36C25618R0260-00001002.pdf

Project Test Report May 7, 2015 to April 9, 2016

Electrical Maintenance & Testing Project

Cover

Performed by

SDV Services Inc

Veterans Affairs Medical Center Shreveport, Louisiana

Electrical Testing and Maintenance Project

Veterans Affairs Medical Center

Shreveport, Louisiana May 7, 2015 to April 9, 2016

Section 1 Electrical Testing and Maintenance Summary

Section 2 Publications/Exhibits

Section 3 Electrical Test Records

Table of Contents

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Electrical Testing & Maintenance Report Summary

General

SDV Services Inc. provided electrical testing and maintenance services at the Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Shreveport, Louisiana May 7, 2015 to April 9, 2016. All services were conducted in accordance with contract specifications, industry standards, NFPA 70B and manufacturer’s recommendations. This report consists of the following:

Section 1 Electrical Testing and Maintenance Report Summary

Section 2 Publications/Exhibits

Section 3 Electrical Test Records

The types of equipment inspected during this session included:

Medium Voltage Circuit Breakers and Protective Relays

Medium Voltage Air Switches

Medium Voltage Transformers

Low Voltage Main & Distribution Switchboards w/ Circuit Breakers

Automatic Transfer Switches

Findings & Recommendations

Outlined below are findings and recommendations for each issue noted during this testing session.

1. Shock and Arc Flash Hazard Information

Issue

Presently, none of the electrical equipment in this facility contains shock and arc flash hazard warning labels beyond generic warning labels. Such labels are required to provide critical information such as incident energy levels, flash and shock hazard boundaries necessary to determine personal protective equipment (PPE) for servicing such equipment item as required by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70E sections 130.3(B)(1) and 130.5, National Electric Code (NEC) section 110.16 outlined below in addition to OSHA regulation §1910.303.

Both shock and arc flash hazard analyses incorporating essential short circuit and selective

2 | P a g e coordination studies need to be performed to determine shock and incident energy levels necessary to develop proper warning labels.

NFPA Reference 130(B)(1) Electrical Hazard Analysis

Appropriate safety-related work practices shall be determined before any person is exposed to the electrical hazards involved by using both shock hazard analysis and arc flash hazard analysis.

NFPA 70E Reference

130.5 Arc Flash Hazard Analysis

Employers must conduct an arc flash hazard analysis and place a label on an external surface of equipment that indicates the degree of the thermal hazard or recommends PPE for protection from the degree of existing thermal hazard. The NEC requires a label that warns employees of a potential thermal hazard. Employers must provide sufficient information for an employee to conduct the necessary hazard analysis. Labels are one element of the hazard analysis.

NEC Reference

110.16 Flash Protection.

Electrical equipment, such as switchboards, panel boards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers, that are in other than dwelling occupancies, and are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized shall be field marked to warn qualified persons of potential electric arc flash hazards. The marking shall be located so as to be clearly visible to qualified persons before examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance of the equipment.

FPN No. 1: NFPA 70E-2004, Standard for Electrical Safety in the Workplace, provides assistance in determining severity of potential exposure, planning safe work practices, and selecting personal protective equipment.

FPN No. 2: ANSI Z535.4-1998, Product Safety Signs and Labels, provides guidelines for the design of safety signs and labels for application to products.

Simply turning off and on of a circuit breaker creates the potential for an arc flash incident.

Refer to the excerpt below for the response to question 2 in the OSHA letter (copy of the full text has been included in the publications section to this report). Paragraph 2 of the answer clearly indicates the potential for an arc flash incident and related danger to personnel even with the enclosure doors closed. In this case, they cite a defective circuit breaker being the culprit for the incident.

OSHA Determination Point Question (2)

Scenario: Construction employees will be turning off circuit breakers. These circuit breakers, some of which are rated in excess of 240 volts (but not greater than 600 volts) and others less than 240 volts, are installed in three-phase panel boards contained within an approved enclosure with a bolt-on cover trim. The enclosure and cover trim prevent live parts from being exposed. Would the circuit breaker be considered an exposed electrical part when it has a closed cover trim installed such that PPE would be required to protect against electric shock when someone turns the breaker on or off? Would PPE be required to protect against arc flash?

Answer: The requirement in 1926.416(a)(1) to provide protection is triggered where an employee "could contact the electric power circuit." The circuit breaker you refer to is contained within an approved enclosure and has no exposed live parts. The enclosure and closed cover trim is a type of dead front design that does not expose employees to live parts.

Therefore, electric shock protection is not required when simply turning the switch on or off.

Arc flash, however, may occur if the switch is defective. Employees in the scenario you describe may be exposed to risk when they are fixing the breaker or turning it on or off. While the chances of serious injury from arc flash may be remote in certain circumstances, NFPA 70E calls for a flash hazard analysis (or use of PPE under its table of tasks) to be performed in order to determine the risk level and the appropriate PPE. NFPA 70E 130.3 states:

A flash hazard analysis shall be done in order to protect personnel from the possibility of being injured by an arc flash. The analysis shall determine the Flash Protection Boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the Flash Protection Boundary shall use.

