repair details, updated one-lines, and recommendations.

D. Compliance and Standards and Guidelines

1. VHA Directive 1810 – Boiler and Boiler Plant Operations:

· All work performed under this contract must comply with VHA Directive 1810, which governs boiler and boiler plant operations for the Department of Veteran Affairs. The contractor shall ensure that all safety device repairs, testing, inspections, and training meet the requirements outlined in this directive, ensuring the continued safe operation of the boiler plant in accordance with Veterans health Administration (VHA) policies and safety standards.

2. Safety Device Testing and Inspection – VHA Boiler and Associated Plant Safety Device Testing Manual Eighth Edition:

· All safety device testing and inspection procedures shall conform to the latest standards outline in the VHA Boiler and Associated Plant Safety Device Testing Manual Eighth Edition, published by Boiler Efficiency Institute (BEI). The contractor shall use this manual as the primary reference for procedures related to the testing, calibration, and inspection of safety devices, ensuring that all safety devices are tested in accordance with the best practices established by BEI.

3. Documentation

· The contractor shall provide detailed reports for all safety device tests and inspections, documenting compliance with both VHA Directive 1810 and the VHA Boiler and Associated Plant Safety Device Testing Manual Eighth Edition. These reports shall be submitted to the boiler plant supervisor upon completion of each phase of the work and will be used as part of the acceptance criteria.

4. Training Requirements

· As part of the training for boiler plant operators, the contractor shall include instruction on the safety device testing and inspection procedures specified in VHA Directive 1810 and the VHA Boiler and Associated Plant Safety Device Testing Manual Eighth Edition. Training must ensure operators are proficient in applying these standards to ongoing maintenance and operational procedures.

E. Schedule

1. The VA requires a schedule be submitted no later than 14 calendar days of Contract Award. Any work that is to be performed must be approved by the COR prior to commencement of work.

2. With respect to project schedule, the hospital operations shall take priority. Contractor may have to shift areas of work around to accommodate hospital operations. In the even the schedule is to be changed for any reason the contractor is responsible for notifying the COR within two (2) working days.

3. Period of Performance: 90 days

4. Hours of Work:

· Normal working hours are 0700 – 1700 Monday to Friday, except for Federal holidays.

· All schedules and work hours shall be requested, coordinated, and approved through the COR.

5. Milestones:

· Initial inspection and assessment

· Major repairs and replacements

· Final testing and calibration

· Delivery of final report

F. Performance Metrics

1. Successful completion of all repair tasks as identified in the survey.

2. Boiler system operational and compliant with all safety regulatory standards.

3. Minimal disruption to the VA Medical Center operations during repair activities.

G. Acceptance Criteria

1. Completion of all tasks as specified in the SOW and survey.

2. Verification of system performance through testing and calibration.

3. Approval of final report by VA Medical Center facilities management.

H. Site Specific Requirements

1. Employees of the contractor and sub-contractors shall always conduct themselves in a professional manner while on medical center property. The contractor shall ensure all personnel working on this contract are aware of RMR VAMC policies pertaining to employee behavior and conduct.

2. Physical or verbal misconduct may be grounds for removing employees from Medical Center property, or grounds for arrest by the Veteran Affairs (VA) Police. Employees may be banned from RMR VAMC property because of inappropriate or illegal behavior. The contractor shall not be entitled to any compensation from the Government for any costs resulting from employee misconduct (including, but not limited to, delays in contract completion) and may be held liable for costs incurred by the Government because of employee misconduct.

3. Smoking and vaping are strictly prohibited on the entire VAMC campus.

4. It is the contractor’s responsibility to properly assess the working conditions and include in the bid any specialty equipment, training, additional time, personnel, or safety equipment to perform the work safely and in compliance with all applicable RMR VAMC, local, state, and federal regulations.

