Final JA Redacted.pdf

MICC Control No: Eustis-2021-4 Contractor: Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc.

Program/Equipment: JMC-F Support

Version – September 2018 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FAR Part 16 Exception to Fair Opportunity Justification Under Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Contracts

For Actions Exceeding the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT)

1. Contracting Activity: U.S. Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC), Fort Eustis, 705 Washington Avenue, Fort Eustis, Virginia 23604

2. Description of Action: Futures and Concepts Center (FCC) requests a sole source firm-fixed price (FFP) task order with Booz Allen Hamilton Inc. (BAH) located at 8283 Greensboro Drive, McLean, VA 22102-3830 for a base period of six (6) months and four one-month for a total of up to 10 months, ending 18 October 2021, in order to maintain continuity of services to follow an existing non-personal services task order (W911S0-15-D-0001 – W911S0-19-F-0049). The General Services Administration (GSA) One Acquisition Solution for Integrated Services (OASIS) Pool 1 Unrestricted will be used. The Government projects award for December 2020 using fiscal year 2021 Operations and Maintenance funds. The current Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) Multiple Award Task Order Contract (MATOC) expired on 18 June 20. No new orders could be placed after this date and all existing order deliveries cannot exceed 18 December 20. There are no options to exercise or additional extensions available. Therefore, to avoid unacceptable delays in service until the new MATOC is competitively awarded, a bridge task order is required. An acquisition plan is not required because this procurement does not meet the threshold at Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 207.103(d)(i)(B).

3. Description of Supplies/Services: The purpose of this effort is to obtain the necessary technical services and expertise to enable FCC to meet its mission. The contractor will provide unique and highly specialized technical support to ensure JMC-F executes its responsibilities across a broad range of technical, training and testing related disciplines including, but not limited to: analysis of organizational roles and missions, analysis of experimentation, Network Integration Evaluation analysis, Capability Needs analysis, Agile Process analysis, and Rapid Acquisition Process analysis, Cost Benefit Analysis and Analysis of Alternatives, integration and evaluation of the network, other adaptive and core capabilities. All tasks necessary to successfully execute the JMC-F mission are defined in the Performance Work Statement (PWS).

They include provisioning of centralized, organized, coherent, timely project management support; JWA Concepts and Capabilities Review, Assessment and Prioritization; live field experimentation support; joint planning cell task management and mission support; JWA Joint Planning Support; services to conduct/update Annual Policy and Procedures Review; and representation of JMC-F Future Capabilities Center as required. The estimated costs for this bridge task order are $ 1,620,964.00 with a Period of Performance from 19 December 2020 – 18 October 2021.

Period of Performance Base Period: 19 Dec 20 to 18 Jun 21 Value: $972,578.40 Option Period 1: 19 Jun 21 to 18 Jul 21 Value: $162,096.40 Option Period 2: 19 Jul 21 to 18 Aug 21 Value: $162,096.40 Option Period 3: 19 Aug 21 to 18 Sep 21 Value: $162,096.40 Option Period 4: 19 Sep 21 to 18 Oct 21 Value: $162,096.40

Total Value: $ 1,620,964.00

4. Authority Cited: This action is authorized under provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2304c(b)(1) as implemented by FAR 16.505(b)(2)(i)(A) – The agency need for supplies or services is so urgent that providing a fair opportunity would result in unacceptable delays.

5. Reason for Authority Cited:

a. With the impending lapse in service described in paragraph two (2) above, the proposed acquisition must be accomplished through an exception to fair opportunity for the reasons cited below.

1) The new IDIQ MATOC (ref. Solicitation W911S0-19-R-0002) is not yet awarded due to delays caused by the changing and evolving mission of the FCC as well as changes in their internal personnel assigned to the re-compete of this requirement.

2) The planning for the new MATOC has been ongoing for at least two (2) years.

A procurement of this magnitude would take approximately two (2) years to complete under normal circumstances. During the last two (2) years, the procurement was encumbered due the mandated transition of Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) to FCC that created turbulence in the timely development of the requirement.

The transition resulted in organizational changes in the Army Futures Command and personnel moves that contributed to delays as the new organization shifted personnel to new positions. The personnel new to the requirement process required time to become familiar with the requirement. Mandatory telework in 2020 also hampered progress of the MATOC award to a minor degree. The impact is that the new MATOC award will not be in place before the current task orders expire creating a lapse in critical services required by the agency.

3) There is insufficient time and resources available to award a bridge task order on a competitive basis without further delaying award of the follow-on contract. The urgency resulted from the expiration of the ARCIC MATOC and the lack of success in awarding its replacement MATOC before expiration.

4) Until it is awarded, these vital services must continue without delay or lapse in service. The bridge requirement is necessary to facilitate the competitive award of the new MATOC anticipated in June 2021.