Upon completion of the arc flash study, ensure arc flash warning labels are posted on all required electrical equipment containing the information outlined in NFPA 70E section

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130.5(C). Personnel should then be briefed on associated hazards when servicing such equipment.

NFPA 70E Reference 130.5(C) Equipment Labeling.

Electrical equipment such as switchboards, panelboards, industrial control panels, meter socket enclosures, and motor control centers that are in other than dwelling units, and are likely to require examination, adjustment, servicing, or maintenance while energized, shall be field marked with a label containing all the following information:

(1) At least one of the following:

a. Available incident energy and the corresponding working distance

b. Minimum arc rating of clothing

c. Required level of PPE

d. Highest Hazard/Risk Category (HRC) for the equipment

(2) Nominal system voltage

(3) Arc flash boundary

Below are sample labels reflecting minimum required information:

An overview of the arc flash process and electrical study procedures utilized by SDV Services as well as a Square D white paper concerning arc flash issues is provided in Tab 2 of this report. This publication provides a highly informative overview of the need for and the process of establishing arc flash levels. A scope of work for an arc flash study developed by SDV Services has been included as well. This can serve as a very good starting point for preparing and issuing an arc flash study solicitation.

Additionally, electrical drawings should be verified to ensure they accurately depict the present configuration of the electrical system. The lack of updated drawings can be dangerous to personnel operating and attempting to resolve issues in the electrical system as well as establishing proper lockout/tagout procedures. Such drawings should be updated as a part of the arc flash study project.

Recommendation

Conduct shock and arc flash hazard analyses to determine potentials hazard and incident energy levels. Upon completion, ensure arc flash NFPA-compliant warning labels are posted on all required electrical equipment. Personnel should then be trained on Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) requirements when servicing such equipment.

All electrical single-line drawings should be updated to incorporate all upgrades and additions to the electrical system. This is necessary to provide maintenance personnel with up-to-date

4 | P a g e information to ensure proper safeguards are in place while performing maintenance operations. This should be incorporated into the short circuit and selective coordination study project.

Lockout/tagout procedures should be revised upon completion of the drawing updates. Both are necessary to provide maintenance personnel with up-to-date information to ensure proper safeguards are in place while performing maintenance operations.

2. Protective Device Selective Coordination

The building 1S, Dental Clinic and switchboard C (building 1) circuit breakers tested during this session were found with protective device setting at the factory default minimum settings. It is unclear if these settings have been selectively coordinated as a part of an electrical study.

The lack of coordination and minimum settings can lead to nuisance trips on these circuits due to non-fault related issues. Both phase imbalances and inrush currents during equipment startup are common causes of breakers opening under what appears to be a ground fault condition.

The requirement for coordination of these devices is outlined in National Electric Code (NEC) sections 240, 700.27 and 701.18 outlined below:

NEC Reference.

240.12 Electrical System Coordination.

Where an orderly shutdown is required to minimize the hazard(s) to personnel and equipment, a system of coordination based on the following two conditions shall be permitted:

(1) Coordinated short-circuit protection

(2) Overload indication based on monitoring systems or devices

240.100 Feeders and Branch Circuits.

(A) Location and Type of Protection. Feeder and branch-circuit conductors shall have overcurrent protection in each ungrounded conductor located at the point where the conductor receives its supply or at an alternative location in the circuit when designed under engineering supervision that includes but is not limited to considering the appropriate fault studies and time–current coordination analysis of the protective devices and the conductor damage curves. The overcurrent protection shall be permitted to be provided by either 240.100(A)(1) or (A)(2).

700.27 Coordination.

Emergency system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective devices.

Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required in (1) or (2):

(1) Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective devices, where only one overcurrent protective device or set of overcurrent protective devices exists on the transformer secondary,

(2) Between overcurrent protective devices of the same size (ampere rating) in series.

701.18 Coordination.

Legally required standby system(s) overcurrent devices shall be selectively coordinated with all supply side overcurrent protective devices.

Exception: Selective coordination shall not be required in (1) or (2):

(1) Between transformer primary and secondary overcurrent protective devices, where only one overcurrent protective device or set of overcurrent protective devices exists on the transformer secondary,

(2) Between overcurrent protective devices of the same size (ampere rating) in series.

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Upon completion of the study or if already completed, protective device settings should be checked against study specifications and changed as needed. Note – such a study is an inseparable component of the above-mentioned arc flash study.

A coordination study to determine necessary protective device settings is an integral part of an arc flash study. A separate study to address the potential coordination issue in these three buildings/areas should not be performed separately unless the above-referenced arc flash study is not performed. Upon completion, all protective device settings should be adjusted to reflect values derived in the study. This is important to ensure the facility is safely and properly protected in the event of a fault.

3. Electrical System Condition

There have been several recent electrical system upgrades in this facility designed to provide a safer environment for the buildings and their occupants. However, there are a couple of areas containing equipment that has far exceeded its useful industry service life 25 years of age and the 15 year service life outlined in the VA Electrical Design Manual reference below.