I. Phasing

1. Any work specific to a single boiler can be worked on without interfering with hospital operations.

2. Execute work to interfere as little as possible with normal functioning of RMR VAMC.

J. Infection Control and Safety

Prior to commencing work, general contractor shall provide proof that an OSHA certified “competent person” (CP) in compliance with (29 CFR 1926.20(b)(2) will supervise all work under this contract and maintain a continual presence at the work site whenever the general or subcontractors are present. At all times during performance of this contract and until the work is completed and accepted, the Contractor shall directly superintend the work or assign and have on the worksite a competent superintendent who is satisfactory to the CO and has authority to act for the Contractor. Assigned CP shall have completed the OSHA 30-hour construction safety training within the past five (5) years and all other personnel shall have at least a 10-hour OSHA course.

K. Parking/Laydown Area

At no time shall vehicles be parked on roadways, patient parking areas, the loading dock, etc. Coordinate use of the loading dock for loading/unloading material with the COR. Materials shall not be deposited on the loading dock for any length of time.

All must be coordinate with the COR. There is no guarantee for laydown of material. Materials may be staged provided that the materials are secured and inaccessible by Medical Center patients. Interim Life Safety Measure (ILSM) Permit may be required for staged materials due to increased combustible loading. It is the responsibility of the Contractor to ensure their materials remain secure.

