36C24619R0069-005.pdf

Hunter Holmes McGuire VA Medical Center – Richmond, VA February 25-27, 2015

Hunter Holmes McGuire VA Medical Center

Richmond, VA

February 25-27, 2015

Boiler Plant Safety Device Training

Boiler Efficiency Institute LLC.

David Burch

03-05-2015

1 CONTENTS

2 Overview

3 Deficiency summary

4 Report Documentation

4.1 Entrance meeting (30 Min) - To discuss the objectives and methods of the training

4.2 Document review

4.2.1 Site specific test procedures

4.2.2 Boiler Safety testing Documentation (2 years)

4.2.3 Written Boiler Program Training

4.2.4 Records for testing on back-up fuel (Monthly)

4.3 Testing boiler information

4.4 Safety Device Testing Summary- Found 39% compliant - Left 52% compliant

4.5 Additional Safety Testing Done

4.6 Combustion Tests – Natural Gas

4.7 Water Chemistry Tests

4.8 Plant Reliability

4.9 Final Meeting with plant personnel (up to 1 hr.)

4.10 Exit Meeting with VAMC Management

4.11 Site assessment

5 Appendix A – Safety Test Comments

Boiler Safety Device Training (January 2015)

2 OVERVIEW

Per contract VA255-12-C-0258 the Boiler Efficiency Institute has been employed to conduct safety device training/testing at 23 VA hospitals from August 2014 – July 2015. These training / testing sessions consist of three eight hour days. The training is specifically tailored for VA Boiler operators and their supervisors. The training requires hands on in situ testing of the devices and utilizes the VHA Boiler

Plant Safety Device Testing Manual – Current Edition.

The primary objective of work is to provide training in boiler plant safety device testing and to assist the plants in complying with the testing requirements specified in VHA Directive 2008-062 and Boiler Plant

Safety Device Testing Manual 3 rd

Edition. The structure of this training will be the testing of the 23 safety devices listed in section 4.4. The results from these tests are documented, compared to previous test results, and shared with VACO and CEOSH. Any repairs that are made on site during testing are noted in the results.

If time permits, additional safety devices are tested.

In addition to the training/testing, some on-site time is allocated to review required boiler plant documentation, mechanical layouts/installations, water chemistry, boiler tuning, etc. An overall site assessment rating is also given based on the gathered information and conversations with plant personnel.

3 DEFICIENCY SUMMARY

The following table depicts only those devices tested which were not marked “Compliant as Found”. For more information about each device tested, refer to Appendix A.

Safety Test Procedure Not

Adequate

Issue Last

Inspection

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired.

Low Fire Proving

Switch (Gas) ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ Low Fire Proving

Switch (Oil) ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ FD Damper Open

Proving Switch ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ Low Water Alarm ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒ Low Water Cutout ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Low Water Cutout

(Secondary) ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒ Steam Safety

Relief Valve #1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Steam Safety

Relief Valve #2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Purge Airflow

Proving Switch ☐ ☒ ☒ ☐ Combustion Air

Pressure Switch ☐ ☒ ☒ ☐ Low Gas Pressure

Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ High Gas Pressure

Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ High Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ Low Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☒ ☐

Low Atomizing

Media Pressure ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Atomizing Media

Diff. Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒

4 REPORT DOCUMENTATION

4.1 ENTRANCE MEETING (30 MIN) - TO DISCUSS THE OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF THE

TRAINING.

The following list details all those who participated in the training, and on which days they were present. All those noted as participating on Day 1 were included in the Entrance Meeting.

Days Attended

Name

Title /Location*

Phone/Email Entrance 1 2 3 Exit

Russell “Karl”

Brockenbrough

Boiler Plant Supervisor

Salem VA

540-982-2463x2699 russell.brockenbrough@va.gov

X X X X

Willie R. Love Jr.

Boiler Operator

Salisbury NC

704-638-9000x3317 willie.love3@va.gov

X X X X

Joseph M.