VA Electrical Design Manual Reference

1.15.4 AGE AND PHYSICAL CONDITION

(b) The equipment should be capable of remaining in use for a minimum of 15 years of additional life or having 60 percent of remaining life, if not the equipment shall be replaced.

Those areas are:

a. Medium Voltage Substation including circuit breakers and protective relays,

b. Boiler Plant, and

c. Building 6 Main Switchboard (located outside)

Additionally, the majority of circuit breakers in switchboards A, B and C in the main building contain original trip units that are over 40 years of age and are showing increasing signs of failure as documented further below in this summary. Attachment A to this summary provides a listing of all circuit breakers containing these original General Electric Versa Trip protective devices.

Replacement parts for this equipment are becoming increasingly more difficult to obtain due to age and technical obsolescence. Equipment of this age and condition raises the question of reliability in regards to the ability of the equipment to properly and safely protect the facility.

Careful consideration should be given to upgrading the older equipment throughout this facility.

As electrical equipment ages, the associated risk of a failure increases significantly. Such failures usually occur without prior warning and can be potentially catastrophic. Repairing or replacing aged equipment is another issue due to obsolescence or non-availability of parts. In the event of a failure, there is a great possibility parts will not be available or will have

6 | P a g e significant lead times. As an example, SDV found a defective main switch in a federal building that took 6 months to acquire a replacement part due to technical obsolescence. This can lead to very costly repairs and extended down time for equipment and related circuits.

Included in section 2 to this report is an article presented by three professional engineers (PEs) specializing in electrical distribution systems – “Renovating Electrical Distribution Systems” by Syed M. Peeran, PhD, PE; Mario Vecchiarello, PE; and Jeff Romeo, PE. The first page of this article references the hazards of aging electrical systems and the unpredictability of equipment exceeding its useful service life. Equipment identified in this report has far exceeded this service life without upgrade and has this element of unpredictability regardless of past performance or testing.

Recommendation

Due to the age and obsolescence of the above-referenced systems, a project should be initiated to replace the electrical systems in the medium voltage substation, building 6 and the Boiler Plant.

The circuit breakers listed in Attachment A containing original GE Versa Trip protective devices need to be retro-fitted to the most current trip devices available.

4. Overhead Sprinklers

Much of the electrical equipment located throughout this facility has sprinkler heads and related water pipes directly over or within the spray pattern of the electrical equipment as represented by the picture to the right. No protective covers have been installed to prevent water from getting into the electrical equipment nor are physical protective devices installed to protect the actual sprinkler heads from physical damage. Both are required by National Electric Code section 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d) as outlined below.

110.26(F)(1)(a) through 110.26(F)(1)(d)

(F) Dedicated Equipment Space. All switchboards, panelboards, distribution boards, and motor control centers shall be located in dedicated spaces and protected from damage.

Exception: Control equipment that by its very nature or because of other rules of the Code must be adjacent to or within sight of its operating machinery shall be permitted in those locations.

(1) Indoor. Indoor installations shall comply with 110.26(F)(1)(a) through (F)(1)(d).

(a) Dedicated Electrical Space. The space equal to the width and depth of the equipment and extending from the floor to a height of 1.8 m (6 ft) above the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower, shall be dedicated to the electrical installation. No piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or other equipment foreign to the electrical installation shall be located in this zone.

Exception: Suspended ceilings with removable panels shall be permitted within the 1.8-m (6-ft) zone.

(b) Foreign Systems. The area above the dedicated space required by 110.26(F)(1)(a) shall be permitted to contain foreign systems, provided protection is installed to avoid damage to the electrical equipment from condensation, leaks, or breaks in such foreign systems.

(c) Sprinkler Protection. Sprinkler protection shall be permitted for the dedicated space where the piping complies with this section.

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(d) Suspended Ceilings. A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling that does not add strength to the building structure shall not be considered a structural ceiling.

The dedicated electrical space includes the space defined by extending the footprint of the switchboard or panelboard from the floor to a height of 6 ft above the height of the equipment or to the structural ceiling, whichever is lower. This reserved space permits busways, conduits, raceways, and cables to enter the equipment. The dedicated electrical space must be clear of piping, ducts, leak protection apparatus, or equipment foreign to the electrical installation. Plumbing, heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning piping, ducts, and equipment must be installed outside the width and depth zone.

Foreign systems installed directly above the dedicated space reserved for electrical equipment must include protective equipment that ensures that occurrences such as leaks, condensation, and even breaks do not damage the electrical equipment located below.

Sprinkler protection is permitted for the dedicated spaces as long as the sprinkler or other suppression system piping complies with 110.26(F)(1)(c). A dropped, suspended, or similar ceiling is permitted to be located directly in the dedicated space, as are building structural members.

The electrical equipment also must be protected from physical damage. Damage can be caused by activities performed near the equipment, such as material handling by personnel or the operation of a forklift or other mobile equipment. See 110.27(B) for other provisions relating to the protection of electrical equipment.