5) The services performed by the incumbent, BAH, are essential to the successful execution of the JMC-F mission and a priority for the Chief of Staff of the Army’s readiness initiatives. Any disruptions in the performance of this critical training program could result in gaps in defense knowledge and skills or adversely affect readiness. BAH is the only offeror that has the immediate necessary manpower, resources, and proven technical proficiency to perform these critical mission services without a lapse in service.

6) This bridge extension provides the best method to procure these services in a timely manner, without a break in service, at a price that is fair and reasonable. The skill sets required to support the JMC-F effort are complex in nature and deemed hard to fill.

The JMC-F mission is highly leveraged with contractor support. JMC-F’s non-military workforce consists of 4 government employees and 12 BAH employees. This level of reliance on highly technical contractor support makes their work no-fail and hard to replace rapidly. As the incumbent, BAH already employs the proper individuals and can continue performance under a bridge task order without a phase-in period, which is typically required to get to full operational capability. The time necessary to use fair opportunity procedures will create unacceptable delays and cause disruption to the services being performed to support the JMC-F mission. The rationale for using 10 U.S.C. 2304c(b)(1) is to prevent a break in service in the midst of Joint and Army assisting and tracking activities for JMC which are related to the command’s prototyping experimentation effort.

7) The required performance delivery schedule ensures the bridge requirement is only as long as necessary in order to award the new MATOC. The base period of performance is 19 December 2020 through 18 June 2021. There are four (4) one-month options in the event the competitive MATOC is not awarded as projected.

8) The previous task order was competed among all three (3) MATOC contract holders. BAH provided a proposal that satisfied the Government’s requirements and placed the least risk to the Government. Its technical approach, key personnel, integrated management and execution of the mission can seamlessly transfer to this and provide continued support and expertise during the bridge period of performance. BAH has been the service provider since November 2018.

9) The JMC-F’s workload requirements are subject to fluctuation. Thus, the contractor must be able to successfully manage these conditions and ensure that requirements can be supported without delay since providing a transition period will not be possible due to the current task order expiring on 18 December 2020. There are not any other Government agencies buying these same services.

b. Alternatives

1) Forgo Services. Forgoing services is not a viable alternative. This would result in a significant disruption of providing cost and effectiveness analysis. FCC would be unable to complete the analytical rigor to identify, describe, and quantify the benefits and costs associated with each proposed warfighting capability, resulting in mission failure for this critical FCC service, as well as disrupting normal operations.

2) Use of Government Resources. Currently there are no available Government personnel (military or civilian) on-hand able to assume this work with the experience required to execute the mission-oriented tasks contained throughout the PWS should there be a lapse in service. The organization does not have the capability to in-source personnel to meet mission requirements without a break in operational support. The Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) provides for adequate oversight and management of the task order effort but lacks personnel with the requisite skill sets to execute the tasks outlined in the PWS.

3) Re-competing a new task order effort. Conducting a limited competition would be costly and create operational risk if the task order was awarded to another company other than BAH. A “new” vendor would have to learn how the FCC conducts business while simultaneously conducting the prioritization, integration, and synchronization of DOTMLPF capabilities developments. Awarding the new task order on a competitive basis under compressed timelines will cause unacceptable disruptions to FCC’s mission.

There is insufficient time to re-compete this requirement as a new start by the task order expiration date of 18 December 2020.

c. Verified Minimum and Need. A critical need exists to continue the complex JMC- F services beyond 18 December 2020. The bridge task order is requested in order to provide continuity of services. This extension will provide the needed time in order to award a task order that is fair and reasonable and provides adequate fair opportunity.

The bridge task order will continue to meet JMC-F mission requirements and mitigate the risk of disruption of operational support. The minimum requirement includes performance of all PWS tasks until the new MATOCs are awarded in 2021. The current services will continue until 18 December 2020. The Government requires a six-month base performance period with four one (1) month optional periods of performance. This will provide for a continuation of services through 18 October 2021. This extension will provide the needed time in order to award a contract that is fair and reasonable and provides adequate fair opportunity.

d. Considerations for using one source. Time available versus time required, phase-in/phase-out time, and the complexity of the requirement were considered in the decision to solicit only to one source. The time available to procure new services is not adequate to obtain both required FCC approvals, Government Procurement approvals, and solicit and award a new task order. Additionally, competing the extension and transitioning to a new contractor under that compressed timeline create significant operational risk and enhances the possibility that JMC-F will experience disruptions in the performance of essential knowledge management functions, mission command decision-making functions, and the ability to perform oversight functions vital to mission execution.

e. Interim Task Order Cost. This is an interim task order with the incumbent, BAH. It would be neither cost effective nor realistic to expect another Contractor to perform during the brief interim period. A new contractor will experience manning problems including recruitment and associated relocation fees; continuity of service, variety and complexity of requirements; and preparation of management plans.