Atkinson

Utility Sys. Operator

Richmond VA 804-675-5848

X X X X

Emmett L. Hart Boiler Plant Supervisor

Hampton VA

757-722-9961x2096 emmett.hart@va.gov

X X X X

John S. Seburn Utility Sys. Operator

Richmond VA John.seburn@va.gov

X X

Karl Eric Walter Boiler & A/C Supervisor

Richmond VA

804-675-5848 karl.walter@va.gov

X X X X X

Charles Williams Assistant Chief Engineer

Richmond VA charles.williams007@va.gov

X X

Chase Omary Instructor

BEI

334-821-3095 boiler@boilerinstitute.com

X X X X

David Burch Instructor

BEI

334-821-3095 boiler@boilerinstitute.com

X X X X X

Summary:

Other than the Site Management Exit Meeting, all activities were conducted in the boiler plant to allow the on-shift operator to participate fully.

4.2 DOCUMENT REVIEW

The main purpose of the document review below is to determine if this facility has a boiler safety testing program and determine if it functions properly and efficiently.

4.2.1 Site specific test procedures

The next directive will likely require detailed site specific test procedures. The documentation reviewed in section 3.2.2 is used to help answer this question.

☒ This site is using a document to test which has less detail than the current edition. The testing method described is not detailed adequately.

☐ This site is using the current safety testing manual. The test procedure is stock or has very little modification.

☐ This site is using a document that is custom tailored for this facility. The procedure is very descriptive and has details that are relevant only to this site. The document is very easy to read and can be implemented easily by the current staff.

☐ The procedures used for testing are not on record in the VA boiler plant (e.g. a contractor is using a procedure that is not on file).

☒ There are obvious inadequacies in the current test procedure.

Comments:

There has not been a routine “Semi Annual” testing program in this facility in some time. Due to a turnover in management, many issues seem to have “fallen through the cracks”. Current facility

Engineering and Management staff exhibited considerable dismay upon receiving knowledge of the current inadequacies. The images, below, are of the Currently available testing “datasheets”.

4.2.2 Boiler Safety testing Documentation (2 years)

Check for written documentation for frequency of Boiler Safety Device Testing (Back 2 years)

☐ This site has adequate boiler safety testing documentation dating back at least 2 years.

☐ This site has some boiler safety testing documentation but does not date back 2 years.

☒ This site has some boiler safety testing documentation but the testing report is inadequate.

☐ This site could not access any boiler safety testing documentation.

Comments:

The note and images with Section 4.2.1 apply here, as well. There is testing data going back more than 2 years, but the tests performed have been incomplete and the documentation is inadequate.

4.2.3 Written Boiler Program Training

☐ This site has a written SOP or Training plan for boiler safety testing (OJT is inadequate).

☒ This site does not have a written SOP or Training plan for boiler safety testing.

Comments:

New operators must pass the “Keep it Steamin' : Keep it Safe” program. They are paired with the current

Lead Operator for up to three months, while working through the Plant Operating Procedures manual.

4.2.4 Records for testing on back-up fuel (Monthly)

☐ This site has monthly records of testing the boilers on their back-up fuel. (The boiler log is sufficient).

☒ This site does not have monthly records of testing the boilers on their back-up fuel.

Comments:

Monthly Fuel Oil firing is covered in notations in the daily logs. There are no separate records.

4.3 TESTING BOILER INFORMATION

Boiler # 3

Manufacturer: Nebraska

Model: NSC46 Watertube

Serial #: National Board No.: s/n 2D1953, nb 1907

Typical Operating Pressure: 130 psig

Date of Manufacture: 1981

Design Pressure/Capacity: 200 psig, 25000 lb/hr

Burner

Manufacturer: Nebraska

Fuels: Natural Gas and #2 Fuel Oil

The boiler casing and burner housing appear to be in good mechanical condition. The plant environment is clean and well maintained. There were no noted leaks in the fuel, feedwater or steam systems.

4.4 SAFETY DEVICE TESTING SUMMARY- FOUND 39% COMPLIANT - LEFT 52% COMPLIANT

The following table contains the safety device test results. Only the items specifically required for this contract are included in the table. The “Issue Last Inspection” column indicates the last inspection either failed, was inadequately tested, or other general problem. See Appendix-A for detailed safety device testing comments. The last Test Data available for this site (Testing conducted by BEI) was from

March 2004.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired.