Attachment A

System
Sub-System
Device
Comment
Risk
Plant Device
Condensate Storage Tank High Water Alarm
4.1 Condensate Storage Tank High Water Alarm
Installation failure- Device required to be a Conductivity Probe.
Feedwater deaerator running dry and, consequently, boiler feed pumps running dry will cause overheating and damage to pumps and potential for plant shut down. Failure of make-up water controls (in open position) could lead to significant cost from waste of water and condensate from the tank overflow if this occurs over a long time period.
Plant Device
Condensate Storage Tank Low Water Alarm
4.2 Condensate Storage Tank Low Water Alarm
Installation failure- Device required to be a Conductivity Probe.
Low water in condensate storage tank can cause overheating and damage to condensate transfer pumps. Likely to “starve” feedwater deaerator and boiler feed pumps resulting in boiler feed pumps running dry and damaging pumps and potential for plant shut down
Plant Device
Feedwater Deaerator High Water Alarm
4.3 Feedwater Deaerator High Water Alarm
Conductivity probe type switch. Float type switches have high failure rate in this application where they are exposed to steam that causes seals to harden and prevent float movement.
Excess water level can cause dangerous water hammer in the DA as the water level encroaches into the steam space.
Plant Device
Feedwater Deaerator Low Water Alarm
4.4 Feedwater Deaerator Low Water Alarm
Installation failure- Device required to be a Conductivity Probe.
Damage to boiler feed pumps if they run dry and possible plant shut down.
Plant Device
Feedwater Deaerator Overflow System
4.5 Feedwater Deaerator Overflow System
Dump-Line is routed to CST- Must be routed to Drain. In-Line Valve to Drain is not (and must be) Lockable Only in the Open Position (LOOP.) Dump line is to CST is not (and must be) Locked/Lockable Only Closed.
Water hammer and rupture of deaerator, opening of safety valve. Potential for scalding hot water flowing down into the boiler room from ruptured deaerator or from safety valve.
Plant Device
Boiler Plant Building Combustible and Carbon Monoxide Monitor
4.8 Boiler Plant Building Carbon Monoxide Monitor
There are four Combustible Gas Sensors and five Carbon Monoxide Sensors. CO Test Gas is 50PPM (acceptable). CO Sensors all (Except the one adjacent to Boiler 2- which is failed/out of service) generated an audible alarm with this gas. Combustible gas sensors not accessible for testing. Reported that “Remote Test Plumbing Kits” are on order. Acquire 10% LEL Methane test gas for bump-testing sensors. There is no “Outside the Boiler Plant” repeat alarm for this system.
Carbon monoxide may cause death of personnel. Combustible gas may explode.
Boiler No. 1
Boiler Water Level Control
5.1.1. Low Water Cutoff (LWCO)
Fail- Float cutout activated with 2- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110).
Water level in boiler may go sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion if the auxiliary low water cutoff (ALWCO) also fails. This double failure has been witnessed in a VA plant. Low boiler water is a major cause of boiler accidents.
Boiler No. 1
Boiler Water Level Control
5.1.2. Auxiliary Low Water Cutoff (ALWCO)
Fail- Probe cutout activated with 1.5- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110).
Water level in boiler goes sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion.
Boiler No. 1
Boiler Water Level Control
5.1.4. High Water Alarm (HWA)
Fail Logic: Probe Activated about 0.5-inch from the top of the sight glass. No Alarm sounds if the Burner is switched Off. (Must operate with switch Off.)
As recommended by boiler manufacturer. Water level in the gage glass must be clearly visible from the operating floor at the set point.
Boiler No. 1
Pressure Containment
5.2.2. High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HBSPLS)
Fail-Logic: Switch allows Boiler to automatically Re-Start (Recycles.) Directive 1810 does not allow automatic re-start. Additionally, the CB Hawk system has a soft-setpoint start/stop capability which must be disabled.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the non-recycling pressure switch and the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
5.3.1. Low Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be raised to at least 2.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit. Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be Lockable Only in the Open Position.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
5.3.2. High Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be lowered to at most 3.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit, it Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position.
Flame may become very fuel-rich and generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO). Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air resulting in a damaging furnace “puff” when the excess fuel explodes. A fuel-rich flame is always dangerous.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
5.3.4. Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (AFGSVV)
Vent Valve does not leak. Manual Vent Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position and kept locked open.
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
5.3.7. Pilot Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (APFGSVV)
Vent Valve does not leak. Manual Vent Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position and kept locked open.
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – #2 Oil Section
5.4.1. Low Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFOPCS)
Fail-Installation and Setpoint: The isolation valve for this switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint is Too Low.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – #2 Oil Section
5.4.2. High Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFOPCS)
Fail-Installation: the valve adjacent to the Low Oil Pressure Switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint is close.
A fuel pressure rise will cause the flame to become fuel-rich and potentially generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO) and smoke. Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – #2 Oil Section
5.4.3. Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (LAMPS)
Fail-Installation and Setpoint. There is no Lockable Only in the Open Position Isolation Valve and Test Port to facilitate testing. Setpoint is almost “zero”- Way Too Low.
Flame may become unstable, smoky, have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – #2 Oil Section
5.4.4. Secondary Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (SLAMPS)
A Secondary Low Atomizing Media Pressure Switch must be installed to monitor the Atomizing Air Pressure leaving the Atomizing Pump.
Pressure decrease may cause flame to become unstable, smoky, and have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 1
Fuel Train Safety Devices – #2 Oil Section
5.4.5. Automatic Oil Fuel Shutoff Valves - Leak Test (AFOSV)
Downstream Valve does not leak. Relief Valve between Valves may be leaking back, or upstream valve may be leaking. Remove relief valve, and re-test upstream leak.
Unburned fuel will collect in the furnace and may explode when burner is started. Serious damage to boiler and hazard to personnel will result.

Recommended type of fuel valves: UL and FM approved for fuel service.

Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.6. Low-Fire Proving Switches (LFPS)
Fail- Installation and Setpoint (Gas) – breaks approximately 38% Firing Rate. Connection for switch-activating arm not pinned to gas-valve stem.
Ignition could be explosive because of the large amount of fuel and air igniting. Damage to boiler could occur along with hazard to personnel.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.8. Combustion Air Pressure Switch (CAPS)
Fail: Installation (Isolation Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position.), Logic and Setpoint are acceptable.
Forced draft fan or damper drive may fail and cause the flame to be fuel-rich. There may be an explosion if the fan or damper is suddenly activated to increase the air supply.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.9. Pre-Purge Airflow Proving Switch (PAPS)
Fail- Installation: Valve not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint and Logic are acceptable.
Required pre-purge may not be achieved and some combustible gases may remain in the furnace when the burner is ignited. An explosion can occur.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.10. Forced Draft Motor Interlock (FDMIS)
Fail (Policy and Logic): While these devices do function, they are installed within an enclosure with exposed, Three Phase Power. VA Specification requires they be installed in a separate enclosure with no exposed 3-Phase. Interlock does not generate an Annunciation Message.
Fan motor may be running at lower speed due to “single-phasing” or other problem or may not be running. Lack of combustion air will cause fuel-rich fire. Explosion may occur if the air flow suddenly increases.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.11. Minimum Pilot Flame Test and Low Pilot Gas Pressure Switch (LPFGPCS)
Fail- Logic, Installation and Setpoint. (Logic) Switch is wired in the power circuit to the Pilot Gas Valves, and must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. (Installation) Isolation Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position. (Setpoint) Setpoint must be adjusted to a value no lower than 80% of the regulated Pressure.
The pilot gas pressure regulator may fail and allow the pilot pressure to decrease to a point where the pilot flame is too small to quickly ignite the main flame. The result may be a build up of unburned fuel in the furnace and an explosion if it suddenly ignites. This could cause damage to the boiler and harm to personnel.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.12 Low Flue Gas Oxygen Alarm and Cutout (LFGOLI)
The system Setpoint is at Zero, and was not accessible to be set at a reasonable value. Required setpoint must be determined from Burner Tuning data. Oxygen test gas at the required concentration must be obtained for testing the interlock system, and plumbing installed to provide test-gas to the sensor.
Flame may become fuel rich due to failure of combustion controls or other fault. A fuel rich flame can result in an explosion if there is a sudden introduction of combustion air, such as at the post-purge.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.13 Liquid Relief Valve on Economizer (LRVE)
Improper Valve- must have a setpoint no higher than 90% of Economizer MAWP
Economizer rupture.
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.14. Flue Gas Recirculation Damper Interlock (FGRDI)
Fail-Installation and Logic: Coupling on FGR Valve must be drilled and pinned to provide positive engagement. Switch in the wrong circuit- it is wired in the Lightoff-circuit, it must be part of the Pre-Purge Proving circuit.
Improper purge of boiler and/or FGR Duct
Boiler No. 1
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
5.5.16. Furnace Pressure Switch (FPI)
Fail- Logic and Setpoint: No annunciation message with interlock. Setpoint too high for detected pressure range. NOTE: There is no Outlet Stack Damper- therefore this device is not Required. Removal is recommended.
High furnace pressure may cause poisonous flue gas to leak into the boiler room. Combustion may go fuel rich with a potential for explosion if the flue restriction suddenly is removed.
Boiler No. 2
Boiler Water Level Control
6.1.1. Low Water Cutoff (LWCO)
Fail- Float cutout activated with 1.9- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110).
Water level in boiler may go sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion if the auxiliary low water cutoff (ALWCO) also fails. This double failure has been witnessed in a VA plant. Low boiler water is a major cause of boiler accidents.
Boiler No. 2
Boiler Water Level Control
6.1.2. Auxiliary Low Water Cutoff (ALWCO)
Fail- Probe cutout activated with 2.0- inches of water in the sight glass (Before activation of Float.) Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110).
Water level in boiler goes sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion.
Boiler No. 2
Boiler Water Level Control
6.1.3. Low Water Alarm (LWA)
Fail- Setpoint:–LWA activates at 2.0-inch water level in the sight glass, same level as the Float LWCO.
Unplanned burner shut down due to operation of low water cutoffs. Boiler explosion from low water if the low water cutoffs do not operate properly.
Boiler No. 2
Boiler Water Level Control
6.1.4. High Water Alarm (HWA)
Fail Logic: Probe Activated about 2-inch from the top of the sight glass. No Alarm sounds if the Burner is switched Off. (Must operate with switch Off.)
Water level could increase sufficiently to cause tremendous carryover of liquid water with the boiler steam into the steam piping resulting in dangerous water hammer. Potential for piping rupture releasing steam into the boiler room.
Boiler No. 2
Pressure Containmentt
6.2.2. High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HBSPLS)
Fail-Logic: Switch allows Boiler to automatically Re-Start (Recycles.) Directive 1810 does not allow automatic re-start. Additionally, the CB Hawk system has a soft-setpoint start/stop capability which must be disabled.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the non-recycling pressure switch and the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
6.3.1. Low Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be raised to at least 2.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit. Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. A Lockable Only in the Open Position Isolation Valve must be installed.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
6.3.2. High Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be lowered to at most 2.88 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit, it Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position.
Flame may become very fuel-rich and generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO). Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air resulting in a damaging furnace “puff” when the excess fuel explodes. A fuel-rich flame is always dangerous.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
6.3.4. Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (AFGSVV)
Vent Valve does not leak. Manual Vent Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position and kept locked open.
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.

