022. Justification for Other than Full and Open Competition (JOFOC)-Unusual_and_Compelling_Urgency_Avionics Unit_Post.pdf

Rev: 06/2026 1

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

George C. Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)

JUSTIFICATION FOR OTHER THAN FULL AND OPEN COMPETITION

(JOFOC)

UNUSUAL AND COMPELLING URGENCY

For 80MSFC26Q0007/Secondary Payloads Avionics Units and Sustaining

Engineering/Space Launch System (SLS)

1. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 6.104-1(a)(1) – Identification of the agency and the contracting activity, and specific identification of the document as a “Justification for other than full and open competition.”

This document is a justification for other than full and open competition prepared by

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

The procuring agency is NASA, and the contracting activity is MSFC/PS44 Space Launch System (SLS) Spacecraft Payload Integration & Evolution (SPIE) Procurement Support Office.

2. FAR 6.104-1(a)(2) – The nature and/or description of the action being approved:

This justification provides the rationale for contracting by other than full and open competition to award a sole-source contract under solicitation number 80MSFC26Q0007 with Space Vector LLC.

The general purpose of this contract is to procure Secondary Payload Avionics Units and engineering support for Artemis IV and V, including a spare unit, in order to provide the Avionics Units (AU)s NASA requires as part of the SLS Secondary Payload Deployment System (SPDS) to control the deployment of secondary payloads from the Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) Stage Adapter (MSA) during these missions. This requirement is critical to NASA’s Artemis campaign and its overall mission to safely land humans on the lunar surface.

The Artemis campaign’s timeline, and its included mission dates, are a vital component of the government’s need. For reasons discussed below, delays to mission execution as a result of developmental challenges are likely to result in mission failure. This contract is necessary to ensure that development of a lunar landing capability is complete in time to support NASA’s Artemis missions.

a. The Artemis Campaign and National Strategic Interests.

The Artemis campaign consists of several interconnected NASA programs, encompassing multiple contracts and international efforts. Each component of the campaign is required to reach the agency’s end state of landing humans on the lunar surface. Among these programs

JOFOC Unusual and Compelling Urgency

80MSFC26Q0007

Rev: 06/2026 2 are: the Space Launch System (SLS), NASA’s primary space launch capability; Orion, NASA’s solution for transport of crew from low-earth orbit to cis-lunar orbit; Extra- Vehicular Activity (EVA) suits and the Human Landing System (HLS). Each of these programs depends upon the timely development and success of the others to perform its role, and delays within one program have a cascading effect upon the others.

NASA’s Artemis campaign explores the Moon for scientific discovery, technology advancement, and to learn how to live and work on another world in order prepare for human missions to Mars. The Artemis campaign collaborates with commercial and international partners and establish the first long-term presence on the Moon. These efforts support several vital national strategic interests including national security, solidifying the United States’ leadership and influence in space, supporting scientific and technological development, and supporting space commercial development.

To support these interests and ensure continued American superiority in space exploration, it is critical that the United States return to the lunar surface before its global competitors. By completing a lunar landing mission in advance of our global competitors, the United States can shape rules, policy, priorities, and the overall geopolitical landscape of future space exploration. This will provide the United States with the initiative needed to best advance related national interests and maintain its role as the global leader in space exploration.

Falling behind our global competitors in this effort cedes this initiative, and our nation’s leadership in space exploration, to our global competitors. This will result in unacceptable impacts to the United States’ geopolitical position and its national security.

Currently, China is actively developing a human crewed Moon landing mission. China has recently experienced significant success in development of space exploration technologies, including launch and landing of the country’s first reusable orbital rocket in 2025. China’s significant space technology progress has established the country as a near-peer competitor to the United States for space exploration. China’s recent progress also includes significant developments in the country’s crewed lunar program, including successful liftoff and landing tests of a crewed lander. These developments place China on target to meet their current goal of landing two astronauts on the lunar surface before 2030.

It is critical to the national interests of the United States, and therefore to NASA’s mission, that the Artemis program return American astronauts to the Moon before China reaches this milestone and seizes the initiative and global leadership role in human space exploration.