Low Fire Proving

Switch (Air) ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ Low Fire Proving

Switch (Gas) ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒ Low Fire Proving

Switch (Oil) ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒ Low Water Alarm ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒

Low Water Cutout

(Primary) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒

Low Water Cutout

(Secondary) ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ High Steam Press

Limit #1 ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ High Steam Press

Limit #2 ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Steam Safety

Relief Valve #1 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒

Steam Safety

Relief Valve #2 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒

Purge Airflow

Proving Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐

Combustion Air

Pressure Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐

Proof of Closure

Switches (Gas) ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Low Gas Pressure

Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒

High Gas Pressure

Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒

Low O2 Alarm and

Cutout ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Flame Scanner

Main Flame ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Flame Scanner

Not Sensing ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Igniter Timing ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Main Flame

Ignition Timing ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

High Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒

Low Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐

Low Atomizing

Media Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒

4.5 ADDITIONAL SAFETY TESTING DONE

The following table details the tests which were conducted beyond the scope of the mandatory list.

Safety Test Procedure

Not

Adequate

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired.

High Water Alarm on Boiler ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ Main Gas Valve Leak

Test ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ Main Gas Vent

Valve Leak Test ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ Forced Draft

Damper Wide Open

Proving Switch

Low Atomizing

Media Differential

Pressure Switch

4.6 COMBUSTION TESTS – NATURAL GAS

Combustion performance data are given in the table below.

Load Steam

(PSIG)

O2 (%)

Dry

O2 (%)

Wet

CO

(ppm)

T-Stack

(F)

Efficiency

Low 127 5.1 4.7 4 372 82.3

Medium 136 4.5 4.2 5 407 81.7

High 139 4.5 4.3 5 439 80.9

CO formation onset is at approximately 1.5 % O2. The Interlock setpoint is 1.5% O2. The CO at the interlock was 200PPM.

4.7 WATER CHEMISTRY TESTS

Water chemistry data for one boiler, condensate return, and soft water are given in the table below.

Vendor records are acceptable.

Sample

TDS

(ppm)

Sulfite

(ppm)

Phosphate

(ppm)

Alkalinity

(ppm)

Hardness

(ppm) pH

Boiler 2200 50 Polymer 350

Feedwater 80 9.2

Condensate 30 9.0

Makeup 150 0

Calculate the boiler plant makeup percentage. Either with the TDS method below or other method.

100*

CondensateoftyConductiviMUoftyConductivi

CondensateoftyConductiviFeedwateroftyConductivi Makeup

(80 – 30) / (150 – 30) * 100% = 42% Makeup

☐ This site has a makeup rate of 15% or less.

☐ This site has a makeup rate of 16% to 25%.

☒ This site has a makeup rate of 26% or more.

The somewhat elevated (9.0) condensate pH is indicative of an overfeed of Steam Line Treatment

(Amines.) An investigation of the pH distribution throughout the facility will determine if the current feed level is necessary or can be reduced.

The relatively high conductivity level for the condensate (30 uS/cm) is a possible indicator that raw water is returning with the condensate. This would mean that the real makeup rate is higher than that calculated by the above method, or that indicated by makeup and steam-flow meters. A more thorough investigation of the source of the high condensate conductivity should be carried out.

4.8 PLANT RELIABILITY

The following table contains a mixture of general plant reliability and safety components. These devices were not tested, but the results of a plant walk through type inspection are given in the table.

Safety Installed?

Yes / No

Comments:

Deaerator bypass present: ☒ ☐

Condensate tank bypass present: ☒ ☐

Softener bypass present: ☒ ☐

Auxiliary makeup to DA: ☒ ☐

Emergency water to boiler: ☒ ☐

High alarm on oil tank present: ☒ ☐

High gas pressure cutout or alarm on main gas coming into plant:

Emergency fuel shutdown (kill) button present:

Current system is inadequate. A complete safety system, capable of securing all fuel flow into the plant (Main gas valve and oil pumps), with switches located at all points of egress from the boiler plant, should be installed, tested and maintained.