Recommended type of vent valve: UL approved for the fuel service.

Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
6.3.7. Pilot Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (APFGSVV)
Vent Valve does not leak. Manual Vent Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position and kept locked open.
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
6.4.1. Low Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFOPCS)
Fail-Installation: The isolation valve for this switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint and Logic are acceptable.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
6.4.2. High Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFOPCS)
Fail-Installation and Setpoint: the valve adjacent to the Low Oil Pressure Switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint is too high. Logic is acceptable.
A fuel pressure rise will cause the flame to become fuel-rich and potentially generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO) and smoke. Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air resulting in a damaging furnace “puff” when the excess fuel explodes. A fuel-rich flame is always dangerous.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
6.4.3. Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (LAMPS)
Fail-Installation. There is no Lockable Only in the Open Position Isolation Valve and Test Port to facilitate testing. Setpoint and Logic are acceptable.
Flame may become unstable, smoky, have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
6.4.4. Secondary Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (SLAMPS)
A Secondary Low Atomizing Media Pressure Switch must be installed to monitor the Atomizing Air Pressure leaving the Atomizing Pump.
Pressure decrease may cause flame to become unstable, smoky, and have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 2
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
6.4.5. Automatic Oil Fuel Shutoff Valves - Leak Test (AFOSV)
Downstream Valve does not leak. Relief Valve between Valves may be leaking back, or upstream valve may be leaking. Remove relief valve, and re-test upstream leak.
Unburned fuel will collect in the furnace and may explode when burner is started. Serious damage to boiler and hazard to personnel will result.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.6. Low-Fire Proving Switches (LFPS)
Fail- Installation and Setpoint (Gas) – breaks approximately 48% Firing Rate. Connection for switch-activating arm not pinned to gas-valve stem. Switch Arm for the Air Damper occasionally hangs on the protective screen. Setpoint too high on Oil.
Ignition could be explosive because of the large amount of fuel and air igniting. Damage to boiler could occur along with hazard to personnel.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.7. Forced Draft Damper Wide-Open Pre-Purge Proving Switch (FDDWOPS)
Fail- Setpoint approximately 80% (too low.) Logic and Installation good.
Insufficient purge air flow may not purge the boiler of all explosive gases. An explosion could result during the ignition sequence.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.8. Combustion Air Pressure Switch (CAPS)
Fail: Installation (Isolation Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position.), Logic acceptable. Setpoint very Low.
Forced draft fan or damper drive may fail and cause the flame to be fuel-rich. There may be an explosion if the fan or damper is suddenly activated to increase the air supply.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.11. Minimum Pilot Flame Test and Low Pilot Gas Pressure Switch (LPFGPCS)
Fail- Logic, Installation and Setpoint. (Logic) Switch is wired in the power circuit to the Pilot Gas Valves, and must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. (Installation) Isolation Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position. (Setpoint) Setpoint must be adjusted to a value no lower than 80% of the regulated Pressure.
The pilot gas pressure regulator may fail and allow the pilot pressure to decrease to a point where the pilot flame is too small to quickly ignite the main flame. The result may be a build up of unburned fuel in the furnace and an explosion if it suddenly ignites. This could cause damage to the boiler and harm to personnel.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.12 Low Flue Gas Oxygen Alarm and Cutout (LFGOLI)
The system Setpoint is at Zero, and was not accessible to be set at a reasonable value. Required setpoint must be determined from Burner Tuning data. Oxygen test gas at the required concentration must be obtained for testing the interlock system, and plumbing installed to provide test-gas to the sensor.