f. Interim Task Order Requirement. This is an interim task order required until award of a MATOC. The anticipated award date is June 2021. There is no protest associated with this interim task order request.

g. Impact. The impact of not awarding a bridge task order would result in a lapse in service or work stoppage. If there is a lapse in the services being performed by BAH, JMF-F’s ability to fulfill its mission requirements for FCC would be placed in jeopardy, impacting FCC’s ability to accomplish its overall mission to the Army. JMC-F relies on BAH to perform the mission critical tasks in the PWS that support their mission requirements from FCC. No internal redundancy exists within JMC-F to take on the tasks performed by BAH. Therefore, a lapse in service would mean the critical tasks in the PWS would not be performed, and without those tasks being performed, the JMC-F’s and ultimately the FCC’s mission would not be accomplished. This bridge task order temporarily mitigates the risks to mission success through continuing support until the JMC-F Mission Support Services work effort can be transitioned to the new FCC MATOC.

For these reasons, upon review of this request and the authority cited above, a task order for 10 months is needed.

6. Actions to Increase Competition: In order to increase competition in the future, a new MATOC is currently being procured and will be awarded in calendar year 2021. This will provide fair opportunity among those contractors selected for the services. As the FCC is evolving, there may be changes to the way the services are provided as some of the tasks may be supported with a different task order in the future. The MICC-Fort Eustis plans to issue a new task order following the award of the MATOC. No previous justifications exist for the requirements performed under the current task order.

7. Market Research:

Market research was conducted for this new bridge task order in September 2020.

Market research techniques included using the same NAICS code (541690), reviewing the procurement history, reviewing mandatory and preferred sources, and searching www.sam.gov and small business databases. Additionally, the market research for the MATOC re-compete included issuing a sources sought on 18 May 2018 and conducting an Industry Day on 7 May 2019. Eleven companies responded to the sources sought.

One large business and one small business were deemed either fully or moderately capable of performing all task. The other nine vendors were not fully capable in all performance areas required to include capability development support, experimentation and evaluation support, synergy support, and information technology and information management support. The Industry Day resulted in high participation. Both large and small businesses expressed interest in the procurement. The Industry Day determined the market has not changed since a Sources Sought was posted in 2018, and small businesses expressed interest in only performing a few of the task areas or seeking a teaming arrangement as a subcontractor. Small businesses do not have the capability to meet the specific and complex needs of the FCC, such as synergy support and experimentation and evaluation, to meet FCC’s mission and provide the required. While research shows the availability of multiple contractors who are capable of performing these services, this does not take into account the specialized nature of JMC-F services.

In July 2020, FCC approved the use of the GSA OASIS Unrestricted Pool 1 contract to provide a seamless continuation of services to the FCC until the new MATOC IDIQ (ref. Solicitation W911S0-21-R-0002) is awarded.

A competitive award cannot be made without a break in service. There is not enough time to compete this action on a full and open competition basis. The current task order expires on 18 December 2020, and competing a new task order using full and open competition will jeopardize the mission of FCC and cause mission failure. It would not be in the best interest of the Government to pursue a re-compete at this time. Furthermore, the requirements executed under the bridge task order are compatible with the scope of the OASIS vehicle.

8. Other Facts:

Procurement History: The current task order, W911S0-15-D-0001 – W911S0-19-F- 0049, is a firm-fixed price task order and was awarded following full and open competition within the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Mission Support Services (MSS) MATOC to Booz Allen Hamilton, Inc. on 21 November 2018 in the amount of $3,649,134.93, for a base year plus one option year. Fair opportunity procedures of FAR 16.505(b) were provided with the award of the current task order.

The previous task order, W911S0-15-D-0003 – 0003, was also a Firm Fixed Price task order and was awarded following full and open competition under the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Mission Support Services (MSS) MATOC to Janus Research Group, Inc. on 21 October 2015 for a base year and two option years.

Approval

Based on the foregoing justification, I hereby approve the procurement of mission support services for Joint Modernization Command-Forward using an exception to fair opportunity pursuant to the authority of Title 10 United States Code Section 2304c(b)(1) as implemented by Federal Acquisition Regulation 16.505(b)(2)(i)(A) – The agency need for supplies or services is so urgent that providing a fair opportunity would result in unacceptable delays. The estimated amount is $1.62 million for a period of performance consisting of a base period of 6 months and 4 one-month option periods from 19 December 2020 through 18 October 2021. This approval is subject to availability of funds, and provided that the services herein described have otherwise been authorized for acquisition.

SCOTT D. KUKES

Alternate Advocate for Competition U.S. Army Mission and Installation Contracting Command, JBSA Fort Sam Houston, TX