This facility was free from obvious places where access to valves and equipment are not adequate to allow proper maintenance or access during emergency.

4.9 FINAL MEETING WITH PLANT PERSONNEL (UP TO 1 HR.)

Below is a summary of the final meeting with plant personnel. In this meeting, the operators and BEI personnel summarize the findings and recommendations gathered throughout the training session. This is also chance to answer and respond to any questions that have not been addressed.

Summary:

All attending personnel were given opportunity to ask any questions they may have had about any of the test procedures covered, or any other relevant issue that had not been discussed. An overview of the issues to be addressed (all items marked as “Failed not Repaired”) was discussed. Non-Richmond

Supervisors were interested in extending the knowledge gained in the training to their plant operations personnel. All personnel were supplied with contact information for BEI and encouraged to follow up with any questions or issues that may arise.

4.10 EXIT MEETING WITH VAMC MANAGEMENT

Below is a summary of the exit meeting with VAMC management. In this meeting, the contractor summarized the findings and recommendations gathered throughout the training session.

Name (Please Print) Title / location

Karl Eric Walter Boiler & A/C Supervisor, Richmond

Charles Williams Assistant Chief Engineer, Richmond

David Burch Instructor, BEI

Summary:

In this meeting, several items were discussed, including the results of the tests conducted. Among the more important items noted were:

• The necessity improving the facility’s performance of the required semi-annual testing program.

• The necessity to immediately replace the failed Steam Safety

Valves on Boiler 3.

• The progress made in correcting some of the failures that were identified. In particular, the deficiencies with the Purge Airflow

Proving Switches on all three boilers.

4.11 SITE ASSESSMENT

The following table contains the contractor assessment of the host facility. This evaluation was completed at the end of the training. The following guidelines are used in scoring each question:

10 - Excellent / Good- progressing in the correct manner and has or will meet the VA goals if continued in this manner

6 - Fair-Progressing in the correct manner, but more is needed in this area to meet VA goals in a timely manner.

2 – Poor-Progress is not going well and at this pace and will not accomplish VA goals in a timely manner.

Questions – To be answered for the facility being visited only. Assessment (1-10)

Current safety device testing results. 6

Review of safety device testing records. 4

BP Supervisor engagement in safety device testing, willingness to learn and participation at training session.

Facility knowledge of the proper safety device testing methods and understanding of the site specific requirements.

• Using the current test procedure & has understanding that the stock procedure must be modified to better fit this site.

• Can follow and understand the written test procedure.

• Demonstrates knowledge of the major steps required to test as outlined in the testing manual without reading from the manual.

• Comprehensive understanding of generic safety control logic.

• Understands the function of each device and the hazards associated with device failure.

Ability to test the safety devices correctly

• Proficiency with a multimeter and verifying circuit is “dead.”

• Comfortable accessing and testing the circuitry in various switch types.

• Comfortable using mechanical and electrical measurements during a test to determine switch functionality.

7.5

Plant equipment being set up for proper device testing. 8

Proper test equipment is available & documented calibration data on record. 5

Ability/knowledge to use the testing equipment. 8

Boiler plant overall score as related to boiler plant safety device testing. 5

The Safety Device Testing can be accomplished in-house without additional training, or additional training is needed before in-house testing should be done.

In-House with occasional outside review

Comment: It was recommended that they begin to pursue conducting the routine safety tests, and seek contracting either an outside expert for additional testing or (preferably) further training in addition to additional testing. Management was encouraged to aggressively pursue the comprehensive safety program. There has been in recent years a lack of understanding of the VHA Boiler Plant Safety

Requirements.