Flame may become fuel rich due to failure of combustion controls or other fault. A fuel rich flame can result in an explosion if there is a sudden introduction of combustion air, such as at the post-purge.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.13 Liquid Relief Valve on Economizer (LRVE)
Improper Valve- must have a setpoint no higher than 90% of Economizer MAWP.
Economizer rupture.
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.14. Flue Gas Recirculation Damper Interlock (FGRDI)
Fail-Installation and Logic: Coupling on FGR Valve must be drilled and pinned to provide positive engagement. Switch in the wrong circuit- it is wired in the Lightoff-circuit, it must be part of the Pre-Purge Proving circuit.
Improper purge of boiler and/or FGR Duct
Boiler No. 2
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
6.5.16. Furnace Pressure Switch (FPI)
High furnace pressure may cause poisonous flue gas to leak into the boiler room. Combustion may go fuel rich with a potential for explosion if the flue restriction suddenly is removed.
High furnace pressure may cause poisonous flue gas to leak into the boiler room. Combustion may go fuel rich with a potential for explosion if the flue restriction suddenly is removed.
Boiler No. 3
Boiler Water Level Control
7.1.1. Low Water Cutoff (LWCO)
Fail- Float cutout activated with 1.5- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110). Activates before Low Water Alarm.
Water level in boiler may go sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion if the auxiliary low water cutoff (ALWCO) also fails. This double failure has been witnessed in a VA plant. Low boiler water is a major cause of boiler accidents.
Boiler No. 3
Boiler Water Level Control
7.1.2. Auxiliary Low Water Cutoff (ALWCO)
Fail- Probe cutout activated with 3- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110). Activates “First”- before Alarm or LWCO.
Water level in boiler goes sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion.
Boiler No. 3
Boiler Water Level Control
7.1.3. Low Water Alarm (LWA)
Did not activate before either LWCO or ALWCO.
Unplanned burner shut down due to operation of low water cutoffs. Boiler explosion from low water if the low water cutoffs do not operate properly.
Boiler No. 3
Boiler Water Level Control
7.1.4. High Water Alarm (HWA)
Fail Logic: Probe did not activate at the top of the sight glass.
Water level could increase sufficiently to cause tremendous carryover of liquid water with the boiler steam into the steam piping resulting in dangerous water hammer. Potential for piping rupture releasing steam into the boiler room.
Boiler No. 3
Pressure Containment
7.2.2. High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HBSPLS)
Fail-Logic: Switch allows Boiler to automatically Re-Start (Recycles.) Directive 1810 does not allow automatic re-start. Additionally, the CB Hawk system has a soft-setpoint start/stop capability which must be disabled.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the non-recycling pressure switch and the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Saftey Devices - Natural Gas Section
7.2.3. High-High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HHBSPLS)
Fail- Setpoint: No setpoint separation from HBSPLS.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Saftey Devices - Natural Gas Section
7.3.1. Low Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be raised to at least 2.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit. Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be Lockable Only in the Open Position.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Saftey Devices - Natural Gas Section
7.3.2. High Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFGPCS)
Fail- Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be lowered to at most 2.95 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit, it Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit.
Flame may become very fuel-rich and generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO). Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air resulting in a damaging furnace “puff” when the excess fuel explodes. A fuel-rich flame is always dangerous.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Saftey Devices - Natural Gas Section
7.3.4. Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (AFGSVV)
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.