NASA plans to launch its first mission to return humans to the Moon (currently titled “Artemis IV”) by 2028. This launch schedule is critical to NASA’s mission and the national interests it supports.

b. Spacecraft Payload Integration and Evolution (SPIE) Element of the SLS Program Background

The SPIE Element oversees and manages the acquisition and integration of the Interim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage (ICPS) with the MPCV as an upper stage capable of boosting the MPCV from Earth orbit to the Lunar vicinity. As a part of the integration of the upper

Rev: 06/2026 3 stage, a Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (LVSA) was needed to step the diameter of the rocket from wide enough to house the internal fuel tanks to a smaller diameter fitted to the ICPS and an MSA to connect the ICPS and MPCV. To maximize return on investment, it was determined that the MSA could house multiple secondary payloads in the form of much smaller satellites (cubesats) which would then be deployed after separation of the MPCV from the MSA using the SLS SPDS. The required AUs are the power and control components of the SPDSs.

3. FAR 6.104-1(a)(3) – A description of the supplies or services required, to meet the Agency’s needs (including the estimated value):

a. NASA requires Secondary Payload AUs and engineering support for Artemis IV and V, including a spare unit, as part of the SLS SPDS to control the deployment of secondary payloads from the MSA during these missions. Each AU is comprised of a sequencer, capable of storing and executing multiple deployment scenarios, and a battery to supply power to the deployment system for the duration of the mission objectives.

Space Vector LLC is the designer, developer, and qualified manufacturer of the flight-ready Avionics Units that have already successfully flown on Artemis I and Artemis II, and the Avionics Unit for Artemis III is fully developed, qualified, and ready for integration and launch. This proven flight heritage, along with established integration compatibility, makes Space Vector the only responsible source capable of meeting program schedule, as use of any other contractor would introduce at least three months of additional development and qualification testing.

In addition, the Electrical Ground Support Rack (EGSR), which includes a designated laptop loaded with battery charging and skit loading software that was screened in accordance with NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 7150.2, NASA Software Engineering Requirements, was designed and developed to interface specifically with Space Vector LLC AUs. Any changes to the current laptop configuration or design will require an additional NPR 7150.2 screening by the Government. The additional screening is approximated to add an additional 2 months to the pre-integration schedule.

Based upon the current SLS build schedules, the MSA, with integrated SPDS including the AU, must be delivered to the Kennedy Space Center no less than nine months prior to the anticipated launch date. Integration of the SPDS with the MSA is anticipated to require approximately three months. Even if a new contractor performs the required development, qualification, and testing in the best-case estimate of five additional months, the Artemis IV rocket would still require at least 17 months before it could be ready for launch. This assumes that a full and open competition is completed and award is made in less than one week. The current cadence for launch of Artemis IV is early 2028, which is between 16 and 20 months away.

b. The anticipated cost for this action is expected to be approximately .

4. FAR 6.104-1(a)(4) – An identification of the statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition:

Rev: 06/2026 4

The statutory authority permitting other than full and open competition is 10 U.S.C.

3204(a)(2), as implemented by FAR 6.103-2, Unusual and compelling urgency.

5. FAR 6.104-1(a)(5) – A demonstration that the proposed contractor’s unique qualifications or the nature of the acquisition requires use of the authority cited:

The rationale supporting the use of 10 U.S.C. 3204(a)(2) is as described below.

The agency’s need for the AUs for the SLS SPDS is of such an unusual and compelling urgency that the Government would be seriously injured, both financially and in terms of significant negative impact to the national interests discussed herein, if it is not permitted to limit the number of sources from which it solicits proposals.

In order to return to the lunar surface before our global competitors and advance the United States’ national interests in space exploration and leadership, NASA must return American astronauts to the surface of the Moon as quickly as technological development will safely allow. Current Artemis mission timelines require a lunar landing mission by 2028, with capability demonstration mission milestones planned for Fiscal Year 2027.