5 APPENDIX A – SAFETY TEST COMMENTS

Safety Test Procedure

Not Adequate

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Water Alarm ☒ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒

Comments: The Low Water Alarm is based on a transducer signal, through the Hays Cleveland Control

System. The alarm setpoint is less than 3-inches above the bottom of the sight glass. Install an independent

(Conductivity Probe based) Low water alarm, with a setpoint of at least 3-inches above the bottom (visible water level) of the sight glass.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Water Cutout

(Primary)

Comments: The primary Low Water Cutout is a Warrick, Probe based system. The setpoint was 1-inch above the bottom of the sight glass. There is a single Low Water Shunt Switch, which bypasses both the

Primary (Probe) and Secondary (Float) Low Water Cutoffs. The setpoint of this cutout should be raised to 2-inches above the bottom (visible level) of the sight glass.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Water Cutout

(Secondary)

Comments: This is a float-type device. The second cutout activates at a level below the bottom of the sight glass. The single shunt switch makes a proper test of this device impractical. Install independent shunt switches for the primary and secondary Low Water Cutouts. Raise the float to achieve a setpoint at least 1-inch above the bottom (visible level) of the sight glass.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

High Water Alarm ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Comments: This is a Warrick Probe device. It did function with the Burner Control Switch in the off position. The alarm activated with the water level 2-inches below the top of the sight glass.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

High Steam Pressure

Limit #1

Comments: This is a Mercoid (snap action) switch. The switch functioned correctly, with a setpoint of 143 psig.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

High Steam Pressure

Limit #2

Comments: This is a Mercoid (snap action) switch. The switch functioned correctly, with a setpoint of 155 psig.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Steam Safety Relief

Valve #1, 2

Comments: These valves are Consolidated brand, with stamped ratings of 160 psig (14917 lb/hr) and 165 psig (23793 lb/hr). These valves Did Not Lift. The test was extended to a boiler pressure of 170psig (3% above the rating of the higher pressure valve, 6% above the lower pressure valve rating). It is recommended that the Steam Safety Valves on the remaining (two) boilers be immediately tested as well.

These (and any other failed) valves must be replaced as soon as possible.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Gas Pressure

Switch

Comments: This is a Mercoid-brand, electronic switch. The setpoint is 80% of the Regulated Pressure.

There is an isolation valve in the switch piping. This valve was locked open, but the valve needs some modification to ensure that it is Lockable Only in the Open Position (LOOP).

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

High Gas Pressure

Switch

Comments: This is a Mercoid-brand, electronic switch. The setpoint is greater than 120% of the Regulated

Pressure. There is an isolation valve in the switch piping. This valve was locked open, but the valve needs some modification to ensure that it is Lockable Only in the Open Position (LOOP). The menu system on this switch does not readily demonstrate the proper procedure for adjusting the setpoint, and no documentation was readily available.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Main Gas Valves and

Main Gas Vent Valve

Leak Tests

Comments: The main (Maxon) valves do not leak. The Vent Valve does not leak. The manual valve in the vent line was locked open, but the valve needs some modification to ensure that it is Lockable Only in the

Open Position (LOOP).

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Proof of Closure

Switches (Gas)

Comments: Proof of Closure switches and circuits for the (Maxon) gas valves functioned correctly.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐

Comments: This (Mercoid, snap acting was found to have an incorrect setpoint (less than 60% of

Regulated Pressure- 128 psig). The setpoint was raised to (95 psig) with no problems immediately noticed.

This pressure setpoint must be raised to within 90% of the Regulated pressure (to at least 115 psig).

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

High Oil Pressure ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ ☒

Comments: This (Mercoid, snap acting) switch is not plumbed in the correct location. It is sensing the fuel oil pressure downstream of the Automatic Shutoff and Flow Control Valves, and cannot provide proper protection. It must be re-piped as shown in the Safety Device Testing Manual (Third Edition), and the setpoint set to no more than 110% of the regulated Fuel Oil Pressure.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Atomizing Media

Pressure

Comments: The atomizing steam supply is at plant header pressure with no regulator. Normal pressure is

130 psig. Having a correct setpoint for the plant pressure (80% of 130) would require using compressed air for atomization if header pressure falls below 105 psig. It is recommended that a steam pressure regulator be installed to provide 80 psig steam to the atomization system (the maximum steam atomization pressure is only 75 psig at high fire). This will allow a switch setpoint of 72 psig (and therefore much more capacity to recover the plant while firing fuel oil), and achieve compliance with this safety requirement.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Atomizing Media