Recommended type of vent valve: UL approved for the fuel service.

If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.

Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Saftey Devices - Natural Gas Section
7.3.7. Pilot Gas Train Solenoid Vent Valve – Operation and Leak Test (APFGSVV)
Vent Valve does not leak. Manual Vent Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position and kept locked open.
If vent valve fails closed, it will pressurize the second automatic shut off valve if the first shut off valve is leaking. If the second shut off valve also leaks, the boiler can be filled with fuel which will explode when the burner is started. Leakage of the vent valve seat results in gas loss to the atmosphere with the accompanying cost of the gas.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
7.4.1. Low Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFOPCS)
Fail-Installation and Setpoint: The isolation valve for this switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint is Too Low.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
7.4.2. High Pressure Oil Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFOPCS)
Fail-Installation: the valve adjacent to the Low Oil Pressure Switch is not Lockable Only in the Open Position. Setpoint is too high.
A fuel pressure rise will cause the flame to become fuel-rich and potentially generate large amounts of carbon monoxide (CO) and smoke. Change of burner firing rates or shut down may suddenly introduce more combustion air resulting in a damaging furnace “puff” when the excess fuel explodes. A fuel-rich flame is always dangerous.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
7.4.3. Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (LAMPS)
Fail-Installation. There is no Lockable Only in the Open Position Isolation Valve and Test Port to facilitate testing. Setpoint is very close.
Flame may become unstable, smoky, have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 3
Fuel Train Safety Devices - #2 Oil Section
7.4.4. Secondary Low Oil Atomizing Media Pressure Switch (SLAMPS)
A Secondary Low Atomizing Media Pressure Switch must be installed to monitor the Atomizing Air Pressure leaving the Atomizing Pump.
Pressure decrease may cause flame to become unstable, smoky, and have high carbon monoxide. Flame may be momentarily extinguished and relight with a furnace “puff” that could be damaging.
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.6. Low-Fire Proving Switches (LFPS)
Fail- Installation and Setpoint (Gas) – breaks approximately 30% Firing Rate. Connection for switch-activating arm not pinned to gas-valve stem. Air Damper switch setpoint approximately 15% (must be no higher than 10%.)
Fail- Installation and Setpoint (Gas) – breaks approximately 30% Firing Rate. Connection for switch-activating arm not pinned to gas-valve stem. Air Damper switch setpoint approximately 15% (must be no higher than 10%.)
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.9. Pre-Purge Airflow Proving Switch (PAPS)
Fail- Setpoint: setpoint approximately 40% of max, must be at least 80%.
Required pre-purge may not be achieved and some combustible gases may remain in the furnace when the burner is ignited. An explosion can occur.
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.11. Minimum Pilot Flame Test and Low Pilot Gas Pressure Switch (LPFGPCS)
Fail- Logic, Installation and Setpoint. (Logic) Switch is wired in the power circuit to the Pilot Gas Valves, and must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. (Installation) Isolation Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position. (Setpoint) Setpoint must be adjusted to a value no lower than 80% of the regulated Pressure.
The pilot gas pressure regulator may fail and allow the pilot pressure to decrease to a point where the pilot flame is too small to quickly ignite the main flame. The result may be a build up of unburned fuel in the furnace and an explosion if it suddenly ignites. This could cause damage to the boiler and harm to personnel.
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.12 Low Flue Gas Oxygen Alarm and Cutout (LFGOLI)
The system Setpoint is at Zero, and was not accessible to be set at a reasonable value. Required setpoint must be determined from Burner Tuning data. Oxygen test gas at the required concentration must be obtained for testing the interlock system, and plumbing installed to provide test-gas to the sensor.
Flame may become fuel rich due to failure of combustion controls or other fault. A fuel rich flame can result in an explosion if there is a sudden introduction of combustion air, such as at the post-purge.