Exhibits 110.21, 110.22, and 110.23 illustrate the two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F), that is, the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

In Exhibit 110.21, the dedicated electrical space required by 110.26(F) is the space outlined by the width and the depth of the equipment (the footprint) and extending from the floor to 6 ft above the equipment or to the structural ceiling (whichever is lower). The dedicated electrical space is reserved for the installation of electrical equipment and for the installation of conduits, cable trays, and so on, entering or exiting that equipment. The outlined area in front of the electrical equipment in Exhibit 110.21 is the working space required by 110.26(A). Note that sprinkler protection is afforded the entire dedicated electrical space and working space without actually entering either space. Also note that the exhaust duct is not located in or directly above the dedicated electrical space. Although not specifically required to be located here, this duct location may be a cost-effective solution that avoids the substantial physical protection requirements of 110.26(F)(1)(b).

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Exhibit 110.21 The two distinct indoor installation spaces required by 110.26(A) and 110.26(F): the working space and the dedicated electrical space.

A facility-wide survey of all electrical rooms/closets should be conducted to identify electrical components not properly protected or shielded from the sprinkler systems spray patterns or with overhead water lines. Additionally, the survey needs to identify sprinkler heads without physical protective covers.

Shields need to be installed in all areas where electrical components are within the spray pattern or have overhead water lines to prevent damage to prevent overhead water sources (sprinklers and water lines) from penetrating the enclosures. Such penetration could lead to a potentially catastrophic failure. Protective covers or cages need to be installed on unprotected sprinkler heads to prevent accidental activation with the same potential for catastrophic failure as mentioned above.

5. Improper Working Clearance

Switchboard NBBSB in room BW14 of the main building has been placed directly against the wall represented by the picture to the right. National Electric Code section 110.26(A)(1) requires a minimum 30” working clearance outlined below.

110.26(A)(1)(a) Dead-Front Assemblies

(a) Dead-Front Assemblies. Working space shall not be required in the back or sides of assemblies, such as dead-front switchboards or motor control centers, where all connections and all renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, are accessible from locations other than the back or sides. Where rear access is required to work on nonelectrical parts on the back of enclosed equipment, a minimum horizontal working space of 762 mm (30 in.) shall be provided.

Exhibit 110.9

Distances measured from the live parts if the live parts are exposed or from the enclosure front if the live parts are enclosed. If any assemblies, such as switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, the working clearance dimensions would be required at the rear of the equipment, as illustrated. Note that for Condition 3, where there is an enclosure on opposite sides of the working space, the clearance for only one working space is required.

In the case of this new switchboard installation, there are bus connections located in the rear of the enclosure that cannot be serviced from the front as they are blocked by other installed equipment (circuit breakers, support structures, secondary conductors, etc.). Any attempts to service these connections as well as clean the rear portion of the enclosure from the front would require extensive disassembly of circuit breakers and secondary conductors that clearly is not the intent of the manufacturer or the NEC.

There appears to be confusion and misapplication related to installation guidelines of similar “dead-front switchboards” throughout the country based on our findings. The National Electric Code (NEC) defines “dead front” as “without live parts exposed to a person on the

9 | P a g e operating side of the equipment.” The recently-installed main low voltage switchboard located in the basement of the building is a “dead-front switchboard” based on this NEC definition. Operating personnel are protected from the energized components when covers are in place. However, this definition makes no reference to working space requirements.

NEC section 110.26(A)(1)(a), Dead-Front Assemblies (outlined below) uses this definition and applies other qualifying factors or elements in determining working spaces around such assemblies. Those factors or elements are:

1) Connections,

2) Renewable or adjustable parts, such as fuses or switches, and

3) Accessibility from locations other than the back or sides.

Additional clarification regarding work space requirements is provided in Exhibit 110.9 further down in NEC Section 110.26(A)(1)(a). It states, “If any assemblies, such as switchboards or motor-control centers, are accessible from the back and expose live parts, the working clearance dimensions would be required at the rear of the equipment.” The switchboard in question does have covers providing rear access that expose the switchboard bus components. This installation clearly meets these conditions requiring a minimum 30” horizontal working space.

The NBBSB switchboard needs to be relocated to provide the minimum 30” horizontal working distance as required by NEC Section 110.26(A)(1)(a). This is necessary to facilitate proper maintenance and servicing of the bus and other components of the switchboard to include cleaning.

6. Adverse Conditions

Building 6 - The main switchboard is located outdoors. Even though the enclosure is rated for outdoor usage, the equipment continues to be penetrated by dirt/debris and exposed to lower than normal ambient operating temperatures. Such conditions can impact the physical ability of the breaker to respond to a fault while low ambient temperatures can lead to hardening of grease used to lubricate the internal operating mechanisms. Either condition may result in the circuit breakers and switches either operating slowly or not at all in the event of a fault. A delayed response in opening (seconds versus cycles) can lead to a sustained arc while failing to open can lead to a fire. Both have the potential for a catastrophic failure if left uncorrected.