Differential Pressure

Comments: This switch (as found) had a setpoint of zero (or less). The minimum differential across all firing rates was 10 psid. The setpoint was raised to within 80% of the minimum atomizing differential (8 psid). The switch was found to be wired into the start circuit for the boiler, rather than the (required) running interlock circuit. This wiring deficiency must be repaired as soon as possible.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Flame Scanner for

Main Flame Out

Comments: The Honeywell (Self Checking, UV) flame safeguard system shut the automatic gas shutoff valves within 2-seconds of loss of flame.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Flame Scanner Not

Sensing Igniter

Comments: Functioned Correctly.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Igniter Timing ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

Comments: System is utilizing Early Spark Termination. The Spark Duration was 6 seconds.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Main Flame Ignition

Timing

Comments: The Honeywell (Self Checking, UV) flame safeguard system shut the automatic gas shutoff valves within 12-seconds of beginning to open.

Issue last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Fire

Proving

Switch (Air)

Comments: External switch contacted by damper arm at low-fire position. Setpoint was acceptable. Wiring and Control System Response is correct.

Issue last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Fire Proving

Switch (Gas) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Comments: Switch is internal to Siemens Gas Valve Positioner. It is difficult to access for testing (See photo). Wiring and Control System Response is correct. Setpoint is too high (16% Firing Rate). Setpoint must be lowered to break at not more than 5% firing rate above low fire. Connection from the positioner motor to the valve must be drilled and pinned.

Issue last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low Fire Proving

Switch (Oil) ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ Comments: Switch is internal to Siemens Gas Valve Positioner. It is difficult to access for testing (This is the same series positioner as that shown for the Gas Valve.) Wiring and Control System Response is correct. Setpoint is too high (13% Firing Rate). Setpoint must be lowered to break at not more than 5% firing rate above low fire. Connection from the positioner motor to the valve must be drilled and pinned.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Forced Draft Damper

Wide Open Switch ☐ ☐ ☐ ☒ ☐ Comments: As found Switch Setpoint was approximately 2/3 damper opening. Wiring and Control System

Response is correct. Setpoint was adjusted to within 10% of Damper Wide Open position.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Combustion Air

Pressure Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐ Comments: The CAPS is setup to sense the difference between ambient (room) air pressure and the fan discharge. The boiler fan is driven by a VFD with a minimum speed of 25 Hz. The minimum fan pressure was found to be 1.6 INWC at low fire. The switch setpoint was found to be 0.7 INWC. Wiring and Control

System Response is correct. Setpoint was raised to 1.35 INWC, above 80% of the minimum pressure.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Purge Airflow Proving

Switch ☐ ☒ ☐ ☒ ☐

Comments: This switch is shown in the Control Diagram as being in series with the Combustion Air Pressure

Switch (CAPS). The switch was found to be stuck “made”, completing the circuit with any signal from high vacuum to high pressure. When the circuit is broken the Boiler locks out on Combustion Airflow Interlock.

The maximum signal was 7.5 INWC. This switch was replaced and the new switch adjusted to a “make” setpoint of 6 INWC (80% of the Maximum signal). This switch was rewired to be in series with the

FDDWOPS, and retested. The retest confirmed correct Control System Response. The Control Diagram for this boiler must be updated to reflect the correct configuration of this switch. Boilers 1 and 2 were found to have the same deficiency, except those switches were usable. Wiring for the other two boilers was also modified to comply with the sketch shown below. The setpoints for the PAPS on Boilers 1 and 2 need to be fine-tuned using a manometer and proper test procedures. Those setpoints were rough-set only.

Issue Last

Inspection

Compliant as found

Failed

Repaired

Failed Not

Repaired

Low O2 Alarm and

Cutout

Comments: The interlock activated at 1.5% O2 (on the Hays Cleveland monitoring system). The CO level at the time of interlock was 200PPM