Though this mission timeline places NASA close to the developmental timelines and mission goals of our global competitors, this timeline ensures that the Agency is able to support the country’s space policy objectives and related national interests. Further delay to this timeline would place the United States unacceptably close to ceding its leadership in space exploration to our global competitors – significantly harming the national interests of the United States, including national security, scientific advancement, technological maturation and superiority, and other critical Government priorities.

Allowing full and open competition would result in at least five months of additional delay, including three months to develop and qualify a new Avionics Unit and two months to update and certify the necessary software being realized. Due to the cutting-edge nature of the technology required for this capability, every day in the developmental timeline is absolutely vital for ensuring that a lunar landing capability is completed in time for NASA’s established mission dates. Each day added to this timeline – including the significant time that would be required for a full and open competition – places the United States closer to ceding its space exploration leadership to our global competitors.

6. FAR 6.104-1(a)(6) – A description of the efforts made to ensure that offers are solicited from as many potential sources as practicable, including whether a notice was or will be publicized as required by Subpart 5.1 and, if not, which exception under 5.101 applies:

The contracting officer has determined in accordance with FAR 5.101(b)(1) that this action is exempt from the notice required in FAR 5.101, because unusual and compelling urgency precludes competition to the maximum extent practicable and the Government would be seriously injured if the agency complies with the publicizing and response time periods specified in FAR 5.101(d).

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7. FAR 6.104-1(a)(7) – A determination by the contracting officer that the anticipated cost to the Government will be fair and reasonable:

The contracting officer’s signature on this document indicates that the Contracting Officer has determined that the anticipated cost to the government will be fair and reasonable. The Contractor must be required to submit a proposal to be evaluated and negotiated by the Government. Prior to execution of the contractual instrument, a proposal analysis will be performed. The proposal analysis will ensure that the final agreed-to price for the contract action is fair and reasonable.

8. FAR 6.104-1(a)(8) – Description of the market research conducted, and the results, or a statement of the reasons market research was not conducted (e.g., urgent, and compelling requirement):

Based on the unusual and compelling urgency of NASA’s requirement and the authority of FAR 6.103-2(b), additional market research was not conducted. A Request for Information (RFI) was issued on the Government Point of Entry (GPE) website (Sam.gov) on July 6, 2022, with a response due date of July 21, 2022. Two responses were received from (1) Space Vector LLC and (2) Southwest Research Institute (SwRI). Market Research for similar equipment and capabilities, conducted in 2026, indicates that the marketplace has shown little growth in this area since the cited RFI.

Through the use of previous competitive activities, including the already established market research, and consultation with knowledgeable individuals in Government relative to aerospace activities, the contracting officer has determined Space Vector LLC is the only source capable of performing this requirement in the required timeframe.

9. FAR 6.104-1(a)(9) – Any other facts supporting the use of other than full and open competition:

This action aligns with the Executive Order 14369, Ensuring American Space Superiority, directive to return humans to the lunar surface no later than 2028. It also supports national priorities to ensure American leadership in space exploration by returning humans to the lunar surface before our international competitors.

10. FAR 6.104-1(a)(10) – A listing of the sources, if any, that expressed an interest in writing in the acquisition:

Based on the unusual and compelling urgency of NASA’s requirement and the resulting use of NASA’s authority under 10 U.S.C. 3204(a)(2), the Agency did not conduct public Requests for Information and thus received no responses. NASA also did not receive any unsolicited proposals to support a different approach to the Agency’s requirements.

11. FAR 6.104-1(a)(11) – A statement of actions, if any, the agency may take to remove or

Rev: 06/2026 6 overcome any barriers to competition before any subsequent acquisition for the supplies or services required:

NASA’s future approach to acquisitions related to human space exploration is intended to establish a robust, competitive space economy. NASA has engaged in a parallel developmental contract structure in part to ensure completion of future Artemis missions and to support a sustained contractor base for future competitive lunar transportation requirements.

The Agency will continue to examine the market in the future for alternative solutions or new sources before executing any subsequent acquisitions for the same requirements.