Building 4 Outdoor Switchboard - the main switchboard for building 4 is located outdoors on a concrete pad. The location and configuration of this switchboard possesses similar issues to the building 6 switchboard in relation to dirt/debris penetration and abnormal ambient temperatures. There are some additional issues with this switchboard as follows:

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a. Pad size – the concrete pad has been placed at grade level and without a caulk seal at its base. This allows water to flow freely through the enclosure. Outdoor enclosures should be placed on a minimum 6” high pad to prevent such an occurrence.

b. Corrosion – it is unclear if this enclosure is rated as a NEMA 3R type suitable for outdoor usage. Regardless, the enclosure does not have weather stripping or other seals/screens installed to prevent moisture, dirt and debris from penetrating the enclosure that have led to corrosion within the interior of the unit not to mention considerable accumulations of dirt and debris. It should be noted the exterior of the enclosure is also showing relatively early signs of corrosion that will reduce its service life.

Chiller Plant Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) - The new Chiller Plant ATS has been placed outside behind the building under a shed roof. This switch does not appear to be rated for outdoor usage. As a result, it is subjected to the same dirt/debris and abnormal ambient temperatures as mentioned above that will lead to a reduced service life or premature failure.

Furthermore, this can result in the switch failing to transfer and total power loss to downstream emergency circuits. This ATS also contains a secondary side circuit breaker that can cause it to either operating slowly or not at all in the event of a fault. A delayed response in the circuit breaker opening (seconds versus cycles) can lead to a sustained arc while failing to open can lead to a fire. Both have the potential for a catastrophic failure if left uncorrected.

Additionally, the motor control centers in this facility are subjected to damaging environmental conditions – airborne chemicals used in the various mechanical equipment items (chillers, etc.), dirt and debris. This can lead to a reduced service life and premature failure of this equipment.

Enclosed in section 2 to this report is a Square D publication concerning placing electrical equipment in corrosive or adverse environments. It provides guidelines for protecting such electrical equipment.

Building 6 - Square D recommends building a room or enclosure with conditioned air around the main switchboard presently located outside. This will help to minimize the potential for dirt/debris to penetrate the equipment. Additionally, conditioned air would serve to reduce the equipment operating temperatures. Both measures would serve to extend the useful service lives of this equipment. If left uncorrected, the potential exists of a catastrophic failure and possible fire.

Building 4 – The same recommendation for the main switchboard for building 6 applies to that of building 4. Additionally, the enclosure needs to be treated with a rust inhibiting paint to prevent further degradation of the enclosure. To offset penetration by moisture, dirt and debris, the following steps should be accomplished:

a. Weather stripping should be installed around all doors.

b. Filters or screens should be installed around louvered enclosure openings.

c. Caulk the base of the enclosure.

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Chiller Plant Automatic Transfer Switch (ATS) - The Chiller Plant ATS needs to be relocated to an area segregated from operating equipment such as boilers, chillers, etc. that create an airborne chemical environment with the potential for a greatly reduced service life. This is best accomplished by building a room with conditioned air around the ATS to prevent penetration by these airborne chemicals and maintain a steady temperature. As with building 6 above, these measures will help to extend the useful service lives of this equipment.

Motor Control Centers (MCCs) – these equipment items need to be segregated from operating equipment such as boilers, chillers, etc. that create an airborne chemical environment with the potential for a greatly reduced service life. This is best accomplished by building a room with conditioned air around the MCCs to prevent penetration by these airborne chemicals and maintain a steady temperature. As with building 6 above, these measures will help to extend the useful service lives of this equipment.

7. Combustible Material

The main switchboards for building 6 and building 1S (outside) contain cardboard in an apparent effort to protect interior cables from damage by sharp metal surfaces. However, such combustible materials are specifically prohibited by National Electric Code sections

110.27 and 408.50 outlined below.

110.18 Arcing Parts.

Parts of electrical equipment that in ordinary operation produce arcs, sparks, flames, or molten metal shall be enclosed or separated and isolated from all combustible material.

408.50 Panels.

The panels of switchboards shall be made of moisture-resistant, noncombustible material.

The cardboard material in these two switchboards needs to be removed and replaced with an insulating or “mastic” material as needed to protect the enclosed cables.

8. Improper Lug Terminal Configuration

The lug terminal for the incoming conductors in the building 1S main switchboard have been configured in a manner that prevents the line side conductors from being properly torqued or tightness verified. SDV personnel conducted an infrared scan of these terminals to ensure no immediate issues existed.

The lug terminal needs to be replaced with one allowing full access to the installed conductors for subsequent torqueing and tightness verification.

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9. Defective Circuit Breakers

Issues

The circuit breakers below were found to be defective. Each is listed by location along with a description of the deficiency.

Location Circuit ID Issue

Main Bldg., Rm. BE96, Substation B

Spare Serial No. AK75926

Failed to trip on short time delay during overcurrent testing.

Main Bldg., Rm. BE96, Substation B

Spare Serial No. AK75918

Failed to trip during overcurrent testing.

Main Bldg., Rm. BE96, Substation C

Spare Serial No. AK75935

Failed to trip during overcurrent testing.

Main Bldg., Rm. BE96, Substation C

Spare Serial No. AK75932

Breaker tripped prematurely during overcurrent testing.