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.13 Liquid Relief Valve on Economizer (LRVE)
Improper Valve- must have a setpoint no higher than 90% of Economizer MAWP.
10% above max feedwater pressure and less than 90% of max allowable economizer pressure.
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.14. Flue Gas Recirculation Damper Interlock (FGRDI)
Fail-Installation and Logic: Coupling on FGR Valve must be drilled and pinned to provide positive engagement. Switch in the wrong circuit- it is wired in the Lightoff-circuit, it must be part of the Pre-Purge Proving circuit.
Improper purge of boiler and/or FGR Duct
Boiler No. 3
Burner and Air Train Safety Devices
7.5.16. Furnace Pressure Switch (FPI)
Fail- Logic and Setpoint: No annunciation message with interlock. Setpoint close to required value. NOTE: There is no Outlet Stack Damper- therefore this device is not Required. Removal is recommended.
High furnace pressure may cause poisonous flue gas to leak into the boiler room. Combustion may go fuel rich with a potential for explosion if the flue restriction suddenly is removed.
Boiler No. 4
Boiler Water Level Control
8.1.1. Low Water Cutoff (LWCO)
Fail- Float cutout activated with 2- inches of water in the sight glass. Device is Not wired in the Running Interlock (3 to P) Circuit, does not Lock Out BMS (Fireye YB110).
Water level in boiler may go sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion if the auxiliary low water cutoff (ALWCO) also fails. This double failure has been witnessed in a VA plant. Low boiler water is a major cause of boiler accidents.
Boiler No. 4
Boiler Water Level Control
8.1.2. Auxiliary Low Water Cutoff (ALWCO)
The LWCO and ALWCO should be of different types so that both are not subject to the same mode of failure.
Water level in boiler goes sufficiently low to cause boiler explosion.
Boiler No. 4
Boiler Water Level Control
8.1.4. High Water Alarm (HWA)
Fail Logic: Probe Activated about 1-inch from the top of the sight glass. No Alarm sounds if the Burner is switched Off. (Must operate with switch Off.)
Water level could increase sufficiently to cause tremendous carryover of liquid water with the boiler steam into the steam piping resulting in dangerous water hammer. Potential for piping rupture releasing steam into the boiler room.
Boiler No. 4
Pressure Containmentt
8.2.2. High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HBSPLS)
Fail-Logic: Switch allows Boiler to automatically Re-Start (Recycles.) Directive 1810 does not allow automatic re-start. Additionally, the CB Hawk system has a soft-setpoint start/stop capability which must be disabled.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the non-recycling pressure switch and the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 4
Pressure Containmentt
8.2.3. High-High Boiler Steam Pressure Limit Switch (HHBSPLS)
Fail- Setpoint: Does Not activate prior to First SVB lifting. Switch does not Generate Lockout through Burner Safety Control, but is a Manual Reset Switch.
Boiler explosion from overpressure if there are also failures of the boiler safety valves. Excess pressure on steam distribution system that could cause pressure reducing valves in the system to fail. This has the potential for over-pressuring steam systems downstream from the pressure reducing stations if the pressure reducing station safety valves fail.
Boiler No. 4
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
8.3.1. Low Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (LFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be raised to at least 2.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit. Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be Lockable Only in the Open Position. Boiler occasionally trips- Low Pressure at Lightoff, indicating Gas Pressure Regulator is not performing to Specification.
As an example, a pressure regulator malfunction that allows the fuel pressure to drop and then allows the fuel pressure to increase could result in a furnace explosion from the excess air present in the furnace and the sudden increase of fuel into the furnace.
Boiler No. 4
Fuel Train Safety Devices – Natural Gas Section
8.3.2. High Pressure Gas Fuel Cutoff Switch (HFGPCS)
Fail-Installation, Setpoint and Logic: Setpoint should be lowered to at most 3.0 psig. Switch is wired in the “Limits” Circuit, it Must be in the Running Interlock (3-P) Circuit. Valve must be made Lockable Only in the Open Position.

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