Boiler Plant Panel NE Breaker Breaker failed to trip during overcurrent testing.

Boiler Plant, Generator Room Generator Main Breaker failed to trip during overcurrent testing.

Recommendations

The trip units for the four spare circuit breakers in substations B and C need to be replaced.

The Panel NE and generator main breakers in the Boiler Plant need to be replaced.

10. Building 6 Emergency Power Configuration

There has been confusion in the past regarding how the building 6 generator and emergency power system were tied into the building electrical system. During this testing session, the conductors for the normal and emergency power systems were traced through the automatic transfer switch (ATS) and ultimately to the panels in building 6 to gain an understanding of how this all tied together.

The source of the confusion appears to be related to the fact that the load side conductors (N) of the ATS run back into the MDP switchboard and around the two sections before leading to the building 6 panels.. This gives the appearance that the MDP switchboard is downstream of the ATS and is powered by both normal and emergency power sources. If that were correct, both normal and emergency power sources would have to be de-energized to allow the MDP switchboard to be tested and serviced.

After tracing the circuits, it was determined that the MDP switchboard is only powered by the medium voltage transformer and not the generator as well. This transformer feeds the MDP switchboard containing the normal power feed to building 6. This building 6 normal power feed supplies power to the normal side of the ATS. Upon a loss of power to this breaker or

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MDP switchboard, the generator is designed to start up and supply power to the emergency side of the ATS which then feeds the building 6 panels.

Outlined below is a drawing depicting the configuration of this building’s electrical system:

Building 6 Power Configuration

Note Load side conductors from ATS are routed through MDP sections 1 and 2 before going to building 6 panels.

Building 6 Panels

B ld g.

ATS

300 kVA

Sp ar e

Sp ar e

Sp ar e

Main

B ld gs . 1

Sp ar e

G

Generator

MDP Section 1 MDP Section 2

N E

N

No related recommendations.

11. Transformer Oil Test Results

Oil samples were taken of all medium-voltage oil-type transformers. Each sample was tested using dissolved gas analysis (DGA). Laboratory test results have been incorporated into the test records for the medium-voltage transformers located in tab 3 to this report. All results were found to be normal.

No further recommendations needed.

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12. Transformer Gauges

The building 1S transformer does not have pressure gauges to indicate whether the transformer has negative, neutral or positive pressure in the oil tank. In the event the transformer has a negative pressure, obtaining oil samples on these transformers creates the potential for moisture and air to be pulled into the oil compartment. This can lead to “bubbling” with the potential for a flashover and catastrophic failure.

Enclosed is a publication by Transformer Testing and Repairs, Inc. discussing the importance of transformer gauges and reasons for maintaining a positive pressure in the oil tank. An ABB publication has also been included describing the process for establishing the vacuum and subsequent nitrogen blanket on the oil compartment.

Install a pressure gauge in the building S1 transformer. The transformer should have a vacuum pulled and nitrogen blanket placed on top of the oil to create a positive pressure and minimize the potential for moisture penetration. The level of pressure required varies by manufacturer. The applicable instruction manual for each manufacturer should be consulted for the appropriate pressure level.

CD-ROM Version

Inside the front cover of each report copy is a CD-ROM containing an electronic copy of the Electrical Testing & Maintenance Report. These have been created using Adobe Acrobat and can be viewed by anyone with Adobe Acrobat Reader 7.0 or higher on their computer. Additional report and work order copies can be printed using this CD-ROM.

In the event you do not have a compatible viewer, you can download a free version from the internet following the instructions at:

www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/index.html

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Attachment A. Circuit Breakers with VersaTrip Protective Devices

The circuit breakers listed below contain the original General Electric Versa Trip protective devices. Breakers should be retro-fitted with the latest such devices.

Building Location Circuit ID Serial No.

Main Swbd A ATS-EL AK75923

Main Swbd A ATS-EC2 AK75917

Main Swbd A ATS-EC1 AK75916

Main Swbd A A2 Main AK75904

Main Swbd B B1 Main AK75901

Main Swbd B Pnl NBMP AK75929

Main Swbd B Pnl PM AL75927

Main Swbd B ATS-EEQ2 AK75914

Main Swbd B Pnl PNPDEEQ AK75915

Main Swbd B ATS-EEQ1 AK75908

Main Swbd B B2 Main AK75903

Main Swbd C Main AK75931 http://www.adobe.com/products/acrobat/index.html

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Attachment A. Circuit Breakers with VersaTrip Protective Devices

The circuit breakers listed below contain the original General Electric Versa Trip protective devices. Breakers should be retro-fitted with the latest such devices.

Building Location Circuit ID Serial No.

Main Swbd A ATS-EL AK75923

Main Swbd A ATS-EC2 AK75917

Main Swbd A ATS-EC1 AK75916

Main Swbd A A2 Main AK75904

Main Swbd B B1 Main AK75901

Main Swbd B Pnl NBMP AK75929

Main Swbd B Pnl PM AL75927

Main Swbd B ATS-EEQ2 AK75914

Main Swbd B Pnl PNPDEEQ AK75915

Main Swbd B ATS-EEQ1 AK75908

Main Swbd B B2 Main AK75903

Main Swbd C Main AK75931

Electrical Testing and Maintenance Project VAMC – Shreveport, Louisiana

Publication Section

Enclosed are publications or articles referenced in this report. Such publications are invaluable and designed to provide additional discussion, authoritative commentary and/or guidance on issues noted during this testing session. Publication/articles have been broken down into categories and separated by a red divider page as follows:

Arc-Flash Equipment Product Literature

“Arc Flash in the Water/Wastewater Industry: No Longer an Emerging Issue” by Larry Ray, PE, John Carlin, PE, Raquel Sims, PE with Square D Company

OSHA Determination Letter, issued by Steven F. Witt, Director of Directorate of

Construction, Occupational Safety and Health Association, February 29, 2008

Arc Flash Process Overview sample by SDV Services at the Lake City VA Medical

Center, September to December 2009.

“Arc Flash Study Scope of Work Rev 2” by SDV Services, 2012 Version

Equipment Installation Guides

“Renovating Electrical Distribution Systems,” article by Syed M Peeran, May 2009 issue of Consulting-Specifying Engineer (re-print)

“Electrical Equipment and Components in Adverse/Corrosive Environments” Data

Bulletin by Square D Company, 09/2004

“Gauges are an Important Part of Your Transformer’s Operations” by Guy Agustin and Ben Caples, Transformer Testing & Repairs Inc., undated

“Inertaire® Oil Preservation Systems Installation, Operation, & Maintenance Guide

RN_ _” by ABB, May 1996

Arc Flash in the Water/Wastewater Industry: No Longer an Emerging Issue

Larry Ray, PE; John Carlin, PE; Raquel Sims, PE April 2006

Abstract In the “project background” portion of its February 2006 Request for Proposal for Arc Flash Analysis, a county municipality – one that includes a major U.S. city – states:

The County “is taking steps to meet the highest standards for electrical safety in the workplace, established in National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 70E, at each of its wastewater treatment facilities…In updating and building new facilities in the past three years, the County has been incorporating NFPA 70E compliance into the designs. Existing facilities that have had no electrical modifications since NFPA 70E was established need to be brought into compliance.”

While water treatment and wastewater treatment facilities have sometimes been viewed as being outside the requirements of new arc flash standards, this perception is rapidly changing. Through the years, requirements for employee safety in the workplace have come under increasing government scrutiny. In particular, worker electrical safety is one of the latest and is still evolving. Although perceived as largely a liability issue, there are benefits to the w/ww industry of an electrical safety program that includes an arc flash hazard analysis. This paper will present some of the technical portions of the safety requirements and the potential benefits.

The paper begins with an overview of the regulatory and technical requirements behind safe work electrical practices including a brief description of the applicable standards.

The focus will be on facility electrical equipment and the requirement for an arc flash hazard analysis. Some of the misconceptions associated with the analyses are presented.

Specific issues from recent analyses will be discussed with particular emphasis on w/ww facilities. Finally, the benefits of an electrical safety program are explained, including how an arc flash analysis can be applied to minimize liability, increase safety, protect equipment and processes, and minimize downtime.

Introduction The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), the National Electric Code (NEC), the Occupation Safety & Health Administration (OSHA) and others are implementing the current standards for arc flash analysis. The complete study includes a short-circuit analysis, an overcurrent device coordination study and an arc flash hazard analysis.

The short-circuit analysis evaluates the adequacy of the electrical distribution equipment in the facility based on the maximum available short-circuit current at its location. The overcurrent device time-current coordination analysis determines the suggested settings and, where appropriate, the ampere ratings and types for the electrical power system protective devices to achieve the desired system protection and electrical service continuity goals.

The arc flash hazard analysis establishes the flash protection boundary around electrical equipment within which a worker exposed to an arcing fault would expect to receive 2nd degree burns if not adequately protected. The analysis also determines the incident energy levels at specific working distances from equipment, which can be used to select appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE) to be worn when working within the flash protection boundary.

Over the past two decades the electrical industry has begun to recognize arc flash as a safety hazard in addition to electrical shock for personnel working near exposed energized conductors. The hazard was further quantified through controlled testing of 600V systems that included the effect of an enclosure in reflecting heat from the arc toward the opening of the enclosure. PPE for the arc flash hazard is the last line of defense. The protection is not intended to prevent all injuries but to mitigate the impact of an arc flash upon the individual, should one occur.

In many cases the use of PPE has saved lives or prevented injury. Adequate PPE may be required during load interruption, during the visual inspection that verifies that all disconnecting devices are open, and during the other steps necessary for placing a circuit in an electrically-safe condition, also known as lockout/tagout. Adequate PPE is always required during the tests to verify the absence of voltage after the circuits are de-energized and properly locked out/tagged out. It must be emphasized that the only way to prevent electrical injuries and fatalities is to ensure that equipment is de-energized and in an electrically safe condition. But even this act subjects the worker to potential hazards.

Background

Regulatory The federal law that initiated worker safety was the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970. Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations, part 1910.132(d)(1) requires the employer to assess the workplace for hazards and the need for personal protective equipment. The law does not provide specific details or include specific standards to be met. The intent was for national consensus standards to form the specific details.

No such standard existed until the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), publishers of the National Electrical Code, created a committee to develop such a standard. The result was NFPA 70E, Electrical Safety Requirements for Employee Workplaces. The first edition was published in 1979 but the standard was not comprehensive until the 1995 and later versions.

The current version of NFPA 70E (2004) covers training, electrical safety programs, lock-out/tag-out, hazard analysis, work permits, protective boundary criteria, personal protective equipment, and maintenance. The standard has become the de facto definition of compliance.

The National Electrical Code (NEC) in article 110.16 requires that many types of electrical equipment be field marked to warn of potential arc-flash hazards. It does not specify what information should be on the label. Current industry practice is to list the personal protective equipment (PPE) required and approach distances defined in NFPA 70E.

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) does not enforce electrical workplace hazard requirements. Like other worker safety provisions, they do not routinely look for conformance unless there has been a serious injury or death or there has been notification of unsafe work practices.

Technical The severity of the hazard related to an arcing fault is measured by the amount of energy that an arc delivers to an exposed worker. Calculation of this “incident energy”, which is commonly measured in calories per square centimeter (cal/cm2) or joules per square centimeter (J/cm2), provides a basis for selection of proper PPE, including flame-resistant clothing, flash suits, arc hoods, and the like. Another important value is the “flash protection boundary” and is defined as the distance from a fault source inside which the incident energy level exceeds 1.2 cal/cm2, a level that can cause second degree burns on exposed skin.

Both the incident energy and the flash-protection boundary vary based on many parameters. Among the most important factors are:

• System voltage.

• Arcing fault current level.

National Electrical Code NFPA 70E-2004 OSHA 29 CFR

Part 1910

IEEE 1584 -2002

Governs Electrical Installations –

“Equipment shall be field marked…”

Governs Employee Workplace Safety –

“Electrical safety standard that would serve OSHA’s needs.”

OSHA Standards (Iowa Shown) –

“Electrical safety related work practices shall be employed”

Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard

Calculations –

“Based on extensive test data”

National Electrical Code NFPA 70E-2004 OSHA 29 CFR

Part 1910

IEEE 1584 -2002

Governs Electrical Installations –

“Equipment shall be field marked…”

Governs Employee Workplace Safety –

“Electrical safety standard that would serve OSHA’s needs.”

OSHA Standards (Iowa Shown) –

“Electrical safety related work practices shall be employed”

Guide for Performing Arc Flash Hazard

Calculations –

“Based on extensive test data”

• Distance from a worker to the fault source.

• Duration of the arcing fault.

As such, the hazard level depends on many system variables, including equipment type, prospective bolted fault currents, and time-current characteristics of the upstream protective devices. An analysis of the potential arc flash hazard at a given system location should be performed so that workers can select and use appropriate levels of

PPE.

NFPA 70E-2004 defines five categories of protective clothing based on the degree of protection provided by each class or Hazard Category (HC), and is shown in the PPE table below. PPE is assigned an Arc Rating (cal/cm2), which defines the “maximum incident energy resistance demonstrated by a material.”

Hazard Category Clothing Description # of Layers

Minimum Arc Rating of PPE (cal/cm2)

0 Untreated natural fiber clothing 1 N/A

1 Fire Resistant Shirt + Fire Resistant Pants 1 4

2 Cotton Underwear + Cat 1 2 8

3 Fire Resistant Coverall over Cat 2 3 25

4 Multi-layer flash suit over Cat 2 4 40 Personal Protective Clothing categories are based on the layering effect of untreated natural fiber and flame retardant clothing.

No protective classes are given for locations with energy levels exceeding 40 cal/cm2, even though protective clothing capable of providing flash protection at incident energy levels of up to 112 cal/cm2 is commercially available. While NFPA 70E-2004 does not explicitly prohibit work at locations with energy levels above 40 cal/cm2, research into the potential for non-burn injuries (internal injuries, hearing damage, etc.) indicates that these other injuries become a significant concern at such high-energy locations.

At the low end of the clothing categories, note that untreated natural fiber clothing does not have a published arc rating. While this clothing is not tested in the same way as flame retardant clothing, category 0 is considered by NFPA 70E to be sufficient protection up to an incident energy of 2.0 cal/cm2.

Recognizing the limitations of existing methods of arc flash hazard analysis, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) embarked on a test program in order to develop an accurate model for incident energy under simulated end-use conditions. The result, IEEE 1584-2002, IEEE Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations, provides empirically-derived models for calculating incident energy and arc flash boundaries.

Empirical equations are given that cover systems at voltage levels ranging from 208V to 15kV and for available bolted fault currents ranging from 700A to 106kA, sufficient to cover the majority of low-voltage and medium-voltage installations. The equations are

1 Collect system and installation data 2 Determine system modes of…